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 The purpose of this thesis is to analyze tying practice through the lens of Turkish 
competition law and its implementation. In this context, we identified that the Turkish Competition 
Act (the Act) states that tying practice can violate competition law if it is conducted by a dominant 
firm and if it is found to be abusive, without defining an abuse. We also determined that the Turkish 
Competition Board decisions do not provide a systematic framework to determine the abusive 
character of tying and do not clarify the concerned competitive harm in tying cases. We recognized 
that the Board has followed an approach that stipulates tying practice can only be anticompetitive 
if it is exclusionary.  
 To understand the validity of the current legal approach to tying practice, we raised two 
questions: what is exploitative tying and should tying be exclusionary to be deemed 
anticompetitive? The first two chapters set out the Turkish competition policy objectives and 
approach to exploitative abuse under Turkish competition law. The third chapter suggests that the 
exploitative tying practice is the conduct that restrains consumer freedom of choice. The fourth 
chapter addresses the second question, recognizing that theoretical conditions for the exploitative 
effect (consumer surplus extraction) of tying are unlikely to occur in the real world, where restraint 
in consumer choice is applicable in all concrete cases. The fifth chapter determines the minimum 
legal conditions for the anticompetitive effects of tying, and concludes that aftermarket tying 
practice need not be exclusionary to be deemed exploitative, thus anticompetitive. In other tying 
practices, tying should at least affect the tied percentage of total market sales of the tied product 
to restrain consumer choice to be deemed exploitative.  
 Overall, our thesis concludes that the current approach to tying practice is not accurate due 
to its emphasis on exclusionary abuse. To determine the inclusive anticompetitive harm, it should 






 Free market economy suggests that the states are obligated to provide a 
competit ive environment in which all  market actors have “freedom of choice”. In  
this system, instead of intervening directly with the economy, the state intervenes 
with legal and admin istrative regulations called “competit ion law” 1.  Competit ion 
policy refers to the entire  set of means of  state intervention in the market 
structure, while competit ion law refers to the set of rules designed to prevent the 
distortion of competit ion by under takings in order to protect and develop 
competit ion in the market 2.   
 The tying arrangement of undertakings is one of the practices that has been 
addressed by competit ion authorit ies, and it  can be defined as a stipulation by a 
party who sells a product (tying product)  on the condition that the buyer also 
purchases a different (or t ied) product, or at  least agrees to not purchase that 
product from another supplier3.  Tying practice is common and can contribute to 
economic growth. However, choice restraint is inherent in this practice. 
Therefore, competit ion authorit ies have been tasked with separating the good from 
the bad. 
 Under Turkish competition law, tying practices can be subject to antitrust 
inquiry if they are conducted by dominant firms and are found to be abusive 
pursuant to Article 6 of the Turkish Competit ion Act No. 4054 (TCA). However,  
the objective of Article 6 of the TCA is not placed and when tying practice should 
be found abusive under Article 6 of the TCA is not determined in the Act i tself.  
This lack of clarity creates uncertainty for firms and requires questioning of 
legitimate application.  
                                                             
1 ATEŞ, Mustafa, Rekabet Hukukuna Giris [Introduction to Competition Law], Adalet Yayinevi, Ankara 2013, p.31. 
2 Republic of Turkey Prime Ministery State Planning Organization (SPO), The Ninth Development Plan (2007-2013), 
Competition Law and Policies,  Specialization Commission Report: 676, SPO Publication No 2723, Ankara 2007, p. 
3. 
3 Northern Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958), at 5, 6. 
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  This shortcoming could be overcome by Turkish Competit ion Board 
(Board) by establishing a systematic framework for the necessary legal conditions 
for tying antitrust analysis. However, the Board ’s  approach does not provide this. 
We detect that the underlying reason behind this  is the Board’s  failure to 
determine a comprehensive theory of anticompetit ive harm in tying ca ses. 
Therefore, with this thesis, we attempted to specify an overarching theory of  harm 
that tying can cause to competition in order to establish minimum necessary legal 
conditions for tying antitrust analysis.  
 At this point, i t  is worth mentioning that one of the factors that undermine 
the Board examination of tying cases is i ts underestimation of the exploitative 
effect of tying. The Board recognized that exploitative tying practice can raise 
antitrust concerns but,  without any justification, it  disregarded the question of 
whether tying can be exploitative and has consistently reiterated that the tying 
practice can only be anticompetitive if i t  is exclusionary. Likewise, Turkish 
li terature only mentions the possible exploitative aspect of tying, but i t  does not 
suggest a framework for treatment of exploitative tying practice under Turkish 
competit ion law. Instead, i t  focuses on exclusionary tying.  
 Therefore, we aim to examine the validity of the current legal approach to 
the tying practice, or whether it  cannot be exploitative unless i t  is exclusionary.  
Our purpose is  to understand the circumstances in which pure exploitative tying 
practice can and should raise antitrust concerns, the possible merits for 
competit ion authorit ies ignor ing pure exploitative effects, and whether this 
approach can be considered consistent with Turkish competition policy.  
 The first  chapter will  provide insight into Turkish competit ion law and 
policy by examining the motivation and purposes of the adoption of the Turkish 
Competit ion Act. The same chapter also analyzes possible competit ion law and 
policy goals. It  demonstrates that promoting consumer welfare and efficiency 
were the main objectives of Turkish competit ion policy. However, “consumer 
welfare” is a vague term, and efficiencies are varied. Therefore, it questions 
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which aspects of these concept s should and can be implemented in  Turkish 
competit ion policy and law, and which we should consider while identifying the 
factors to determine the anticompetit ive  harm resulting from tying cases.  
 The second chapter focuses on unilaterally imposed tying conduct, the most 
common form practiced. It  explains relevant concepts of unilaterally imposed 
exploitative tying and examines legal frameworks for assessing tying practice 
under different competit ion laws in order  to recognize the antitrust concerns 
addressed in tying cases. The chapter  also discusses the appropriate  approach to 
determining why and when exploitative practice may require intervention by 
competit ion authorit ies, and whether tying practice can raise these concerns and, 
if so, to what extent. 
 The third chapter deals with the components of the tying arrangement,  i .e. , 
separate product requirement, market definition and determination of dominant 
position, and abuse. They are the legal conditions for the assessment of tying 
practice under competit ion law. It  detects possible difficulties and alternatives 
for the necessary determinations and indicates specific issues for the tying cases 
to be considered in antitrust analysis.  
 The purpose of the fourth Chapter is to examine the competit ive effect of 
tying practice, to conclude whether the common understanding –  including the 
Turkish perspective –  that tying conduct is exploitative only where i t  is 
exclusionary has merits. To reach a conclusion , we will analyze whether 
theoretical conditions to establish the exploitative effect of tying is  applicable in 
concrete cases. We will also verify whether our suggested theory of harm 
(restraining freedom of consumer choice) is applicable to concrete cases.  
 In the fifth chapter , we attempt to provide minimum legal conditions to 
determine the anticompetit ive effects of tying. Lastly,  the fifth chapter suggests 
possible remedies for violation of Article 6 of the TCA, and proposes possible 




UNDERSTANDING OF TURKISH COMPETITION LAW  
 This chapter introduces the purposes of the adoption of the Turkish Competition Act and 
asserts that the Turkish Competition Authority embraces an objective that aims to increase 
consumer welfare through increased efficiency via competition protection. However, this chapter 
demonstrates the lack of consensus on the definition of consumer welfare, and efficiencies are 
varied. In this context, it also indicates that increasing consumer welfare and promoting efficiency 
might not occur concurrently, thus it might be necessary to accept a trade-off between these two 
objectives, as well as between different types of efficiency. Thus, this chapter discusses which 
aspects of these concepts should be considered relevant for determining the anticompetitive harm. 
1. TURKISH COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY  
1.1. Overview of Turkish Competition Policy and Adoption of Turkish 
Competition Law  
Competit ion refers to rivalry or a race between at least two people who fight for  
a particular purpose4.  Competition in the economic sense may be  defined as the 
race between the firms in the market that struggle for economic purposes , such as 
acquiring more customers, thereby increasing their sales of goods and services 
and, consequently, their profits 5.   
 In the legal sense, competit ion is defined  as “the contest between 
undertakings in markets for goods and services, which enables them to take 
economic decisions freely” 6.  Although this definition refers to rivalry, the concept 
of competit ion refers to the market structure. This market structure fo resees an 
                                                             
4 http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/competition. 
5 http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/competition.html. See AKINCI, ateş, Rekabetin Yatay Kısıtlanması 
[Horizontal Restrain in Competition], Rekabet Kurumu yayını, Ankara, p. 3-6; SANLI, K. Cem, Rekabetin korunması 
Hakkındaki Kanunda Öngörülen Yasaklayıcı hükümler ve Bu Hükmlere aykırı Sözleşme ve Teşebbüs Birliği 
Kararlarının Geçersizliği [Prohibition Proscribed by the Law on the Protection of Competition and the Invalidity of 
the Decisions and Practices of Associations of Undertakings], Rekabet Kurumu Yayını, Ankara 2000, p. 3-5. 




economic system that operates according to i ts own dynamics, emerging without 
any interference to the market conditions of supply and demand, which is a free 
market economy that places competition at the center. It  is believed that this 
system protects the independence of the decisions of market actors and their 
actions in the pursuit  of their own interests . It  is in fact the way to distribute and 
use the scarce resources of society in the most efficient way  and to provide goods 
and services to consumers at  the lowest price and highest  quality7.  
 Therefore, the expected benefits from the market economy system can only 
be realized by creating and protecting the competit ive environment in the markets. 
Thus, competition policy is a means used by the state to compete and to form a 
well-functioning market economy.  
 1.1.1. Constitutional framework of economic order and substructure of  
free market economy  
 It  is known that the social and  economic structure also orient  polit ical and 
legal insti tutions. Thus, the constitutions that determine the polit ical and legal 
fundamental order of a society also guarantee economic rights and freedoms as 
well  as other fundamental rights and freedoms. Consequently,  the economic 
predictabili ty, which is essential  for peopl e who face economic activities, can be 
guided by the constitutions. Therefore, it  is necessary to assess the economic 
structure predicted by the constitutions and the scope and consequences of the 
constitutional arrangements that are relevant to the econom ic field.  
 Since competit ion is central to free market economy, we should first  
examine the Turkish Constitution8 and whether  i t  envisages an economic order. 
We should also investigate whether intervention in economic life is necessary; if 
i t  is necessary, what purpose and means of intervention are suitable? Furthermore, 
                                                             
7 See General Preamble of the Act (The Act on the Protection of Competition No. 4054). 
8 The Constitution was adopted by the Constituent Assembly on October 18, 1982 to be submitted to referendum and 
published in the Official Gazette dated October 20, 1982 and numbered 17844; republished in the repeating Official 
Gazette dated November 9, 1982 and numbered 17863 in the aftermath of its submission to referendum on November 
7, 1982 (Act No. 2709). (hereinafter the 1982 Constitution or the Constitution). 
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i t  can also be questioned whether the 1982 Constitution 9 imposes any economic 
policy model on polit ical power.    
 In the 1982 Constitution, there is no clear principle established by the S tate 
regarding the grounds of existence and functioning of the economy. The 1982 
Constitution regulated the “Financial and Economic Provisions”  separately.  
However, to determine the economic order envisaged by the Constitution, i t  is not 
sufficient to examine only the provisions of this section. They should be assessed 
along with the principles that set  economic policy and general principles.  
 The social state embraced by the 1982 Constitution is a fundamental 
element that shapes the economic order and restraining economic policy. In  
Article 2 of the “Characteristic of the Republic” of the 1982 Constitution, i t  is 
stated that the Republic of Turkey is “… a democratic, secular and social state 
governed by rule of law […] based on the fundamental tenets set forth in the 
preamble”. The preamble to the Constitution states that “[e]ach Turkish cit izen 
will  benefit  from basic rights and freedoms in this Constitution in terms of  
equality and social justice” 10.  
 The function of the state, which is an extension of the understanding of the 
social state, is mentioned in Article 5. According to this article, the main aims 
and tasks of the State are “to ensure the welfare, peace, and happiness of the 
individual and society; to strive for  the removal of polit ical,  economic, and social 
obstacles which restrict  the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual in 
a manner incompatible with the principles of justice and of the social state 
governed by rule of law; and to provide the conditions required for the 
development of the individual’s material  and spiritual existence”.  
                                                             
9 It has adopted by the 1961 Constitution (Article 2). 
10 In the 1982 Constitution, the Article 176 states that " The preamble, which states the basic views and principles the 
Constitution is based on, shall form an integral part of the Constitution”. Therefore, validity of any legal norm depends 
on the Constitutional Court’s interpretation of the principles which contained in the preamble.  
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 According to the Constitutional Court, a “[s]ocial state [is] governed by 
rule of law, respects human rights and freedoms, establishes a balan ce between 
person and society, realizes peace and prosperity of the individual, establishes 
balance between labor and capital  relations, endures private enterprise to exercise 
in security and determination, commits to the protection of the workers and the 
fair distribution of the national income by taking social ,  economic and financial 
precautions, takes measures for the prevent unemployment and development of 
the working life in a stable way , and founds a just  legal system and assuming 
responsibili ty for sustaining this, and constitutes a state that exercises a liberty 
regime”11.  
 The 1982 Constitution regulates the right to property (which is also an 
economic right) as an individual right (Article 35).  Social and economic rights 
and duties have a broad scope in the 1982 Constitution (Articles 41-65). It  states 
that everyone has the freedom to work and conclude contracts, to establish private 
enterprises, and the state will  take measures to ensure that private enterprises 
operate in accordance with the national economic requirements and social 
objectives (Article 48). Expropriation (Article 46) , nationalization, and 
privatization (Article 47) are also regulated by the Constitution.  
 The 1982 Constitution envisages a  planned development principle 12 under 
the financial and economic provisions in the Article 166:  
Planning the economic, social , and cultural development, in 
particular the rapid, balanced , and harmonious development of 
industry and agriculture throughout the country and the efficient use 
                                                             
11 The Constitutional Court decision, dated 18.2.1985, E. 1984/9, K. 1985/4 [1 ANAYASA MAHKEMESİ 
KARARLARİ DERGİSİ (AMKD) 21, p. 59]. 
12 After unplanned and unsustainable growth during the 1950s and 1960s, there is a general acceptance that Turkish 
economy should be planned. This idea entered the 1961 Turkish Constitution and it stipulated the preparation of 
Development Plans to carry out economic, social and cultural development in a democratic way. For this purpose, the 
State Planning Organization affiliated to the Prime Ministry was established on September 30, 1960. It has been aimed 
that the economy and the private sector would run in the form of a mixed economic system, in a way that complement 
each other. The main goal of all development plans is to reach the specified growth rates of gross national product 
(GNP) and to grow the income at a high and stable rate. 
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of national resources by taking inventory of and evaluating them, and 
the establishment of the necessary organization 13 for this purpose are 
the duties of the State.  
Measures to increase national savings and production, to ensure 
stability in prices and balance in exte rnal payments, to promote 
investment and employment shall  be included in the plan; in 
investments, public interests and necessities shall  be taken into 
account and the efficient use of resources shall be. Development 
activities shall  be realized according to this plan”.  
It  should be noted that there is a difference between the planning envisaged 
in the 1961 Constitution and the nature of the planning foreseen in the 1982 
Constitution. The former contains the provision of Articles 41 and 129 regarding 
planning. In these provisions, planning is organized according to economic and 
social l ife, justice, and full employment principle , and aims to ensure human 
dignity for all .  Such an arrangement is not included in the 1982 Constitution. 
While the social state is pivotal  in the planning of the 1961 Constitution, the 1982 
Constitution aims to ensure  growth and economic development, especially in the 
second paragraph of Article 166, within the framework of a free market 
economy14.  
Furthermore, the 1982 Constitution imposes the duty of  “Supervision of the 
Markets” to the State, by including a  provision that was absent in the 1961 
Constitution. According to the fi rst  paragraph of Article 167, “[t]he State shall  
take measures to ensure and promote the sound and orderly functioning of the 
markets for money, credit ,  capital ,  goods and services; and shall  prevent the 
                                                             
13 Article 166 states that planning is to be carried out, but it does not indicate which organization to carry out this 
planning. The State Planning Organization (SPO) was abolished from the enforcement in 2011 by Statutory Decree 
No. 641 (The Statutory Decree on the Organization and Duties of the Ministry of Development, published in the 
Official Gazette dated 08.06.2011 and numbered 27958). Within same Statutory Decree, the Ministry of Development 
established and it is stated that the Ministry of Development will fulfills the planning task instead of SPO (Article 43). 
14 KORUCU, Serdar, 1982 Anayasasina Göre Ekonomik Düzenin Anayasal Çerçevesi [Constitutional Framework of 
Economic Order According to 1982 Constitution], Ankara Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enst itüsü, Yüksek Lisans 
Tezi, Ankara 2005, p. 212. 
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formation of monopolies and cartels in the markets, emer ged in practice or by 
agreement” .  Therefore, the State is not only the provider of a sound and orderly 
functioning market, but also has the duty to take measures to improve  functioning 
of the markets. Because of the adoption of this new provision, i t  has been 
suggested that the deterministic effect of the social state principle in the economic 
order foreseen by the 1982 Constitution is less than that of the 1961 
Constitution15.  
 The second paragraph of Article 167 states : “ In order to regulate foreign 
trade for the benefit  of the economy of the country, the Council  of Ministers may 
be empowered by law to introduce additional financial impositions on imports, 
exports and other foreign trade transactions, except taxes and similar impositions, 
or to l ift  them”.  
 Exploration and exploitation of natural resources (Article 168), Forests and 
the forest vil lagers (Articles 169-170), Developing cooperatives (Article 171), 
Protection of consumers (Article 172 ), and Protection of craftsmen and artisans 
(Article 173) are also regulated by economic provisions.  
 According to Article 172 of the 1982 Constitution, “[t]he State shall take 
measures to protect and inform consumers; shall encourage their init iatives to 
protect themselves”. In the grounds of the same article further is stated that: 
 [T]he protection of consumers is a social problem and the precautions to 
be taken in this regard should protect consumers on the one side, but at the same 
time these measures should be able to encourage the competition between 
producers and sellers. The protection of the consumer is a measure of a free 
market economy… Consumer protection is possible, f irst ,  by creating ‘consumer 
consciousness’ in consumers. Protection of consumer, in terms of  price and 
                                                             
15 KORUCU, p. 212. 
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quality, can be assured by ensuring free competit ion condi tions, prevention of 
monopolies and cartels .   
 As demonstrated in the article, the idea of consumer protection is based on 
competit ion law and is possible only in the presence of free market economics.  
 In fact , in a decision taken by the Constitutional C ourt, attention was drawn 
to the close relation between Articles 167 and 172 of  the Constitution . 
Furthermore, the duty of the State to prevent monopolization and cartelization is 
to protect consumers and this duty, imposed on the State by Article 172, is secured 
only by free competit ion conditions through preventing monopolization and 
cartelization16.    
 The 1982 Constitution aims to establish the legal substructure of a sound 
market economy, and it  also expects the social state to prevent “unfair” situ ations 
that may arise from the operation of the market economy.  To prevent “unfair” 
situations, i t  can be considered that economic processes may have the function of 
“reducing social inequalit ies”. Regarding the function of “reducing social 
inequalit ies”, the social state represents an interventionist  state 17.  When 
examining the provisions of the extension of the understanding of the social state, 
i t  is clear that the 1982 Constitution has many provisions to authorize the State 
to intervene in the economy in  order to realize the “social” aims.  
 Therefore ,  the concept of “social market economy” has been used as a 
pragmatic approach that reconciles market economy and social state requirements. 
In this approach, the social market economy is  regarded as a model t o provide  
                                                             
16 The Constitutional Court decision, dated 09.12.1994, E.1994/43, K.1994/42-2 (1 AMKD 31, p. 295, 296). 
17 See TAN, Turgut. “Anayasal Ekonomik Düzen” [Constitutional Economic Order], Anayasa Yargısı, Cilt 7 (1997), 
p. 166, available at http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/files/pdf/anayasa_yargisi/anyarg7/tan.pdf (last visited 24.07.2017); 
Korucu, p. 246. 
19 
 
social state requirements by pointing out the necessity of  taking some measures 
and regulating the state to solve the problems in the economic system 18.  
 The social market economy is based on the principle that the market 
economy should maintain the institutions and rules that can produce the desired 
results, but i t  assumes that the market economy has some shortcomings. Thus, i t  
tasks the state with minimizing these inadequacies. Nonetheless, while the social 
state interventionist  from an economic perspective, i t  does not mean that this 
intervention is an economic order in which all  decisions are taken by a  centralized 
mechanism instead of a market economy 19.  Therefore, adoption of social state 
principles is not an obstacle to free market economy.  
 The main problem of state intervention in economic life is essentially 
concerned with the state theories. In terms of state -economy relations, economists 
have foreseen three state models, whic h are generally referred to as “ l iberal 
state”, “social state” or “welfare state” and “neoliberal state”  respectively20.  
However, beyond these theories of economic -constitutional relations, when we 
examine implementation, the generally accepted atti tude and approach in the 
current democratic liberal constitutions is that the “economic neutrali ty of the 
constitution” is considered a precondition of pluralist  democracy 21.   
 The Constitutional Court has stated that the 1982 Constitution adopts a 
democratic regime and there is no obstacle to the pursuit  of an interventioni st or 
l iberal policy in the economics field22.  In a sense, the Constitution can follow a 
                                                             
18 TAN, p. 166; KORUCU, p. 247; AKTAN, Can Coşkun, “Ekonomik Düzen Teorisi, Ekonomik Anayasa Hukuku 
Ve Sosyal Piyasa Ekonomisi [Theory of Economic Order, Economic Constitution and Social Market Economy]”, 
available at http://www.canaktan.org/felsefe-sosyo/ordo-liberalizm/sosyal-piyasa.htm (last visited 24.07.2017). 
19 TAN, p. 166. 
20 YÜZBAŞIOĞLU, Necmi, Anayasa ve Ekonomi [Constitution and Economy], Galatasaray Üniversitesi Hukuk 
Fakültesi Dergisi, 2009/1, p. 13-15, available at 
http://dosya.gsu.edu.tr/Docs/HukukFakultesi/TR/FakulteDergisi/fakulte-dergisi-2009-1-hukuk-fakultesi.pdf (last 
visited 24.07.2017). 
21 YÜZBAŞIOĞLU, p. 15. 
22 The Constitutional Court decision, dated 18.02.1985, E. 1984/9, K. 1985/4 (1 AMKD 21, p. 59). 
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mixed economic policy in preference to a l iberal economic policy23,  and Articles 
5, 35, 48, and 167 are available to pursue under a mixed economic system24.  
 The decisions of the Constitutional Court and the doctrinal studies concur 
that the 1982 Constitution does not foresee any model of economic policy and 
does not impose any kind of economic policy that political powers should 
implement25.  Therefore, it  reflects the economic neutrali ty of the constitution26.  
The nature of the economic policies to be implemented is left  to the preferences 
of political power. According to the 1982 Constitution, polit ical powers can apply 
their own economic policies, provided they remain with in the frame drawn by the 
Constitutional provisions 27.  
 The freedom of movement granted to polit ical powers in this respect is 
entrenched through Article 65 of the Constitution. Within the provision, the State 
is allowed to act in accordance with the “prior i ties appropriate with the aims of 
these duties” and to act with “the capacity of the financial resources”. This 
provision has been crit icized as i t  can provide a basis for selecting loose policies 
relating to social rights 28.  However,  The Constitutional Court adjudged that the 
provision of Article 65 does not relieve the state of i ts social and economic duties 
and it  does not undermine the meaning and intention of social rights29.  
 In summary, the Turkish Constitution establ ishes a social state in Articles 
2, 5, and the resulting social and economic responsibili t ies of the State. However, 
this character is not an obstacle to opt ing for a  free market economy. Articles 35, 
48, 166, and 167 are suitable  provisions to form the substructure for this. Whether 
i t  is called a social market economy due to emphasi s on the social state character, 
                                                             
23 The Constitutional Court decision, dated 27.09.1985, E. 1985/2, K. 1985/16 (1 AMKD 21, p. 222). 
24 The Constitutional Court decision, dated 5.5.1987, E. 1986/1, K. 1987/10 (1 AMKD 23, p.196). 
25 TAN, p. 165, 166; GÖZLER, Kemal, Türk Anayasa Hukuku [Turkish Constitutional Law], Ekin Kitabevi Yayınları, 
Bursa 2000, s.154-168 (www.anayasa.gen.tr/sosyaldevlet.htm); KORUCU, p. 248. 
26 TAN, 165, 166; GÖZLER, p. 154-168; KORUCU, p. 240, 241; YÜZBASIOGLU, p. 15, 16. 
27 Therefore, it has been stated that in liberal democratic constitutional regimes, “conditional economic neutrality” is 
valid. See YÜZBASIOGLU, p.15 
28 AZRAK, Ülkü, “Sosyal Devlet ve 1961 Anayasasının Sistemi [Social State and 1961 Constitution System]”, 27 
ISTANBUL ÜNİVERSİTESİ HUKUK FAKÜLTESİ MECMUASİ 1-4 (1962), p. 222. 
29 See the Constitutional Court decision, dated 21.10.1963, E.1963/172, K.1963/244 (1 AMKD 1, s.439-455). 
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or by omitting the adjective “free” in front of i t ,  social market economy is not a 
new economic order or different from a market economy30.  The implementation of 
the political power (since 2002 under the same government) is clear that Turk ish 
economic system is a market economy given its basic structure and components 31.  
 However, the lack of similar provision to Articles 41 and 129 in the 1961 
Constitution (which envisages a connection between social state principle s and 
planned development ) in the 1982 Constitution cannot be interpreted to mean that 
the State ’s duty to strengthen the market economy is merely enhancing economic 
growth (or increasing production and efficiency). Enhancing economic growth 
should be concurrent to augmenting “fairness” (fair distribution of the national 
income).  
 Furthermore, competit ion is central to a  free market economy. The concept 
of competit ion refers a market structure that has two dimensions, i.e. ,  supply 
(producers) and demand (consumers). Th is market structure also requires  that all 
market actors are able to make decisions independently. Therefore, the duty of  
State is, on the one hand , to take measures to increase production (Art. 166) by 
ensuring freedom of enterprise (Art. 48)  while, on the other hand, adopting 
measures that protect and inform consumers (Art. 172), thus ensuring “consumer 
consciousness”.  
 Hence, under the 1982 Constitution, the proper synthesis of social market 
economy and free market economy suggests that the State is obligated to provide 
a competit ive environment in which all market actors have “freedom of choice” 
that enhances economic growth by reallocating resources in the most efficient 
way. However, enhancement of economic growth is not an end in i tself.  The State 
                                                             
30 See AKTAN. 
31See Eight Five-Year Development Plan (2001-2005), Ninth Development Plan (2007-2013), Tenth Development 
Plan (2014-2018). The Development Plans are available at ttp://www.kalkinma.gov.tr/Pages/KalkinmaPlanlari.aspx. 
(last visited 12.08.2017). 
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must ensure that each Turkish cit izen  receives an equal and fair share from this 
economic growth.  
 1.1.2. Adoption of competition law 
 In Turkey, since the early 1980s, reforms have been put into place to ensure 
that the market economy is fully alive. However, the enforcement of rules to 
protect market competit ion did not  take place in the mid-1990s, despite the 
availabili ty of various preparations and drafts.  
 The primary legal basis of the Turkish competit ion policy is Article 167 of 
the 1982 Constitution. The provision stipulates that “[t]he state shall take 
measures to ensure and promote the sound, orderly functioning of the money,  
credit ,  capital ,  goods and services markets;  and shall  prevent the formation, in 
practice or by agreement, of monopolies and cartels in the markets”. Therefore, 
the main factor in drafting the Act on the Protection of Competit ion No. 4054 was 
the need to fulfil l  this obligation in the provision.  
 The first  act aimed at protecting competit ion in Turkey was a symposium 
in 1971, spearheaded by the Ministry of Commerce, which mainly addressed 
consumer protection. Following this symposium, a study  by the Ministry of  
Commerce resulted in the “Draft  Law on the Regulation of Activities Related to 
Commercial Goods and Services for the P rotection of Consumers”. This draft law 
mainly included provisions on consumer protection and regulation of the intern al 
market.  
 The second draft  prepared by the Ministry of Commerce on the subject was 
the “Draft  Law on the Regulation of Trade and Protection of Consumers” dated 
1975. This draft  law included the first  provisions introducing regulation on 
competit ion law in Turkey. Another draft  law prepared by the Ministry in 1980 
was ti t led “Draft  Law on the Protection of Honesty in Commerce”.  
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 “Draft  Law on the Regulation of Commercial Activities and Protection of 
Consumers”, prepared in 1981 by the Ministry of Commerce ,  essentially includes 
provisions in parallel  to those in the previous draft ,  despite the differ ent t i tle. 
Two versions of the “Draft  Law on Consumer Protection”  dated October 1983 and 
March 1984, addressed  regulations related to cartels and monopolies in separate 
sections for the first  t ime.  
 In the environment created by the new economic model adopted in Turkey 
in the 1980s, in addition to the explic it  duty placed on the State by Article 167 of  
the 1982 Constitution to prevent monopolization and cartel  fo rmation in the 
markets, the Ministry of Industry and Commerce separated problems related to 
competit ion restriction from provisions concerning consumer protection. 
Therefore , the “Draft  Law on Agreements and Practices Restricting Competit ion” 
was created in November 1984, which was the first  independent text on 
competit ion.   
 In addition to Article 167 of the 1982 Constitution, Turkish relations with 
the European Union played an important role in the formation and shaping of  
Turkish competit ion rules. According to the agreement32 signed within the scope 
of relations with the European Union and the decision 33 taken in accordance with 
the protocol34,  Turkey has been under obligation to harmonize its legislation on 
competit ion rules with the Community legislation, and to implement these rules 
in an effective manner.  
 The Turkish Competit ion Act (hereafter TCA) is based primarily on Articles 
81 and 82 of the Treaty of Rome 35.  The studies on competit ion protection started 
                                                             
32 Assosciation Agrement (Ankara Treaty) signed in 1963 for association relationship with the European Economic 
Community (EEC) (Article 16). 
33 Decision No 1/95 of the EC-Turkey Association Council of March 6 1995 that created Customs Union between 
European Union and Turkey, available at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/1-95-sayili-ortaklik-konseyi-karari-gumruk-birligi-
karari.tr.mfa (last visited 12.08.2017) (hereinafter Decision No 1/95). 
34 The Additional Protocol (Article 43), which was adopted in favor of the AnkaraTreaty, and the implementation of 
the necessary measures for the implementation of the competition rules envisaged in the Rome treaty in the context 
of the convergence of the parties' economic policies. 
35 The revised Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) then renumbered as the Articles 101 and 102. 
Hereinafter we will use the new numbering of the TFEU when quating any opion related to old numbering  of the 
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in the 1970s, and could be transfo rmed into a concrete text in 1992 within the 
scope of partnership with the EC. After finally being accepted by the Turkish 
Grand National Assembly (hereafter TGNA) on 7 December 1994, i t  was 
promulgated under the name of “The Act on the Protection of Compe tition No. 
4054 (TCA)”. However, the act was implemented only after the appointment of 
the Competit ion Board (hereafter Board) and the establishment of the Competit ion 
Authority (hereafter Authority) in 1997.  
 The brief history of the adoption of Turkish competit ion law demonstrates 
that drafters have regarded competit ion policy as a part  of consumer protection 
policy, especially in respect to prevention of monopolies and cartels. The later 
drastic changes to this approach should not do away with the necessary connection 
between consumer protection and competit ion policy. This l ink is inherent in 
Article 172 of the 1982 Constitution, and it  is a necessary condition for free 
market economy.  
 1.1.3. Overview of competition policy 
 In market economies, instead of intervening directly in the economy, the 
state intervenes with legal and adm inistrative regulations called “competit ion 
law”36.  Competit ion policy refers to the entire range of state interventions in the 
market structure, while competition law means the set of rules designed to prevent 
competit ion distortion by undertakings so as to protect and develop competit ion 
in general and in the market 37.   
                                                             
Treaty establishing the European Community which are respectively Article 81EC and Article 82EC. We will keep 
the old numbering only if it is on the title of the reference or the document. 
36 ATEŞ, Mustafa, “AB’ye Uyum Bağlamında Türk Rekabet Hukuku ve Politikasına Genel Bir Bakış [An Overview 
of Turkish Competition Law and Policy in the Context of EU Adaptation]”, 9 ANKARA BAROSU FİKRİ 
MÜLKİYET VE REKABET HUKUKU DERGİSİ 1 (2009), p. 59, available at 
http://www.ankarabarosu.org.tr/siteler/ankarabarosu/frmmakale/2009-1/3.pdf (last visited 20.07.2017) [hereinafter 
Ateş (2009)]; ATEŞ, Mustafa, Rekabet Hukukuna Giris [Introduction to Competition Law], Adalet Yayinevi, Ankara 
2013, p.31. 
37 Republic of Turkey Prime Ministery State Planning Organization (SPO), The Ninth Development Plan (2007-2013), 




 Competit ion policy is  important in relation to other pol icies and regulations 
that affect competit ion in general, as well  as guiding competit ion law practice. 
The government has policies that directly affect the markets such as foreign trade, 
state aid, privatization, tax, and foreign investment. In  addition to  this policy, the  
state must reach beyond competition law to address market disruptions resulting 
from the economic characteristics of such markets (such as natural monopolies, 
network externalit ies) or to achieve various public policy purposes (such as 
protection of consumers due to asymmetric information on financial markets). 
There are ongoing regulations and competition is not fully established in these 
markets. For the economic well -being and the interest of the country, i t  is 
necessary to consider competit ion policy in the formation of  such economic 
policies.  
 Competit ion policy, in the narrow sense, and com petit ion law consist  of 
prohibition of agreements, decisions and concerted practices restricting 
competit ion between undertakings as well  as abuse of dominant positions by 
undertakings holding such positions in their markets, control mergers , and 
acquisitions over certain thresholds.  
 At the same time, they are intervention instruments for competition law. In 
addition to the enforcement of competiti on rules, Competit ion Authority uses the 
competit ion advocacy as a means within the scope of competition law 
applications. Competit ion advocacy refers to the initiatives by competit ion 
authorities in relation to establishing and fostering a competit ive env ironment 
mainly through their relations with other public organizations, but also through 
raising public awareness of the benefits of competit ion 38.   
 Several activities have been considered as competition advocacy . These 
include market inquiries, discoursing on legislations currently in force or on draft 
legislations, advising on state interventions that are l ikely to encourage practices 
l iable to restrict  competit ion, organizing seminars or publishing bulletins aim ed 
                                                             
38 Competition Terms Dictionary, Turkish Competition Authority Publication, Fifth  Edition, Ankara 2014, p. 167. 
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at enlightening public opinion directly, using media to enlighten public opinion 
indirectly, to inform the members of the judiciary and the regulatory agencies on 
matters related to competit ion policy, and to take actions on actual or potential 
state interventions that are l ikely to affect competition. Competit ion advocacy is 
an important means, especially in developing countries , for the effectiveness of 
competit ion law and policy39.   
 To work on and study competit ion law and to approach certain issues in this 
field, one must first  ascertain the aims in this field of law and which benefits can 
be expected. The first  Article of the TCA does not mention another ultimate 
purpose beside competit ion protection 40.  
 In the General Preamble of the TCA, the main aim is stated a s “protection 
of competit ion process or free competit ion” or “protection of efficient 
competit ion” and the aims pursued by the competit ion law are the following:  
Protecting the competitive process ensures the allocation of a country's 
sources according to  public demand (1) and contributes to general welfare 
with increasing economic efficiency (2).  Competit ion among actors 
involved in commercial activit ies lead s to a more eff icient production and 
business management, and promotes using fewer sources to lower costs  
(3),  technological innovations and developments  (4). Because of this, i t 
will  be possible to buy products with better quality at lower prices , and 
thus the consumer and social welfare will increase  (5). Beside the 
abovementioned aims, the competit ion system also has secondary aims. 
First ,  a competition system helps to protect smaller undertakings by 
eliminating entry barriers  (6) On the other hand, competit ion system 
                                                             
39 GAL, Michal S., “The Ecology of Antitrust: Preconditions for Competition Law Enforcement in Developing 
Countries”, COMPETITION, COMPETITIVENESS AND DEVELOPMENT, New York University Law and 
Economics Research Paper Series Working Paper No. 02-03, 2004, p. 20-38, available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=665181 (last visited 20.07.2017). 
40 “The purpose of this Act is to prevent agreements, decisions and practices preventing, distorting or restricting 
competition in markets for goods and services, and the abuse of dominance by the undertakings dominant in the 
market, and to ensure the protection of competition by performing the necessary regulations and supervisions to this 
end.” (The TCA Art. 1). 
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contributes to the integrity and honesty of the market  (7) [and] … to 
decreasing inflation.  Another benefit  expected from competit ion l aw is 
strengthening entrepreneurship  (8)41.  
 It  demonstrates that ensuring an effective competit ive process is i tself an 
objective. It  is not clear from the language, though, whether this objective is both 
a goal and a means to achieve other desirable goals such as (1) ensur ing allocative 
efficiency, (2) promot ing general (social) welfare, (3) enhanc ing productive 
efficiency, (4) augmenting dynamic efficiency, (5) promot ing consumer and social 
welfare, (6) protecting of small  and medium-sized enterprises, (7) foster ing 
fairness and equality in the market, (8) fight ing inflation, (9) and encouraging 
entrepreneurship. In other words, the General Preamble of the TCA is not clear 
on whether these “objectives” are expected effects or benefits of the primary goal 
referred to as “protection of competitive process” or  whether i t  refers to more 
than one objective.  
 The Seventh Five -Year Development Plan emphasized the competition 
policies and thei r contributions to efficiency and welfare , and promised to avoid 
market sharing, to keep the market open, and to reduce market uncertainties. The 
Eighth Five-Year Development Plan makes similar long-term promises. The Ninth 
Development Plan (2007-2013) includes a Specialization Commission Report on 
Competit ion Law and Policies (SCR) 42.  The SCR states that the goal of 
competit ion law and policy is not the competit ion itself,  but promoting economic 
efficiency43.  
 SCR crit icized many of  the objectives stated in the General Preamble of the 
TCA, because they may conflict  with each other to ensure economic efficiency,  
which is the main objective of competit ion law enforcement 44.  Therefore, i t  has 
                                                             
41 General Preamble of the Act (numbered references added). 
42 The Ninth Development Plan (2007-2013),Specialization Commission Report on Competition Law and Policies, 
available at  http://www.kalkinma.gov.tr/Pages/OzelIhtisasKomisyonuRaporlari.aspx (last visited 20.07.3017). 
43 SCR, p. 23. 
44 SCR, p. 23. 
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been suggested that the implications of competit ion law should aim to increase 
consumer welfare or total  welfare through promoting economic efficiency 45.  Even 
though the commission has noted that the Competit ion Authority favors consumer 
welfare over total  welfare, i t has warned that “competit ion law enforcement may 
also produce results that sometimes serve other purposes, such as protection of 
consumers or small  and medium-sized enterprises, but these objectives should not 
be decisive for competit ion policy” 46.   
 SCR also stated that the type  of economic efficiency (allocative,  
productive, or dynamic) to be chosen should be determined by the Competit ion 
Board, who may make a more accurate evaluation while  considering the needs of 
the country and the economic and social conditions in practice 47.   
 The international documents regarding Turkish Competition Policy and Law 
mention that “protect [ing] the competitive process” is the goal, and the promotion 
of consumer welfare and efficiency is considered as a possible outcome of 
competit ion law enforcement 48.  However, when the OECD Report was t ranslated 
into Turkish, the Competition Authority added  that “the ultimate goal of the Act 
is to maintain the competit ion process (not just  competition between firms) in 
order to create efficient market and increase consumer welfare”. The Author i ty 
considered this approach  as consistent, not only with Art. 167 of the 1982 
                                                             
45 SCR, p. 24. 
46 SCR, p. 24. 
47 SCR, p. 24. 
48 See The International Competition Network (ICN), “Competition Enforcement and Consumer Welfare- Setting the 
Agenda”, 10th Annual Conference 2011, p. 13, 20, 45, available at 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc857.pdf (last visited 14.02.2017) [hereinafter 
ICN (Consumer Welfare)]. ICN, “Report on the Objectives of Unilateral Conduct Laws, Assessment of 
Dominance/Substantial Market Power, and State-Created Monopolies”, 6th Annual Conference 2007, p. 79, available 
at http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc353.pdf (last visited 14.02.2017) [hereinafter 
ICN (Unilateral Conduct)]. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Reviews of 
Regulatory Reform, “Regulatory Reform in Turkey”, 2002, p. 8, available at 
https://www.oecd.org/turkey/1840741.pdf (hereinafter OECD Report).  
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Constitution, but also with Art .  172, which requires the State to “take measures 
to protect and inform consumers”49.  
 In the TCA, consumer welfare and efficiency objectives can b e found in 
Article 5, which regulates exemption for agreements, concerted practices and 
decisions limiting competition (Art. 4). Article 5 sets cumulative conditions that 
make a practice that infringes Art . 4 exempt from the prohibition. Restrictive 
practice that contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or  
to promoting technical or economic process and  benefit t ing consumers 50 are two 
of these conditions.  
 The Guidelines on the Application of Articles 4 and 5 of the Act No 4054 
on the Protection of Competit ion to Technology Transfer Agreements 51 also state 
that  promoting consumer welfare, efficient allocation of resources , and promoting 
innovation are competition law objectives. 
 We regard the SCR’s suggestion that efficiency  as an overarching goal of 
competit ion policy as unfortunate. Furthermore, the statement that “protection of 
consumer or small  and medium-sized enterprises objective should not be decisive 
for competit ion policy” 52 contradicts Articles 172, 5, and 48 of the 1982 
Constitution. In fact ,  the policy statement of the Competit ion Authority grants 
equal importance to efficiency and consumer welfare, as well  as emphasizing the 
interaction between consumer protection policy and competit ion policy.   
                                                             
49 OECD Report in Turkish, 2005, p. 12, available at http://www.rekabet.gov.tr/tr-TR/Sayfalar/OECD-Ile-Iliskiler 
(last visited 20.07.2017). 
50 Article 101(3) TFEU has similiar regulation, but there it is stated as “allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting 
benefit”. “Fair share” concept is not included in Article 5 of TCA, but in the grounds of the article stated that “[i]n 
case these positive effects are not reflected on the consumer and stay as firm profits, the exemption will not be 
implemented. The fact that the consumer receives a just share of the benefit created also reveals the social side of the 
competition law”. 
51 No: 09-22/ 486, dated 5.13.2009 [hereinafter the Guidelines (Technology Transfer Agreements)]. 
52 SCR, p. 24. 
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 1.2. Difference between Turkish Competition Law and Turkish 
Consumer Protection Law  
 In recent years , the application of competit ion law emphasizes consumer 
welfare. Therefore, i t  requires a closer examination of the relationship between 
consumer protection and competit ion policies.  
 Consumer welfare as a focus of competit ion law has existed in US practice 
and is stated as an objective with the reform efforts of the European Union in the 
competit ion law regimes53.  
 In Turkish competition law, as a reflection of the reform efforts in the 
European Union, an increasing number of references are made to consumer 
welfare in secondary legislation and in Board decisions. In this context, the 
definition of the relationship between the two policies, the concept of consumer 
welfare in terms of both policies, and the extent to which competit ion policy can 
serve to increase consumer welfare is being debated.  
 In general, the relationship between these two policies is explained by the 
interaction of supply and demand, which plays a  decisive role in efficient market  
operation, i .e. ,  the functioning of an effective market is shaped by consumer 
preferences (demand side) and firm behavior (supply side) 54.  Competit ion rules 
                                                             
53 Starting late 1990s the early 2000s, the European Commission has been modernising its approach to EU Competition 
rules with a more economic approach that embraces a consumer welfare standard as its objective. See White paper on 
Modernisation of the Rules Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty, 
http://europa.eu/documents/comm/white_papers/pdf/com99_101_en.pdf; Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 on the 
implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty”, 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/competition/fi rms/l26092_en.htm; DG Competition Discussion Paper on the 
Application of the Treaty to Exclusionary Abuses, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/art82/discpaper2005.pdf; 
Guidelines on the Application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty (2004), 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/competition/fi rms/l26114_en.htm;  Guidance on the Commission’s 
Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant 
Undertakings (2008), http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/art82/contributions.html [hereinafter Guidance 
(2009)]. See also speeach of Mario MONTI, “Competition for Consumer’s Benefits”, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2004_016_en.pdf; and Philip Lowe, “Preserving and Promoting 
Competition: A European Response”, http://eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2006_018_en.pdf (last visited 
16.07.2017). 
54 TOPALÖMER, Serap, Tüketici Refahinin Arttirilmasinda İki Farkli Araç: Tüketici Politikasi Ve Rekabet Politikasi 
[Two Different Tools in Increasing Consumer Welfare: Consumer Policy and Competition Policy], Rekabet Kurumu 
Uzmanlik Tezleri Serisi No: 138, Ankara 2015, p. 1,2. 
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serve to preserve and enhance the competit ive environment, thus e nhancing the 
supply direction of the market by providing quality and diversity in the goods and 
services market. Consumer protection rules have been introduced to protect 
consumers from unfair commercial practices, unfair contract conditions, 
information asymmetries, and problems caused by cognitive bias within the scope 
of protection of consumers’ economic interests ,  and they strengthen the demand 
side of the market55.  The disruptions that may arise on one side of this two -way 
relationship may prevent the formation of a sound competit ion environment. Thus, 
the convergence between the two policies is gaining more importance in the 
presence of market failures that require the combination of supply - and demand-
side approaches56.  
 Consumer protection policy cons ists of regulations and practices related to 
informing, educating, and protecting consumers in general, while competit ion 
policy refers to the protection and development of the competit ive process. In  
Turkish law, both policies have a constitutional legal basis (the 1982 Constitution 
Articles 167 and 172) and the intentions of consumer protection and competit ion 
are considered to be closely related to each other.  
 The main approach shaping the consumer protection policy is  that 
consumers are weak in terms of bargaining power and knowledge level against  
providers or  sellers. Especially in the post industrialization period, the belief that 
consumers who can be protected freely within the market mechanism in the l iberal 
economy has been shaken57.  Thus, i t  has been recognized that the government 
needs to take protective measures for consumers. Provisions for this purpose are 
                                                             
55 See ARMSTRONG, Mark, “Interactions Between Competition and Consumer Policy: A Report Prepared for the 
OFT”, OFT Economic Discussion Paper (2008), available at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/7258/1/ (last visited 
20.07.2017). 
56 See KOVACIC, William “Competition Policy, Consumer Protection, and Economic Disadvantage”, 
WASHİNGTON UNİVERSİTY JOURNAL OF LAW & POLİCY (2007), available at  
http://openscholarship.wustl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1204&context=law_journal_law_policy (last visited 
20.07.2017). 
57 KOCA, Güneş, Tüketicinin Korunması Açısından Abonelik Sözleşmeleri [Subscription Agreements in Terms of 
Consumer Protection], Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Ankara 2004, p. 12, 13; TOPALÖMER, p. 5. 
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regulated in the Law on the Protection of Consumer No 6502 58 (hereinafter 
Consumer Law).  
 The first  article of  Consumer Law t i t led “Purpose of Law”  states that “[i]t 
is necessary to arrange for consumers to take measures to protect their health, 
safety, and economic interests, to compensate their losses, to protect them from 
environmental hazards, to provide consumers with enlightening and conscious 
measures, to encourage consumer self -protection initiatives , and to encourage 
voluntary organizations in policy formulation”. In other words, the consumer 
protection policy seeks protection of consumers in economic and social areas. 
 At the point of increasing consumer welfare, in terms of understanding the 
relationship between consumer and competit ion policies, which are considered to 
have a common goal, it  is useful to understand first  what these two policies refer 
to with the concep t  of “consumer”. This will  help us draw the line between the 
policy practices. 
 In Article 3 (k) of the Consumer Law, the consumer is defined as “a natural 
or legal person acting for commercial or non -professional purposes”. The final 
consumers (end-users) are referred to here, and this definition is based on the 
purpose of use.  
 In competition law, the concept of “consumer”, which is used in the 
analyses of competit ive process  violation and efficiency assessment, is not l imited 
to the end user59.  Although the definition of consumer is not in the TCA, it  is  
evident in the secondary legislation. In the Guidelines on The General Principles 
of Exemption60 (n. 43):  
                                                             
58 Law No. 6502 on the Protection of the Consumer, adopted on 7.11.2013 , was published in the Official Gazette on 
28.11.2013. 
59 Consumer is defined as the ultimate user of a product in the Competition Terms Dictionary which is published by 
the Turkish Competition Authority. See Competition Terms Dictionary, Ankara 2010, Turkish Competition Authority, 
Publication Number 0236. 
60 No 13- 66 / 923- RM(10), dated 11.28.2013 [hereinafter the Guidelines (Exemption)]. 
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 Wit h respect  to  t he assessment  o f exemptio n,  t he concept  o f ‘consumer ’ shou ld be  read 
as enco mpass ing a l l d irect  or  ind irect  users o f t he product s o r services in t he re levant  market  
covered by the agreement .  Producers t hat  use t he product s in quest ion as an input ,  who lesa lers,  
ret ailers and dea lers t hat  make resa les can be de f ined as consumer .  The conc ept  o f consumer  
covers no t  only end users but  a lso  those who  purchase the product s fo r  resa le purposes.  
Consumers can be rea l persons o r  lega l ent it ies .   
 The Guidelines on the Assessment of Exclusionary Abusive Conduct by 
Dominant Undertakings 61 (n. 22), regarding evaluation of consumer welfare, states 
that “reduction in consumer welfare may emerge at the resale level or at the f inal 
consumer level”, which indicates intermediate level buyers are also regarded as 
consumers.  
 CSERES points out the importance of consumers in terms of consumer 
policy by stating that the consumer is at the center; his interests , needs, and 
economic role define the content and orientation of consumer law 62.  Furthermore, 
consumer policy addresses not only economic, but al so non-economic (social) 
aspects of market transactions63.  Therefore, i t  can be said that consumer law has 
foreseen a direct protection for consumers.  
 In Turkish li terature, ASLAN suggests that “consumer protection” is the 
main goal underlying competit ion law and its social aspect should not be 
ignored64.  GÜRKAYNAK contends that while any social or non-economic aspect 
can be an objective of competit ion policy, consumer welfare can be only included 
as i ts economic concept , which is directly related to “economic efficiency”  as the 
                                                             
61 No 14-05/97-RM (1), dated 01.29.2014 [ hereinafter the Guidelines (Dominant Position)]. 
62 CSERES, Kati J., “The Controversies of the Consumer Welfare Standard”, 3 EUROPEAN COMPETİTİON LAW 
REVİEW 2 (2007), p. 129, 130, available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=1015292 (last visited 05.07.2017) [hereinafter 
Cseres (2007)]. 
63 CSERES, Kati J., “Competition and Consumer Policies: Starting Points for Better Convergence”, AMSTERDAM 
CENTER FOR LAW & ECONOMİCS, Working Paper No. 2009-06 (2009), p. 6, available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1379322 (last visited 05.07.2017) [hereinafter Cseres (2009)]. 
64 YILMAZ, Ejder, “Rekabet Kanunu Uygulamasında Usul ve Ispat Sorunları [Procedural and Proof Issues in the 
Application of the Competition Law]”, Persembe Konferansları 2, Rekabet Kurumu Yayını, Ankara (1999). 




main antitrust goal65.  According to this view,  competition policy can serve only 
indirect protection by protecting the competitive p rocess that  provides low price 
and product quality66.  AŞÇIOĞLU ÖZ proposes that in the case of competit ion 
policy, protection of the competit ion process is an end in i tself,  and the efficiency 
and consumer welfare have emerged consequent  to this process67.  This belief 
follows that  undistorted competit ive process will  ult imately tend to maximize 
wealth and benefit  consumer welfare . 
 The f irst  obvious difference is the concept of “consumer”. In consumer law, 
i ts scope is the end-user, while the competition law contains customers (parties 
on the buyer side at any level) and end users. The view which claims that 
competit ion policy indirectly protects consumers ignores the situation wherein 
profit  increases (efficiency) merely occur from consumer surplus extraction. If 
the protection of competitive process draws the distinction, how does one 
interpret the  competit ion law provisions that envisage direct harm to consumers. 
For instance, TCA Article 6 condemns “abusive” practice ,  and consumer harm is 
used for the determination of “abuse” [The Guidelines (Dominant Position) n. 22].  
 It  can be said that  under competit ion law, “protection of consumer” is 
l imited to protection “from the negative consequences of the restriction of 
competit ion”. It  is generally accepted that increased price, reduced output ,  and 
decreased quality are negative effects 68.  These are accepted as an indicator to 
consumer detriment and  are generally regarded as having emerged from distortion 
of the competit ion. Thus, competit ion law enforcement implies an effect based 
approach, does not intervene specific contract between seller and consumer, but 
has an indirect way to enforce consumer interest.  At the same time,  i t  uses 
                                                             
65 GÜRKAYNAK, Gönenç, Türk Rekabet Uygulaması İçin “Hukuk ve İktisat” Perspektifinden “Amaç” 
Tartışması[Debate on "Objective" from the Perspective of "Law and Economics" for Turkish Competition Practice], 
Rekabet Kurumu Yayınları, Ankara 2003, p. 25 [hereinafter GÜRKAYNAK (2003)]. 
66 GÜRKAYNAK (2003), p. 25. 
67 AŞÇIOĞLU ÖZ, Gamze, Avrupa Topluluğu Ve Türk Rekabet Hukukunda Hakim Durumun Kötüye 
Kullanılması[Abuse of the dominant position in European Community and Turkish Competition Law], Rekabet 
Kurumu Yayınları (No 0051), Ankara 2000.p. 15, 22. 
68 See Guidelines (Dominant Position), n. 22. 
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consumer harm as an indicator to determine whether the practice is anti -
competit ive or pro-competitive. Nevertheless, consumer law aims to prevent 
consumer harm. In o ther words, the intervention of competit ion law can result  in 
direct protection of consumers (regarding condemning practice that increase price 
and reduce output) or indirect protection of consumers (condemning practice that 
creates barrier to entry or prevent expansion of rivals’ sale to increase consumer 
choice). 
 In this context , because of the tools competit ion law has, consumer interest 
has an economic concept. Depending on the policy choice ( selecting 
consumer/total  welfare, or focusing on short -term/long-term interest),  the scope 
of the interest can extend or shrink, or i t  may be included in the social aspect. 
However,  consumer law is not  only based on economic efficiency,  but also on 
equity, and it  always is also a social justice component69.  The creation of 
“consumer consciousness” is the primary goal of consumer law. For competit ion 
law, i t has been suggested that market imperfections (information failures) can 
distort  competit ive market s70.  In this respect, consumer interest can include a 
social aspect, if competit ion authority opts to introduce remedies for this issue.  
 Our understanding suggests that “harm to competit ion” or the “distorted 
competit ion” as a prerequisite  for competit ion rules to intervene for consumer 
protection draws the l ine be tween competit ion and consumer protection policy .  
While i t  is found in most of the cases, the goal of “protection competit ion” itself 
requires ensuring functioning of the demand-side, which can only occur when the 
consumer makes an informed choice . Therefore, consumer protection and 
competit ion policies’ primary goal are common. However,  achievement of this 
goal under these policies will  be through different paths due to different tools 
provided under related regulations.  Nonetheless, consumer protection from the 
                                                             
69 CSERES (2009), p. 130. 
70 See GRIMES, Warren S., “Antitrust Tie-In Analysis After "Kodak": Understanding the Role of Market 
imperfections”, 62 ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL 2 (Winter 1994), available at 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40844119 (last visited 17.06.2017). 
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negative consequences of competit ion restriction is just  one aspect of the 
competit ion policy goal.  
 1.3. Difference between Turkish Competition Law and Turkish Unfair 
Trade Rules  
 Competit ion law prevents the violation of the competit i ve order in the 
market, ex ante  (mergers and acquisit ions) , and ex post  (with cartel  agreements 
and abuse of dominant position), or has a preventative role such as sector inquiry.  
Unfair competit ion law, on the other hand, provides freedom of economic acti vity 
through the protection of fair competition.  
 First ,  the relationship must be determined by an accurate perspective 
through the goal of both fields. INAN states that they serve for opposite purpose s, 
i .e. ,  unfair competition rules intend to limit competition, and even if i t is unfairly 
abusive, i t  establishes the boundaries of competit ion rights, while competit ion 
law aims to expand competit ion as much as possible 71.  According to AŞÇIOĞLU 
ÖZ,  competition law is different in terms of i ts purpose, scope , and protected 
legal interest from unfair competit ion rules . Unfair competit ion rules are the 
application of the honesty rule as envisaged in the Turkish Civil  Code 72 (Article 
2) to a specific area, namely abuse of right to compete freely. They foresee 
protecting those injured by the practice, and who are rivals or customers73.  
However, the protected interest is competit ion itself as an insti tution by 
competit ion rules, and not the interests of the people or the competitors are 
intended to be protected direct ly74.  PINAR questions these views by proposing 
that competit ion law and unfair competit ion law are not contradictory or from 
different fields. Rather, they should be complementary and have coherent 
objectives, which is the aim of protection of competit ion , but from a different 
                                                             
71 İNAN, Nurkut, Rekabet Hukukunun Diğer Disiplinlerle İlişkisi [The Relationship between Competition Law and 
Other Diciplines], Rekabet Kurumu Perşembe Konferansları-1, Rekabet Kurumu Yayını, Yayın No. 0039, Ekim 1999 
Ankara, p. 10. 
72 Law No 4721, adopted on 22.11.2001, in Official Gazette dated 7.8.2003 and numbered No. 25192 
73 AŞÇIOĞLU ÖZ, p. 18. 
74 AŞÇIOĞLU ÖZ, p. 19. 
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perspective. While competit ion law protects freedom of competit ion from 
violations, unfair competit ion law protects fair competit ion from unfair 
commercial practices75.  In other words, competit ion law serves to control market 
structure and unfair competit ion law serves to control market behaviors, that is, 
unfair commercial practices in the market76.  
 In Turkish Commercial Code Law No. 610277,  Article 54 (1), the purpose 
of the unfair competit ion rules is clearly stated as “ensuring the honest and 
undistorted competition in the interests of all participants”. According to  
preamble of the  article , there are three reasons to favor the concept of “honest 
and undistorted competit ion” instead of the concept of “economic competit ion”: 
First ,  the latter is vague; second, i t  can be understood as “competit ion between 
rivalries”; and third ,  to facili tate harmonization with the language of T urkish 
Competit ion Act. For the last  reason, also the concept of “all  participants” refer s 
to “the famous trio of competit ion law are meant: Economy, consumer and 
public”.  
 We agree that both regulations are not contrary, but they are complementary 
to each other. However, the triggering of the legal enforcement is different, as 
are the tools for competit ion protection. Competit ion distortion in violation of 
honesty rules or by means of  deceptive behavior triggers the unfair competit ion 
enforcement . Furthermore, agreements between undertakings or decisions that 
aim to affect markets and restrict  competit ion in respect of goods and services as 
well  as market concentration, and which lead to abuse of dominant position, 
monopolization, or distortion of competit ion can trigger enforcement of 
competit ion law.  
 We should mention that ASÇIOGLU ’s  opinion was partly valid at  the t ime 
of her writing, however consequent to  adoption of the New Turkish Commercial 
                                                             
75 PINAR, Hamdi, “Rekabet Hukuku İle Haksiz Rekabet Hukuku İlişkisi [The Relationship Between Competition 
Law and Unfair Competition Law]”, 15 REKABET DERGİSİ 2 (2014), p. 66. 
76 PINAR, p. 69-72. 
77 Official Gazette dated 14.02.2011 and numbered 27846. 
38 
 
Code, interest of consumers  and public are included into the objective of  the 
prevention of unfair competition rules. Therefore, the general saying that 
“competition rules protects competition, while unfair trade rules protects 
competitors” is no longer valid. The modern approach clarifies that unfair trade 
rules also protect  the competit ive process.   
 Nonetheless, these improvements in the unfair trade rules are positive and 
complement the competit ion advocacy activities carried out by the Turkish 
Competit ion Authority in establishing and promoting a competit io n culture in 
Turkey.  
2. DEBATE ON GOAL OF COMPETITION LAW: WELFARE AND 
OBJECTIVES 
 Consumer welfare is a stated objective of competition policy alongside  
increasing efficiency. However, there is no consensus on the meaning  of consumer 
welfare. Therefore, enforcement of the competition rules must be questioned 
under these objectives, which can be legitimate and provide legal certainty. Since 
the current emphasis is on “consumer welfare” through “economic efficiency”,  
this section addresses the understanding of welfare and the potential  conflicts 
between different welfare concepts, and then explains the trade-offs between 
different types of efficiency.  
 2.1. Welfare Economics, Different Understanding of Welfare and 
Efficiency 
 2.1.1. Welfare economics  
 “Welfare” can be defined as the “well-being” of an individual or a society 78.  
Welfare economics refers to the analysis of the effect of economic policies on the 
welfare of an individual or society,  i .e.,  to compare the relative merits of the two 
situations79.  While welfare economics aims to use resources optimally to reach 
                                                             
78 ORBACH, Barak Y., “The Antitrust Consumer Welfare Paradox”, 7 JOURNAL OF COMPETITION LAW & 
ECONOMICS 1 (December 2010), p. 140, available at http://jcle.oxfordjournals.org/ (last visited 26.10.2016). 
79 AKMAN, Pinar, The Concept of Abuse in EU Competition Law, Hart Publishing, Oxford (2012), p. 13,14 
[hereinafter AKMAN (2012)]. 
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the maximum well -being of the individual and society,  economic welfare is not 
measurable , as the economic welfare of the individual is defined by the “util i ty” 
level of the individual, which refers to happiness or satisfaction80.  Even if the  
util ity of one individual can be measured, the welfare of society requires the 
util ity total  of all . This calculation requires calculating interpersonal util i ty (a 
unit  of subjective value) between individuals, which is impossible. Since each 
individual has his/her own goals in l ife, one cannot compare the well -being of the 
one individual against the harm caused to another81.  One might suggest that 
distributional judgments can determine which individual should compromise for 
the sake of social welfare, but i t  st i l l  requires the policy consensus on income 
distribution82.  
 The Pareto principle suggests that distributional concern should be avoided 
and improvement in social  welfare is possible if i t  increases the utili ty of at  least 
one individual and decreases the util i ty of none. However,  welfare here refers to 
“efficiency” ,  and efficiency is maximized where no individual would be better off 
without someone becoming worse off83.  The Pareto principle does not require 
compensation, since it  proposes that everyone would be better off or at  least no 
one would be worse off.  
 Contrary to this, the Kaldor-Hicks criterion suggests that if in society some 
individuals are better off and some worse off, the gainers could compensate the 
losers in such way that , overall ,  everyone was better off, in which case welfare 
would then be increased84.  However, this criterion for the maximization of 
efficiency cannot be regarded as compensation, but as a trade-off that requires 
gains in terms of money being greater than losses 85.  The perspective of assuming 
                                                             
80 ORBACH, p. 140, 141. 
81 De LEON, Ignacio: An Institutional Assessment of Antitrust Policy – The Latin American Experience, Netherland: 
Kluwer Law International (2009), p. 206. 
82 AKMAN (2012), p. 13. 
83 HOVENKAMP, Herbert, “Antitrust Policy After Chicago”, 84 Michigan Law Review 2  (1985), p. 239, available 
at http://www.jstor.org/stable/1289065 (last visited 10.02.2017) [hereinafter HOVENKAMP (After Chicago)]. 
84 HOVENKAMP (After Chicago), p. 239, 240; GÜRKAYNAK (2003), p. 64, 65. 
85 GÜRKAYNAK (2003), p. 65, 66; AKMAN (2012), p. 13,14. 
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that some would be worse off is more realistic than the Pareto principle, but i t  is 
flawed in that i t  allows the imposition of losses on individ uals and suggests the 
trade-off in terms of money86.  However, this trade-off is only workable if the unit 
of currency has the same value to everyone to overcome distributional 
judgments87.  
 2.1.2. The Concepts borrowed from welfare economic: welfare and 
surplus 
Welfare has been used to refer to surplus in antitrust legal li terature 88.  Even 
though economists use the term interchangeably, the nuance between them  is 
mentioned89: Surplus is defined in terms of supply and demand curves in a single 
market and such curves can in principle be estimated from observations of 
supplier and consumer behavior, without reference to util ity.  Although surplus 
can be related to util i ty via marginal util ity theory 90,  uti li ty is not needed in its 
definition, and surplus should be  measured in monetary units,  not in units of  
util ity. Furthermore, welfare is often related to util ity at  a theoretical level, but 
i t  is frequently estimated without reference to utili ty and is  measured in monetary 
units.  
                                                             
86 AKMAN (2012), p. 14. 
87 AKMAN (2012), p. 14. 
88 ORBACH, p. 136 (stating that courts should inform “…about the meanings and limitations of the term consumer 
welfare in antitrust law. It is a poor term that inconsistent with antitrust methodology”). See OECD Glossary of 
Industrial Organisation Economics and Competition Law, p. 29, available at 
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consumers, consumers’ surplus is a measure of aggregate consumer welfare.”). 
89 See for the discussion (http://economics.stackexchange.com/questions/1903/difference-between-surplus-and-
welfare, last visited: 03.10.2016). 
90 Economics concept that although it is impossible to measure the utility derived from a good or service, it is usually 
possible to rank the alternatives in their order of preference to the consumer. Since this choice is constrained by the 
price and the income of the consumer, the rational consumer will not spend money on an additional unit of good or 
service unless its marginal utility is at least equal to or greater than that of a unit of another good or service. Therefore, 




Moreover, common sense dictates that welfare is good, something policy 
should aim to increase and , in this respect, there is an important difference 
between surplus and welfare: “Surplus” is a purely descriptive concept (a term of 
positive economics), whereas “welfare” is descriptive and e valuative91.   
For  instance, in the case of a product that is deemed bad for health, lowering 
the price of the product will  enhance consumer surplus, which is a supposed 
antitrust goal 92.  Further, i t  can be stated that i t  will  also enhance consumer welfare 
(if consumers are aware of the harm and act rationally, and their pleasure from 
consumption outweighs the harm). However, i t  is impossible to maximize 
consumer welfare,  unless the state can perfect each individual ’s welfare (and it  is 
not possible when individual taste s differ or are in conflict).  Therefore, promoting 
one dimension of welfare does not necessarily mean maximization of welfare, 
when other individuals place greater value on other dimensions 93.  Thus, the 
welfare needs to be appraised by value  or quality ,  not solely by price94.  In  
addition, to maximize welfare, one should solve the problem of interpersonal 
comparisons. 
The two most used concepts in antitrust analysis are consumer surplus and 
total  surplus.  Consumer surplus is the difference between the highest price a 
consumer is will ing to pay and the actual market price of the product in a 
particular market. On the other hand, the producer surplus is the difference 
between the market price and the lowest price a producer would be willing to 
accept, i .e. ,  in the case of producers, surplus can be regarded as profit  (the 
                                                             
91 See for the discussion (http://economics.stackexchange.com/questions/1903/difference-between-surplus-and-
welfare, last visited: 03.10.2016). 
92 See ORBACH, p. 153 (“…for goods or bads, antitrust laws appear to welcome low prices regardless of actual impact 
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93 See STUCKE, Maurice E., “Should Competition Law Promote Happiness?” 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2575 (2013), 
p. 2596, available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2203533 (last visited 19.10.2016) [hereinafter STUCKE (Promote 
Happiness). 
94 See de la MANO, Miguel, “For the Customer’s Sake: The Competitive Effects of Efficiencies in European Merger 
Control”, Enterprise Papers No 11 (2002), p. 18, available at http://www.uni-mannheim.de/edz/pdf/entpap/ep-11-
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difference between the amount a buyer is paid for a product and the seller’s cost 
of providing it)95.  The two in combination create total  surplus [the sum of 
consumer surplus and producer  surplus (producer’s profit)].  
 2.1.3 Different Types of Efficiency and Efficiency Trade -Offs in 
Competition Law  
 2.1.3.1. Different types of e fficiency 
Three main types of efficiency are addressed in economic welfare analysis.  
These efficiencies can be categorized under two concepts: static efficiency and 
dynamic efficiency. The distinction between these two concepts is the relevant 
t ime horizon over which these efficiencies present their effects. While sta tic 
efficiency is  concerned with efficiency at a particular point in time, dynamic 
efficiency is related to the ability of a firm and its incentives to introduce new 
products or new processes of production over a period96.  
Static efficiency is concerned with the optimization of existing products, 
processes, and capabili ties within present technology and level s of existing 
knowledge to minimize deadweight loss 97.  There are two forms of static 
efficiency: allocative efficiency and productive efficiency.  
Allocative efficiency considers the preferences of the consumers, i .e. ,  the 
consumer’s will ingness to pay.  Allocative efficiency is achieved when the cost of 
resources used in production is equal to the consumer’s willingness to pay. In  
other words, allocation of resources (quantity) is efficient (and aggregate welfare 
is maximized) when each consumer is will ing to  pay a price that is at  least equal 
                                                             
95 http://www.investopedia.com. 
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Eefficiency”, European Competition Journal (2015), 11:2-3, p. 319, available at 
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recurring and enhancing social wealth over the time) See for further distinguishing criteria such as recurring and 
synergetic character of dynamic efficiency, KATHURİA, p. 328-338. 
97 See de la MANO, p. 9; ORBACH, p. 141. 
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to marginal cost98.  This can occur within two different market scenarios: perfect 
competit ion or perfectly discriminating monopolist .   
Under perfect competit ion, a firm’s conduct does not affect the price . All  
consumers pay a price equal to the marginal cost, thus consumer surplus  is equal 
to social welfare99.  That also means producer surplus is equal to zero. On the other 
hand, a perfectly discriminating monopolist  will  charge each consumer exactly 
the amount he/she is will ing to pay. Therefore , the monopolist  extracts all 
consumer surplus, and it  becomes producer surplus , which is also equal to 
maximized social welfa re within this scenario100.  
Even though the same quantity of  goods are produced in both scenarios, 
wealth distribution occurs in a opposing way.  Therefore, a monopolist  who is 
unable to discriminate (who charges the same price to all  consumers) would create 
allocative inefficiency, because some consumers will  have a  reservation price 
below the price set by monopolist ,  yet sti l l  above the marginal cost of the product . 
Since it  is socially efficient to produce an additional unit , this outcome is counted 
as allocative inefficiency, because a monopolist chooses to withold surplus from 
all  other consumers who are supplied instead of reducing the price to serve the 
marginal consumers who are not supplied 101.  In this scenario, even though the 
consumer and the monopolist  gain a surplus, the social welfare is not maximized 
and there is a welfare loss, which is known as a “deadweight loss”102.  
                                                             
98 See BRODLEY, p. 1025; OECD (Efficiency Claims), p. 12; KATHURİA, p. 321. See ORBACH, p. 141 (fn.:30) 
(“Another common definition of allocative efficiency is Pareto optimality, which is a resource distribution in which 
no voluntary exchange could make a person better off without making someone else worse off.”). See also Brodley, 
p.  1025 (fn.: 19) (“Allocative efficiency in the broad sense encompasses efficient pricing on both the input and output 
side, but antitrust focuses mainly on seller behavior in output markets. Therefore, allocative efficiency as used … 
pricing efficiency (or marginal cost pricing) in output markets.”). See also de la Mano (“…competiton policy is 
primarily designed to deal with the impact of business conduct on allocative efficiency. This approach reflects the 
relative simplicity of focusing on price effects, as well as on the robust and direct relationship that exists between 
price increases and dead-weight welfare losses.”). 
99 OECD (2012), “The Role of Efficiency Claims in Antitrust Proceedings”, p.12, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/competition/EfficiencyClaims2012.pdf  (last visited 20.07.2016) [hereinafter OECD (Efficiency 
Claims)]. 
100 OECD (Efficiency Claims), p. 12, 13. See also, BRODLEY, p. 1035-1036.  
101 OECD (Efficiency Claims), p. 12, 13. 
102 OECD (Efficiency Claims), p. 13. 
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Productive efficiency (or technical efficiency) alludes to the level of 
util ization of resources in the economy. It  implies that a fi rm is using the least 
costly inputs (labor, capital ,  etc.) with the best available technology and the most 
efficient production process, while minimizing the resource wastage in the 
production process103.  Therefore, productive efficiency is achieved when goods 
and services are produced with an optimal combination of inputs, resulting in the 
maximum output at  the lowest cost 104.  
A broad and well  refined definition of dynamic efficiency 105 is given by 
KATHURIA: 
“Dynamic e ff ic ienc ies are relat ed to  t he abil it y o f  a  fir m and it s  incent ives to  
int roduce new product s or  processes o f p roduct ion (o r  to  improve exist ing ones)  
by adopt ing new t echno logy o r  enhanc ing  knowledge endogenous ly,  i . e . , to  move  
the eff ic ient  front ier  o f product ion fast er  or  fur ther  fo rward. Dynam ic  
e ffic ienc ies are t here fo re linked to  innovat ion,  lear ning by do ing and research 
and deve lopment  act ivit ies ; cont rary to  st at ic  e ff ic ienc ies,  t hen,  t hey d isp la y 
the ir  e ffect s genera l ly over  t ime”106.  
A close relationship exists between productive efficiency and dynamic 
efficiency. The first enables the firm to maximize the output at a particular cost, 
whereas the second, through the introduction of new processes or tools, reduces 
the production cost107.  Furthermore, i t  has also been  that dynamic efficiency,  
concerning introduction of better products, increases consumer surplus, since 
consumers are willing to pay more for the same product108.  
It  is  clear that from a  consumer welfare  perspective, static efficiency will 
suggest a price close to marginal cost ,  which will increase output and consumer 
surplus.  Productive efficiency offers direct benefits for producers by reducing 
                                                             
103 De la MANO, p. 8, 9; OECD (Efficiency Claims), p. 13; KATHURIA, p. 321. 
104 See BRODLEY, p. 1025; de la MANO, p.8,9; ORBACH, p. 141; OECD (Efficiency Claims), p. 13. 
105 It is also called “innovation efficiency”, see BRODLEY, p. 1025. 
106This definition is from OECD (Efficiency Claims) paper that is modified by author. See KATHURIA, p. 338. See 
also de la MANO, p. 9. 
107 KATHURIA, p. 326. 
108 KATHURIA, p. 326. 
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their costs, and provided these cost benefits are reflected in the price of the 
product, consumers will  also benefit .  However, dynamic efficiency directly 
benefits producers and consumers . On the one hand, i t  introduces new, cheaper or 
better products for consumers, and not merely increase consumer surplus but also 
consumers’ utili ty and choice. On the other hand, producers benefit  from 
improved production processes or products that encourage them to be more 
competit ive . However, dynamic efficiency comes at a price;  i t  requires 
investment. Therefore, “price equal to marginal cost”  to maximize allocative 
efficiency does trigger dynamic efficiency. Thus, the concept of consumer welfare 
equals consumer surplus impedes increased consumer util ity and choice  while 
thwarting a possible and sustainable increase in consumer surplus.    
 2.1.3.2. Efficiency trade-offs in competition law 
 Efficiency trade-offs occur in competition policy when a practice does not 
increase or decrease all  types of  efficiencies simultaneously.  There are two 
situations that efficiency outcomes are not aligned but in tension: allocative vs.  
productive efficiency, and static vs. dynamic efficiency.  
The trade-off between allocative and productive efficiency occurs when a 
firm reduces i ts costs, increases its productive efficiency and its market power, 
which may lead to decreased allocative efficie ncy because of reduced output and  
increased prices. This trade -off was suggested for merger cases by Williamson. 
Williamson’s trade -off model demonsrates that a merger that increases prices and 
results in a loss in allocative efficiency through increasing in market power, may 
nevertheless increase productive efficiency due to cost savings 109.  In the model, 
i t  is assumed that a relatively modest cost reduction is usually sufficient to offset 
                                                             
109 Williamson had offered his trade-off model for merger-based efficiency, yet later his model be founded wider 
application, as well as he realized. See WILLIAMSON, Oliver E., “Economics as Antitrust Defense: The Welfare 
Tradeoffs” (1968) 58(1) 58 AMERICAN ECONOMIC REV 1 (March 1968), p.32, available at 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1831653, (last visited: 06.02.2017) [hereinafter WILLIAMSON (Antitrust Defense)]. See 
BORK, p. 108 [indicating that “(Williamson’s) diagram can be used to illustrate all antitrust problem, since it shows 
the relationship of the only two factors involved, allocative efficiency and productive efficiency…They are what we 
have to estimate-whether the case is about the dissolution of a monopolistic firm, a conglomerate merger, a 
requirements contract, or a price-fixing agreement”]. 
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relatively large price increases, even if the elasticity of demand is  quite high110.  
However, this model does not consider wealth transfer from consumers to 
producers111.  
The second efficiency trade -off occurs between dynamic and static 
efficiency. Static models focus on price competition between firms, merely 
considering price  and output effects. Dynamic efficiency occurs not from price 
competit ion, but from competit ion on innovation. It  has been remarked that 
dynamic efficiency is  the major source of economic growth and leads to raised 
living standards112.  It  has been also contended that innovative activity is a  
safeguard for long-term consumer interest and it  garners higher consumer 
satisfaction via cheaper, better ,  or new goods 113.  Therefore, dynamic efficiency 
creates more social welfare than static efficiency does114.  
 The preference for dynamic efficiency over static efficiency is 
predominantly associated with Schumpeter, who suggests that the short -term costs 
related to allocative and productive inefficiencies stemming from market power 
can comfortably be offset by benefits  derived from encouraging dynamic 
efficiencies through “creative destruction” 115.  Further, SCHUMPETER proposes 
that large-scale establishments have become the most powerful engine of 
economic progress and the long-term expansion of total  output, thus, perfec t 
competit ion, is not only unlikely, but also inferior116.  Firms invest  in the  research 
                                                             
110 WILLIAMSON (Antitrust Defense), p. 22, 23. 
111 WILLIAMSON (Antitrust Defense)], p. 26,27. See for the model that includes distribution of surplus FARRELL, 
Joseph/  SHAPIRO, Carl, “Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis”, 80 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC 
REVIEW 1 (March 1990), pp. 107-126, available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/2006737 (last visited 16.07.2017). 
112 BRODLEY, Joseph F., “The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer Welfare, And Technological 
Progress”, 62 N.Y.U LAW REVIEW (1987), p. 1026, available at 
http://heinonline.org/HOL/Print?collection=journals&handle=hein.journals/nylr62&id=1036 (last visited 
09.02.2016); ORBACH, p. 141; KATHURIA, p. 323. 
113 BRODLEY, p. 1037; de la MANO, p. 9. 
114 See BRODLEY, p. 1026; KATHURIA, p. 323. 
115 KOLASKY, William J. / ANDREW, R. Dick, “The Merger Guidelines and the Integration of Efficiencies into 
Antitrust Review of Horizontal Mergers”, available at 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2007/07/11/11254.pdf (last visited 20.05.2017). 
116 See SCHERER,”Antitrust, Efficiency, and Progress” , 62 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW (1987), p. 
1010, available at 
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and development  in order to become the first to innovate and be rewarded with 
earning monopoly profits. Thus, a monopoly can be regarded as a necessary 
market structure  (rather than an inefficient one) in which consumers benefit from 
firms’ risky innovative activities117.   
 BRODLEY argues that competition law concentrates mostly on promoting 
allocative efficiency. However,  dynamic efficiency provides the greatest  
enhancement of social wealth, followed by productive efficiency, and then 
allocative efficiency118.  Further, he contends that the only efficiency that  is  
reasonably measurable is productive efficiency and , prior to a transaction, none 
of the three types of efficiencies appears measurable 119.  Eliminating the allocative 
inefficiency while sti l l  achieving the produ ctive and dynamic efficiencies is the 
ideal. Nevertheless, whether and under what circumstances the realizat ion of 
productive and dynamic efficiencies justifies a loss of allocative efficiency  would 
be difficult  to answer under competit ion law 120.   
 In competition law and policy, different types of efficiency inevitably 
require trade-offs. Ultimately, policy choice will  determine the preference 
between lower prices in the short-term and relatively higher prices that are l ikely 
to boost innovation and result  in better and new products in the long-term. The 
difficulty is to decide the weight attributable to each type of efficiency.  
 Therefore, policy statements that increase consumer welfare through 
efficiency or  increasing consumer welfare and efficiency concurrently  is not 
conflict  free. Consumer welfare can guide the competit ion authority in respect of 
attributable weight for  each type of efficiency. However, this requires a 
determined concept of “consumer welfare”. Equation of consumer welfare  to 
consumer surplus will  suggest greater weight on static efficiency over the  
                                                             
http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/nylr62&div=38&g_sent=1&collection=journals last visited 
(20.05.2017). 
117 SCHERER, p. 1010.  
118 See BRODLEY, p. 1028- 1037. 
119 BRODLEY, p. 1028-1032. 
120 BRODLEY, p. 1032. 
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productive and dynamic efficiency, while understanding of multi -dimension of 
consumer welfare that includes util ity, choice, satisfaction etc. will  hav e 
preference for dynamic efficiency over allocative efficiency .  
 2.2. Objectives Of Competition Law And Policy  
 The concept of “standard” is not peculiar to Turkish law. The rules and 
standards feature in common law. The distinction between “rules ”  and “standards” 
can be briefly explained .121 In common law, “rules” are evident and clear. For 
example, “young people under 18 cannot drive cars”. Standards are less precise 
and interpretable: “Slow car  down in front of the school”. For  this standard, i t  is 
necessary to interpret how slow (50 km/h, 60 km/h) and where the “in front of 
school” begins and ends. When this discri mination is adapted to civil  law (such 
as in Turkey), i t  is met with the concept of “discretionary power”. In this legal 
system, there are rules that recognize and disregard discretionary powers in the 
judiciary. Appreciation of the judicial  authority is  s ometimes stated in the 
legislation, and sometimes it  is understood that the concepts used in the judiciary 
need to be fi l led in122.   
 Thus, the concept of “consumer welfare standard” applies to the goal or 
objective of the antitrust law in US li terature, whi le in EU and Turkish li terature , 
the “consumer welfare objective” is applied. The propositions and arguments 
regarding the objectives stemming from the US may not always serve the needs 
of Turkey or Europe due to poli t ical,  economic , and cultural differences123. 
However,  explaining these concepts will  aid our later discussions.  
                                                             
121 ODMAN BOZTOSUN, Ayse, “Tek Yanli Davranislara Nasil Yaklasalim? [How Shall We Approach Unilateral 
Conduct?]”, 11 REKABET DERGISI 3 (2010), p. 143, 144. 
122 See Turkish Civil Code (Art. 4): “Whereas has granted discretion power or has ordered to consider the necessities 
or justifiable reasons, the judge will decide according to law and equity”. 
123 We use the term of “antitrust” while referring to US legislation, because Sherman Act (dates from 1890) was 
initially addressed to only cartels and monopolies, then merger control was introduced with the Clayton Act (from 
1914). But both cartels, monopolies and merger controls are regulated under same act, therefore the term 
“competition” has been used in EU and Turkey. 
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 The US Antitrust law is based on  the Sherman Act, which has vague 
language. Therefore, i t  was necessary to understand the ratio legis  of the act to 
establish legitimate enforcement of i t . The debate surrounding the goal of 
antitrust law is based on legislative history. There are two main streams regarding 
the objective; both camps base their argument on their interpretation of the 
legislative history of the Sherman Act 124.   
 However, borders between these two camps are not always clear. We can 
briefly explain this situation by offering two main reasons. First ,  this confusion 
is generally granted to Bork  he famously stated, “consumer welfa re prescription” 
is the only legitimate goal of antitrust,  based on his own interpretation of 
legislative intent of  the Sherman Act. Subsequently,  US courts borrowed his 
terminology (consumer welfare prescription). However, i t  has been noted that 
Bork’s consumer welfare prescription coincides with total  welfare. Thus, i t  
became difficult  to distinguish the sense in which consumer welfare is used, as 
some scholars borrow the Borkean term of consumer welfare, while others do not. 
Second, starting with Bork and strengthened by the Chicago School, economic 
efficiency justification came into question under the rule of reason approach. 
Even so, some consumer welfare supporters left their concern about price 
increases to consumers, and aimed for  a net gain to  the consumer via economic 
                                                             
124 Meanwhile, some authors stay out this stereotyped legal analysis and follow different approaches. Such as seeking 
non-economic (or non-efficiency) goal of antitrust law, see ELZİNGA, Kenneth G., “The Goals of Antitrust: Other 
Than Competition And Efficiency, What Else Counts?”, 125 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW 
(1977), p. 1191-1213, available at 
http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4964&context=penn_law_review (last visited 
03.02.2016) or instead of examination of the legislative history, attempting to determine which approach would lead 
a stable political support by consumers and producers, see BAKER, Jonathan B., “Economics and Politics: 
Perspectives on the Goals and Future of Antitrust”, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2175 (2013), available at 
http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol81/iss5/4 (last visited 03.02.2016) [hereinafter BAKER (Future of Antitrust)]. See 
STUCKE (Promote Happiness), p. 2602-2612 (contending that competition policy never looked for promote only one 
economic objective, such as consumer surplus, rather it sought to promote political, social, and moral values of fair 
competition, individual autonomy, and dispersal of economic power). For a correlative approach, see generally 
BRODLEY (developing an antitrust welfare -as ignoring solely consumer welfare or economic efficiency approach- 
using a long-run perspective as stating that dynamic efficiencies (technological progresses) is the largest single source 
of social wealth enhancement and, combining economic efficiencies, consumer welfare and interfirm rivalry into 
single working principle). 
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efficiencies created by market power. Therefore, we will  explain the suggested 
standards under our own categorization.   
 2.2.1. Welfare standard in competition law and policy 
 2.2.1.1. Borkean consumer welfare standard 
Bork has been crit icized125 for misleading the legislative intent of the 
Sherman Act when he claimed the Sherman Act was a “consumer welfare 
prescription”, while equating it to “efficiency” and “social welfare” 126 and stating 
that for the implementation of this goal “law must be drawn to serve as mesh that 
stops output-restricting behavior and permits efficiency-creating activity to pass 
through”127.  In other words ,  he claimed that “… the policy the courts were intended 
to apply [was] the maximization of wealth or consumer wan t satisfaction. This 
requires courts to distinguish between agreements or activit ies that increase 
wealth through efficiency and those that decrease it  through restriction of 
output”128.  His crit ics argued that when Bork stated efficiency was necessary for  
maximizing consumer welfare, the term consumer welfare  actually meant 
allocative efficiency in his mind 129.  
                                                             
125 See generally KIRKWOOD/ LANDE; ORBACH. For a modest defense of  Bork, see generally CRANE, Daniel 
A., "The Tempting of Antitrust: Robert Bork and the Goals of Antitrust Policy." 79 ANTITRUST L. J. 3 (2014), pp. 
835-853, available at http://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2549&context=articles (last visited 
19.10.2016) [hereinafter CRANE (The Tempting of Antitrust)]. Crane concludes that “…Bork made a tremendously 
important contribution by crystallizing antitrust law as the application of objective economic analysis to advance a 
cluster of efficiency interests centered on the consumer. Bork sought to demystify the aspects of antitrust jurisprudence 
that opposed bigness, concentration, and economic power without linking those qualities to demonstrable economic 
harms to concrete interests.” (id., p. 852)]. 
126 ORBACH, p. 11. Orbach interprets the term “the wealth of nation”- which Bork use- as “social welfare” in 
economic language (ORBACH, p. 16). 
127 BORK, Robert H., The Antitrust Paradox- A policy at War with Itself, The Free Press, New York (1978) 
[hereinafter BORK (The Antitrust Paradox)], p. 70. See also BORK (The Goals of Antitrust Policy), p. 242 (“My 
thesis is that existing statutes can be legitimately interpreted only according to the canons of consumer welfare, defined 
as minimizing restrictions of output and permitting, efficiency, however gained, to have its way.”) (emphasis added). 
128 BORK, Robert H., “Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act”, 9 THE JOURNAL OF LAW & 
ECONOMICS, (October 1966), p.7, 36, 39, available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/724991 (last visited: 03.11.2016) 
[hereinafter BORK (Legislative Intent)]. 
129 ORBACH, p. 11. Bork assumed that this interpretation was the only way consistent with legislative intent and 
consumer-oriented [“Though an economist of our day would describe the problem to Sherman differently, as a 
misallocation of resources restriction of output rather than one of high prices, there Sherman and he would be talking 
about the same thing. Demonstrated more than once that he understood that brought about by a restriction of output. 
… This and other remarks Sherman and his colleagues identified the phrase "restraint "restraint of trade" with 
"restriction of output”. See, BORK (Legislative Intent), p. 16, 39, 46]. However, many assign this equation of 
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Bork has also received crit ic ism130 for his equating of the term “consumer 
welfare” with “total welfare”, because of his reference to welfare of all 
individuals in society (considering monopolists as consumers) and rejecting 
income distribution effect 131.  Under his consumer welfare model, owners of the 
monopoly are also consumers, and a shift  in income between the two classes of 
consumers does not affect the antitrust inquiry, because a loss of consumer surplus 
turns into a gain in monopoly profits, and thus i t remains in society132.  In other 
words, reduction of consumer surplus is not a dead-weight loss,  therefore i t  should 
not be considered. Bork understands  that not only higher prices are an antitrust 
concern, but decreased output leading to higher prices are too133.  Moreover, Bork 
assumes that the choice between the two consumer groups should be made by the 
legislature rather than by the judiciary 134.  
Briefly, Bork contended that allocative and productive efficiencies and 
their relationship is necessary for  determining which consumer welfare model 
Court should hold, because in his representation, provided the cost savings are 
larger than the dead-weight loss (the amount above costs that consumers would 
be willing to pay for the lost output), the practice represent s a net gain to all  
consumers 135.  Furthermore ,  Bork claims that “antitrust should concern itself solely  
                                                             
consumer welfare with total welfare (while referring to allocative efficiency) to Bork, Meese remarks that Bork was 
not the first one to define the consumer welfare in this manner. See MEESE, Alan J., “Reframing the (False?) Choice 
Between Purchaser Welfare and Total Welfare”, 81 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW (2013), p. 2205,2205, available at 
http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4882&context=flr (last visited 15.03.2016) [hereinafter 
MEESE (Reframing the Choice)] (observing that Alan Harberger who is an economist had used the term consumer 
welfare in the same manner in his work [quoting to “Monopoly and Resource Allocation”, 44 AM. ECON. REV. 77 
(1954)] that he had written a decade before Bork’s major work on the subject). 
130 It has been widely assumed that Bork argued for a total welfare standard. SEE KIRKWOOD/ LANDE, p. 199; 
KIRKWOOD, John B. The Essence of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers and Small Suppliers from Anticompetitive 
Conduct, 81 FORDHAM L. REVIEW (2013), p. 2436, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2201053 (last visited 
19.10.2016) [hereinafter Kirkwood (The Essence of Antitrust)]; STUCKE (Promote Happiness), p. 2603 fn.: 171. 
131 See BORK (The Antitrust Paradox), p. 110-112.  
132 In Bork’s word: “...does not lessen total wealth…” [BORK (The Antitrust Paradox), p. 110-111]. 
133 But cf. see FİSHER, Alan A. and LANDE, Robert H., “Efficiency Considerations in Merger Enforcement”, 71 
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW (1983), p. 1592, available at 
http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/californialawreview/vol71/iss6/1 (last visited 13.05.2016) (contending that 
“Congress’ goal was competitive pricing, which it defined primarily in distributive rather than in efficiency terms.”). 
134 BORK (The Antitrust Paradox), p. 80, 111. 
135 BORK (The Antitrust Paradox), p. 108-109 (emphasis added). 
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with allocative and productive efficiency” 136 and “income distribution effects of 
economic activity should be completely excluded from the determination of 
antitrust legality of the activity” 137.  This concept was the most important 
contribution of Bork to antitrust enforcement, representing the rejections of the 
alternatives to efficiency or consumer welfare -oriented approaches. Bork also 
rejects the second-best theory, the cost of gaining and maintaining monopoly and 
externalities under his “consumer” welfare model 138,  and finds that technical 
progress is irrelevant to efficiency evaluation 139.  
Indeed, Bork’s consumer welfare calculus does not account for today’s 
consumer welfare standard, which considers consumer surplus and wealth transfer 
from consumers to monopolies as a main concern of antitrust law 140.  It  is now 
widely accepted that efficiency and consumer welfare are not necessarily aligned.  
Several studies claim that such conduct may lead to efficiencies and (at the same 
time) increased prices141.  However, as the US Supreme Court promoted Bork’s 
                                                             
136 Bork’s productive efficiency consideration was important to creation of consumer welfare, but this task of antitrust 
was limited in the scope of that “…the effort to improve allocative efficiency without impairing productive efficiency 
so greatly as to produce either no gain or a net loss in consumer welfare”, otherwise, he has not purposed and supported 
a tradeoff between productive efficiency versus allocative efficiency in the cases where two were in conflict, on 
contrary he has rejected regarding its unmeasurable character (and unforeseeable factor especially in horizontal merger 
cases), and concluded that it is not proper for case-by-case analysis, and more importantly these efficiency defenses 
cannot measure the factors relevant to consumer welfare [See BORK (The Antitrust Paradox), p. 91, 124-129]. See 
also CRANE (The Tempting of Antitrust), p. 850, 851 (devoting the suggestion that courts should weigh the competing 
interests of consumer welfare and productive efficiency to Bork is inaccurate). 
137 BORK (The Antitrust Paradox), p. 108-111. The school follows Borkean welfare calculus endorses a Kaldor-Hicks 
efficiency standard as ignoring distributional effects of a challenged practice. See EASTERBROOK (Workable 
Antitrust Policy), p. 1703, 1704 [stating that “The dominant theme is the protection of consumers from overcharges. 
This turns out to be the same program as one based “efficiency”. In the long run consumers gain the most from a 
policy that emphasizes allocative and productive efficiency” and “Goals based on something other than efficiency (or 
its close proxy consumers’ welfare) really call on judges to redistribute income”]. See POSNER, Richard, Antitrust 
Law: An Economic Perspective, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1976, p. 22 [hereinafter POSNER 
(Antitrust Law)] (contending society’s economic welfare would be greater whenever competition promotes 
efficiency). 
138 See BORK (The Antitrust Paradox), p.109-115. 
139 See BORK (The Goals of Antitrust), p. 251 (regarding “Progress … is obviously not costless to consumers” and 
“Courts have no criteria for establishing compromise deviations from consumer welfare here either”). 
140 Bork’s approach or his equation to efficiency reflect a Kaldor-Hicks standard. See MEESE (Reframing the Choice), 
p. 2204. 
141 ORBACH, p. 16. See WILLIAMSON, Oliver E., “Allocative Efficiency and the Limits of Antitrust”, 59 THE 
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Eighty-First Annual Meeting of the American 
Economic Association (May, 1969), p. 106, available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/1823660 (last visited 03.11.2016) 
[hereinafter WILLIAMSON (Allocative Efficiency)] (stating that Bork has recognized that mixed cases are exists, but 
Bork mainly prefers to divide the activities into those that have efficiency or market power consequences). 
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consumer welfare prescription, the Court did not propose the Borkean meaning of 
the term142.  
 2.2.1.2. Consumer welfare standards  
 2.2.1.2.1. Purchaser welfare standard 
This approach proposes that courts would ban any restraint that reduces the 
“consumer surplus” of purchasers in the relevant market, even though the restraint 
increases the welfare of producers by a greater amount 143.  
The proponents of this approach maintain that Congress wanted to protect 
consumers from exploitation while providing the benefits of competition to 
consumers with lower price, better quality, and a greater choice144.  Thus, this 
approach suggests that when an action presents a conflict  between protecting 
consumers and promoting efficiencies (for instance, a merger increases prices but 
reduces costs), the courts would always choose consumer protection over 
efficiency145.  In other words, the fundamental goal of antitrust law is competit ive 
prices for all146.  More importantly, even though this school of thought points out 
consumer interest in quality, i t  equates consumer welfare (also referring to 
                                                             
142 ORBACH, p. 17. See also KIRKWOOD/LANDE, p.194-196. But cf.  MEESE (Reframing the Choice), p. 2216, 
fn.: 76 (claiming that when Court cited to Bork’s consumer welfare prescription used the term referring to total 
welfare, at least until Lande published his work). Compare CRANE (The Tempting of Antitrust), p. 848 (finding that 
even though the distinction is unimportant, only e few courts have explicitly tied the consumer welfare to allocative 
efficiency, yet in none of the cases the possible distinction has mattered). However, this debate should be out dated 
since today both courts and scholars are aware of the terminology. See also OECD (Efficiency Claims), p. 26, 27 and 
fn.: 33 [(asserting that -with some hesitation- the U.S. competition authorities rely on consumer welfare, as citing to 
Judge Easterbrook (Workable Antitrust Policy)]. But it worth to point out that, Easterbrook obviously used the term 
consumer welfare align with Bork. See EASTERBROOK, Frank H., “Workable Antitrust Policy”, 84 MICHIGAN 
LAW REVIEW 8 (August 1986), p. 1703, available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/1288943 (last visited 10.02.2017) 
[hereinafter EASTERBROOK (Workable Antitrust Policy)] (“…the legislative history, the dominant theme is the 
protection of consumers from overcharges. This turns out to be the same program as one based on "efficiency."… the 
long run consumers gain the most from a policy that emphasizes allocative and productive efficiency.”). 
143See MEESE (Reframing the Choice), p. 2199—2219. This approach is also called “price standard” for merger case, 
or even more specifically “pure price standard” to distinguish it from “modified price standard” that concerns wealth 
transfer from consumers to producers but allows efficiencies to offset a price increase. See EOCD (Efficiency Claims), 
p. 26.  
144 KIRKWOOD/LANDE, p. 191-193. 
145 KIRKWOOD/LANDE, p. 192.  
146 KIRKWOOD/LANDE, p. 196 (fn: 14), 203 (For “all”, they refer to purchasers, buyer, customers -not just 
consumer, regardless whether they are the ultimate end users).  
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consumer wealth and property right s147) with consumer surplus under antitrust 
law148.   
Moreover, these proponents claim that  Bork’s allocative (in)efficiency is  
worrisome due to increased prices to consumers, and they furthermore state that 
Congress was concerned with the unfair transfer of wealth from consumers to 
monopolies and cartels149.  Furthermore, this camp was also aware that Congress 
recognized productive efficiencies , yet aimed to ban such combinations (increase 
productive efficiency by reducing cost) because they believed that firms tend to 
reap the fruits of such efficiency and do not pass these cost savings to 
consumers150.  
Furthermore, the proponents of this approach  endorse their argument with 
case law which adopted the view that antitrust law ’s  ult imate (overarching) goal 
is to protect consumers and not to increase efficiency; they state that “…they 
                                                             
147 See LANDE, Robert H., “Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency 
Interpretation Challenged”, 34 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL (1982), p.70, available at 
http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1362&context=all_fac (last visited 3.11.2016) 
[hereinafter LANDE (1982)] (“Congress implicitly declared that consumers’ surplus was the rightful entitlement of 
consumers; consumers were given the right to purchase competitively priced goods. Firms with market power were 
condemned because they acquired this property right without compensation to consumers.”). 
148 See KIRKWOOD/LANDE, p. 196 (“The antitrust laws, in other words, can be explained as a congressional 
declaration that the property right we today call “consumers’ surplus” belongs to consumers, not to cartels. While this 
certainly does involve the use of economic analysis, it is not efficiency analysis”). See also BRODLEY, p. 1033 
(“However, if consumer welfare is to serve as an operational principle of antitrust law, it must refer to the direct and 
explicit economic benefits received by the consumers of a particular product as measured by its price and quality. 
Using the more precise language of economics, consumer welfare can be defined as consumer surplus, which is that 
part of the total surplus that accrues to consumers”). See also HOVENKAMP, Erik and HOVENKAMP, Herbert, 
“Tying Arrangements and Antitrust Harm”, 52 ARIZONA LAW REVIEW (2010), p. 929, available at 
http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/arz52&div=39&g_sent=1&collection=journals (last visited 
15.08.2016) [hereinafter HOVENKAMP/ HOVENKAMP (2010)] (“The term ‘welfare’ has a relatively fixed meaning 
in economics. It equals the sum of consumer and producer surplus, assuming no one else is affected.”); MEESE 
(Reframing the Choice), p. 2202; Orbach, p. 137. 
149 KIRKWOOD/LANDE, p. 202. Beside unfair transfer of wealth explanation, these proponents also challenge the 
concept of the allocative efficiency could be in the mind of Congressmen, regarding that this concept was making 
only the first appearance in economics literature when the Sherman Act was passed. See KIRKWOOD/LANDE, p. 
203,204; LANDE (1982), p. 88-90. Contrary to their argument, it has been stated that Adam Smith understood 
allocative (in)efficiency as one burden of monopoly. See MEESE (Reframing the Choice), p. 2214, fn.:64 (citations 
omitted). 
150 KIRKWOOD/LANDE, p. 205, 206 (Refering to Senator Sherman speech: “[i]t is sometimes said of these 
combinations that they reduce prices to the consumer by better methods of production, but all experience shows that 
this saving of cost goes to the pockets of the producer”, see KIRKWOOD/LANDE, p. 201 (fn: 34). See also LANDE 
(1982), p. 90-93. 
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[judges] never say that conduct that harms consumers in the relevan t market may 
be justified if it  increases the efficiency of the economy” 151.   
 2.2.1.2.2. Consumer surplus standard 
According to this concept, the distributional effects of allged restraints in 
competit ion are taken into account, while consumer welfare is eq uated with 
consumer surplus in the relevant market and surplus of the same market’s 
producers are neglected.  
Supporters of this camp allow efficiency justifications under the consumer 
welfare balancing (net efficiency)  test  and suggest that the court weigh s the harm 
to purchasers against the benefits of the challenged practice 152.   
However, unlike purchaser welfare approach, under this approach the 
practice should be valid, even if it  raises the prices to consumer s, provided it adds 
other benefits to the consumer that exceed its negative effects on consumer s153.  
                                                             
151 KIRKWOOD/LANDE, p. 212 (In other words, they claimed that “They (courts) do not suggest that increases in 
allocative efficiency may outweigh harm to consumers, id. p. 216). The only additional goal as a limited exception to 
this view (meaning considered the statutes to design to protect competition - therefore the Robinson-Patman Act was 
out of the scope since its protectionist feature of secondary-line purchasers) was the courts’ concern for supplier 
welfare in certain buy-side cases (See KIRKWOOD/LANDE, p. 233-237). 
152 OECD, “What is the Competiton on the Merits?”, Policy Brief (June 2006), p. 6, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/competition/mergers/37082099.pdf (last visited 09.02.2017); See BRODLEY, p. 1042 
(“Consumer welfare becomes the exclusive or dominant factor in antitrust, however, when the effects of a proposed 
action on production and innovation efficiency are neutral or indeterminate, or when allocative pricing efficiencies 
alone are involved.”). See also BAKER (Future of Antitrust), p. 2186 (suggesting a qualified consumer welfare 
standard that antitrust law should ban all practices that injure consumers in the relevant market unless doing so would 
sacrifice very large efficiencies in a particular case, but he also considers lawful alternatives that if efficiencies could 
practically be obtained in some other way that results less harm to consumers, very large efficiency justification would 
not be valid). 
153 This concept is also called as “consumer surplus welfare standard” and it is indicated that this approach is used 
interchangeably with “modified price standard”. Furthermore, under a broad definition it concerns not only 
efficiencies but also non-price considerations (such as product quality, choice and innovation) to dissipate ex-post 
price increase. See OECD (Efficiency Claims), p. 26. See also BRODLEY, p. 1032-1034, 1037-1039 (allowing that 
production or innovation efficiencies justify a loss of allocative efficiency (or immediate consumer interest), but 
requiring that “pass on” the benefit from productive or innovation efficiencies to consumers in the long run. Providing 
that lack of less harmful alternatives to achieve such efficiencies and not result in permanent market structure change 
that will exclude rival firms. Last condition is necessary for returning the consumer surplus, which sustains during the 
conduct, to consumers). 
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 2.2.1.3. Total welfare (surplus) standard  
Bork’s approach has been followed by many scholars who endorse 
efficiency promotion in antitrust inquiry. However, they did not refer to their 
approach as consumer welfare but, more properly, as a “total welfare”154 approach 
or even more correctly, “total surplus standard”155.   
This school of thought grants equal weight to consumer and producer 
surplus by neglecting wealth transfer between them , and they contend that 
competit ion authorit ies would ban restraints  in competit ion that reduce society’s 
overall  welfare as resulting output reduction and misallocation of resources and 
deadweight loss156.   
However, unlike purchaser welfare school  of thought, they endorse  that 
courts should approve the practice, even if i t raises prices, provided it  produces 
efficiencies that exceed deadweight allocative losses resulting from enhanced 
market power157.  Furthermore, in contradistinction to purchaser or consumer 
welfare, price increase or wealth transfer is not their concern. Therefore, this 
approach does not require transferability of the efficiency gains from producers 
to consumers158.  
                                                             
154 It is also called interchangeably “aggregate welfare”. See SALOP, Steven C., “Question: What Is the Real and 
Proper Antitrust Welfare Standard? Answer: The True Consumer Welfare Standard”, 22 LOYOLA CONSUMER 
LAW REVIEW 3 (2010), pp. 336- 353 available at 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/445f/a73f90bf1fff03546ec93f90de9d06d22075.pdf [hereinafter SALOP (Welfare 
Standard)] (last visited 26.10.2016); Orbach, p. 137-139. 
155 See generally FARRELL, Joseph & KATZ, Michael L., “The Economics of Welfare Standards in Antitrust”, 2 
COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 3 (2006), available at http://escholarship.org/uc/item/1tw2d426; ORBACH, p. 137-
139. 
156 See OECD (Efficiency Claims), p. 27; MEESE (Reframing the Choice), p. 2199, 2205, 2206. 
157 MEESE (Reframing the Choice), p. 2199. See also BAKER (Future of Antitrust), p. 2186 (adopting a Canadian 
weighted and total surplus approach that total surplus standard can be preferable over the consumer surplus standard 
where very large efficiency justification is at the issue). For “Weighted and total surplus in Canada”, see OECD 
(Efficiency Claims), p. 28. 
158 See de la MANO, Miguel, “For the Customer’s Sake: The Competitive Effects of Efficiencies in European Merger 
Control”, Enterprise Papers No 11 (2002), p. 19, available at http://www.uni-mannheim.de/edz/pdf/entpap/ep-11-
2002.pdf (09.02.2017); OECD (Efficiency Claims), p. 27. But cf. See BRODLEY, p. 1037 (contending that short-run 
(immediate) consumer interests are subordinated to economic welfare of whole society, but on the condition that 
consumers eventually will get significant benefit from via better or new products). In this point, Brodley distanced 
himself from total welfare invokers. 
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This camp distances i tself from the Borkean approach that suggests  a trade-
off between allocative efficiencies and productive efficiencies (or even further 
dynamic efficiencies), because Bork rejects Williamson’s productive efficiency 
defenses regarding the quantification of the productive efficiency problem , which 
renders a case-by-case analysis unworkable and , more importantly, these defenses 
cannot measure the factors relevant to consumer welfare 159.   
Bork also disagrees with dynamic efficiency consideration as a goal 
independent of consumer welfare. He questions i ts cost to  consumers and the 
competence of the courts to determine the degree of the progressiveness 160.  
In summary, the consumer welfare standard suggests triggering antitrust 
inquiry when a restraint on trade harms the relevant welfare, while total  surplus 
standard would allow this restraint provided the practice increases the firm’s 
profit  by more than it  harms consumer welfare.  
Both Borkean consumer welfare and the purchaser welfare standard can be 
crit icized due to their static nature  which ignore the  benefits that may occur from 
dynamic efficiency for consumers and  society.  The consumer surplus standard 
recognizes that in addition to allocative efficiency,  productive and dynamic 
efficiency can benefit  consumers. It  also requires that created benefits should 
offset consumer harm to not be deemed anticompetit ive. While the total  surplus 
standard does not have this concern, increasing efficiency is the overarching goal,  
and whether gained benefits will  pass on to consumer s is not an antitrust concern 
but should be achieved through other policies.  Therefore, what determines the 
stated concept of “welfare” refers to whether “consumer welfare” or “total 
welfare” is  “distributional concerns” or “pass -on requirement”.  
We do not crit icize favoring the consumer surplus standard over total 
surplus standard, or vice versa ,  but there is an underlying risk to choosing either 
                                                             
159 See BORK (The Antitrust Paradox), p. 124-129. 
160 BORK (The Goals of Antitrust Policy), p. 251; BORK (The Antitrust Paradox), p. 132. 
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of them as a predominant goal for competition policy. Both standards misjudge 
that competit ion policy is not only about the consequences of the conduct , but 
also about competit ive process 161.  Thus, distinguishing good from bad directly via 
the “welfarist” point will  not serve to establish a fully competitive market 
environment.  
 2.2.2. Objective of Turkish competition law and policy  
 As mentioned above, The  Competition Authority defines its ultimate policy 
goal as protection of the competitive process in order to create an efficient market 
and increase consumer welfare. However,  they do not  define  “competit ive 
process” ,  “consumer welfare” ,  or which type of efficiency is referred  to. 
 Turkish li terature  indicates different opinions regarding the ultimate goal  
of competit ion policy. AŞÇIOĞLU ÖZ claims that protection of the competit ion 
process is an end in i tself,  and that efficiency and consumer welfare have emerged 
because of this process162.  TOPALÖMER shares this view and explicit ly states 
that consumer harm cannot be the ultimate test of anticompetitive conduct, 
because competit ion rules are designed to protect the “instit ution” of 
competit ion163.  Thus, this approach suggests that in the event of  injury to 
competit ion, even if the practice does not cause consumer harm, the competit ion 
authority should intervene 164.   
 However, ODMAN BOZTOSUN proposes that competition protection is 
subjective and unmeasurable; therefore, i t  should be understood that competit ion 
rules serve and should serve only  for consumer welfare through increasing 
                                                             
161 FARRELL/ KATZ, p. 7.  
162 AŞÇIOĞLU ÖZ, p. 15. 
163 TOPALÖMER, p. 28, 29. 
164 TOPALÖMER, p. 29. This is grounded in the belief that the undistorted competitive process will generally tend to 
maximize wealth and consumer welfar and EU competition rules do not require a finding of direct consumer harm. 
See EİLMANSBERGEr, Thomas, “How to Distinguish Good from Bad Competition under Article 82 EC: In Search 
of Clearer and More Coherent Standards for Anticompetitive Abuses”, 42 COMMON MARKET LAW REVİEW 
2005, p. 133; available at https://www.biicl.org/files/1403_eilmansberger_on_82.pdf (last visited 16.06.2017); 
SCHWEİTZER, Heike, “The History, Interpretation and Underlying Principles of Section 2 Sherman Act and Article 




efficiency165.  Consumer harm should function as a final test  of anticompetit ive 
conduct, i .e. ,  even if the practice restricts competit ion, if there is no consumer 
harm, the competition authority should not intervene 166.   
 GÜRKAYNAK shares this opinion, and considers protection of the 
competit ive process as a means, not a goal. However,  he states that competit ion 
law and policy cannot have more than one objective, such as protection of small - 
and medium-sized enterprises, fairness , or fighting inflation. There should be only 
one goal, “an overarching objective”, which should be social welfare 167.  He 
recognizes, though, that this goal cannot be a direct goal, because it  is not 
measurable. Thus, he suggests sett ing a target with an observable and measurable 
concept to achieve this end, namely “promoting economic efficiency”. He regards  
other objectives that are beyond the scope of economic efficiency as “function s” 
of competition law. Therefore, he contends that “consumer protection” cannot be 
an objective of competition law, but can be a positive external outcome that occurs 
in the social area, as a result  of reaching the antitrust goal168.  In summary, he 
agrees that total welfare should be the ultimate goal through increasing economic 
efficiency.  
 Before expounding our opinion, we would like to present several policy 
declarations of the Competit ion Authority. From our statement above, i t  is not 
clear whether “protection of competit ive process” is a means or an  end, or whether 
the role of “consumer welfare” is a “standard” that distinguish es anticompetit ive 
practice from pro-competitive practice. Furthermore, clarity i s needed on whether 
promoting efficiency and consumer welfare are two different objectives to be  
achieved, or whether the objective is “promoting consumer welfare through  
increasing efficiency”. If i t  is the latter, should distributional concerns be 
                                                             
165 ODMAN BOZTOSUN, Ayse, “Tek Yanli Davranislara Nasil Yaklasalim? [How Shall We Approach Unilateral 
Conduct?]”, 11 REKABET DERGISI 3 (2010), p. 134, 135, 159,160. 
166 ODMAN BOZTOSUN, p. 135. See also CSERES (2009) suggesting that in collusive and unilateral trade practices 
competition authorities and courts should require explicit proof of consumer harm in the relevant output market (p. 8, 
9). 
167 GÜRKAYNAK (2003), p. 65, 66. 
168 GÜRKAYNAK (2003), p.26-28.  
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considered? Moreover, is there any preference between dynamic and static 
efficiencies? In other words, does competit ion policy favor consumer interest in 
the long-term over the short -term, and whether political powers’ att itude s 
regarding “economic efficiency is the only matter”169 can influence the 
Competit ion Authority.  
 We will  recall  several policy declarations given by The Competit ion 
Authority to answer our questions:  
As the Competit ion Authority, our vision is…(to) increase consumer w elfare 
through the formation and protection of eff icient competitive markets ”170;  
“competit ion authorities which have an obligation to enforce competit ion 
laws are charged with taking the necessary measures and implementing the 
necessary regulations in order  to prevent practices and operations of 
undertakings which distort eff icient competitive conditions, with a view to 
increase social welfare by safeguarding the freedom of enterprise and 
ensuring eff iciency in resource allocation ”171;  “Consumer sovereignty 
means that consumers decide how much goods should be produced in a 
country, that is,  the consumers direct the allocation of resources. The 
dominance of the market economy is that this demand and the tendency to 
respond better than other systems. Raising the welfare of the societies 
depends on the most eff icient establishment of consumer sovereignty. In this 
way, the economic resources of the society can be used for the purpose of 
consumer needs. In such a system, the products that the consumers want to 
buy will  be produced in the quantity and quality that the consumers want, 
so that the needs will  be satisfied and the economic resources will  not be 
wasted… The most important of the economic development and expected 
practical outcomes that are to be achieved is  the prosperity, standard of 
l iving or quality of l i fe of the consumers. In another respect, the ultimate 
                                                             





goal of the competit ion rules is to increase the welfare level of the consumer 
and to use any kind of util ity that can be provided to consumers throug h 
the application of these rules 172.  
 Our first  determination is  that  even though social welfare is stated as an 
objective, i t  does not refer to total  welfare, but  to consumer welfare. Second, 
“protection of competitive process” may be understood as prevention of “restrain t 
on the competit ion”. The Turkish Competit ion Authority does not interpret that 
restrain on trade is il legal whenever i t  harms consume welfare.  However,  i ts 
understanding suggests that an undistorted competit ive market is established 
when “freedom of enterprise” is provide d while, at  the same time, “allocation of 
resources”  is ensured. The Authority explicit ly denotes that the consumer s should 
direct the resource allocation , which means thatconsumers should be free to buy 
the product  in the quantity and quality they “want”.  
  Third, consumer welfare is stated as an “expected outcome” and “the 
ultimate goal” of the competition rules . Thus, “protection of competit ive process” 
is a means  to increase consumer welfare. The consequences of determining this  
as a means  is: the objective “increase consumer welfare” has a different 
implementation from the consumer protection policy,  because, application of 
competit ion rules requires “injury to c ompetit ion”. Consumer harm without injury 
to competit ion is beyond the scope of competition rules , which is appropriate for  
two reasons: First ,  consumer law has more efficient tools for this situation 
(shorter process, burden of proof, and costs). Second, the competit ion authority 
should not intervene in an efficient  market. However, the competit ion rules will 
define injury to competit ion. Furthermore, the competit ion authority does not  
reduce consumer welfare to consumer surplus, but also considers i ts social 
aspects. 
                                                             
172 “The Fifth Competition Letter” issued by the President of Turkish Competition Authority (2013), available at 




 Concerning whether enhancing efficiency and consumer welfare can be 
selected as separates objectives, we conclude this as  a no. Otherwise, if efficiency 
defenses merely benefit  producers or sellers ,,  then neither social nor consumer 
welfare can be stated as competition policy objective. If the practice increase 
efficiency by merely exploitation of consumer, this practice should not be 
considered efficient. Thus, it  should be understood that the objective is  to 
“promote consumer welfare through efficiency”. This indicates that efficiency 
gains should pass on to  the consumer, whether in the short -term or the long-term. 
 The Turkish Competit ion Authority emphasizes quality of l ife and 
innovation173 and gives priority to the long-term interest of consumers. This 
understanding is explicit ly placed in the Guidelines (Technology Transfer 
Agreements) in no. 6 174 and 128.  
 However, the most important question may be whether distributional 
judgements will  be considered. There is no explicit  policy declarati on regarding 
this. Nonetheless, the practices that do not provide any efficiency –  but merely 
cause wealth transfer from producers to consumers – are not welcome. 
Furthermore, when the 1982 Constitution authorized ensuring a  free competit ive 
market, i t drew the boundaries of this authority with the principles of social state 
governance by rule.  
 It  is unfortunate that the development plan suggests that a competit ion 
policy should merely concern itself with economic efficiency. Polit ical powers 
                                                             
173 See the “Fifth Competition Letter”. 
174 Guidelines (Technology Transfer Agreements) n.6: “In the assessment of license agreements under articles 4 and 
5 of the Act, it must be kept in mind that the process of creating intellectual property rights often entails substantial 
investment and that this is often a risky activity. In order not to reduce dynamic competition and to maintain the 
incentive to innovate, the innovator must not be unduly restricted in the exploitation of intellectual property rights. 
For these reasons, it is important that the innovator should be free to determine the remuneration for the exploitation 
of intellectual property rights taking failed projects into account for maintaining their investment incentives. On the 
other hand, technology rights licensing may also require the licensee to make significant sunk investments. Articles 4 
and 5 must be applied by considering such ex ante investments made and the risks taken by the parties. Therefore, the 
risk facing the parties and the sunk investment that must be committed may thus constitute a reason for the relevant 
agreement to fall outside the prohibition in article 4 of the Act or benefit from the exemption in article 5 for the period 
of time required to recoup the investment”. 
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hold that income distribution should be targeted by other policies (education, 
employment, tax etc.)175,  but Turkey is situated between countries that have 
established income equality and those that have income inequality 176.  Thus, 
competit ion policy as a part  of econom ic policy should have its role in solving 
this problem. 
 The independence of the the Turkish Competit ion Authority from polit ical 
power is a key element of an effective competit ion regime. Regarding this, the 
Turkish Competit ion Authority has some safeguards that prevent undue political 
interference: 
 TCA Article 20 states the following:  
 The Co mpet it ion Author it y having a publ ic lega l persona l it y,  and an admin ist rat ive  
and financ ia l autonomy is e st abl ished to  ensure t he fo r mat ion and deve lopment  o f 
market s  fo r  goods and services in a free and sound compet it ive environment ,  to  observe  
the implementat ion o f t his Act ,  and to  fu lfi l l  t he dut ies ass igned to it  by the Ac t .  The  
Author ity is  independent  in fu lf i l l ing it s  dut ies.  No o rgan,  author it y and person may 
g ive co mmands and o rders to  inf luence the fina l dec is io n o f t he Author it y.  
 Furthermore, Article 22 regulates appointment of the Competit ion Board 
as: 
The Compet it ion Board is t he decis io n -mak ing body o f t he Author it y and is composed  
o f a  tot al o f seven members,  one be ing the Cha ir man and the o ther  be ing the Deputy 
Cha ir man.  The Counc il o f Min ist ers appo int s t he members fro m among the two  
cand idat es ap iece,  to  be nominated fro m ins ide o r  out side the fo llowing inst it ut ions fo r  
each vacant  membership:  t hree me mbers fro m the Minist r y,  one member  from the  
Minist r y o f Deve lopment ,  one member  fr om Turk ish Unio n o f Chambers and Co mmodit y 
Exchanges,  and one member  from amo ng the two cand idat es ap iece,  to  be nominated  
fro m ins ide the Supreme Cour t  o f Appea ls and Counc il o f St at e.  One o f t he members to  
be recru it ed fro m the quo ta o f t he Minist ry o f Customs and Trade is appo int ed fro m 
among the personne l o f t he Author it y.  
                                                             
175 See the Ninth Development Plan. 
176 See OECD data, available at https://data.oecd.org/turkey.htm. 
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 The Authority has financial autonomy and to prevent i ts subordination to 
polit ical repression, the polit ical authority can propose only two members for the 
establishment of the Board. Although these legal and structural provisions do not 
automatically lead to an independent agency,  they are nevertheless important 
determinants for independence.  
 The Competit ion Authority does not have the status of an independent 
autonomous authority,  because of the strict  formal rules of Turkish 
Administrative Law. However, i t is generally accepted that the Competit ion 
Authority has a sui-generis  structure, whose foundat ion of formation is based in 
the constitution177.  
 Moreover, wording of the TCA does not have as i ts objective the 
implementation of “fairness”.  However, the objective of increasing consumer 
welfare cannot be achieved if the enforcement  thereof does not require at  least a 
fair share of the efficiency gains to pass on to  consumers. Even if  one of the 
secondary legislations have this requirement, they are not binding rules but mere 
guidelines178.   
 In summary, our reading suggests that Turkish competition policy aims to 
increase consumer welfare through efficiency. Therefore, merely increasing 
efficiency will  not serve this objective. The conduct that restrain s competit ion, 
while creat ing efficiencies will  be allowed , but only if consumers receive benefits 
from these.  Then, i t  requires a further measure, namely to “pass on to consumer”. 
Thus, protection of competit ion  cannot be an end in itself,  because efficiencies 
and consumer welfare do not always occur simultaneously.  It  requires 
                                                             
177 AKINCI, Müslüm, “Ekonomik Kamu Düzeni ve Rekabet Kurumu”, [Economic Public Order and Competition 
Authority], REKABET DERGİSİ 5 (2001), pp. 6-10. 
178 Guidelines (Technology Transfer Agreements) in no. 128: “Within the framework of the second condition of article 
5 of the Act, the condition that consumers must receive a fair share of the benefits, implies that consumers of the 
products produced under the license must at least be compensated for the negative effects of the agreement. This 
means that the efficiency gains must fully off-set the likely negative impact on prices, output and other relevant factors 
caused by the agreement. This may be possible by changing the cost structure of the undertakings concerned, giving 
them an incentive to reduce price, or by allowing consumers to gain access to new or improved products and thus any 
likely price increase could be compensated”. 
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determination of “consumer welfare” and preference between types of  efficiency. 
In this context, consumer welfare is not equal to consumer surplus ; i t  indicates 
consumer preference. Within this framework, consumer preference also identif ies 
which type of efficiency is given weight in each case. At the same time, increasing 
consumer welfare or promoting efficiency objectives should not be considered 
stand-alone to determine competitive harm, or they cannot provide an overarching 
theory of competit ive harm, because they focus on the outcome of the conduct, 
not the competit ive process i tself.  Our thesis suggests  inclusion of the 
“competitive process”  in the determination of competit ive harm, therefore 
determination of “abuse”. With “competit ive process”, we refer to “competit iv e 
environment” ,  which is the desired market structure in which all  market actors 















CONCEPT OF UNILATERALLY IMPOSED EXPLOITATIVE TYING  
 The second chapter clarifies the necessary terminology for the analysis of 
unilaterally imposed tying conduct and reviews the legal framework for assessing 
tying practice under different competit ion law s to understand the addressed 
anticompetit ive harm and antitrust concerns about the outcome of the tying cases. 
This chapter primarily aims to combine the understanding that we presented in 
the first  chapter , interpret  competition policy objective as “maintain competit ive 
process” or “protection of competition ” as an end in i tself with the understanding 
that the competition policy objective embraces consumer welfare. To answer 
whether the pure exploitative effect of a behavior cannot be addressed by 
competit ion law because such a practice does not cause “injury to competit ion” , 
we will  review the excessive -pricing analysis under Turkish competit ion law . In 
this regard, this chapter will determine what the concerned competitive harm in 
this exploitative practice  is, when pure exploitative practice requires the 
competit ion authority’s intervention, and what represents the “injury to 
competit ion”.  
1. TYING ARRANGEMENTS AND PRICE DISCRIMINATION  
1.1. Tying Arrangement  
The classic definition of tying comes from the case Northern Pacific R. Co. v.  
United States179,  in which the Court defined a tying arrangement as “ [1] an 
agreement by a party [who] sell  one product [tying product], but only on the 
condition that the buyer also purchases a different (or t ied) product, or [2] at  least 
agrees that he will  not purchase that product from any other supplier”.  
 The first  part  of the definition refers to the most traditional form of a tying 
arrangement, where a seller requires a buyer to purchase two products. In general, 
tying occurs when a consumer who wants to buy a product (product A) is also 
                                                             
179 356 U.S. 1 (1958), at 5, 6.  
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required to buy another product (product B). Product A cannot be bought without 
product B; on the contrary, product B can be purchased individually.  Product A 
is called the “tying product”, while product B is the “tied product”.  
 The second part  of the given definition refers to anoth er form of tying that 
occurs when seller X announces that he/she will  only sell  i tem A (tying product) 
to consumers who agree not to purchase item B (tied product) from seller Y. Here,  
seller X does not demand that consumers purchase the t ied product from seller X, 
but consumers simply cannot purchase it  from seller Y. This form of tying is  
called “conditional tying” 180.  
 The terms “tying”,  “tying arrangement” and “tie -in” are used 
interchangeably, and they do not have conceptual difference s. However, tying can 
take several formats. We suggest a categorization based on 1) form of integration 
of t ied product 2) purchasing time of the products 3) availabili ty of components 
separately (bundling).  
 The integration form of the t ied product refers to the distinction between 
technological tying and contractual tying. Technological tying occurs when one 
product is integrated into another and cannot easily be removed without harming 
the whole product itself ,  or the tying product is  designed in a way that only 
functions with the specific tied product181.  For example, the video game Halo is 
exclusive to the Xbox format, thus a consumer who wants to  buy Halo must also 
buy the Xbox hardware.  
                                                             
180 See KLEİN, Benjamin and WILEY JR., John S., “Competitive Price Discrimination as an Antitrust Justification 
for Intellectual Property Refusals to Deal”, 70 ANTITRUST LAW JOURNALS 3 (2003), p. 601, available at 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40843568 (last visited 10.02.2017);  LESLIE, Christopher R., “Unilaterally Imposed 
Tying Arrangements and Antitrust's Concerted Action Requirement”, 60 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL 5 (1999), 
p. 1780 (fn.:21), available at http://hdl.handle.net/1811/65031 (last visited 22.03.2017) [hereinafter LESLIE (1999)]. 
181 NALEBUFF, Barry, “Bundling, Tying, and Portfolio Effects”, DTI ECONOMICS PAPER NO. 1 (February 2003), 
p. 14, available at http://faculty.som.yale.edu/barrynalebuff/BundlingTyingPortfolio_Conceptual_DTI2003.pdf (last 
visited 03.05.2017) [hereinafter NALEBUFF (Bundling)]. 
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 Contractual tying,  on the other hand, occurs w hen the purchase of one 
product involves a contractual obligation to also purchase another ;  there is no 
technical or physical obstacle to separating one product from the other 182.  
 Tying based on purchasing time of the products occurs in two forms: Static 
tying and dynamic tying. In static tying, a consumer who wants to buy A must  
also buy B at the t ime of purchase183.  In dynamic tying, in order to purchase item 
A, the consumer is also required to purchase item B. However,  the difference from 
the static form is  that the quantity of i tem B may vary from consumer to consumer 
and the amount of the tied goods to purchase is not determined at the t ime of the 
initial  purchase184.  For example, a seller of printer s requires the purchaser also to 
buy ink. The consumer does not need to determine how much ink to buy at the 
t ime of purchasing the printer and will  buy the amount of ink depending on his/her 
product usage. Another difference is that the goods involved in the dynamic tie 
products are complementary, i .e. ,  to use printer, ink is necessary185.  
 The basic economic motivation behind dynamic tying is to engage in price 
discrimination by charging different prices to different consumers, based on their 
valuation of the product. Such ties are typically called “metering ties”, because 
they use the demand for the t ied product to measure differences in consumer 
values for tying product, which are presu med to vary with intensity of  use 186.   
                                                             
182 NALEBUFF (Bundling), p. 14. 
183 EKDİ, Baris, “Ürün Baglama ve Paket Satislar Yoluyla Hakim Durumun Kötüye Kullanilmasi” [Abuse of 
Dominant Position Through Product Bundling and Package Sales], p. 455, 446, in Abuse of Dominant Position: 
Problems and Solution Suggestion Symposium, 22.06.2010), On Iki Levha Yayincilik, Istanbul 2011. 
184 KARAKILINÇ, Hasan, Rekabet Hukukunda Baglama Uygulamalari [Tying Practices in Competition Law], On Iki 
Levha Yayincilik, Istanbul 2013, p. 21. 
185 NALEBUFF (Bundling), p. 16. 
186 KLEIN/ WILEY, p. 601, 602; LAMBERT, Thomas A., “Appropriate Liability Rules for Tying and Bundled 
Discounting” (July 9, 2011), Ohio State Law Journal, Forthcoming; University of Missouri School of Law Legal 
Studies Research Paper No. 2011-04, p. 8, available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1781130 (last visited 16.07.2016) 
[hereinafter Lambert (2011)]. See BOWMAN, Ward S. Jr., “Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem”, 67 
YALE LAW JOURNAL (1957), p. 23, available at http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/4246 (last visited 
10.03.2016) [hereinafter BOWMAN (Leverage Problem)] (explaining that when different buyers use different 
quantities of tied product with one unit of the tying product, if the tying product is worth more to the intensive users 
than to the less intensive users, tying can achieve the goal of discriminatory pricing for the tying product, and in this 
situation, the tied product serves as a counting device to measure how intensively the tying product is being used). 
See also BURSTEIN, M. L., “A Theory of Full-Line Forcing”, 8 J. REPRINTS ANTITRUST L. & ECON. (1977), p. 
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 Tying is also used interchangeably with “bundling”. However,  bundling can 
be formed in two types: Pure bundl ing and mixed bundling. Pure bundling occurs 
when two products A and B are sold together and they are not avai lable for 
individual purchase187.  Furthermore, they are sold only in fixed proportion s, 
meaning consumers can only purchase the entire bundle. Bundle s can include more 
than two products, in which case it  is referred to as a “package tie -in”188.  Thus, 
general tying differs from pure bundling, because in the former , the tied product 
is available for individual purchase.  
 In mixed bundling, products A and B are sold together and each of them is 
also available individually189.  The package should sell  at  a discount compared to 
the individual price. If the sum of the price of A and B is equal to the A and B 
package, then it  is not classified as mixed bundling 190.  Tying is a special case of 
mixed bundling.  
 Tying and bundling are common practice s, and they encompass costs  and 
benefits from an efficiency perspective. At the same time, the main antitrust 
concern against tying and bundling  is that  they inevitably restrain consumer 
choice, and choice is the core element for a fully competit ive environment. 
Therefore, the difficulty from an antitrust perspective is to separate good from 
bad, as is determining the factors of efficiency and restriction in competition, and 
the trade-off between them. 
 1.2. Price Discrimination  
 Price discrimination generally is  defined as the situation in which the same 
product is sold to different buyers at  different prices. However, these differences 
                                                             
613, 614 available at: 
http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/illlr55&div=13&g_sent=1&collection=journals, (last visited 
09.08.2017) [hereinafter BURSTEIN (Full-line Forcing)]. 
187 KARAKILINÇ, p. 17. 
188 NALEBUFF (Bundling), p. 13, 14. 
189 EKDİ, p. 81; KARAKILINÇ, p. 18. 
190 NALEBUFF (Bundling), p. 14. 
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in price do not necessarily reflect the differences in the cost of supply 191.  If the  
same price is charged to all  the consumers while the costs of supplying them are 
considerably different, i t  is also regarded as price discrimination. In other words, 
different prices for the same product do not necessarily amount to price 
discrimination, as such difference may be justified by cost variations 192.  
 Therefore, more technically and accurately, price discrimination is defined 
as “sales at  differing ratios of price to marginal cost, or as prices that have 
different percentage markups in relation to cost” 193.  
 It  is generally remarked that in the absence of one or several conditions 
below, price discrimination is impossible or at  least unlikely to succeed 194: 
1) A firm must have some market power (the abili ty of  set supra -
competit ive prices) to be able to price discrim inate. Monopoly or 
dominance position is not essential  for price discrimination to occur; thus, 
price discrimination can be observed even in highly competit ive markets.  
2) The firm must have the abili ty to categorize consumers according to 
their will ingness to pay for each unit .   
3) The firm must be able to prevent or l imit the arbitrage between 
consumers, i .e. ,  resale of goods or services from consumers paying the 
lower price to those who pay the higher price.  
                                                             
191 BISHOP, Simon, “Delivering Benefits To Consumers Or Per Se Illegal? Assessing The Competitive Effects Of 
Loyalty Rebates”, in The Pros and Cons of Price Discrimination, Swedish Competition Authority, Stockholm 2005, 
p. 65, 66 [hereinafter BISHOP (Royalty Rebates)]. 
192 GERADIN, Damien and PETIT, Nicolas, “Price Discrimination Under EC Competition Law: Another Antitrust 
Doctrine in Search of Limiting Principles?”, 2 JOURNAL OF COMPETITION LAW AND ECONOMICS 3 (2006), 
p. 482, available at doi:10.1093/joclec/nhl013 (last visited 04.04.2017) [hereinafter GERADIN/ PETIT (2006)]. 
193 See HOVENKAMP, Erik & HOVENKAMP, Herbert, “Tying Arrangements and Antitrust Harm”, 52 ARIZONA 
LAW REVIEW (2010), p. 938, available at 
http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/arz52&div=39&g_sent=1&collection=journals (last visited 
15.08.2016) [hereinafter HOVENKAMP/ HOVENKAMP (2010)]. See also KLEIN/ WILEY, p. 603 (”…economic 
definition of price discrimination, whereby a firm takes advantage of differing elasticities of demand for similar goods 
by charging different profit-maximizing prices relative to cost”). 
194 GERADIN/ PETIT (2006), p. 482. 
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 It  is generally stated that price discriminat ion strategy serves to extract 
surplus from consumers as far as possible 195.  However, price discrimination is a 
very common practice and has different forms.  
 First ,  categorization of price discrimination is based on work of Pigou 196,  
which proposes categoriza tion of price discrimination depending on the way in 
which the seller segments consumers: first -,  second- and third-degree price 
discrimination. 
 First -degree price discrimination is referred to as perfect price 
discrimination, because it occurs when the f irm is able to charge the exact 
valuation (willingness to pay)  of each consumer for each unit  of a given product  
or service197.  However, most economists indicate that this scenario is extremely 
rare in practice, since it  requires that the firm has perfect kn owledge of i ts 
customers’ willingness to pay.  
 Firms select second-degree price discrimination when they know that there 
are different types of consumers in the market, but unlike first -degree price 
discrimination, the seller is not able to sort  consumers individually to distinguish 
among them198.  Thus, in second-degree price discrimination , the seller offers 
products or services under a single price scheme, but the price differs related to 
consumer consumption patterns199.  In other words, second-degree price 
discrimination occurs when certain selling practices are used to induce consumers 
to self-select according to willingness to pay 200.  The quantity discounts or prices 
for first- and second-class travels are regarded as second-degree price 
discrimination.  
                                                             
195 V. PERES, Catarina/ LEİTÃO, Morais/ TELES, Galvão, “Price Dsicrimination- AirportsCase”, p. 292, 293, 
available at http://www.mlgts.pt/xms/files/Publicacoes/Artigos/561.pdf (last visited 20.04.2017) (hereinafter V. 
PERES et al.). 
196 PIGOU, Arthur Cecil, The Economics Of Welfare, Fourth Edition, McMillian, London (1932). 
197 GERADIN/ PETIT, p. 483; V. Peres et al., p. 287. 
198 V. PERES et al., p. 289. 
199 HOVENKAMP/ HOVENKAMP (2010), p. 933-936.  
200 BISHOP (Royalty Rebates), p. 68. 
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 Third-degree price discrimination occurs when a firm charges different 
prices to different consumer groups depending on their elasticity of  demand 201.  
Consumers with high elasticity of demand will  be charged higher prices than those 
with low elasticity of demand. Unlike second-degree price discrimination, seller 
does not need to rely on consumer self -selecting mechanism. Under third -degree  
price discrimination, the seller divides consumers into groups before the sale and 
charges different prices for each group 202.  For example, a movie theater that offers 
a discount to children, students , and senior cit izens falls under third -degree price 
discrimination. 
 The welfare effects of first -degree price discrimination are not discussed 
extensively, since it  does not occur in reality,  but i t  is observed that since every 
individual buyer is charged his/her reservation price, the output resorts to the 
competit ive level203.  Therefore total welfare would be higher than monopoly 
pricing, yet charging the maximum from each consumer (who is will ing to pay for 
a given product or service ), perfect price discrimination would extract all 
consumer surpluses204.  
 However, contrary to first -degree discrimination, second- and third-degree  
price discrimination are common and  their welfare effect draws attention. Second - 
and third-degree price discrimination are considered that they may  increase 
welfare when they allow a firm to supply a group of  consumers that would not be 
supplied in the absence of price discrimination 205.  
 In general, second-degree price discrimination is competitive and welfare 
augmenting in that  i ts effects are similar to  perfect price discrimination. In 
second-degree price discrimination, everyone is offered the same price schedule 
with different unit  prices corresponding to different quantit ies or product 
                                                             
201 GERADIN/ PETIT, p. 483. 
202 See HOVENKAMP/ HOVENKAMP (2010), p. 934-937.  
203 HOVENKAMP/ HOVENKAMP (2010), p. 935; GERADIN/ PETIT, p. 484. 
204 HOVENKAMP/ HOVENKAMP (2010), p. 935; GERADIN/ PETIT, p. 484. 
205 GERADIN/ PETIT, p. 484. 
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varieties. Therefore, as the number of classifications in the scheme increase s, the 
scheme nears approximating first -degree or perfect price discrimination 206.   
This analogy indicates that under second-degree price discrimination, each 
individual purchaser pays his or her reservation price and output increases toward 
the competit ive level. Even though the price scheme is offered to everyone,  
different purchasers make different choices based on their will ingness to pay, thus 
profitabili ty is higher for some classifications than for others 207.  In summary, in 
second-degree price discrimination , i t is assumed that output increases, total 
welfare enhances, and consumer welfare varies depending on the reservation price 
and consumption patterns.   
 Welfare effects are different under third-degree price discrimination, 
because the seller divides purchasers into separate groups based on observations 
about their will ingness to pay. Each group is charged a unique price and pr ices 
offered to one group are not made available to the other group. For instance, a 
concert ticket is sold to students at  20 liras, and at  36 liras for non-students. This 
type of discrimination is profitable only when the consumers’ reservation price is 
concentrated into two or more distinct price intervals 208.  If the seller charges a 
unique price for all  purchaser s, i t would in all  likelihood be set at  somewhere 
between the high and low price ( in the case of 20 to 36 liras, the resultant price 
would be 28 liras).  
Furthermore, the discrimination scheme excludes consumers whose  
valuations is below the price (20 liras), but includes consumers whose reservation 
price is lower than the non-discriminatory price (28 liras) but higher than the low 
price (20 liras).  The seller selects discrimination as offering lower prices for 
consumers who have low valuations, hoping to recover this loss (8 l iras) from 
consumers who have relatively higher valuations.  
                                                             
206 HOVENKAMP/ HOVENKAMP (2010), p. 934, 935. 
207 HOVENKAMP/ HOVENKAMP (2010), p. 935; GERADIN/ PETIT, p. 484, 485. 
208 HOVENKAMP/ HOVENKAMP (2010), p. 934. 
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Moreover, third-degree price discrimination excludes those consumers 
whose reservation price is higher than the non-discriminatory pricing (28 liras) 
but lower than the discriminatory pricing (36 liras). For instance, a non -student 
whose reservation price is 29 liras would be able to buy ticket under non -
discriminatory pricing, but would not be able to under discriminatory pricing. 
Therefore, third-degree price discrimination redirect s output from consumers with 
relatively high valuations to those with relatively low ones, and consumer welfare 
will  be jeopordized even if output levels are maintained but do not increase 209.  
  Continuing with the same example, the seller identifies two groups of  
consumers and offers the t ickets to first  group at 20 liras and to second group at  
36 liras. Consumers in the second groups (non -students) will  purchase if their 
reservation price ia equal to 36 liras or more, but a consumer (X) cannot purchase 
even if his/her reservation price is 35 liras , which is sti l l  profitable for the seller, 
yet the seller will  sell  the t ickets to a student (Y) whose reservation price is 25 
liras. In this instance , consumer X would have 7 l iras ’  (35-28) consumer surplus 
loss under discriminatory pricing, while student Y would not have 5 liras (25 -20) 
consumer surplus loss under non-discriminatory pricing. There fore, the 
discrimination scheme removes the sale from a consumer whose reservation price 
is relatively higher, and shifts  i t  to a consumer whose reservation price is 
relatively lower. Hence, it  requires that the seller should sell  more tickets under 
discriminatory pricing to not reduce consumer welfare.  
 Another categorization suggested for price discrimination based on to 
whom the discrimination is directed: Primary line injury and secondary line injury 
to competition. 
 Primary-line discrimination is the practice that damages competit ion 
between the undertaking and its rivals by causing the exclusion of i ts rivals210.  In 
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this case, price discrimination directly harms a rival, and this may cause an injury 
to competition and thereby generate indirect harm to cu stomers. 
 Secondary-line discrimination is the practice that distorts competition in 
the downstream amongst the customers or third parties of the discriminating 
undertaking211.  This results in a practice that directly harms the customers of the 
firm. 
 The incentives, the ability, and the welfare effects of price discrimination 
are significantly varied based on the type of discriminating practice, therefore i t 
requires accurate categorization of the alleged practice and applies different 
economic and legal principles. 
 It  should be noted that  for the antitrust concern , welfare effects of price 
discrimination should not play a decisive role , not only because they are  
ambiguous, but also because those determinations are based on “perfect price 
discrimination’ as a benchmark. An antitrust analysis that  is only based on welfare 
effects of price discrimination will  imply that competit ion policy maximizes 
surplus or efficiency,  because any deviation from “perfect price d iscrimination” 
will  be deemed anticompetit ive .  
2. TYPE OF CONDUCT AND ABUSE  
2.1. Type of Conduct: Unilateral Conduct and Agreement (Concerted Action)  
Competit ion laws generally establish a dual approach to anticompetitive conduct : 
Agreement by at least two undertakings and unilaterally behavior by one 
undertaking.  
 The term agreement is used to refer to all  forms of compromise or accords 
to which the parties feel bound, even if these do not meet the conditions for 
validity as regards the civil  law. It  is not important whether the agreement is 
written or oral.  Even if the existence of an agreement between the parties cannot 
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be established,  direct or indirect relations between the undertakings that replace 
their own independent activities and ensure a coordination and practical 
cooperation are prohibited if they lead to restriction on competit ion.  
 Agreements restricting competit ion may be i n the form of vertical or 
horizontal agreements. Horizontal restrictions are the agreements between actual 
or potential  competitors operating at the same level of production and distribution 
process. On the other hand, vertical restriction agreements occur  for the purchase, 
sale, or resale of certain goods or services between two or more undertakings 
operating at different levels of the production or distribution chain (e.g. 
manufacturer, wholesaler, supplier, customer , and licensee). 
 Competit ion authorit ies are usually more concerned with concerted practice 
to restrain competit ion. Unilateral conduct of a single undertaking is subject to 
antitrust scrutiny only when it  has a dominant position or monopoly.  There are 
practical consequences to make this disti nction upfront because threshold for 
l iabili ty differs.  
 It  is not always easy to distinguish the concept of agreement from unilateral 
practices that do not require the express or implied participation of another 
undertaking. EU courts apply the criterion of “a concurrence of wills between at 
least two parties” to make this distinction212.  
2.2. Type of Abuse: Exploitative and Exclusionary  
In competition laws, generally i t  is not inherently i l legal for an undertaking to 
hold a dominant position or for a firm to hold monopoly power, provided these 
                                                             
212 European Court of Justice decision,06.01.2004, BAI and Commission of the European Communities v Bayer AG, 
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powers result  from their internal efficiencies213.  However, dominant undertakings 
and monopolies are considered to have a “special responsibility” to avoid their 
conduct from restrict ing competition214.   
The main objection to an undertaking with market power is i ts abili ty to  
abuse its position in a way that would not be possible for an undertaking on a 
competit ive market. In this respect, there has traditionally been a division of 
antitrust enforcement of unilateral condu ct into behavior that exploits market 
power, and behavior that helps to acquire, strengthen or protect market power 215.  
The former is called “exploitative abuse”, while the latter is “exclusionary abuse”.  
 The further distinction between exclusionary and exp loitative abuse is216:  
Exclusionary abuses are the practices of a dominant undertaking which seek to 
harm the competit ive position of i ts competitors or to exclude them from the 
market, and therefore may harm consumers indirectly .  Exploitative abuses can be 
defined as attempts by a dominant undertaking to use the opportunities provided 
by its market power to harm consumers directly . 
 In practice, it  is not possible always to categorize a practice as purely 
exclusionary or exploitative. Usually exclusionary practices are assumed to also 
be exploitative, since they harm consumers indirectly. Furthermore, they are  
condemned not because of their effects on competitors, but because of their effect 
on market structure. Considerat ion of consumer harm that results from 
exclusionary conduct and pure exploitative behavior (that does not affect market 
structure) are assumed il legal depend ing on the chosen competition policy.  
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 The competit ive effects of tying can be either exclusionary or exploitative. 
Historical ly, exclusionary tying was explained with “leverage theory”. According 
to i t , a firm with market power (usually a monopoly) in one market could use this 
market power to extend its power into a second (tied) market and thereby ext ract 
higher prices from consumers 217.  In this case , the exclusionary effect is extension 
of the market power via tying; this extension affects the number of t ied sales in 
the relevant market, yet i t  does not necessarily lead to the exclusion of any rival 
(foreclosure).  
 Another exclusionary effect of tying is anticompetit ive foreclosure, which 
is the most stated antitrust concern with tying practices. Foreclosure refers to the 
situation where a firm with market power eliminates or impedes actual or potential  
competitors’ access to sources of supply or  markets, to the detriment of the 
consumers218.  Harm to consumers may occur in the form of increased prices, 
decreased product quality and level of innovation, and reduced variety of goods 
and services219.  Thus, those exclusionary effects are deemed also exploitative 
since they harm consumers indirectly.  
 Exploitative effects of tying occur when tying facili tates price 
discrimination. For instance, if the t ied product (e.g. ink) is a complement for the 
tying product (e.g. printer) that is used in varying amounts by different 
consumers, a firm may be able to price discriminate between heavy and low -
intensity users of the tying product by pricing the t ied product above the 
competit ive level and lowering the price of the tying product 220.  Thus, the overall 
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effect of the tying pricing will  result  in the heavy users paying more for the tying 
product.  
 There is also a third type of conduct that is called “discriminatory”. 
Discriminatory abuses can be exclusionary or exploitati ve. 
 Primary-line injury cases that cause injury to a rival while harming 
consumers are considered exclusionary abuses.  
 Regarding secondary-line discrimination, the type of abuse depends on 
whether the dominant firm is vertically integrated. If the firm e xploits i ts market 
power in upstream market and thus damages or distorts competit ion amongst i ts  
vertically integrated undertaking(s) and other customers in a downstream market, 
i t  will  be called “distortionary pr ice discrimination” 221.  It  involves a  leverage 
strategy that may lead  to exclusion of rivals of dominant undertaking’s 
downstream operations222.  
 If the non-vertically integrated firm exploits i ts market power to 
discriminate amongst i ts customer or consumer, it  will  be called “exploitative 
price discrimination”223.  
 This classifying matter, since exclusionary and exploitative abuses are 
addressed by different legal and economic understanding s, and relative 
competit ion laws may also require different remedies.  
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harm to a competitor). 
223 OECD (Price Discrimination), n. 25; LANG, John Temple/ O’DONOGHUE, Robert, “Defining Legitimate 
Competition: How to Clarify Pricing Abuses Under Article 82 EC”, 26 FORDHAM INT’L LAW JOURNAL 1 (2002), 
p.86, available at http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1866&context=ilj (last visited 
14.07.2017); GERARD, Damien, “Price Discrimination under Article 82(2)(c) EC: Clearing up the Ambiguities”, 
Global Competition Law Centre Research Papers (2005), p. 17, available at 




3. LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING TYING AND PRICE 
DISCRIMINATION 
3.1. US Antitrust Law  
 Tying arrangements can be subject to antitrust l iability assessment under 
Section 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, Section 3 of the Clayton Act , or Section 5 of 
the Federal Trade Commission Act.  
 Section 1 of the Sherman Act states that “[e]very contract, combination in 
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce 
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal”. Even 
though this norm literally forbids every contract or agreement, since all  contracts 
or agreement unavoidably would restrain trade on some level, in an early case the 
Supreme Court declared that Section 1 aims to deter only “unreasonable” 
restraint224.   
 However, this l imitation does not clarify i ts scope, and it  remains to the 
courts’ interpretation to establish the criteria for each type of conduct or for each 
case. Therefore, i t  is the tying case law that indicates antitrust l iabili ty of tying.  
 Section 2 of the Sherman Act proscribes “[e]very  person who shall  
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other 
person or persons, to monopolize any part  of the trade or commerce among the 
several States, or with foreign nations”. This norm does not prohibit  the legally 
obtained monopoly itself,  but circumscribes the firm to enjoy its monopoly power 
by not allowing conduct that only intends to obtain, maintain , or extend monopoly 
power.  
 Section 3 of the Clayton Act declares the following:  
I t  sha ll be unlawfu l fo r  any person engaged in co mmerce,  in t he course o f such 
commerce,  to  lease or make a sa le o r cont ract  fo r sa le o f goods, wares,  merchand ise,  
machiner y,  supp l ies,  o r  other  commodit ies,  whether  pat ented o r  unpatented,  fo r  use,  
                                                             
224 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). 
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consumpt ion,  o r  resa le … or  any insu lar  possess io n o r  other  place under  t he jur isd ict ion 
of t he Unit ed Stat es,  o r fix  a pr ice charged therefo r ,  o r discount  fro m,  or  rebat e upon, 
such pr ice,  on the cond it ion,  agreement ,  or  underst and ing that  t he lessee o r  purchaser  
t hereo f sha l l not  use or  deal in  t he goods,  wares,  merchand ise,  machiner y,  supp l ies,  o r 
other  commodit ies o f a  compet it o r or compet it ors o f t he lesso r o r se ller ,  where the 
e ffect  o f such lease,  sa le,  o r cont ract  fo r  sa le o r such cond it ion,  agreement ,  or 
underst and ing may be to  subst ant ia l ly le ssen co mpet it ion o r  t end to  creat e a monopo ly 
in any l ine o f co mmerce.   
 This is the only norm that specific ally bans tying arrangements if the single-
firm conduct or the agreement “substantially lessen s competit ion” or “tends to 
create a monopoly”. Even though it  deals with specifically tying arrangement, 
tying can be sti l l  challenged under Section 1 or Section 2 of the Sherman Act 225.  
 Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act prohibits “unfair methods 
of competit ion in or affecting commerce”, and “unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices in or affecting commerce”. Its scope is wider than the Sherman Act in a 
sense that all  violations of the Sherman Act also violate the FTC Act 226,  and it  can 
also address the other practi ces that harm competit ion by not complying with the 
Sherman Act 227.  
                                                             
225 See United Shoe Machinery Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451(1922), at 459,460 (“The Sherman Act and the 
Clayton Act provide different tests of liability…[W]e pointed out that the Clayton Act was intended to supplement 
the Sherman Act, and, within its limited sphere, established its own rule…The cause of action is therefore not the 
same.”). See International Salt Co., Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947), at 394-296 (hereinafter Int. Salt) (the 
tying arrangement challenged under both section 1 of the Sherman Act and section 3 of the Clayton Act). 
226 Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953), at 609 (hereinafter Times-Picayune). 
227 Baker and Salop express that merely by exploiting that market power to charge supra-competitive prices generally 
does not violate the Sherman Act, and they purpose a change in policy which might require legislative action to 
condemn monopolistic “exploitative” conduct, but this policy might be implemented by Federal Trade Commission 
under its existing statute, if the FTC concludes that monopoly pricing or price discrimination targeted at less 
advantaged consumers can be an unfair practice in violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act 
(BAKER, Jonathan B.  and SALOP, Steven C., “Antitrust, Competition Policy, and Inequality”, 104 THE 
GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL ONLINE (2015), p. 22, 23, available at 
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1294&context=facsch_lawrev (last visited 
19.04.2017). Cf. CARLTON, Dennis W. and HEYER, Ken, “Appropriate Antitrust Policy Towards Single-Firm 
Conduct”, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS GROUP DISCUSSION PAPER No. EAG 08-2 (March 2008), p. 3, available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1111665 (last visited 10.04.2017). [hereinafter CARLTON/ HEYER (Appropriate Antitrust 
Policy)] (claiming it has been accepted that high profits are a deserved reward for success, thus denying a firm the 
opportunity to benefit from lawfully obtained market power would be unfair). 
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 A Tying arrangement can be challenged under those four provisions of the 
antitrust law, but each of them provides different tests of liabili ty. One can see 
that among the provisions, the highest threshold is brought by Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act, because it  deals with single -firm conduct (therefore concerted 
action is beyond its scope) and it  requires exclusionary effect s such as obtaining, 
maintaining, or extending of market power.  
 Nonetheless, tying practice by a monopolist  can sti l l  be challenged under 
Section 3 of the Clayton Act, which sets lower threshold s for tying monopoly 
power by not requiring a foreclosure effect, but requiring that actions 
“substantially lessen competiti on”.  
 On the other hand, the same provision foresees higher threshold s for the 
tying practice by not requiring a monopol istic power on the tying product, but is 
able to condemn tying market power if i t  substantially lessens competit ion 228.   
 Section 1 of the Sherman Act sets the lowest threshold to trigger the 
antitrust l iability in a sense that its scope is wider than Section 2 of the Sherman 
Act and Section 3 of the Clayton Act. It  does not require “substantially lessen 
competit ion” ,  but “unreasonab le restraint on trade”. Since all  tying arrangements 
have this character that affects the sale of tied products, they are all considered a 
restraint.  
 Moreover, Section 1 of the Sherman  Act does not demand obtain, maintain, 
or extend tying monopoly power or single firm conduct, but li terally includes 
single firm conducts and concerted agreements. Therefore, the structure of this 
section provides antitrust l iabili ty for all  tying arrangements . 
 The 1984 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist .  v. Hyde 229 is one of the cornerstone 
cases in tying case law. The Court noted that even though the per se  rule 
                                                             
228 Cf. Times-Picayune, at 608-609 (The Court distinguished between the Clayton Act and the Sherman Act regarding 
monopoly requirement for tying inquiry and imposed that monopoly requirement is necessary just in the latter). 
However, this approach had never been embraced by the courts. 
229 466 U.S. 2 (1984). 
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automatically condemns any conduct that fell into a certain category,  which was 
the rule endorsed since In ternational Business Machines Corp. v. U.S.  (1936) for 
tying arrangement , the court found that this rule should be discriminated for tying 
and at least a threshold should be required 230.  Therefore, the Court established a 
threshold requirement to condemn tyi ng il legal per se .   
 The Court contended that at  least these three questions should be asked 
before condemning tying per se  i l legal : 1) whether the tying and tied product are 
separate231;  2) whether tying affects a “not insubstantial  foreclosure of commerce”  
in t ied product market232;  and 3) whether there is “sufficient market power” in the 
tying product market233.   
 Requirement of the last  two together were called “forcing” and the Court 
determined that “forcing” is the main reason to condemn tying and it  exists  when 
“ the seller's exploitation of i ts control over the tying product to force the buyer 
into the purchase of a t ied product that the buyer either did not want at all  or 
might have preferred to purchase elsewhere on different terms ”234.  
 The “Forcing” test  requires an independent evidence of “market power” and 
the abili ty to use this power to compel consumers to purchase the t ied product, 
which it  assumes is only possible when consumers have price consciousness and 
awareness of the quality of the t ied produc t235.   
                                                             
230 id., at 9-18. 
231 It must be the first question, because unless there are spate product, tying cannot exist. See Jefferson Parish, 19-
21. 
232 This question was part of the tying case law since Int. Salt, at 394-396 See SLAWSON, David W., “Excluding 
Competition Without Monopoly Power: The Use Of Tying Arrangements To Exploit Market Failure”, 36 
ANTITRUST BULLETIN (Summer 1991), p. 464, 465, available at 
http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/antibull36&div=20&g_sent=1&collection=journals (last 
visited 10.31.2015) [hereinafter SLAWSON (1991)]. 
233 Until United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, 429 U. S. 610 (1977), at 619–621 (hereinafter Fortner II), 
the courts did not require expressly independent proof of the possession of the market power, but either request a 
monopoly power (see Times-Picayune, at 605-609), or just assumed it when tying product is patented or copyrighted 
[ see Int. Salt, at 395, 396; International Business Machines Corp. (IBM) v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936), at 
132, 132-136 (hereinafter IBM); United States v. Loew’s Inc.,371 U. S. 38 (1962),  at 45-48 (hereinafter Loew’s)]. 
234 Jefferson Parish, at 12. 
235Jefferson Parish, at 26-29. 
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 The Court concluded that “[a] lack of price or quality competition does not 
create this type of forcing”, because the consumers will not be willing to purchase 
the t ied product or service somewhere else or on different terms,  thus i t  follows 
that “such an agreement [lack of “forcing”] cannot be said to have foreclosed a 
choice  that would have otherwise been made “on merits” 236.  
 Therefore, this threshold is the legal framework for condemning 
anticompetit ive tying. It  does not require a dominant position  or monopoly power,  
but the required “sufficient market power” will be evaluate d on case-by-case  
basis.  
 One may ponder the harm to competition under US tying case law: Is i t  
harm to the consumer (reduction in choice, output l imitation), is i t  the increased 
price of tied product (where tying facili tates price discrimination), or is it  harm 
to competitors (“not insubstantial  foreclosure of commerce” in t ied product 
market)? Does this threshold require that exclusionary tying practice also  be 
exploitative to be illegal, or vice versa : exploitative tying should also  be 
exclusionary to be deemed anticompetit ive? Through the li teral reading of the 
“forcing test”, it  seems that tying should be exclusionary (as foreclosing a 
substantial amount of commerce i n a tied product market) to be deemed 
anticompetit ive . However, our reading suggests that intent  to exclusion was 
sufficient condition for harm to competit ion.  
 The Court does not explicit ly state this, but determination of “sufficient 
economic power” while using perfect competit ion as a benchmark, implies this 
outcome. We have two premises for this conclusion:  
 First ,  the Supreme Court failed to supply the independent proof  required 
for market power. In very early tying cases, tying arrangements were cond emned 
on the ground that they enable a firm which has monopoly power over the tying 
product to obtain a monopoly into a t ied product. It  was the leverage theory of  
                                                             
236 Jefferson Parish, at 28 (emphasis added). 
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t ie-ins that the courts applied, when they were in fact patent misuse cases that 
were concerned about the patentee who had extended (levered) the patent 
monopoly (on the tying product) via tying into an unpatented (tied) product 
market237.   
 This earliest  approach informed later decisions for condemnation of a tying 
arrangement , i .e.,i t  requires a monopoly power or some proxy such as a patent 238.  
The courts adopted the traditional leverage theory without questioning whether 
the t ied product market can be monopolized (or foreclosed) because of i ts staple 
character of the t ied such as ink, paper , or sal t239.  Furthermore, the Court did not 
question whether the tying product(s) was priced at or above a competit ive level 
or the tying firm had derived its profits from unpatented supplies (t ied products) 
was not part  of the inquiry240.  
 The Supreme Court did not need to mention market power issue especially 
in the early tying cases, since there was no request for independent proof of 
                                                             
237 See Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917). See Jefferson Parish, at 9 (fn.: 13) 
[(stating roots of the per se rule for tying analysis can be traced at least until Motion Picture decision, and even further 
to Henry v. Dick Co, 224 U.S. 1 (1912)]. 
238 POSNER (Antitrust Law), p. 172. 
239 International Salt Co., Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); International Business Machines Corp. (IBM) v. 
United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936) [In the instances either a patented or unpatented durable goods (tying products) 
sold or leased in the condition that buyer also purchases the consumable (functionally linked) goods (tied products) 
from the seller. The tied products were staple items such as ink, salt etc. that have largely used in the industry, thus it 
was impossible for the seller to attempt to become dominant position in these markets. However, the courts did not 
raise the concern about foreclosure share effect but merely applied so called “pure” leveraging theory that based on 
tying arrangement could harm consumers by forcing them to pay a monopoly price for a tied product]. See 
HOVENKAMP, Herbert J., “Tying and the Rule of Reason: Understanding Leverage, Foreclosure, and Price 
Discrimination” (March 2011), p. 6,7, available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=1759552, last visited 06.02.2017 
[hereinafter HOVENKAMP (Tying and the Rule of Reason)]. See also POSNER (Antitrust Law), p. 172-175. 
240 See United Shoe Machinery Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451(1922), at 456-458 (United Shoe leased its 
patented machines tied to use of unpatented additional machines for certain kinds of work and purchase of supplies 
exclusively and its conduct found violation of the section 3 of the Clayton Act); International Business Machines 
Corp. (IBM) v. United States, 298 U.S. 136, 139 (The Court looked at the average of the gross receipt of the machines 
and the average sales of the cards per year , and convinced that IBM’s leases “may be to substantially lessen 
competition”). However, the Court did not compare the profits from leasing of the machines and from sales of cards, 
or offer to look whether the profits from the patented machines were reduced to induce the tie. Even though it has 
been noted that the government's payment of a 15% increase in rental to secure the privilege of making its own cards 
was profitable, only if it produced the cards at a cost less than 55% of the price charged by IBM. See BURCHFIEL, 
Kenneth J., “Patent Misuse And Antitrust Reform: Blessed Be The Tie?”, 4 HARVARD JOURNAL OF LAW & 
TECHNOLOGY (Spring 1991), p. 34 and fn.: 170, available at 




market power, but even later referred  to i t briefly and defined market power as 
the ability to “raise prices above the levels that w ould be charged in the 
competit ive market”241.   
 To understand what the courts meant with “market power”, it  depends on 
what “competitive market price” benchmark refers to. We conclude that i t  refers 
to perfectly competit ive equilibrium of price equal to mar ginal cost242;  rather than 
market power that firm’s ability to  influence overall  market conditions (whether 
tying creates barrier to entry, or prevent s the ability of competitors to expand 
sales easily) 243.  Even though courts occasionally assessed the market share of the 
tying firm, when exploitation of power is found, the relevant parameters were 
price, quality, or consumer choice244.  
 Second, whereas tying firms without monopoly power  cannot cause a 
substantial  t ied foreclosure share, the Court did not require independent proof 
whether tying forecloses competitors from a substantial  market, but the courts 
merely infer i t from market power that is presumed from the firm’s ability to  
increase prices245.  
                                                             
241 See Jefferson Parish, at 27, fn.: 46; Fortner II, at 620; Fortner I, at 503-504. 
242 This approach follows a direct measure of market power that based on firm’s ability to control its own price and 
output (firm’s own -price elasticity of demand), not the firm’s ability to influence market conditions (rival’s output 
and price). See LANDES, William M./ POSNER, Richard A., “Market Power in Antitrust Cases”, 94 HARVARD 
LAW REVIEW  5 (March 1981), p. 962, 963, available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/1340687 (last visited 
02.07.2017); WERDEN, Gregory J., “Demand Elasticities In Antitrust Analysis”, 66 ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL 
2 (1998), p. 377, available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/40843402 (last visited 02.07.2017) [ hereinafter WERDEN 
(Demand Elasticities)]. 
243 See KLEIN/ WILEY, p. 631, 632. 
244 Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States 345 U.S. 594 (1953), at 605; Northern Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 
356 U.S. 1 (1958), at 5,6; Loew’s, at 45; Fortner II, at 610-612; Kodak, p. 464, 465-478. 
245 Times-Picayune, at 11; Int. Salt, at 395-396. See also BLAIR, Roger D./ FINCI, Jeffrey, “The Individual Coercion 
Doctrine and Tying Agreements: An Economic Analysis”, 10 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 4 
(1983), pp. 537, available at http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr/vol10/iss4/2 (last visited 20.06.2017) (“Section 3 of the Clayton 
Act only forbids conditional sales when they result in a substantial lessening of competition or tend to create a 
monopoly. It is from this statute that the Court developed the "not insubstantial" amount of commerce prong of the 
per se test. The Supreme Court addressed this issue in a somewhat casual fashion. It observed that International Salt 
sold about 119,000 tons of salt in 1944 for approximately $500,000.6 Without regard to the size of the total market, 




 Therefore, formal tying is  deemed anticompetit ive when it  is exclusionary.  
However,  fail ing in the assessment of actual market condition s for determination 
of tying market power and the lack of independent proof of insubstantial 
foreclosure of commerce in tied product market, the forcing test  created a loop . 
Thus, forcing is presumed because of tying market power and tying market power 
is inferred because of i ts exploitative effect, and when tying market power is 
established, foreclosure of t ied product market is assumed.  
 Moreover, efficiencies were not part  of antitrust inquiry. It  has been 
expressed that the Supreme Court left behind the per se  rule for tying, and so-
called the “quasi-per se rule” approach is embraced by Jefferson Parish .  Indeed, 
the Court brought a threshold for triggering the per se  rule. However, the court 
held that the per se  rule does not allow defenses: “Per se condemnation -
condemnation without inquiry into actual market conditions – is only appropriate 
if the existence of forcing is probable” 246.  The court assumed that when the 
plaintiff proved the presence of forcing as part  of his prima facie  case, i t  was the 
end of the question, and then tying would be per se  i l legal and the court would 
not need to allow defenses247.  This approach has been construed  to mean that the 
Supreme Court eased antitrust l iabili ty for tying arrangement s as bringing burden 
of proof “forcing” onto plaintiff for triggering the per se rule, but actually, 
defenses had been heard in the previous tying cases 248.   
                                                             
246 466 U.S. 15 (emphasis added). See also the Court similarly repeated this view “forcing is present …the Sherman 
Act is violated” (id., at 12); “[when] forcing occurs, our cases have found that the ting arrangement to be unlawful” 
(id., at 14). See also Kodak, p. 479 (“We need not decide whether Kodak’s behavior has any procompetitive effects 
and, if so, whether they outweigh the anticompetitive effects. We note only that Kodak’s service and parts policy is 
simply not one that appears always or almost always to enhance competition, and therefore to warrant a legal 
presumption without any evidence of its actual economic impact.”). 
247 See SLAWSON (1991), p. 465, 466. 
248 See IBM, at 139–140 (rejecting IBM’s claim that it had to control the cards used in its machines to avoid “injury 
to the reputation of the machines and the good will of” IBM in the absence of proof that other companies could not 
make quality cards); Int. Salt, at 397–398 (rejecting International Salt’s claim that it had to control the supply of salt 
to protect its leased machines in the absence of proof that competitors could not supply salt of equal quality). See also 
Slawson (1991), p.466 (“...prior to 1977 [Fortner II] makes clear that defenses were permitted, the justices who decided 
Hyde [Jefferson Parish] were not aware of it”). He also criticizes the government’s conduct (Brief for the United States 
as Amicus Curiae in Support of Reversal, Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Edwin G. Hyde) regarding they 
ignored and did not correct the court decision that held “per se rule does not allow defenses” (id., p. 470-471). 
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 The Court showed its tendency to apply the rule of reason approach limited 
to determination of market power, but since market power was not measure d 
correctly, thebexclusionary effect was not proved.  
 Furthermore, Microsoft ’s  decision249 demonstrated that, even though the 
Court opted for the rule of reason approach due to the special characteristics of 
the relevant market, consumer harm was not a necessary condition for 
characterization of the conduct as anticompetit ive, and the exclusion for the sake 
of exclusion was deemed anticompetitive 250.  
 Nonetheless, exploitative tying practice raises concern s in that i t  facilitates 
price discrimination251,  increasing the t ied product’s price higher than single -
monopoly profit  maximizing pricing can do 252.  In this case, the concern was that 
allowing a monopoly to charge higher prices than non -tying pricing would be a 
social waste. Since a monopolist  does not have competitive pressure, i t  will  have 
li t tle incentive to minimize its production costs 253.  
 It  is worth clarifying that The Supreme Court did not mean that only “high 
prices (charging supra -competit ive prices for tying or t ied products)” or 
“monopoly pricing” is  anticompetit ive 254,  but using tying practice to increase 
                                                             
249 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000), rev'd in part, aff’d in part, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. 
Cir.), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 350 (2001). 
250 See FOX, Eleanor M., “What Is Harm To Competition? Exclusionary Practices And Anticompetitive Effect”, 70 
ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL 2 (2002), p. 383, 387-390, available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/40843559 (last 
visited 29.07.2017) (determining that US antitrust laws protect competition, not efficiency, and the absence of 
consumer harm is no obstacle to judgement for plaintiff). 
251 Even though, there is no specific ban on exploitative price discrimination. Only exclusionary price discrimination 
is banned under the Robinson-Patman Act that prohibits sellers from offering different prices to different purchasers 
of “commodities of like grade and quality” when the “effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen 
competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with 
any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of 
them.” 
252 See Fortner I, at 512-514 (in dissenting opinion); Fortner II, at 617, Jefferson Parish, at 9-11, 14,15; Kodak, p. 487, 
499, 500. 
253 This is the concept known as “X-inefficiency” that it occurs when technical efficiency is not being achieved due to 
lack of competition pressure, and this lead welfare losses. This concept first introduced by Leibenstein 
[LEIBENSTEİN, H., “Allocative Efficiency vs, X-Efficiency”, 56 American Economic Review 3 (1966) pp. 392-
415]. 
254 Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004), p.  407 (“The mere 
possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging of monopoly prices, is not only not unlawful, it is an 
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monopoly profits over the levels that the  defendant could have obtained through 
simple monopoly pricing without tying is deemed anticompetit ive 255.  
 However, this approach so far stayed as a raw dictum, because judges 
express this concern in the cases where tying facili tates price discrimination 
practice was not involved 256;  therefore, there is no holding 257.   
 In summary, tying case law does not require consumer harm when the 
alleged practice is exclusionary. At the same time, when a monopoly leads to 
exploitative tying via price discrimination, i t  doe s not require the exclusionary 
effect to deem the practice as anticompetit ive. One may challenge it while sti l l 
requiring that the  tying affect a substantial  volume of interstate in t ied product 
market, yet this condition is usually satisfied whenever sepa rate products and 
tying market power conditions are met.  
 3.2. EU Competition Law  
 EU competit ion rules are regulated under Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU). There are two main provisions that states tying and price 
discrimination shall  be prohibited:  
                                                             
important element of the free market system. The opportunity to charge monopoly prices—at least for a short period—
is what attracts ‘business acumen’ in the first place; it induces risk taking that produces innovation and economic 
growth”). 
255 See ELHAUGE, Einer, “Rehabilitating Jefferson Parish: “Why Ties Without A Substantial Foreclosure Share 
Should Not Be Per Se Legal”, 80 ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL (2016), pp. 463-520 available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2528605 (last visited 15.02.2106) [hereinafter ELHAUGE 
(Rehabilitating Jefferson Parish)] (calling this effect of tying as “expropriate further consumer surplus”). Compare 
CARLTON, Dennis W. and HEYER, Ken, “Extraction vs. Extension: The Basis For Formulating Antitrust Policy 
Towards Single-Firm Conduct”, 4 COMPETITITON POLICY INTERNATIONAL 2 (Autumn 2008), pp. 285- 305, 
available at   http://economics.mit.edu/files/4058 (last visited 10.04.2017). [hereinafter CARLTON/ HEYER 
(Extraction vs. Extension)]; CRANE, Daniel A., "Tying and Consumer Harm", 8 COMPETITION POLICY 
INTERNATIONAL 2 (2012), pp. 27-33, available at 
http://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2373&context=articles (last visited 
05.04.2017)[hereinafter CRANE (Tying)]; LAMBERT, Thomas A., “Appropriate Liability Rules for Tying and 
Bundled Discounting” (July 9, 2011), Ohio State Law Journal, Forthcoming; University of Missouri School of Law 
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2011-04, p. 7, 25, available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1781130 (last visited 
16.07.2016) [hereinafter LAMBERT (2011)] (contending that US antitrust law allows firms to maximize their profit, 
and it should allow firms also extract remaining consume surplus). 
256 One may challenge that this approach became a holding with Kodak case. However, it was not the tying facilitates 
price discrimination there, the concern was the market imperfections abled the Kodak price discriminate between 
informed and uninformed customers. 
257 Cf. ELHAUGE (Rehabilitating Jefferson Parish), p. 496-498. 
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Artic le 101  
1.  The fo llowing sha l l be prohibit ed as  inco mpat ible  with t he int erna l market :  all 
agreement s between under t ak ings,  dec is ions by assoc iat ions o f under t ak ings and  
concer t ed pract ices which may a f fect  t rade between Member  St at es and which have as  
t he ir  object  o r  effect  t he prevent ion,  rest r ict ion o r  disto rt io n o f co mpet it ion within 
the int erna l market ,  and in par t icu lar  t hose which:  
(a)  direct ly o r  ind irect ly fix  purchase o r  se ll ing pr ices o r  any o ther  t rading cond it io ns ;  
(b)  limit  o r  cont ro l product ion,  market s,  t echnica l deve lopment ,  o r invest ment ;  
(c)  share  market s or  sources o f supp ly;  
(d)  apply d iss imilar  cond it io ns t o  equ iva lent  t ransact ions with o ther  t rading par t ies,  
t hereby p lac ing them at  a  compet it ive d isadvantage;  
(e)  make the conc lus io n o f cont ract s subject  to  acceptance by the other  part ies o f 
supp lementary obl igat ions which,  by the ir  nature o r  according to  commerc ia l usage,  
have no  connect ion with the subject  o f such cont ract s.  
2 .  Any agreement s o r  decis ions prohib it ed pursuant  to  t his Ar t ic le sha l l be  
automat ica l ly vo id.  
3 .  The provis io ns o f para graph 1 may,  however ,  be dec lared inapp licable in t he case  
o f:  
-  any agreement  or  cat egory o f agreement s between under t ak ings,  
-  any dec is io n o r  cat egory o f dec is io ns by assoc iat ions o f under t ak ings,  
-  any concer t ed pract ice o r  cat egory o f concer t ed pract i ces,  
which cont r ibutes to  improving the product ion o r  dist r ibut ion o f goods o r  to  promot ing  
t echnica l o r  economic progress,  while a llowing consumers a fa ir  share o f t he resu lt ing  
benef it ,  and which does not :  
(a)  impose on the under t akings concer ned rest r ic t ions which are no t  ind ispensable to  
t he at t ainment  o f t hese object ives ;  
(b)  a ffo rd such under t ak ings the poss ibi l it y o f e l iminat ing co mpet it ion in respect  o f a  
subst ant ia l par t  o f t he product s in quest ion.  
 
Under this article, price discrimination and tying can be condemned if they 
are practiced as a result of a decision between at least two undertaking. Price 
discrimination is considered under paragraph 1 (d), and tying under paragraph 1 
(e). However, they a re not per se  i l legal. They are subject to effect -based 
approach. If tying or price discrimination practice provides the conditions that 




Artic le 102  
Any abuse by one o r  more under t akings o f a  dominant  posit ion within the 
int er na l market  or  in a subst ant ia l par t  o f it  sha l l be prohibit ed as inco mpat ible 
with t he int erna l market  in so  far  as it  may a ffect  t rade between Member  
St at es.  
Such abuse may,  in par t icu lar ,  cons ist  in:  
(a)  direct ly o r  ind irect ly impos ing unfa ir  purchase o r  se ll ing pr ices o r  other  
unfa ir  t rad ing cond it ions ;  
(b)  limit ing product ion,  market s o r t echnica l deve lopment  to  t he prejud ice o f 
consumers ;  
(c)  applying d iss imilar  cond it io ns t o  equ iva lent  t ransact ions with o ther 
t rading par t ies,  t hereby p lac ing them at  a  compet it ive d isadvantage;  
(d)  mak ing the conc lus io n o f cont ract s subject  to  acceptance by the o ther 
par t ies o f supp lementar y obligat ions which,  by the ir  nature o r according to  
commerc ia l u sage,  have no  connect ion wit h the subject  o f such cont ract s.  
 Article 102 (c) addresses a dominant firm’s abili ty to sell  to buyers at 
different prices or with different terms. It  does not exclusively refer  to customers 
but states “trading parties”, thus it  can be construed to also include “rivals” or 
“final consumers”258.  Nonetheless, the requirement of placing a “competit ive 
disadvantage” may narrow its applicability for exploitative practice that harms 
final consumers259,  since they are not in competition.   
 However, the European Commission (hereafter the Commission) and the 
European Courts (the General Court and Court of Justice of the European Union) 
have the tendency to include discrimination imposed on consumers regarding the 
existence or non-existence of an incentive to create competit ive disadvantage , 
                                                             
258 See GERADIN, Damien/ PETIT, Nicolas, “Price Discrimination Under EC Competition Law: Another Antitrust 
Theory in Search of Limiting Principles”, Global Competition Law Centre Working Paper Series No. 07/05 (July 
2005), p. 9, available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=763484p. 9 (claiming that art. 102 (c) aims to protect customers not 
the competitors of the dominant undertaking). 
259 However, EU Commission interprets “trading parties” in broad sense and does not limited to “contracting parties” 
but merely “business contact” is considered as sufficient. See Commission Decision Deutsche Post AG –Interception 
of cross-border mail, COMP/C-1/36.915 (2001/892/EC) OJ 2001 L 331/40, at 130. 
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which is irrelevant260.  For example, discrimination that directly affect final 
consumers is explicit ly discussed in the Commission’s France 1998 World Cup 
decision. The Commission assessed the practice of French organizer CFO’s 
requirement that the purchaser should be a French resident to be able to buy 
individual entry t ickets and held that 261:  
[w]hile the application of Article 82 [102] often requires an assessment of the 
effect of an undertaking’s behavior on the structure of competit ion in  a given 
market,  i ts application in  the absence of such an effect cannot be excluded. 
Consumers’ interests are protected by Article 82  [102] ,  such protection being 
achieved either by prohibiting conduct by dominant undertakings which impairs 
free and undistorted competition,  or which is direct prejudicial to  consumers.  
Accordingly,  and as has been expressly recognized by the Court of Justice (c iting 
Continental Can) ,  Article 82 [102]  can properly be applied,  where appropriate,  
to  situations in  which a dominant undertaking’s behavior direct prejudices the 
interests of consumers,  notwi thstanding the absence of any effect on the structure 
of competition .  
 Article 102 has the potential  to apply in exploitative price discrimination 
practices, but so far it  has been used to address price discrimination based directly 
or indirectly on the nationality or residence of the customer/consumer 262.  
Moreover, the Commission also refers to subparagraph (a) as finding CFO’s 
behavior abusive on the grounds that imposing unfair trading conditions on 
residents outside France resulted in a l imitation of the market to the prejudice of 
those consumers263.  
                                                             
260 Deutsche Post – Interception of Cross-border Mail; Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche & Co AG v EC Commission 
[1979] ECR 461, [122]-[123]; Case T-83/91 Tetra Pak International SA v EC Commission [1994] ECR II-755. 
261 Commission Decision 1998 Football World Cup (Case No IV/36.888) (2001/12/EC) OJ 2000 L 5/55, at 102. 
L5/55, para. 102. 
262 TUNÇEL, p. 50. See Deutsche Post – Interception of Cross-border Mail and Case 27/76 United Brands Co. See 
also United Brands Continental BV v EC Commission [1978] ECR 207 (condemned practice that involve upstream 
geographic discrimination between customers that do not compete each other, but where partitioning practice also 
existed). 
263 1998 Football World Cup, at 88. 
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 Furthermore, there is no guidance from the Commission tha t addresses non-
exclusionary (either exploitative or distortionary) abuses. Therefore, in the l ight 
of the Court’s  decision as to whether exploitative price discrimination is deemed 
il legal can be answered in three ways:  
 1) Exploitative discrimination tha t harms consumer is i l legal if i t  distorts 
market integration. Hence, it  is not clear whether  only the single market objective 
is implied or whether i t  includes consumer welfare objective. If i t  is the latter, 
exploitative price discrimination might consti tute an abuse under Article 102 (c) , 
even without a distortion of competition, since there is no requirement for this, 
as in Art .  101(1) 264.  
 2) Exploitative discrimination is not anticompetitive unless coupled with 
another abusive practice that either facil i tates or parti tions i t265.  
 3) Since lists of the practice placed in the articles are extensive,  
exploitative price discrimination can indicate a firm’s l iability266.  
 In addition, the approach to exploitative price discrimination is uncertain 
in case law, as there is no Commission or court decision regarding exploitative 
tying. Tying case law is somewhat limited, even though in the decisions consumer 
welfare stated, where tying practices were condemned , exploitation was 
inseparably linked to exclusion 267.  
                                                             
264 GERARD (2005) p. 3, 4 (suggesting that the Commission should make clear that price discrimination might 
constitute an abuse under Article 102(c) only to the extent that it results in a distortion of competition among the 
dominant firm’s trading parties). 
265 See United Brands Company and United Brands Continental BV v Commission [1978] ECR 207. 
266 Case 6/72, Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can Company, Inc. v Commission [1973] ECR 215, para. 
26. See Tunçel, p. 66 (contending that Art. 102 (c) should be applied only whereas discriminatory abuse of a dominant 
undertaking non-vertically integrated in the downstream market). 
267 Commission Decision 88/138 EEC, Eurofix-Bauro v. Hilti, O.J. 1988, L 65/19, confirmed by C-53/92 P, Hilti v. 
Commission, [1994] ECR I-667; Case T-83/91, Commission Decision 92/163/EEC, Tetra Pak II, O.J. 1992, L 72/1; 
Commission decision, of 24.04.2004, Case COMP/C-3/37.792 – Microsoft, OJ L 32. See also Commission decision, 
Case No COMP/M.2220- General Electric/Honeywell, OJ L 395, 30.12.1989 (There was not a tying practice, but the 
Commission was concern that merger GE/Honeywell would probably engage in product bundling, due to having large 
line of complementary products. It was likely to lower price of bundle in the short-run, then competitors would not be 
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 Interestingly, in the early days of European competition policy, from a legal 
viewpoint, i t is suggested that the wording of Article 102 was exclusively 
concerned with exploitative abuses 268.  However, l i terature and the attention of the 
enforcement authority remained limited to excessive pricing in this sense. 
However, the above-mentioned judgements on abuse of dominance are not of 
recent origin, and one may expect that with the modern approach to the concept 
of “abuse” and the so-called “more economic effects -based approach” with i ts 
clear emphasis on “consumer welfare”, there would be greater concern regarding 
exploitative abuse.  
 A brief overview of the development of the modern process demonstrates 
that at  the beginning of the process, according to the EAGCP Report 269,  the main 
concern should be the improvement of “consumer welfare” and the assessment of 
the abuse should be derived from the effects on consumers 270.  Thus, i t has been 
interpreted that the aim is the prevention of anticompetit ive effects that h arm 
consumers, not the “protection of competit ion”, and the implementation of this 
                                                             
able to lower the prices of their product to the same extent, and they would be forced to exit.  Thus, merged firm would 
be able to increase prices in the long-run). 
268 LYONS, Bruce, “The Paradox of the Exclusion of Exploitative Abuse”, in Fredenberg and Strand (eds) (2007) The 
Pros and Cons of High Prices, Swedish Competition Authority, p. 65; FOX, p.393; PAULIS, Emil, “Article 82 and 
Exploitative Conduct”, in Ehlermann and Marquis (eds), European Competition Annual 2007: A reformed Approach 
to Article 82, forthcoming, available at 
https://www.eui.eu/Documents/RSCAS/Research/Competition/2007ws/200709-COMPed-Paulis.pdf (last visited 
01.08.2017). See Also AKMAN, Pinar, “Searching for the long-lost soul of Article 82EC”, Centre for Competition 
Policy Working Paper 07-5 (March 2007), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=977221 
(last visited 01.08.2017). [suggesting this as examining the travaux préparatoires (preparatory documents)]. The 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) in Continental Can clarified that Article 82 also covers exclusionary abuses: "is not 
only aimed at practices which may cause damage to consumers directly, but also at those which are detrimental to 
them through their impact on an effective competition structure" (Case 6/72, Europemballage Corporation and 
Continental Can Company, Inc. v Commission [1973] ECR 215, para. 26). 
269 Report by the Economic Advisory Group for Competition Policy (EAGCP) ‘An Economic Approach to Article 
82’ (July 2005) available at ec.europa.eu/ dgs/ competition/ economist/ eagcp_july_21_05. pdf 2(The EAGCP Report 
commissioned by EU DG Competition addressees an effects-based approach focuses on the presence of 
anticompetitive effects that harm consumers and is based on the examination of each specific case, based on sound 
economics and grounded on facts. An economics-based approach purposes an examination of specific undertaking 
strategies in each particular market and its effect) (hereinafter EAGCP Report). 
270 “An economic approach to Article 82 focuses on improved consumer welfare. In so doing, it avoids confusing the 
protection of competition with the protection of competitors and it stresses that the ultimate yardstick of competition 
policy is in the satisfaction of consumer needs. Competition is a process that forces firms to be responsive to 
consumers’ needs with respect to price, quality, variety, etc.; over time it also acts as a selection mechanism, with 
more efficient firms replacing less efficient ones” (EAGCP Report, p. 2). 
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requires the competit ion authority to explain in each case consumer harm from 
the conduct271.   
 However, the EAGCP Report also  that approach would mainly focus on 
entry barriers and competitive harm arising from exclusionary behavior 272.  It  
concluded that an exclusionary practice, in which a dominant firm harms rivals,  
is only an abuse when the exclusion is also expected to harm consumers 273.  
 The explanation of the former Commissioner Kroes for focusing on 
exclusionary practices was that “it is sound for our enforcement policy to give  
priority to so-called exclusionary abuses, since exclusion is often at  the basis of  
later exploitation of customers” 274.  From Kroes’ speech it  was clear  that that 
undistorted competition in the common market would ultimately benefit 
consumers.  
 On the other hand, as LYONS correctly asserts, i t  is paradoxical since if 
exclusionary abuses are problematic because they ultimately exploit  consumers,  
why should the policy emphasis not be on exploitative practices that directly harm 
customers of a dominant undertaking 275.  
 However ,  the proposition of the “competitive harm” equal to “harm to 
consumer” in the EAGCP Report  was not followed by the DG Competit i on 
                                                             
271 See EAGCP Report, p. 8-10. 
272 “Whenever possible, competition is to be preferred to detailed regulation as the best mechanism to avoid 
inefficiencies and foster productivity and growth; this calls for a ‘non-dirigiste’ approach to competition policy that 
focuses in most cases on entry barriers; in the context of Article 82, it is then natural to focus on competitive harm 
that arises from exclusionary strategies. Possible exceptions concern some natural monopoly industries which may 
require ongoing supervision of access prices and conditions by regulatory agencies.” (EAGCP Report, p.3). 
273 LYONS, p. 69. 
274 KROES, Neelie, “Tackling Exclusionary Practices To Avoid Exploitation Of Market Power: Some Preliminary 
Thoughts On The Policy Review Of Article 82”, 29 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. (2005-2006), p. 595, available at 
http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/frdint29&div=26&g_sent=1&collection=journals (last visited 
22.07.2017). 
275 LYONS, p. 65. 
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Discussion Paper 276 and the Commission Guidance 277.  Neither the Discussion 
Paper nor the Commission Guidance on enforcement priorit ies in applying Article 
102 to exclusionary conduct sought proof of any actual or possible harm to 
consumers, but suggests a test  for the prohibition of exclusionary abuses based 
on actual or likely anticompetit ive effects on the market and implicitly assumes 
that exclusionary behavior harms consumers directly or indirectly 278.  
 Even from the Guidance (2009) writing, i t  is clear t hat exploitation as a 
“direct harm to the customer” is a necessary element of Art. 102 infringement .  
The li terature is divided between those that claim that explicit  harm to consumers 
under Art. 102 (exclusionary) abuses is necessary in order to protect not only 
competitors279,  and the proponents that Art. 102 cannot harm consumers as an 
ultimate test of anticompetit ive conduct, because Art. 102 protects the 
competit ive process i tself,  therefore consumer welfare is merely an expected 
benefit  from undistorted competit ion280.  
                                                             
276 DG Competition Discussion Paper on the Application of Article 82 of the Treaty to Exclusionary Abuses’ (Brussels, 
December 2005) available at: ec.europa.eu/ competition/ antitrust/ art82/ discpaper2005. Pdf (hereinafter Discussion 
Paper). 
277 ‘Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to Abusive 
Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings’ [2009] OJ C45/ 7 [hereinafter Guidance (2009)] See Akman 
(2012), p. 134-136. 
278 See Discussion Paper, n. 4, 54, 55, 88; the Guidance (2009), n. 5, 19, 22. 
279 LYONS, p. 70; LANG, John Temple, “The Use Of Competition Law Powers For Regulatory Purposes”, in Annual 
Competition Policy Conference, Regulatory Policy Institute Oxford (July 2007), p. 6, available at 
http://pascal.iseg.utl.pt/~carlosfr/ses/Lang%20T.J.%20(2207).pdf (last visited 01.08.2017); AKMAN, Pinar, 
“Exploitative Abuse in Article 82EC: Back to Basics?”, CCP Working Paper 09-1 (2009), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1328316 (last visited 15.07.2017) [hereinafter AKMAN (2009)]; 
EVANS, David and PADILLA, Jorge, "Excessive Prices: Using Economics to Define Administrable Legal Rules", 1 
JOURNAL OF COMPETITION LAW AND ECONOMICS (2005) Journal of Competition Law and Economics, pp. 
97–122 (doi: 10.1093/joclec/nhi002) (last visited 01.08.2017). 
280 EILMANSBERGER, Thomas, “How to Distinguish Good from Bad Competition under Article 82 EC: In Search 
of Clearer and More Coherent Standards for Anticompetitive Abuses”, 42 COMMON MARKET LAW REVIEW 
2005, p. 133-135; available at https://www.biicl.org/files/1403_eilmansberger_on_82.pdf (last visited 16.06.2017) 
[hereinafter EILMANSBERGER (2005)];  SCHWEITZER, Heike, “The History, Interpretation and Underlying 
Principles of Section 2 Sherman Act and Article 82 EC”, EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, Working Paper 
2007/32 (2007), available at http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/7626/?sequence=3 (last visited 22.07.2017); 
MARTÍN-LABORDA, Antonio Robles, “Exploitative Prices in European Competition Law”, Abuse Regulation in 
Competition Law, Proceedings of the 10th ASCOLA Conference Tokyo 2015, forthcoming, available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2660956 (last visited 01.08.2017). 
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 The apparent tendency is  not to grant a decisive role in consumer harm in 
the case of abuse control, and suggests a combined reading of Articles 102 and 3 
TFEU, which follows that distortion of competition should be established on the 
basis of harm to the protected values. Here, the Commission emphasis es the 
openness of the market rather than consumer welfare 281.  In addition,  the ECJ 
decision on GlaxoSmithKline consolidates the Commission ’s  understanding that 
consumer welfare is not a single objective for European competit ion law, and it 
states:  
…like other competition rules laid down in the Treaty,  Article [101] aims to  
protect not only the interests of competitors or of consumers,  but als o the 
structure of the market and, in  so doing,  competition as such.  Consequently,  for 
a  finding that an agreement has an anti -competitive object,  i t  is not necessary 
that final consumers be deprived of the advantages of effective competition in 
terms of supply or price 282.  
 To us, European authorit ies do not show the tendency to be concern ed about 
exploitative practice unless i t  endangers the objective of single market 
integration. It  was clear from the Glax oSmithKline decision that consumer harm 
cannot be the final test  for determining anti-competitiveness, nor can consumer 
welfare can be an ultimate objective for European competition law. It  is  
understandable, since it  is a difficult  task to determine the effect on consumer 
welfare, it  is far more complex to assess consumer welfare effects at  a multi-
national level;  i t  may even be  impossible.  
 Nonetheless, this approach does not explicit ly abandon the concern for 
exploitative conduct283 ,  but the Commission is silent on the subject, and li terature 
                                                             
281 AKMAN (2012), p.110.  
282 Case T-168/01 GlaxoSmithKline Service v Commission [2006] ECR II-2969, para. 63. 
283 See Discussion paper, n. 179 (“However, tying and bundling can lead to the following possible anticompetitive 
effects: foreclosure, price discrimination and higher prices. The present section deals only with the foreclosure effects 
of tying and bundling”); Guidance (2009), n. 7 (“Conduct which is directly exploitative of consumers, for example 
charging excessively high prices or certain behavior that undermines the efforts to achieve an integrated internal 
market, is also liable to infringe Article 82. The Commission may decide to intervene in relation to such conduct, in 
particular where the protection of consumers and the proper functioning of the internal market cannot otherwise be 
adequately ensured. For the purpose of providing guidance on its enforcement priorities the Commission at this stage 
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proposes that intervention for exploitative conduct should be under very limited 
circumstances, and perhaps only as a last  resort284.    
 3.3. Turkish Competition Law  
 In the Turkish Competit ion Act, three main articles should be taken into 
account for the assessment of price discrimination and tying practices:  
   Agreements,  Concerted Pract ices and  Decisions Limit ing Competit ion  
Art ic le 4-  Agreement s and concer t ed pract ices between under t akings,  and dec is io ns  
and pract ices o f assoc iat ions o f under t ak ings which have as  t he ir  object  or  effect  o r 
l ike ly e ffect  t he prevent ion,  distort ion o r rest r ict ion o f compet it ion d irect ly  o r 
ind ir ect ly in a par t icu lar  market  fo r  goods o r services are il lega l and prohibit ed.  
Such cases are,  in par t icu lar ,  as fo llows:  
   a)  Fixing the purchase o r  sale pr ice o f goods o r services,  e lement s such as cost  and 
pro fit  which fo rm the pr ice,  and any t erms o f purchase o r sa le,  
   b)  Part it ioning market s fo r  goods o r  services,  and shar ing o r  cont ro ll ing a ll k inds  
o f market  resources or  element s,  
    c) Cont ro ll ing the amount  o f supp ly o r  demand in re lat ion to  goods o r services,  o r 
det ermin ing them out s ide the market ,  
    d) Complicat ing and rest r ict ing the act ivit ie s o f compet ing under t akings,  o r 
exc lud ing under t ak ings operat ing in  t he market  by bo yc o t t s or  other  behavio r ,  o r 
prevent ing potent ia l new ent rant s to  t he market ,  
                                                             
limits itself to exclusionary conduct and in, particular, certain specific types of exclusionary conduct which, based on 
its experience, appear to be the most common”). 
284 See LYONS, p. 83, 84; RÖLLER, Lars-Hendrik, “Exploitative Abuses”, in Ehlermann and Marquis (eds), 
European Competition Annual 2007: A reformed Approach to Article 82, forthcoming, available at  
https://www.eui.eu/Documents/RSCAS/Research/Competition/2007ws/200709-COMPed-Roeller.pd (last visited 
01.08.2017); PAULİS, p. 5; MOTTA, Massimo/ de STREEL, Alexandre, “Exploitative and Exclusionary Excessive 
Prices in EU Law” available at 




    e) Accept  exc lus ive dea ling,  app lying  dif ferent  t erms to persons with equa l st atus 
fo r  equa l r ight s,  obligat ions and act s,  
    f)  Contrary to  t he nature o f t he agreement  o r commerc ia l usages,  oblig ing to  
purchase other  goods o r services together  with a good o r service,  o r t ying a good o r 
service demanded by purchasers act ing as int ermed iar y under t ak ings to  t he cond it ion 
o f d isp laying ano ther  good o r  service by the purchaser ,  o r put t ing fo rward t erms as to 
t he resupp ly o f a  good or  service supp l ied.  
In cases where the exist ence o f an agreement  canno t  be proved,  t hat  t he pr ice changes  
in  t he market ,  o r  t he ba lance o f demand and s upp ly,  o r  t he operat iona l areas o f 
under t ak ings are s imilar  t o  t hose market s  where compet it ion is prevented,  distort ed or 
rest r ict ed,  const it ut es a  presumpt ion tha t  t he under t akings are engaged in concer t ed 
pract ice.  
Each o f t he part ies may re l ieve it se lf o f the respons ib i l it y by proving no t  to  engage in  
concer t ed pract ice,  provided that  it  is  based on economic and rat iona l fact s.  
Exemption  
Art ic le 5-  The Board,  in case a ll t he t erms list ed be low exist ,  may dec ide (Annu l led:  
02.07.2005-Art ic le 5388/Art ic le 1)  (…) to  exempt  agreement s,  concer t ed pract ices  
between under t ak ings,  and dec is io ns o f assoc iat ions o f under t ak ings from the  
app licat ion o f t he provis io ns o f ar t ic le 4 :  
  a) Ensur ing new deve lopment s and  improvement s,  o r  economic o r t echnica l  
deve lopment  in t he  product ion or dist r ibut ion o f goods and in t he provis io n o f 
services,  
  b)  Benefit t ing the consumer  from the above - ment ioned,  
  c) Not  eliminat ing compet it ion in a s ignificant  part  o f t he re levant  market ,  
  d)  Not  limit ing co mpet it ion more than what  is  co mpulso r y fo r  achieving the goals 
set  out  in sub-paragraphs (a)  and (b) .  
(Amended:  02.07.2005 -Art ic le 5388/Ar t ic le 1)  Exempt ion may be granted fo r  a 
de fin it e  per iod,  just  as t he grant ing o f exempt ion may be subject ed to  t he fu lf i l lment  
o f par t icu lar  t erms and/o r  part icu lar  obligat ions.  Exempt ion dec is io ns are va l id  as o f 
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t he dat e o f conc lud ing an agreement  o r  commit t ing a concer t ed pract ice o r  t aking a 
dec is io n o f an assoc iat ion o f under t ak ings,  o r  fu lf il l ing  a cond it ion i f it  has been t ied  
to  a cond it ion.  
In case the t er ms ment ioned in t he first  paragraph are fu lf il led,  t he Board may issue  
communiqués which ensure block exempt ions fo r  t he types o f agreement s in spec if ic  
subject -mat t ers and which ind icat e t he ir  t erms.  
 
Abuse of Dominant  Posit ion  
Art ic le 6-  The abuse,  by one o r more under t ak ings,  o f t he ir  dominant  pos it ion in a  
market  fo r  goods o r services wit hin the who le o r  a  part  o f t he count ry on the ir  own o r 
t hrough agreement s with o thers or  t hrough concer t ed pract ices,  is  i llega l and  
prohibit ed.  Abus ive cases are,  in par t icu lar ,  as fo llows:  
a)  Prevent ing,  d irect ly o r  ind irect ly,  ano ther  under t aking fro m enter ing into  the area 
o f commerc ia l act ivit y,  o r act ions a imed  at  complicat ing the act ivit ie s o f compet i t o rs 
in t he market ,  
b)  Mak ing d irect  o r ind irect  discr iminat ion by o ffer ing d ifferent  t erms to  purchasers  
with equa l st atus fo r t he same and equa l r ight s,  obligat ions and act s,  
c)  Purchas ing ano ther  product  o r service  together  with a product  or  service,  o r  tying  
a product  o r  service demanded by purchasers act ing as int er med iar y under t ak ings to  
t he cond it ion o f d isp laying ano ther  product  or  service by the purchaser ,  o r impos ing  
l imit at ions with regard to  t he t erms o f purchase and sa le in case o f resa le,  such  as no t 
se ll ing a purchased product  be low a part icu lar  pr ice,   
d)  Act ions which a im at  d isto rt ing co mpet it ive cond it ions in  ano ther  market  fo r  goods 
o r services by means o f exp lo it ing financ ia l,  t echno log ica l and commerc ia l advantages  
creat ed by dominance in a par t icu lar  mar ket ,  
 e)  Rest r ict ing product ion,  market ing or  t echnica l deve lopment  to  t he prejud ice o f 
consumers.  
 Tying is l isted under Article 4/II (f) and 6/II (c), and discrimination 
(includes price and non-price based) under Article 4/II (e) and a rticle 6/II (b).  
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 The provisions are badly written, though. The language (“ Abusive cases 
are, in particular ,  as follows”) creates an understanding that abusive or i llegal 
practices are limited to those listed cases. However, the Board explicit ly stated 
that this l ist  is non-exhaustive 285.  
 Another poorly chosen word is in the discrimination provision. Article 4/II 
(e) refers to “person”, while article 6/II (b) places “purchaser”. These terms are 
vague and are inconsistent within the terminology of the remaining provisions.  
Instead of the word “person”, the legislator could opt to use “trading parties”, or 
“competitor/customer/consumer”. It  would be more explicit  whether the provision 
addresses primary line injury,  or secondary line injury.  Nonetheless, Art. 4/II (e) 
does not mention “indirect” discrimination. However,  i t  can be construed as such 
since it  refers to “person” instead of “purchaser”, and the provision does not 
require a “contracting party”, thus indirect discrimination is included.  
 Furthermore, the provisions, unlike Art 101 (d) and 102 (c) of TFEU, do 
not include the condition “competit ive disadvantage”. However, in i ts  decisions, 
the Board sought for the conditions of discriminatory abuse by dominant 
undertaking to “place customer at  comp etit ive disadvantage”286.   
 The Board consistently requires  the exclusionary effect for primary line 
injury, yet states it  is not per se  i llegal287.  However, i t  fails to distinguish between 
                                                             
285 See BELKO decision dated 06.04.2001 and numbered 01-17 / 150-39.  See also grounds for the Article 6 (the most 
commonly encountered abuse cases in practice are listed as examples in the second paragraph and the cases are not 
limited to these examples). 
286 Coca Cola / TAB Food Decision dated 26.05.2005 and numbered 05-36 / 453-106 (The Board stated that there are 
three conditions to meet for discriminatory abuse under Art. 6/ II (b): 1- Discriminatory practice is applied to 
undertakings that are competitors 2- Offering different prices for equal business transactions 3- Creating a competitive 
disadvantage among customers). See also Cine 5 decision dated 11.10.1999 and numbered 99-46/500-316 (The 
cancellation decision of the Council of Sate on 1.11.2007 and renumbered 07-83/1009-393); Bayek decision dated 
18.7.2002 and numbered  02-44/518-213; Roche decision, dated 30.10.2008 and numbered 08-61/996-388. Compare 
Istanbul Otobüs Isletmeleri [Istanbul Bus Operations] decision dated 06.07.2001 and numbered 01-33/313-91 (The 
cancellation decision of the Council of Sate on 23.05.2005 and renumbered 05-60/983-242) [The Board stated that 
discriminatory practice (offering different conditions) is sufficient for the condemnation, it is not considered necessary 
to apply these conditions or to have an effect on the competitiveness of the business parties]. Nonetheless, in the 
decision, the Board found that alleged practice place competitive disadvantage among the customers. 
287 Board Frito Lay decision dated 06.04.2006 and numbered 06-24/ 04-71. 
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primary line injury and secondary l ine injury . In the Gillette decision288 in which 
a dominant undertaking that does not operate in the downstream market terminat ed 
the contracts of some of i ts distributor/customers, the Board concluded that there 
was no violation of Article 6 because there was no competition between the 
dominant undertaking and its customers. On the other hand, in the Sanofi-Aventis  
decision289,  i t was decided that the dominant undertaking , which does not operate 
in the downstream market , had violated Article 6, due to applying different tariffs 
(conditions of sale) to i ts customers 290.  However, there is no judgement that the 
Board considers a discriminatory abuse by dominant undertaking directly to final 
consumer as a violation of Art. 6.  
 Tying provisions, furthermore, are worded differently. Art. 6/ II (c) does 
not include “the nature of the agreement or commercial usages” as a justification 
for unilaterally imposed tying conduct. In addition it  is important, since a practice 
that falls under Art. 4 can be exempt regarding Art. 5.  However,  the TCA does 
not regulate exemptions for the practice that fall  within the scope of Art. 6 291.  
Even though above shortcomings can be overc ome by interpretation of the Board, 
i t  is technically improper.  
 Examination of  twenty years enforcement of the Board indicates that few 
tying cases were condemned. The Board states that tying practice can be subject 
to either Art. 4 or Art. 6, but the latter “dominant position” is considered as a 
pre-condition.  
                                                             
288 Board decision dated 20.03.2008 and number 08-25 / 261-88. 
289 Board dated 20.04.2009 and numbered 09-16 / 374-88. 
290 See also the decision of Cevahir AVM dated 15.06.2006 and numbered 06-44 / 540-142 and Reckitt Benckiser / 
Akyüz Gıda dated 07.10.2010 and numbered 10-63 / 1320-496 (The Board stated that the dominant undertaking which 
does not operate in the downstream market cannot have the intention to disrupt the competition in the downstream 
market or to put a customer in this market in a disadvantageous position because the competitive structure in the 
market itself would grant an additional benefit to the dominant undertaking). 
291 In this situation, dominant firm may ask for negative clearance. See TCA Article 8: “Upon the application by the 
undertaking or associations of undertakings concerned, the Board may, on the basis of information in hand, grant a 
negative clearance certificate indicating that an agreement, decision, practice or merger and acquisition are not 
contrary to articles 4, 6 and 7 of this Act”. 
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 In all  those cases, the Board only once mentioned in an early decision that 
tying can also have “exploitative effect”, but in the decision, due to lack of 
dominant position, concluded that tying could not reduce consumer welfare 292.  In  
another early decision, the Board assessed consumer harm under tying pra ctice, 
but due to lack of exclusionary effect, the tying practice was allowed293.   
 At the end of 2008, the Board started including efficiency defenses in i ts 
tying inquiry294.  Since then, the Board evaluates tying as an exclusionary practice 
and assumes that it  can harm consumers indirectly. However, in the decisions, 
consumers are not always the end users. Furthermore, the Board has been trying 
to ascertain whether efficiency gains pass on to consumers, but does not explain 
on which grounds or what amount of efficiency is considered for the pass -on 
requirement. 
 It  can be said that the process of modernization of Art. 102 TFEU affected 
the Board’s approach, even before the adaptation of the Guidelines (Dominant 
Position) in 2014. Since the Commission Guidance (2009) established the 
priorit ies for exclusionary practice, the Board embraced this concern and 
abandoned assessment of exploitative tying that can harm consumers directly.  
 For exclusionary tying assessment, the Gui delines (Dominant Position) 
suggests that the Board determine the presence of two factors: 1) the tying product 
and the tied product should be distinct, and 2) i t should be likely that the tying 
practice will  to lead to anti -competit ive foreclosure 295.   
                                                             
292 Board Garanti Bank decision dated 5.8.2009 and numbered 09-34/ 787-192. 
293 Board DIPOS decision dated 11.9.2008 and numbered 08-52 / 791-320. 
294 Board TTNET/Avea decision dated 09.10.2008 and numbered 08-57/ 912-363; Yandex/ Google decision dated 
28.12.2015, numbered  15-46/766-281. See also Competition Authority’s Sector Inquiry Report dated 25.11.2009. 
295  Guidelines (Dominant Position), n. 86.  See the Board decisions were already looking for these two conditions 
(TÜVTÜRK decision dated 09.12.2009 and numbered 09-58/ 1405-367; TTNET/Avea decision dated 09.10.2008 and 
numbered 08-57/ 912-363; Garanti Bank decision dated 05.08.2009 and numbered 09-34/ 787-192; TFF/ Digiturk 




 Furthermore, the Guidelines (Dominant Position) also recommend to the 
Board to include in i ts analysis, that the  
arguments of the dominant undertaking engaging in the tying conduct, 
which claim that the practice ensures production and distribution savings 
to the benefit  of customers, that i t reduces transaction costs for customers 
who otherwise would have to buy the bundled products separately, and that 
i t  allows the supplier to pass on to the [customers] 296 any eff iciencies 
stemming from the production or purc hase of the t ied products in large 
numbers 297.   
 The problem is that when it  comes to speech, the Authority and the language 
of the guidelines emphasize “consumer”, but consumer merely means “customer”, 
and is not l imited to final consumers. It  is already a fail ing to omit exploitative 
and discriminatory practices from the Guidelines (Dominant Position). However,  
the presumption that harm to intermediate customers creates harm to consumers 
and where intermediate customers are not competitors of the dominant 
undertaking raises the question of whether competit ion rules can protect 
consumers even indirectly, since there is no consensus where an increase in 
customer welfare leads to an increase in “consumer welfare”.  
 Regarding exploitative abuse while the guideline is stil l  in draft , i t  is stated 
that exploitative abuses are actions that could have adverse effects on consumer 
welfare when the undertaking has a monopoly or near monopoly due to there  being 
                                                             
296 It is worth to note that in original language of the Guideline (Dominant Position) here the term of “müsteri” 
(customer) is used, while in the English version of the Guideline (Dominant Position) published by the Authority, for 
the pass-on requirement the term “consumer” has been used. It may be done inadvertently, yet the implementation of 
this would be challenging for the efficiency defense for the dominant undertaking. In this instance, it would not be 
sufficient for dominant undertaking to prove that it reduces cost for its customers, but also final consumer receive 
benefit from this reduction should be shown. 
297 Guidelines (Dominant Position), n. 94. 
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no regulations on the relevant market 298.  However, these concerns are excluded 
from the published Guideline (Dominant Position).  
 One may wonder whether any exploitative practice has been challenged 
before the Board. Especially excessive pricing is often claimed in Board 
decisions. However, only two violations have been found299.   
 We aware that i t is difficult  task for competition authorities to intervene in 
the market when a practice merely harm s consumers but does not distorts 
competit ion. However, the assessment of exploi tative abuse is vital  for the 
application of Art. 6. Whether the objective of competit ion law is “consumer 
welfare”, or it  at least an expected benefit  from undistorted competition, it  
requires the question of whether the wording of the TCA is the means to this end, 
or even whether the implementation of the TCA is consistent with this approach.  
 The discussion of under which circumstance exploitation should be found 
“abusive” has not been carried out sufficiently, because of the emphasis on 
“exclusionary” abuses. Even though Art. 6 prohibits exploitative abuse, case law 
does not suggest a definition or analytic framework for exploitative abuse. In  
addition the li terature only deals with excessive pricing.  
 Thus, our challenge is, first ,  to determine how t o approach exploitative 
conducts. While doing so, we can understand underlying reasons for the 
intervention for exploitative practice, which will  help us to determine when 
exploitative tying practice should raise antitrust concerns under Article 6 of the 
TCA. 
                                                             
298 ÖZKAN, Ahmet Fatih, “Hakim Durumun Kötüye Kullanilmasi Kilavuzu’nun Kapsamli Bir İncelemesi” [A 
Comprehensive Analysis of Guidelines on The Assessment of Exclusionary Abusive Conduct By Dominant 
Undertakings], REKABET FORUMU 85 (2014), p. 32 [hereinafter ÖZKAN (2014)]. 
299 BELKO decision dated 06.04.2001and numbered 01-17/ 150-39; TÜPRAŞ decision dated 17.01.2014 and 
numbered 14-03/ 60-24. 
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4. UNILATERALLY IMPOSED EXPLOITATIVE TYING  
4.1. Framework of Intervention for the Unilaterally Imposed Exploitative 
Conduct  
Although exploitative abuses are explicit ly prohibited in many competiti on law 
systems, they are discussed in a l imited number o f decisions, and the scope of 
exploitative abuses is one of the most controversial  areas of competition law. 
Regarding the scope of the exploitative abuses, there is  a two-dimensional 
discussion, i .e.,first  conceptual, second practical.  
 The conceptual dimension of the discussion is related to the definition of 
exploitative abuses. In the given definitions of exploitative abuse , “competit ive 
market conditions” are used as a benchmark. However, i t  is overlooked that 
behaving differently from competit ive market conditions is inevitable when it 
comes to dominance position (due to the market power they possess) 300.Thus, this  
raises the question of where to draw the line between the usual behavior s in the 
dominant position and the forms of behavio r in the exploitative nature 301.  
 Once it is assumed that the conceptual dimension of exploitative abuses can 
be overcome, as adopting merely a general premise that the direct harm to 
consumers without strengthening market power or other structural infringem ent 
to market conditions is exploitative, then application -oriented questions arise. 
Should there be an intervention in the exploitative abuse by competition law that 
does not affect the competit ive structure of the market, and if the answer is  
affirmative, what should be the conditions (why and when) and methods of 
intervention and which markets are candidates for intervention?  
 These questions are answered in the case where excessive pricing is the 
abuse: 
                                                             
300 ÜNAL, p. 156. 
301 ÜNAL, p. 156. 
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 Whether competition authorit ies should intervene is answered 
affirmatively, since many competition authorit ies believe that competit ion policy 
is ult imately about protecting consumer welfare. Nonetheless, two main 
hesitations remain in the background: First ,  i t  is difficult  to measure when prices 
are “high” or “excessive” in order to compare them with an appropriate 
benchmark302;  second, i t  is unpredictable that the results of intervention with 
market dynamic due to the risk of impair investment incentive to innovate 303.  
 Due to these drawbacks, there is a consensus in the l i terature that the area 
of intervention should be limited to certain conditions for exploitative abuse.  
Basically,  i t  can be said that intervention should be limited to where markets are 
characterized by significantly high and long-lasting barriers to entry.  
Nevertheless, the proposals concerning what these cumulative conditions should 
be, vary according to the understanding of how competit ion law should be 
intrusive.  
 MOTTA and DE STREEL propose  that intervention should be limited to 
industries where there are: 1) High and non -transitory barriers to entry; and 2) 
monopoly or near-monopoly situations due to current or past exclusive or special 
rights 3)  unless there is an effective way for the competit ion authority to eliminate 
the entry barriers 4) where there is not a sector -specific regulator304.  
 EVANS and PADILLA suggest the necessary circumstances are as follows: 
1) Where the firm has a (near) monopoly position in the market;  2) the prices 
charged by the firm widely exceed its average total costs;  and 3) there is a risk 
that those prices may prevent the emergence of new goods and services in adjacent 
markets305.  
                                                             
302 LYONS, p. 67; EVANS/ PADILLA, p. 99; Paulis, p. 2. 
303 See LYONS, p. 73-77 (considering the role of high prices in the investment incentive for a dominant firm); Röller, 
p. 3 (indicating that in industries where innovation or large upfront investments play a major role, consumers 
ultimately do not benefit from excessive pricing interventions). Cf. PAULIS, p. 4, 7. 
304 MOTTA/ de STREEL, p. 16-17. 
305 EVANS/ PADILLA, p. 119-122. 
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 O'DONOGHUE and PADILLA contend that there should not be 
intervention, unless 1) the market is protected by high barriers to entry; 2)  
consumers have no credible alternatives to the products of the dominant firm; and 
3) firms compete in a mature environment, w here investment and innovation play 
li t tle or no role306.  
 RÖLLER argues that intervention based on exploitative abuse is necessary 
in order to fulfil l  “gap cases” or correct “mistakes 307: In  this way, enforcement 
against exploitative abuses can be used to clo se the gap under Article 102 TFEU, 
which does not address an anticompetitive conduct below the level of dominance, 
or anticompetit ive behavior by an oligopoly. Moreover, action against 
exploitative abuses due to the mistakes  (anticompetit ive behaviours that escaped 
from antitrust scrunity) ,  will  grant a second “shot” for the enforcement, whether 
the dominant position is acquired through exclusionary conduct 308.  His answer to 
the question of “when take to action” for gap or mistake cases under article 102 , 
TFEU is l imited to special circumstances in which 1) significant entry barriers 
exist  2) the market is unlikely to self -correct 3) no structural remedy is available 
4) no regulator exists or there is regulatory failure 309.  
 ÜNAL also recommends a policy to l imi t enforcement against exploitative 
abuses in the markets that are legal or natural monopolies and are not subject to 
regulation310.  Moreover ODMAN BOZTOSUN, contrary to those  in the 
mainstream, contends that a competit ion authority is not authorized to intervene 
where the market is a natural monopoly and where the market is legal monopoly.  
The only intervention means can be competition advocacy to remove the legal 
barriers311.  Further, she proposes a new provision in the TCA that addresses 
                                                             
306 O’DONOGHUE, Robert and PADILLA, A. Jorge, The Law and Economics of Article 102 TFEU, Oxford, Hart 
Publishing, 2013, n. 27103. 
307 RÖLLER, p. 4-6. 
308 Compare LYONS, p. 82, 83; MARTÍN-LABORDA, p. 13 (fn.: 46). 
309 RÖLLER, p. 9-10. 
310 ÜNAL, p. 204-206. 
311 ODMAN BOZTOSUN, p. 122. 
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unilateral conduct, as follows312: 1) The conduct of dominant undertaking in the 
relevant market that harms consumer directly is prohibited; 2) Whereas the direct 
harm to consumer is undetermined, then the exclusionary practice of dominant 
undertaking may be allowed due to effi ciency justifications; 3) Dominant 
undertaking is not allowed to charge higher prices than determined price ceiling 
by the Board; 4) The Board establishes the criteria with respect to determination 
of dominant position, minimum efficiency measurement, thre shold for price 
ceiling with a communiqué . 
 Regarding the intervention methods, the majority opinion is  that remedies 
should be directed at the source of the exploitation, namely,  the market structure. 
In this context, effort s should address removing such entry barriers, opening the 
market , or l iberalizing through competit ion advocacy activities 313.  
 If the structural remedies are not available, then (especially for excessive  
pricing) price regulation should be considered where there is no regulatory agency 
or if the regulator does not operate effectively 314.  Otherwise, i t  is suggested that 
leaving price regulation to a sector-specific regulator would be more efficient 315.  
 In this case , MOTTA and DE STREEL suggest that the authority rather 
lobby the government to  lift  the (legal) barriers and effectively  l iberalize the 
sector than to open several exploitative abuse cases , which may be more cost -
effective316.  Regarding this consideration, PAULIS states that “generally, such 
lobbying efforts by competit ion authorit ies  are more effective at  the national level 
than at the Community level” and “consumers may pay excessive prices for quite 
some time before Community legislation removes the legal barriers” 317.  Thus,  on 
                                                             
312 ODMAN BOZTOSUN, p. 137. 
313 LYONS, p. 77-79; MOTTA/ de STREEL, p. 15; RÖLLER, p. 9. 
314 Yet, it is noted that price regulation or imposing price ceiling still should be considered as ultimate means for the 
regulation, it is recommended for the authorities to impose behavioral remedies, or continue to monitor prices over 
time, therefore converting itself in a regulator. See Lyons, p. 82, 83; Motta/ de Streel, p. 15; Evans/ Padilla; Röller, p. 
9,10. 
315 EVANS/ PADILLA, p. 122. 
316 MOTTA/ de STREEL, p. 17. 
317 PAULIS, p. 6. 
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the one hand,  i t  may require working on both camps at the  same time, while, on 
the other hand lobbying and intervening directly against excessive prices.  
 From our point of view, intervention against (price based) exploitative 
abuse should not be restricted to situations of monopoly or near monopoly, due  
to current or past exclusive or special rights. It  is  a plausible condition for 
excessive pricing practice, but we are attempting to determine  an answer for all 
types of (price-based) exploitative practice s. In addition, since a dominant 
position is a pre-requisi te condition for “abuse”, and competit ion law suggests 
using “indirect” structural measures of market power, viz.  firm’s market share, 
the presence of barriers to entry and the abili ty of competitors to expand sales 318,  
hence “high and long -lasting barriers to entry and expansion” ,  could be 
recognized319.  Otherwise, merely looking for monopoly or a proxy for i t ,  will  lead 
to gap cases.  
 Second, there is a general concern about monopoly induced “high” or 
excessive” prices, yet this concern occurs in opposite dir ections. On the one hand, 
there is resistance to intervention due to concern about impairment of investment 
incentive for potential  innovation 320;  on the other hand, there is support for 
intervention in this instance due to concern s regarding  “quite monopoly life”321.  
 Therefore, the Board has two options to follow: The first  option embraces 
the former approach, and determines whether dominant firm might create dynamic 
efficiency, and finds the practice is abusive due to lack of dynamic efficiency.  
The second option is adopting quite monopoly life presumption, and assesses the  
alleged practice without dynamic efficiency, but allows the firm to justify 
dynamic efficiency. We suggest including dynamic efficiency consideration into 
                                                             
318 See Guidance (2009), n. 9-19; Guidelines (Dominant Position), n.10-21. 
319 See PAULIS, p. 5, 6.  
320 EVANS/ PADILLA, 121, 122; Lyons, p. 73, 74; RÖLLER, p. 2,3; CARLTON/ HEYER (Extraction vs. Extension), 
p. 294. 
321 ELHAUGE (Rehabilitating Jefferson Parish), p. 486-489; BAKER/ SALOP, p. 22, 23. 
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assessment in either way. However, choosing the first  option would ease the 
burden of proof for the dominant firm.  
 We agree also that intervention can take place through competition law or 
competit ion advocacy. However,  the priority should be on structural remedies.  
When structural remedies are not possible, then it  is necessary to distinguish 
whether the sector is regulated or not in order to determine possible remedies:  
 If there is no regulation,  there are several options. We are listing below 
these options in the order that application of these remedies in an accretionary 
way will  reflect an enforcement from more lenient to stricter:  
 1) The Board may merely deliver opinion and opt to challenge the practice 
through competition advocacy, such as leading a market inquiry before de ciding 
whether the price regulation or fine is necessary.  During this t ime, consumers will  
remain defenseless (and may be exploited) or protected limited to  the scope of 
consumer- or contract law. 
 2) The Board shall  impose an administrative fine 322.  The fine may be 
significant for a non-specialist  firm, in which case i t  may have a deterrent effect 
on high prices to l imit future exploitation 323.  However, punishing high prices with 
a fine would complicate business l ife, especially if firms must consult  competit ion 
lawyers every time they raise a price324.  
 3) The Board may prefer price regulation without imposing a fine. The 
price-regulation option is always considered as a last  resort ,  due to  the side effects 
of discouraging entry, cost of  establishing a specialist  bureaucracy, risk of sett ing 
                                                             
322 TCA Art. 16/ IV: “To those who commit behavior prohibited in articles 4, 6 and 7 of this Act, an administrative 
fine shall be imposed up to ten percent of annual gross revenues of undertakings and associations of undertakings or 
members of such associations to be imposed a penalty, which generate by the end of the financial year preceding the 
decision, or which generate by the end of the financial year closest to the date of the decision if it would not be possible 
to calculate it and which would be determined by the Board”. 
323 LYONS, p. 79. 
324 LYONS, p. 79. 
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inappropriate prices etc.325.  Price regulation is undesirable, not just  as a remedy 
option, but generally for  the market. Nonetheless, price regulation is sti l l  deemed 
as the best option for large industries subject to large economies of scale , such as 
gas and electricity.  
 4) The Board may impose fine s for infringement of Art. 6 and also opt to 
regulate prices by imposing a price ceiling. This is not  desirable, but in some 
instances, not imposing a price ceiling and merely ordering to the firm to 
reestablish i ts prices may create uncertainty for the firm.  
 Likewise, the Board in TÜRSAB (the Turkish Travel Agencies Association) 
decision held that TÜRSAB violated Art. 4 as s ett ing a high entry fees and dues 
that created entry barrier into the market 326.  However,  the Board did not say when 
the fee would not be considered high or  anticompetitive ; i t  just  stated that, in 
accordance with related private act, “it  is duty of general assembly of TÜRSAB 
to determine the entrance fee, but the determined amount should not be high 
enough to violate Law No. 4054 [TCA]”. Thus, TÜRSAB were fined three times 
due to fail ing to determine  the “correct” high enough fee each time 327.  
 If there is a specific sector regulator, i t  is debatable whether the Board 
may intervene. In this context, the relationship between competit ion law and 
sector specific regulation in the application of Article 6 has not been addressed , 
either in the TCA or in the Guidelines (Dominant Position)  
 This issue has not been addressed by the Guidance (2009) either, because 
related regulation has left  for the domestic laws of the member states instead of 
the supra-national authorit ies. Nonetheless, there is an example of the 
                                                             
325 LYONS, p. 77-84; RÖLLER, p. 9, 10; PAULIS, p. 3. 
326 TÜRSAB decision dated 17.12.2003 and numbered 03-80/967-397. 
327 See Yilmaz’s criticize of the decision (commenting in Abuse of Dominant Position: Problems and Solution 
Suggestion Symposium, 22.06.2010), in Abuse of Dominant Position: Problems and Solution Suggestion Symposium, 
22.06.2010), On Iki Levha Yayincilik, Istanbul 2011. 
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Commission intervening even though a national regulator either had decided not 
to intervene or had positively endorsed the behavior of a dominant company 328.  
 However, this is  not the case in the Turkish legal system. The discussion 
can be made regarding “general law” and “special law”. Due to lex specialis 
derogat legi generali  principle, the special regulations relating to the competit ion 
will  have the application priority in accordance with the TCA (which is general 
law)329.  
 However, this should not automatically prevent the intervention of the 
Board. If the regulator does not operate effecti vely, then the Board should  enforce 
TCA rules or intervene through competit ion advocacy, since it  has authority 
pursuant to Article 2 of the TCA. In this context,  the Council  of State held that 
existence of specific arrangements to prevent competitive harm; or the existence 
of specific sector regulator (in the case Telecommunications Authority);  or 
whether the practice is realized with the approval of specific sector regulator (the 
Telecommunication Board) are not obstacles for The Competition Board to open 
an investigation and to enforce sanctions in the event of a precise determination 
of the violation of TCA Art. 6 330.  
 4.2. The Board’s Approach to Exploitative Conduct under Article 6 of  
the TCA 
 TCA Article 6 bans the abuse of dominant position parallel  to Article 102 
TFEU, yet unlike Article 102 TFEU, there is no clause in Article 6 of the Law 
that foresees that “directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling 
                                                             
328 The General Court affirms the Commission decision on the grounds that the undertaking has not resorted, despite 
the possibility of removing or reducing the contraventions from the competition, and that the Commission is not bound 
by the decisions of the national regulators [Deutsche Telekom v. Commission, Case T-271/03, Court of First Instance 
(2008)]. Furthermore, The ECJ also stated that competition law is feasible unless sectoral arrangements prevent 
undertakings from making free decisions that restrict or distort competition [ Case C-280/08, Deutsche Telekom AG 
v. European Commission (2010)]. See also The General Court decision, Case T-513/93 CNSD v Commission, ECR 
2000 II-01807 (expressing that competition rules of the Community are superior than the national laws of member 
states). 
329 See Ateş, (2013), p. 413-419. 
330 The Council of State Decision, Borusan Telekom, dated 13.02.2012 and numbered E. 2008/13184, K. 2012/359. 
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prices or other unfair trading conditions” may lead to an abuse. This is important 
since this condition is the basis for the assessment of a significant number of 
exploitative abuses under European competit io n case law. 
 Therefore, i t  raised the academic dispute, especially in the case of excessive  
pricing and whether exploitative conduct should be considered an abuse within 
the framework of Article 6 of the TCA. Turkish li terature answers this question 
affirmatively and it  has been found that excessive pricing should be regarded as 
an abuse under Art. 6 331.  
 As a matter of fact, the Competit ion Board clarified in an early decision 
that the Competition Authority is  obliged to take measures against not only 
exclusionary abuses, but also exploitative abuses 332.   
 Below, the Board decisions will  be examined in terms of exploitative abuses 
to seek to determine the policy for the Board’s intervention 333.   
 The Belko (Belko Ankara Coal and Asphalt  Ltd) decision is important  
because it contains basic elements that establish the Board ’s  approach to the 
detection and prevention of excessive pricing. Belko is the municipal enterprise 
that has the exclusive right  of import and authority to sell  coal for heating 
purposes in the province of Ankara. It  was alleged that i t  charged excessive  prices, 
which constituted abusive practice in violation of Article 6.  
 First ,  The Board determined the monopolistic price as “ the price set above 
competitive prices as a consequence of the use of one’s market power ”, yet 
denoted that determination of “excessive pricing” should be assessed on a case -
                                                             
331 AŞÇIOĞLU ÖZ, p. 171; ASLAN (2017), p. 744, 745; ÜNAL, p. 194, 195; SANLI, Kerem C., Rekabetin 
Korunmasi Hakkindaki Kanun’da Öngörülen Yasaklayici Hükümler ve Bu Hükümlere Aykiri Sözlesme ve Tesebbüs 
Birligi Kararlarinin Geçersizligi [Prohibited Provisions in the Law on the Protection of Competition and the Invalidity 
of the Decision of Associations of Undertakings and Agreements against Those Provisions], Rekabet Kurumu 
Yayinlari, Ankara 2000, p. 273, 274; Aslan (2017), p. 744, 745. 
332 Board Belko decision dated 6.4.2001 and numbered 01-17/ 150-39 (The dismissal decision of the Council of Sate 




by-case basis. For  this assessment, the Board considered the characteristic s of the 
market such as the degree of barriers to entry,  existence of sector regulation, 
positions of other enterprises, and prices of relevant products in different 
geographical markets.  
 In the decision, The Board gave priority to price comparison in different 
geographical markets and remarked that cost -price analysis should be invoked 
only if the cost can be determined precisely. Then, regarding cost -price analysis ,  
held that  “…while, along with high prices, a large margin between the sale price 
and the total cost (excessive profit) could be considered a sign of excessive 
pricing, thus, monopolistic pricing is also possible in situations where the profit 
margin turns out low or even negative due to establishment of real or f icti t ious 
costs in excessively large magnitudes (along with prices set at relatively high 
levels) …”. The Board found Belko prices were 50 to 60 percent higher, on 
average, than prices for the same or equivalent coal being sold in other geographic 
markets that were open to competition.  
 On the other hand, i t  has been noted that BELKO did not earn excessive  
profits, yet i t  was found liable for abusing its dominant position on the ground 
that i ts “ failure to exercise maximum care and diligence in protecting the 
Company’s interests in making purchases; overstaffing; incurring costs higher 
than what they should have been, due to quiet li fe of monopoly ”. The Board 
dismissed the proposition that inefficient monopolists that set  high prices, 
probably to attract new entrants in the long term, and assumed that a monopolist 
firm had special responsibili ties, especially with regard to being prudent and 
managing efficiently.  
 The Belko decision demonstrates that the Board assumed that i t  is 
authorized to intervene and impose fine where the undertaking, though publicly 
owned, was not subject to price control. However, the Board did not opt to 
establish the price level . Instead it  is stated that “…assessments of price levels 
will  not be judged as at what level the prices are set,  but at what level they should 
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not”, and confine itself to notify that “sales prices of coal should be reduced to 
levels that comparable to those on competit ive markets ”, yet the Board did not 
foresee any monitoring mechanism for this.  
 Nevertheless, the Board decided to inform the relevan t public insti tutions 
of i ts opinions and suggestions on how to establish the competit ion environment 
in the relevant market and so remove obstacles from the opening of market 
competit ion in the framework of the competition advocacy.  
 Another decision in which the Board considered the productive inefficiency 
as excessive was TEDAS decision 334.  It  had been stated that the excessive pricing 
behavior, which arises due to cost inefficiency, could be solved only by 
developing mechanisms to reduce costs. However,  i t  was concluded that there was 
no need to open an investigation, because this duty belongs to Energy Market 
Regulatory Authority (EMRA) in terms of the electricity market.  
 However, in the later decisions of the Board, the required conditions for  
the intervention regarding the market structure have not been continued on a 
steady basis. In one decision, the Board conclude d that high pric ing behavior of 
a dominant undertaking cannot be found as a violation due to the fact that the 
relevant market is not a legal or natural monopoly335.  However, in other decisions, 
the Board carried out an excessive pricing assessment even in the case of a clear 
lack of monopoly in the relevant market 336.  
 Moreover, the ASKI decision (preliminary inquiry) demonstrates that the 
Board does not l imit i ts authority within unregulated sectors, but opts to intervene 
in the cases where there is regulatory failure,  or the regulator does not operate 
effectively337.  In this case, the Board evaluated the misuse of legal monopoly 
                                                             
334 Board TEDAS decision dated 30.04.2002 and numbered 02-26/ 262-102 (preliminary inquiry). 
335 Board Çimento decision dated 1.2.2002 and numbered 02-06 / 51-24. 
336 See Board decision dated 1.3.2007 and number 07-18 / 164-54; decision dated 4.12.2008 and numbered 08-69/ 
1123-439; decision dated 08.02.2010 and numbered 10-14/175-66. 
337 Compare with the Board decisions in which any inquiry was rejected on the grounds that alleged excessive pricing 
was in the price regulated. See decision dated 8.3.2002 and number 02-13/ 127-54; decision dated 29.06.2006 and 
numbered 06-46/ 601-172; decision dated 30.10.2008 and numbered 08-61/ 996-388. 
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power on city water of Ankara through price tariffs, and remarked that prices 
could be excessive based on the price comparison and the price -cost analysis 338.   
 The Board noticed the specific provision in the relevant legislation with 
respect to price determination that  stipulates the profit  will  be as low as 10%. The 
Board determined that this arrangement was not proper for natural or legal 
monopolistic markets. Moreover, i t  was found that ASKI had not complied with 
the price determination method that was envisaged in the relevant legislation. 
However, the Board decided not to open an investigation but only notified that 
“ the pricing mechanism should be rearrange as preventing excessive pricing and 
pursuant to consumer benefit  by the relevant and authorized  insti tutions” and 
recommended to ASKI to determine prices on cost -based pricing and to avoid 
excessive pricing.  
 The Board continued this att i tude in the Bereket Geothermal 339 and Izmir 
Geothermal340 decisions. The Board drew attention to the need for control ling 
excessive pricing of undertakings in natural monopoly market, but instead of 
opening an investigation,  they concluded that i t would be sufficient to forward 
their opinion to The Prime Ministry, the Ministry of Energy and Natural 
Resources, and the Energy Market Regulatory Authority.   
 The only decision in unfair contract conditions evaluated by the Board was 
in Izmirgaz 341.  The Board assessed the claim that Izmirgaz requested annual 
purchase commitment from its customers and imposed penalties if the customers 
carried out more or less than their commitments. In the decision, i t was noted that 
the purchase commitments were not established due to negotiation between the 
parties, but they were determined unilaterally by Izmirgaz, which was the sole 
provider in the region.  
                                                             
338 Board ASKI decision dated 20.12.2006 and numbered 06-92/ 1176-354. 
339 Bereket Geothermal decision dated 14.02.2008 and numbered 08-15/ 146-49. 
340 Izmir Geothermal decision dated 15.7.2009 and numbered 09-33/ 739-176. 
341 Izmirgaz decision dated 08.01.2009 and numbered 09-01/ 2-2 (preliminary inquiry). 
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 However, the Board avoided refer ring to the concept of “applying unfair 
contract conditions” without categorizing the infringement, stating that there were 
serious findings for the violation of Article 6 342.  The Board had assessed whether 
the attempted conduct complied with relevant legislation (the Natural Gas Market 
Law no. 4646) and decided that i t would be a ppropriate to terminate i t by the 
regulatory authority (EMRA).  Since it  was noticed that the EMRA had tendency 
to end this practice, the Board concluded that cooperation with EMRA should be 
done in order to end the alleged practice.  
 It  is worth mentioning a recent decision of the Board, namely the TÜPRAS 
decision343,  even though it was not challenged only as exploitative, but also as 
exclusionary conduct. The Board held that th e ex-state-owned oil  refinery 
TÜPRAS abused its dominant position by charging exce ssive prices contrary to 
i ts tariffs for a period of three months (11.10.2008 and 01.01.2009), imposing 
unfair trading conditions on oil  distribution companies that had the effect of 
preventing oil  distribution companies from accessing alternative supplies  under 
more favorable terms. The Board found  that  TÜPRAS’  conduct was an 
infringement of Article 6 and imposed a fine (corresponding to one percent of its 
annual turnover in 2013). The Board decided to send a notice to the EMRA 
suggesting a rearranging of the pricing mechanism of refineries pursuant to 
consumer benefit .  Like  the Belko decision, it  was noticed that TÜPRAS was not  
making profits during the period of infringement 344.  
 In the l ight of above-mentioned decision, except the TÜPRAS decision, the 
Board showed the tendency that tools for intervention is not the competition law 
but competit ion advocacy. Even for the non-regulated sector, the Board did not 
opt to behave as a sec tor/price regulator, but confined itself to notifying the need 
for correcting the price mechanism. Nevertheless, the Board was reluctant to open 
                                                             
342 ÜNAL, p. 201. 
343 TÜPRAS decision dated 17.01.2014 and numbered 14-03/60-24. 
344 See ÖZKAN, Ahmet Fatih, for assessment of TÜPRAS decision, in e-Competition National Competition Law 
Bulletin, January 2014, available at www.concurrences.com (last visited 01.08.2017) (noting that alleged pricing 
could not be regarded as excessive since it was neither significant, nor persistent). 
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an investigation, though several findings showed the  undertaking’s conduct was 
inconsistent with relevant secto r legislation345.  
 Regarding excessive pricing, the concern was not only high prices in terms 
of high profits or monopoly pricing, but the Board needed to intervene in the cost 
of inefficiency. More importantly, in examined cases, market products were basic 
necessities such as gas, electricity, coal, petrol etc. Even though the Board was 
reluctant to impose structural remedies, they could not remain unresponsive due 
to the importance of the products for consumers. However, the Board failed  to 
qualify determining which prices are considered appropriate and how they should 
evolve over the t ime.  In this context, the Board approach does not provide clear 
guidance, but  has merely has sta ted “competit ive price” 346 and “pursuant to 
consumer benefit”347 as a proxy.  At the same time, the Board stipulated that sector 
regulation should allow proper monopolistic profits and considered 10% as 
improper for the relevant market 348.  
 How we can adopt this approach into exploitative tying cases? In other 
words, in which circumstances we can expect competition authority intervention 
for exploitative tying? Tying practice do es not necessarily occur only in a 
monopolistic market, so this is not the only benchmark.  The concern for the 
intervention can be generalized for exploitative practice and whether there is 
strong evidence that the market will  not correct i tself over the t ime.  Monopoly 
pricing is allowed and monopoly profit s of around 10% will  be considered a non-
exploitative level.  
 There is no finding that dynamic efficiency affects the determination of the 
remedies. It  appears that  when a firm is found to be practicing excessive pricing, 
then the firm should reduce its price to a competit ive level. It  should no longer 
                                                             
345 See ÜNAL, p. 199, 200 (indicating the decisions that shows Board’s reluctance to intervene by imposing penalties 
or price regulation on excessive pricing). 
346 See Belko decision. 
347 See TÜPRAS and ASKI decisions. 
348 See ASKI decision. 
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be allowed to charge supra -competit ive prices, even though, before i ts price was 
found to be at  an exploitative level, i t  was allowed to charge the monopoly price. 
A policy intervention in this respect requires the competit ion authority to  
precisely determine  what price will  be considered appropriate instead of loosely 
indicating which price will  be deemed a non-exploitative level. If the only 
question is short-term versus long-term effects, granting today’s consumer benefit  
over tomorrow’s ,  i t  should be realized that this decision may also hinder the future 
benefits of today’s consumers 349.  Moreover, consumer protection policy based on 
competit ion should be preferred over the one based on polit ical or administrative 
price control. This understanding includes not only structural remedies but 
behavioral remedies that can reach to weight of structural ones , such as 
compulsory dealing or any remedies that are closely associated to the 
undertakings’ pricing strategy.   
 4.3. Forms of Exploitative Tying  
 Exploitative effects of tying can occur in thre e forms: ( 1 )  If buyers use  
varying amounts of the t ied product, tying can profitably allow price 
discrimination among buyers of  the tying products (called intra -product price 
discrimination). (2 )  In absent strong positive demand correlation, tying can 
profitably cause price discrimination across buyers of tying and tied products , 
which is called inter -product price discrimination. (3 )  If buyers purchase varying 
amounts of the tying product, tying can profitably extract consumer surplus from 
individual buyers.  
The first  instance, intra -product price discrimination effect ,  is indicated by 
BOWMAN 350 who assumed that tying can profitably permit price discrimination 
among buyers of the tying product if the t ied product is a complement to that used 
                                                             
349 See Report by the Economic Advisory Group on Competition Policy, “An Economic Approach to Article 82”, July 
2005, available at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/competition/economist/eagcp_july_21_05.pdf (last visited 12.08.2017). 
350 See BOWMAN (Leverage Problem), p. 19, 23,24. See POSNER (Antitrust Law), p. 174] (crediting Aaron Director 
for originally developing price discrimination via tying).  
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in varying amounts with tying product351.  Such ties are typically called “metering 
ties”, because they use the demand for the t ied product to measure differences in 
consumer values for tying product, presumed to vary with intensity of  use 352.   
ELHAUGE proposes that as the t ied products were complements used with 
the tying product in Bowman’s theory, they do not need to be limited as 
complements to allow price discrimination, but it  is necessary that the t ied 
product demand is positively correlated to tying product demand 353.  In  other 
words, the existence of complements is just  one possible way to assume that there 
is a positively correlated demand. Therefore, Elhauge proposes that with varying 
usage of t ied product, and if the t ied product is positively correlated with demand 
for tying product, tying would increase monopoly profits, even though  this results 
in no significant foreclosure share in the tied market 354.  
The given classic example is the firm with market power over printers 
(durable product), used with inks (consumable product), and supposing usage of  
ink varies for buyers in a way that positively correlates to the value of the printer 
to each buyer, i .e. ,  buyers who use more cartridges (use their printer more often) 
usually accord more value to their printers. Then, the  firm could lower the price 
of the printer to marginal cost, tying the cartridges to i ts printers and setting the 
cartridges’  price well  above marginal cost. Buyers (high -value users) who use 
more cartridges would pay more,  thus tying would allow the firm to price 
discriminate among buyers of printers 355.  
 For instance, without tying, the printer profit -maximizing price would be 
15 liras, and the ink cartridges would be sold at  2  l iras, which is a competit ive 
                                                             
351 ELHAUGE, Einer, “Tying, Bundled Discounts, And The Death of The Single Monopoly Profit Theory”, 123 
HARVARD LAW REVIEW, Number 2 (December 2009), available at  
http://www.google.com.br/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwj956
aL (last visited 16.07.2016) [hereinafter ELHAUGE (2009)]. 
352 KLEIN/ WILEY, p. 601, 602,, available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/40843568 (last visited 10.02.2017); 
LAMBERT (2011), p. 8. See BOWMAN (Leverage Problem), p. 23; BURSTEIN (Full-line Forcing), p. 613, 614. 
353 ELHAUGE (2009), p. 405. Further, he also remarks demand for complements might sometimes be negatively 
correlated, ELHAUGE (2009), p. 405, footnote 6. 
354 ELHAUGE (2009), p. 405. 
355 ELHAUGE (2009), p. 404. 
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price. Assuming that there are three buyer groups (who use 1, 2 , and 3 cartridges), 
the first group that uses 1 cartridge  ink values the printer at  17 liras, the second 
group values at  19 liras, and third group values  at  22 liras.  
With tying (printer plus ink), the seller offers the printer at  10 liras (price 
equal to marginal cost), and require s the purchase of ink at  4 l iras. Therefore, 
tying has the potential  to attract new consumers whose reservation price for 
printer plus at least one cartridge  is less than 17 liras (the price without tying)  
but more or equal to 14 liras (price with tying). With the tying offer , the first356 
and second357 groups will  receive benefit ,  but third group pays more for the printer 
plus three cartridges358.  If their reservation price is slightly less than 22, they have 
to forego with one less cartridge. Therefore, the seller may have a loss on the t ied 
product sale to high intensive users, yet may increase tying product sales from 
new entrants. This i llustration is just  for simplifying.  In reality, the  success of 
tying (profitabi li ty) depends on the concentration of user intensity in the market 359 
and how accurately the meter is refined360.  
The second instance, the inter-product price discrimination effect ,  is 
indicated by Stigler 361,  who assumed tying could profitably permit price 
discrimination across buyers of both products when the firm has market power 
over each product, even if the products are used or bundled in a fixed ratio 362.  
                                                             
356 Without tying they would pay 17(15+2), while under tying they would pay 14 (10+4), and receive surplus. 
357 Without tying they would pay 19 (15+2+2), while under tying they would pay 18 (10+4+4), and receive surplus. 
358 Without tying they would pay 21 (15+2+2+2), while under tying they would pay 22 (10+4+4+4), and they do not 
receive surplus. 
359 See HOVENKAMP/ HOVENKAMP (2010), p. 945-949, 952; LAMBERT (2011), p.  30, 31. See also BURSTEIN 
(Full-line Forcing), p. 626,627 (noting that under uniform tying requirement only marginal consumer would be fully 
exploited, supra-marginal consumers would retain consumer surplus from the use of the tying good). 
360 See KLEIN/ WILEY, p. 613. See also HOVENKAMP/ HOVENKAMP (2010), p. 941. 
361 See STIGLER, George J., “United States v. Loew’s Inc.: A Note on Block-Booking”, THE SUPREME COURT 
REVIEW (1963), pp. 152-157, available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/3108731 (last visited 07.08.2016) [hereinafter 
STIGLER (Block-Booking)]. ELHAUGE (2009), p. 405, 406 (noting that even though Stigler assumed that demand 
for the bundled products was negatively correlated, later work has shown that theory may apply when there is not a 
strong positively correlation for demand). 
362 ELHAUGE (2009), p. 405, 406. See ELHAUGE (Rehabilitating Jefferson Parish), p. 47-474 (This conclusion has 
been assumed for normal distributions of buyer values, mainly referring to Schmalensee’s seminal articles). See also 
SCHMALENSEE, Richard, “Gaussian Demand and Commodity Bundling”; 57 THE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS 1, 
Part 2: Pricing Strategy (January 1984), available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/2352937 (last visited 07.08.2016) 
[hereinafter SCHMALENSEE (1984)]; SCHMALENSEE, Richard, “Commodity Bundling by Single-Product 
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Unlike intra-product price discrimination, this effect does not require that the 
demand for tying and ti ed products is positively correlated.  
To il lustrate this, assuming that the seller is the publisher of two magazines, 
one about fi tness (product A)  and the other contains cooking recipes (Product B).   
A seller has the market power in products A and B (assu ming each one has a 
constant marginal cost of zero), and demands for A and B are not positively 
correlated. Under profit  maximize pricing, A would be sold at  7  l iras, while B 
would be sold at  3  l iras, and 100 buyers would buy one of each, thus the firm’s 
profits would be 1000, while the aggregate consumer surplus would be 200 363.  
 Reservation price of 
first  group  
Reservation price of 
second group  
Product A 10 7 
Product B 3 4 
 
 
 If the seller offers two magazines as a bundle at  11  liras (7+4), which is 
equal to each buyer’s reservation price for the package, the seller will  earn a 
profit  of 1100. Even if consumers are charged the same amount for the bundle, 
the pricing is discriminatory in the sense that the first  group would not purchase 
product B for 4 l iras, while the second group would receive the consumer surplus 
without tying. When the products are priced separately, the price is suppressed 
by the buyer who values each one less than the other buyer; thus, the bundling 
eliminates this effec t364.  
                                                             
Monopolies”, 25 THE JOURNAL OF LAW & ECONOMICS 1 (April 1982), pp. 67-71, available at 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/725225 (last visited 07.08.2016) [hereinafter SCHMALENSEE (Commodity Bundling)]. 
363 Assume that each group purchases 50 magazines. Without tying first group would receive 150 (3x50), second 
group would receive 50 (1x50), consumer surplus. 
364LAMBERT (2011), p. 919. 
124 
 
The third instance occurs when consumers buy varying amounts of  the tying 
product. This effect is demonstrated by BURSTEIN 365,  who assumed that tying 
can extract individual consumer surplus i)  by allowing buyers to purchase the 
tying product at  the monopoly price (or supra-competit ive price), i i)  only if 
buyers agree to purchase their needs of some tied product at  supra -competit ive 
price (or even monopoly price), and i i i) each buyer will  accept the tie provided 
the burden of paying supra -competit ive prices on the t ied product is less than the 
consumer surplus that they would lose by being unable to buy the tying product 
at  the monopoly price 366.   
The intuition for this theory is based on the buyer’s valuation (reservation 
price) of the product. When the buyer purchases varying amount s of tying 
products at  the same per -unit  price, i t  is assumed that a multi-unit  buyer values i t  
more than the monopoly price –  especially for the first  purchase , which is devoted 
to the buyer’s most pressing need  –  and values each subsequent purchase at  least 
at  the monopoly price 367.  Therefore, the buyer enjoys some consumer surplus.  
Then, i t  holds that a seller can effectively expropriate that consumer surplus by 
selling its monopoly product only on the condition that buyers al so purchase 
another supra-competit ively priced product . The buyer will  accept the tie if she/he 
will  gain more consumer surplus from purchases of tying products than the surplus 
she expects to lose from having to buy the t ied product from the monopolist .  
                                                             
365 See BURSTEIN, M.L., “The Economics of Tie-In Sales”, 42 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND 
STATISTICS 1 (Feb., 1960), p. 68-73,  retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/1926097  (last visited 06.08.2016) 
[hereinafter BURSTEIN (Tie-in Sales)] (analyzes the situation that tying requires the purchaser of tying good to 
purchase also one or more tied goods from seller of the tying product whereas it leads a full-line forcing without 
causing extension of monopoly or exclusion of entry, and purposes that in this situation tying is used as a means of 
extracting the profit in an “all or nothing” selling arrangement. Furthermore, he observes that there is no need that tied 
good is “complimentary” for this result. But it is worth to note that Burstein assumes that tying product is monopolized, 
while Elhauge suggests that same analysis holds as long as the tying firm has some market power in the tying product). 
See ELHAUGE (2009), p. 412, 413. 
366 ELHAUGE (2009), p. 407. This is also called “intra-consumer price discrimination” because it aims to achieve 
effects similar to charging each consumer a different price for each unit it buys, depending on the marginal value of 
that unit. See ELHAUGE (Rehabilitating Jefferson Parish), p. 469. 
367 ELHAUGE (Rehabilitating Jefferson Parish), p. 469. 
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In another example368,  assume that four UEFA Champions League games 
will  occur in Germany, and each ticket will  be sold at  100 Euros . The German 
Football  Federation announced that buyers can buy ticket s for UEFA game only 
if they agree to purchase at  least one ticket for the national league at 50 Euros. 
Then, assume that reservation prices for each ticket decline for each subsequent 
purchase, i .e. ,  for EUFA games reservation prices are respectively ,  from first 
purchase to fourth purchase , 150, 140, 130, and 120 Euros. For national league 
games, the prices are  respectively, 20, 15, 10, 5 Euros. 
 
 
Therefore, consumers will  accept tying until  their reservation price for the 
tying product (UEFA league tickets) exceed s their loss from tied product (national 





                                                             
368 This example is taken from the German Competition Authority Inter-Milan Spiel decision, OLG Düsseldorf, 
22.01.1985, WuW/E OLG. 






1. Ticket  100+50=150 150+20= 170 20 
2. Ticket 200+100=300 290+35=325 25 
3. Ticket 300+150=450 420+45=465 15 




COMPONENTS OF UNILATERALLY IMPOSED EXPLOITATIVE TYING  
 The previous chapters provided an insight into Turkish competition policy 
and the approach to excessive pricing under Turkish competit ion law in order to 
establish parameters for determining competit ive harm in exploitative abuse.  This 
chapter thus analyses the legal conditions for the assessment of tying practice 
under Turkish competit ion law, which include separate product requirement, 
market definition, determination of dominant position , and abuse. This chapter 
follows two purposes: First ,  detecting possible difficulties and alternatives for 
the necessary determinations and emphasizing specific issues for the tying cases.  
Second, i t  answers how exploitative abuse in tying practice should be consistently 
determined in the stated competition policy objective and its implementation.  
1. SEPARATE PRODUCTS REQUIREMENT  
1.1. Separate Consumer Demand and Commercial Usages Tests  
In tying inquiry, most  jurisdictions require that the tying product an d the t ied 
product should be distinct. The assessment of whether separate products exist  may 
differ in the authorit ies’ approach.  
 Separate consumer demand criterion is widely accepted 369.  It  can be tracked 
to the US Supreme Court decision in the Jefferson Parish case, which grounded 
the current test  for determining whether a combination of goods or services 
represents one product or two370.  In that case, consumers who purchased surgery 
services from a hospital  were also required to use the hospital’s anesthes iologists.  
The Court questioned whether surgery and anesthesiology service were two 
                                                             
369 See Jefferson Parish, at 21-22; Kodak case, p.462 (“There must be sufficient consumer demand so that it is efficient 
for a firm to provide service separately from parts”); Case T-201/04 Microsoft v Commission [2007] ECR II-3601, at 
969, 970 (“The distinctness of products for the purpose of an analysis under Article [102 TFEU] has to be assessed 
by reference to customer demand. In the absence of independent demand for the allegedly tied product, there can be 
no question of separate products and no abusive tying”). 
370 466 U.S. 2 (1984). 
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products, and held that “not on the functional relation between them, but rather 
on the character of the demand for the two items”  determines the existence of 
separate products371.   
The implication of this approach is that when there is sufficient demand for 
the purchase of the tying product separate from the tied product, then there are 
two distinct products for the purposes of tying analysis 372.  The Court recognized 
that the fact that patients and doctors often requested their own anesthesiologists  
rather than the ones provided by the hospital was sufficient to demonstrate that 
separate demand existed for anesthesiology, and therefore two distinct products 
existed373.  
 Even though tying decisions of the Turkish Board do not furnish details, i t 
can be said that its approach is based on market -oriented determination. In this  
context, the authority implies a separate consumer demand test  that considers 
whether a significant portion of the consumers would have purchased the tying 
product without purchasing the t ied product.  
 When determining whether the tied and tying products are distinct, the 
Board may use direct evidence, showing that consumers buy the produ cts 
separately when given a choice, or i t  may use indirect evidence, such as the 
presence of undertakings in the market specialized in the production or sales of  
the t ied product without the tying product 374.   
                                                             
371 Id. at 19. 
372 Id. at 21. 
373 466 U.S. at 22-23. Cf., dissenting, at 43 (Justice O'Connor had argued that anesthesia and surgery should not be 
considered separate products because patients were interested in purchasing anesthesia only in conjunction with 
hospital services). 
374 Guidelines (Dominant Position), n. 87. See the Board Decision, Digitürk I, dated 28.08.2002 and numbered 02-50/ 
636-258 (“The evaluation of whether a product contained in the same package is a single product should be done by 
considering the demand for products and consumer preferences that products will not be sold solely”) (hereinafter 
Digitürk I decision) 
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 The Board also considers 375 the criteria such as a) the complementary nature 
of the goods sold 376,  b) functionally l inked products 377,  c) whether the goods are 
sold separately, either previously or currently in the market, d) how they are  
used/consumed, e) whether one of the product s is an inseparable part  of the other. 
The Board then explained this approach with an example, stating that the sale of 
a car with t ires is not regarded as tying, but the requirement of purchasing the 
paper in the sale of the copier machine can be regarded as tying 378.  
 However, the Board example is confusing and does not explain which 
criteria is used to distinguish the existence of separate product in the given 
example. Tires to cars and papers to copier are both functionally l inked products. 
They are not inseparable, and both are s old in the market separately. The criterion 
“how they are used or consumed” only makes sense if i t  refers to efficiency, i .e. ,  
consideration of t ime and transaction costs of buying proper t ires and install ing 
them for consumers. In this sense, it  refers to  commercial usages proxy. However,  
the most plausible criterion seems to be the complementary nature of the goods 
sold. We assume this criterion refers to nature of the agreement or commercial 
usages.  
 Commercial usages can be assumed to be a  complementary indicator for the 
applied separate consumer demand test .  T his test  merely focuses on the consumer 
perspective, but does not include the fact that linking two services may make 
sense from the producer’s point of view or from an efficiency sta ndpoint. The 
only requirement for determining distinct products is separated demand, when one 
of the products is useless without the other. This test  focuses on consumer choice, 
                                                             
375 See Digitürk I decision, n. 1320. 
376 Compare Case T-201/04 Microsoft v Commission [2007] ECR II-3601, at 969,970 (“Complementary products can 
constitute separate products for the purpose of Article [102 TFEU]”). 
377 Compare Jefferson Parish, at 19 (“we have often found arrangements involving functionally linked products at 
least one of which is useless without the other to be prohibited tying devices”). See also Kodak case, p. 463. 
378 Digitürk I decision, n. 1320. 
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but i t  does not include the possibility that efficiency created by tying or bu ndling 
can offer more benefit  than reducing the choice does379.   
 Therefore, commercial usage tests rely on the behavior of  market 
participants to determine whether a tying arrangement is anticompetitive. It  
indicates that consumers prefer the tying (bundle)  rather than to purchase 
separately. In  that sense, tying creates cost savings that benefit  the consumers 
more than it  reduces consumers’ freedom of choice, or tying (bundle) provides an 
improvement in quality that outweighs  the loss of product choice 380 .  
 “Contrary to nature of the agreement or commercial usages” is stated as a  
condition for condemning tying under Art. 4/II (f)  of the TCA and repeated in the 
Guidelines on Vertical Agreements 381.  The mentioned guidelines state that the 
consideration that products are distinct depends primarily on customer demand, 
and an example is given that details when a practice is considered as commercial 
usages382:  
For instance, since customers will  want to b uy shoes with laces, i t  has 
become commercial usage for shoe manufacturers to supply shoes with 
laces. Therefore, the sale of shoes with laces is not a tying practice. Where  
the nature of the product makes i t  technically difficult  to sell  one product 
without the other, this practice becomes acceptable 383.   
 The last  sentence adds further confusion rather than explanation , especially 
considering recognized shortcomings of the commercial usages test for evaluating 
                                                             
379 See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 88 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
380 This test has suggested by Phillip Areeda which has proposed a market-practices test that concentrates on whether 
bundling is “universal” (Hovenkamp, Herbert/ Areeda, Philipp, Fundamentals of Antitrust Law, Second Edition, New 
York 2002, p. 835). It is also placed in Articles 101 and 102 of TFEU. 
381 No: 09-26/567-M, dated 06.03.2009. 
382 Guidelines on Vertical Agreements, n. 204. 
383 Compare EC Guidelines on Vertical Restraints (2010), n. 215 (“For instance, since customers want to buy shoes 
with laces and it is not practicable for distributors to lace new shoes with the laces of their choice, it has become 




technological tying in the innovative markets 384.  This sentence should be omitted 
from the guidelines.  
 The “commercial usages” test explicit ly stated that tying practices are 
implied through an agreement or concerted actions, but neither Article 6 nor the 
Guidelines (Dominant Position) has offered a similar test .  Nonetheless, the Board 
applied this test  in the decision where tying practice is assessed supposedly  under 
Article 6.  
 In the Digitürk decision, the Board evaluated the claim that Digital  Platform 
Communication Services Inc. (Digitürk) caused detriment to the consumer and 
other HD receiver producers and importers by requiring subscription to 
DigiturkPlus (channel) and the purchase of i ts own Pace brand decoder in order 
to be able to watch LigTV (sports channel) HD broadcasts of Digitürk 385.  In the 
examination, the Board concluded that:  
The HD broadcast of DigitürkPlus began in early 2008 and enables 
monitoring a l imited number of Digiturk channels (LigTV HD, Movie Max 
HD, National Geographic Channel HD and Fox Sports HD) in HD 
technology and includes functions such as recording broadcasts, stop live 
broadcast, undo, resume etc . It  is understood that there is a new product 
and service package . The difference between this new subscription model 
and the existing one is that the DigiturkPlus Deco der is purchased by the 
subscriber and the broadcasting package , which is 9.90 Turkish liras more  
than the original price. In this regard, i t  should be remarked firstly that 
                                                             
384 See MARIOTTI, Renato, “Rethinking Software Tying”, 17 YALE JOURNAL ON REGULATION 2 (2000), pp. 
367-406 , available at http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjreg/vol17/iss2/5 (last visited 24.07.2017); SIDAK, J. 
Gregory, “An Antitrust Rule for Software Integration”, 18 YALE JOURNAL ON REGULATION, 1, pp. 1-83 (2001), 
available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=268508 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.268508 (last visited 24.07.2017); 
WEINSTEIN, Samuel Noah, “Bundles of Trouble: The Possibilities for a New Separate-Product Test in Technology 
Tying Cases”, 90 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW 3 (2002), pp. 905-958, available at 
http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/californialawreview/vol90/iss3/9 (last visited 24.07.2017). See Case T-201/04 
Microsoft v Commission [2007] ECR II-3601, at 969,970 (“The fact that tying takes the form of the technical 
integration of one product in another does not have the consequence that, for the purpose of assessing its impact on 
the market, that integration cannot be qualified as the bundling of two separate products”). 
385 Digitürk  decision dated 07.02.2008 and numbered 08-12/ 126-43. 
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the mentioned additional functions of DigiturkPlus can be realized as a 
DigiturkPlus Decoder and can be accessed through a set -top box which 
contains technical features and software that differs from existing Digitürk 
decoders. Currently , consumers in Turkey can usually watch channels 
broadcast on the platform via a set -top box with decoder application 
programs installed by the platform operator/publisher. In addition, in the 
Turkish application, the set -top-boxes are generally sold at a certain price 
and transferred to the ownership of the consumer .. .  In addition, HD 
broadcasting in Turkey is a new activity and in no way consitutes a mature 
market.  Therefore, at this stage, the DigiturkPlus set -top box (decoder), 
which cannot be replaced with other HD receivers  that may be freely 
available on the market due to the abovementioned specifications, should 
be regarded as a natural part of the desired product/service to be received . 
Moreover, i t would be appropriate to accept the purchase of the 
DigitürkPlus decoder by subscribing to DigitürkPlus for the vie wing of 
Digitürk HD broadcasts as a marketing and selling method for providing a 
new product/  service to the new HD broadcasting market in Turkey . For 
this reason, i t  has been concluded that i t  is not possible  to consider that 
the requirement of a product or service on the condition that with another 
which is prohibited under the Law no. 4054 as an obstructive/ disturbing/ 
restrictive action against competition 386.  
 Furthermore, the Board also stated the following: 
Under current conditions, Digitürk will operate under the name of 
DigitürkPlus which is a new product/  service to be util ized, therefore 
regarding to complained about requirement of the current Digitürk 
broadcast packages different subscription terms and pricing strategy for 
                                                             
386 Digitürk decision, n. 90, 100, 120 (emphasis added). 
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LigTV HD viewing cannot be considered an issue within the scope of Law 
No. 4054387.  
 The Board never stated whether the evaluated tying practice is subject to 
Article 4 or Article 6. The complaint was made by a final consumer (end user) 
who was a LigTV subscriber , and it  was alleged that tying was det rimental to 
other HD receiver producers and importers in the market. Our reading suggests 
that the Board’s conclusion with respect to “no distortion in the competit ion” may 
be addressed to detriment of other HD receiver producers an d importers. Thus, i t  
could make Digitürk liable under Article 4 if there was an agreement between 
Digitürk and its own HD receiver producers. Furthermore, the Board’s  conclusion 
regarding the alleged complaint that “cannot be considered an issue within the 
scope of the TCA” may be addressed to consumer  harm. This clarification would 
help us to understand the Board ’s  approach, and if i t  was concluded that there are 
distinct products, then tying could be an issue under the TCA due to its resultant 
direct harm to consumers.  
 It  is also debatable how the Board determined the causality between “tied 
product as natural part  of tying product” and “tied product as a new product” in 
an immature market. Thus, if the tied product emerged in an innovative market, 
then the Board lacked sufficient information to conclude whether the tied product 
is a natural part  of the tying product.  
 Moreover, the Board had noted that there were other HD receivers in the 
market, yet they were not fungible with the Digitürk HD receiver due to the latter 
having higher quality and a greater number of functions388.  Therefore, we do not 
agree that the Board conclusion  is accurate  regarding the t ied product (HD 
receiver) being a natural part  of tying product (LigTV HD broadcast).  This 
approach renders indistinguishable “the usual justification” for alleged different 
products as a single product  –  where their combination provides benefits of lower 
                                                             
387 Digitürk decision, n. 130. 
388 Digitürk decision, n. 70, 80, 120. 
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costs or higher quality that would not exist  if buyers were able to purchase just 
one of the products  –  from a “quality-control or goodwill  defense” 389.    
 Rather, the Board should have considered that  the alleged products are 
distinct and that tying exists, and then focused on the effects on the competit ion 
and allowed Digitürk to challenge that tying its own receiver because of  quality 
control is an objective business justification 390.  
 The Board failed in that i t did not consider  the effects on competit ion . Even 
though the Board was aware that i t  is technically possible to use the same set-top 
box for more than one broadcaster and forcing to buy a separate set -top box will 
harm consumer interest .At the same time alleged practise  might create an 
important entry barrier for companies that will  enter the cryptographic 
broadcasting/digital  platform market391.   
 However ,  the Board remained pointing that “ in Turkey, ex-ante sector 
specific legal arrangements have not yet been made for the same set -top box to 
be co-used by more than one broadcaster”392.  However, the Board did not notify 
the relevant sector’s  specific regulator  of i ts opinion, or failed to mention whether 
the relevant regulator intended to deal with the issue. The Board should at least 
have decided to suggest a monitoring mechanism for a period to check whether a 
new entrant would offer the same quality HD receiver to consumers.  
 Nevertheless, if the Board denoted whether tying practiced assessed under 
Article 6 would clarify the burden of proof issue with respect to nature of the 
agreement and commercial usages criteria , because Article 6 do not cover this  
clause unlike Article 4. Furthermore, the Board application of this criterion 
                                                             
389 See SLAWSON (1991), p. 464. 
390 Likewise See United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corporation, 365 U.S. 567 (1961) (in the decision, the defendant's 
community antenna systems, sold only on condition that the defendant sold and installed every part of them, included 
some parts that were not readily available elsewhere. The Jerrold Electronics was also evidently leading developer 
and installer of community antenna systems at the time, therefore its services were necessary to ensure consumers’ 
satisfaction with its antenna system). 
391 See Digitürk decision, n. 120, 140. 
392 Digitürk decision, n. 120, 170 
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extended beyond its purpose, thus we have reservations: First ,  the Board ’s  
intention was only to apply the commercial usage test ,  thus the lack of a similar 
clause in Article is not an omission, but the Board will  also consider this criterion 
for tying analysis under Article 6. Second, the Board’s implementation was an 
expansion of the commercial usage test’s scope,  and it  did not consider the 
practice as an objective necessity justification. Third, the Board ex officio  
considered that alleged tying practice was an objective necessity. If  so, i t  then 
leaves the question open whether objective necessity justification is a “defense” 
or is integrated in determination of “abuse” 393.  
 The Board decision demonstrates the shortcomings of the current tests for 
technological tying or tying in dynamic markets. It  appears that the Board adopted 
a strained interpretation  by including objective necessity/ efficie ncy 
considerations into i ts analysis  and by extending the scope of commercial usage 
test . 
 The current tests might be sufficient for the determination of existence of 
distinct products in the static markets, but may not be relevant in technological 
tying cases. The consumer demand test cannot always secure a pro-competit ive 
outcome, since consumers may not immediately understand the efficiency of a 
new integrated product. If a new integrated product is sold separately, then the 
consumer demand test  will  suggest that two distinct products exist .  Thus, 
commercial usage cannot result  in a conclusion, since the potential  efficiency of  
the new integration cannot be recognized at the t ime 394.  For instance, i t is difficult 
to say today that a consumer sees a camera and internet function as separable from 
a cellphone. On the other hand, applying only these tests will  make it  easier for 
the firm who has the market power for the tying product to drive out competit ion 
                                                             
393 See Guidelines (Dominant Position), n. 30. (When assessing an objective necessity justification, “[t]he burden of 
proof for demonstrating that the conduct under examination is indispensable for protecting a legitimate benefit lies 
with the dominant undertaking.”). 
394 See WEINSTEIN, p. 950 (suggesting that evaluation of separate product through consumer’s point of view must 
take into account both demand at the time of the integration and demand once the integration has been on the market 
for a period of time). 
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in emerging tied markets, or to i l legally protect i ts existing monopoly 395.  At the 
same time, not recognizing efficiency will  hamper innovation, and hinder better 
product options for consumers.  
 1.2. Suggested Separate Products Tests in Technological  Tying 
 It  is often difficult  to determine whether  or not  offered products under tying 
or bundling are distinct in technologically dynamic markets. The debate arose in 
the case where the court analysed Microsoft’s package of its operating system 
Windows and its web browser Internet Explor er (IE). Microsoft has been 
challenged several t imes over the years 396,  and claimed that by integrating 
Windows and Internet Explorer, a new product had been created  and therefore 
tying could not be a factor397.  When the need for the reviewing current separate  
tests occurred, judges and academics considered alternative tests for 
technological tying.  
 1.2.1. Genuine technological integration test  
 The D.C. Circuit  agreed that the combination of Windows and IE was a 
“genuine technological integration”, which mean s “product that combines 
functionalities . . . in a way that offers advantages, unavailable if the 
functionalities are bought separately and combined by the purchaser” and thus i t 
constituted one product, “regardless of whether elements of the integrated 
package are marketed separately” 398.   
 Therefore, genuine technological integration analysis is assumed to better 
suit  dynamic markets, as they do not hamper innovative initiatives 399,  yet i t  has 
                                                             
395 WEINSTEIN, p. 909. 
396 Microsoft v. United States, 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ("Microsoft I"); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 
F.3d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“Microsoft II”); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“Microsoft 
III”). 
397 Microsoft II, at 947-48; United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000), at 45; Microsoft III, at 
85. 
398 Microsoft II, at 946, 948-952. 
399 LOPATKA, John E. and PAGE, William H., “Antitrust on Internet Time: Microsoft and the Law and Economics 
of Exclusion”, 7 Supreme Court Economic Review (1999), p. 200, available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=1413383 
(last visited 24.07.2017). 
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been crit icized that i t  foresees a significantly low threshold with regard to 
whether the combination “brings some advantage” 400.  Thus, rightly,  i t  has been 
remarked that merely making claims of some potential  benefits that may never  
occur can survive antitrust scrutiny and it  can increase anticompetit ive behavior 
of the monopolist401.  
 1.2.2. Rule-of-reason approach in Microsoft III l itigation  
 The D.C. Circuit pointed out that application of a separate consumer 
demand test  (as following the per se  rule approach established in Jefferson Parish  
decision) had risk in evaluating the efficiency-enhancing effects of “newly 
integrated products” (since such tying practice might produce transaction-cost 
savings and economies of scale or scope ), and remained the tying analysis under  
rule of reason402.  
 Thus, the Court proposed skipping the stage of determining whether the 
Windows and IE are distinct products, and whether the alleged conduct outweigh s 
“benefits against the cost to consumers” 403.  Under suggested approach, Microsoft 
would offer precompetit ive  justifications for i ts product design,  and the plaintiffs 
would have to show that the anticompetit ive effects of the arrangement 
outweighed these justifications404.  
 The D.C. Circuit’s approach can be crit icized on two premises: First ,  the 
Court did not provide proper guideline for determining whether an integration’s 
efficiencies outweigh the loss of consumer choice 405;  second, based on the 
presumption that the newly integrated product was likely efficient, they shifted 
the burden of proof on plaintiffs.  
                                                             
400 Microsoft II, at 950. 
401 Microsoft II (Justice Wald, dissenting), at 957; Mariotti, p. 387-389.  
402 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 87 (D.C. Cir. 2001), at 92-95. 
403 Id., at 94, 95. 
404 WEINSTEIN, p. 928. 
405 WEINSTEIN, 928, 929. 
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 1.2.3. Balancing costs and benefits tests  
 Instead of considering consumer preference to buy products separately, an 
alternative approach suggests to directly evaluate costs and benefits of  the tying 
arrangement. MARIOTTI suggest s  balancing tests that determine whether the 
gains in innovation and reduction in transaction costs for consumers, who want 
the tying and the t ied product  outweigh the costs to consumers who only want to 
buy the tying product 406.  
 SIDAK also proposes a balancing test  for tying in dynamic  markets, which 
follows four steps407: The first  is to determine whether the market is 
technologically dynamic (if i t is not, a separate consumer demand test  will  be 
applied). Second, to determine whether consumers will  benefit from the 
integration. In this instance, benefits are measured by increased consumer 
demand, lowered costs of production, or both; they are not measured in 
comparison with a hypothetical world in which the products have not been 
integrated. The question to answer is whether some actual benefits have been 
created by the integration. In  the third step, i t  should be determined whether the 
integration will  preserve a monopoly over the tying product market. If i t  is the 
case, the final and fourth step is to balance the consumer benefit  from i ntegration 
against the losses in consumer welfare caused by any reduction in competition.  
 Both (Mariotti  and Sidak) suggestions are sound, and may be served better 
than a separate consumer demand test  in dynamic markets. However,  Mariotti’s 
suggestion requires a trade-off against consumer choice , even if i t  is possible to 
balance costs for one  consumer who prefers the bundle against the costs for one 
consumer who prefers to buy the products separately. To achieve an aggregated 
consumer benefit ,  the information of preference dispersion between them  is 
                                                             
406 MARIOTTI, p. 367. See WEINSTEIN, p. 950 (stating a deeper analysis of the strength of the separate markets is 
necessary. “Courts must first identify the consumers with whom they are concerned. They must also take into account 
the sophistication of these consumers. The more knowledge consumers have about a product market, the more weight 
a court must give their opinion. This is because of the increased likelihood that knowledgeable consumers will be able 
to spot the efficiencies of a new bundle”). 
407 SIDAK, p. 29-33. 
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needed, and obtaining this information is costly, if not impossible. Furthermore, 
this suggestion does not include effects in market structure, such as creating entry 
barriers for new entrants into tied market or excluding rivals of t ied product s. 
Therefore, this approach does not include whether consumer choice potentially  
reduces in the long-term, incurring costs to  consumers. 
 Side’s  suggestion is preferable, but we agree only until  the fourth step. To 
balance consumer benefit  from integration against the losses in consumer welfare 
due to reduction in competit ion is difficult ,  as measured consumer benefit  will 
have a static nature, while loss in consumer welfare in evitably will  require 
including dynamic concepts. Even if the potential  losses could be measured, in 
practice there is no concrete way to carry out the trade -off between static 
efficiency and dynamic (in)efficiency.  
 The Board does not distinguish whether the market is static or dynamic 
when applying the separate consumer demand test .  For instance, in a preliminary 
investigation it  was alleged that GOOGLE violated Act No. 4054 through 
contracts signed with original equipment manufacturers who want to use th e 
Android operating system on their mobile devices 408.GOOGLE wanted to 
exclusively pre -install  Google Mobile Services (GMS, a bundle of applications, 
including Google Play, Google Search, and Google Chrome). The Board repeated 
the separate consumer demand te st in the Guidelines (2009), and concluded that 
mobile devices and the pre -installed applications are separate products, since 
consumers can install  these applications and services separately in smart devices, 
and there are different specialist  undertakings that  operate in the application and 
services software market409.   
 We do not see the need for a new test  to evaluate separate product 
requirements for technological tying, at  least for the Turkish Competit ion 
                                                             
408 The Board decision (Preliminary investigation) dated 28.12.2015 and numbered 15-46/766-281 (hereinafter Google 
decision). 
409 Google decision, n. 80, 84. 
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Authority. For US Competit ion Authorities, i t  w as necessary due to the qualified 
per se  standard established in Jefferson Parish 410.  Since the Turkish competit ion 
Board opts in favor of the  rule of reason approach for any tying inquiry, including 
efficiency defenses at  this stage, will  result  in overlapped assessment . Further, i t  
is a risk to broaden the scope of the commercial usage test , as the Board did in 
the Digitürk decision, and overlooked the potential  reduction in the competit ion, 
causing the potential  risk of consumer choice reduction in the long-term. 
Therefore, the question of whether one or two products are involved should be 
kept separate from the question of whether tying is permissible on economic 
grounds. If the Board had difficulty determining the distinction between newly 
integrated products, i t  should clarify the matter  through assessing objective 
justifications and efficiency defenses, such as granting an equal opportunity to  
the parties to present their arguments or evidence.  
2. MARKET DEFINITION 
Article 6 of the TCA only applies to the conduct of a dominant undertaking that 
has allegedly committed an abuse. For the purposes of Article 6 of the TCA, the 
proper definition of the relevant market is a necessary prerequisite to establish 
the existence of a dominant pos ition in each market. Thus, assessment of dominant 
position requires whether the firm under examination confronts significant 
competit ive constraints. The goal of defining a market in product and geographic 
dimensions is to determine which competitors have  the power to restrict  the 
                                                             
410 See WEINSTEIN, p. 949- 957 (purposing a combined standard and applying it in Microsoft litigation, as asking in 
order the following questions: “(1) Was there separate demand for the integrated items at the time of the integration? 
(2) Does there continue to be separate demand for the stand-alone items after the integration? (3) How do other 
manufacturers view the product market? (4) What was the intent of the monopolist in combining the products? and 
(5) Is there substantial evidence that the integration is a genuine technological advance?” And concluding that “If both 
the consumer and manufacturer elements suggest that the integration is two separate products, only overwhelming 
evidence that the integration is a genuine technological advance should lead the court to find that it is one product and 
that there has been no illegal tie-in. This last step is a protective measure; it will ensure that in the rare situation in 
which neither consumers nor manufacturers believe an integration is more efficient, but evidence from the product 
itself shows that it is, innovation will not be quashed. Evidence about the functionality of the product can also serve 
as a tie-breaker if the other four elements point in different directions”).  
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behavior of the undertakings under examination, and to prevent these from acting 
independently of efficient competitive pressure 411.   
 The common indicators of the existence of a dominant position are market 
shares, barriers to ent ry, and expansion in the market 412.  Market shares can only 
be calculated once the relevant market has been accurately determined, while to 
identify the constraints on exercise of market power that stem from potential  entry 
is only possible with correctly a defined market413.  Market definition is also a 
decisive factor in the identification and assessment of the actual or l ikely effects 
of the alleged abusive conduct. Therein, market definition helps to depict the 
markets where competit ion is affected by the beh avior of a dominant firm414.  
Therefore, the definition of a relevant market is an essential  precondition for the 
assessment of dominance415.  
 2.1. Product Market Definition  
 A relevant product market under Article 6 involves all  the products and 
services that impose a competit ive pressure on the product of the undertakings 
whose conduct is assessed. Guidelines (Market Definition) grant the most 
importance to “demand -side subst i tution”. This constraint is enforced by the 
consumers who can switch their consumption to products that they regard as easily 
accessible substitutes416.  Thus, “demand substitution constitutes the most 
immediate and effective disciplinary force on the suppli ers of a given product, in 
                                                             
411 Guidelines on the Definition of Relevant Market dated 01.10.2008 and numbered 08-04/56-M, n. 1 [hereinafter 
Guidelines (Market Definition)]. See Also Guidelines (Dominant Position), n. 9. 
412 Guidelines (Dominant Position), n. 11 
413 O’DONOGHUE/ PADILLA, n. 5746; ASLAN, p. 148. 
414 O’DONOGHUE/ PADILLA, n. 5746. 
415 See MONTI, Mario, “Policy Market Definition As A Cornerstone of EU Competition Policy”, Workshop on 
Market Definition, Helsinki, 5 October 2001, available at http://epceurope.eu/speech-by-commissioner-mario-monti-
policy-market-definition-as-a-cornerstone-of-eu-competition-policy/ (last visited 13.07.2017)(Ex-Commissioner 
Monti notes that the Commission uses market definition and market shares as an easily available proxy for the 
measurement of the market power enjoyed by firms, yet market definition is even a cornerstone of competition policy, 
it cannot be the entire building. It should be considered as a device for the competitive assessment, not a substitute for 
it. The most important is to understand the nature of the competitive situation facing the firms involved in a certain 
practice). 
416 Guidelines (Market Definition), n. 8-10. See also Board Decisions, dated 23.8.2007 and numbered 07-67/836-314; 
dated 11.4.2007 and numbered 07-31/323-119; dated 11.5.2006 and numbered 06-33/411-108. 
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particular in relationship to their pricing decisions” 417.  Whether the products have 
similar physical characteristics usually does not matter, as consumers might view 
products with distinct physical characteristics as close substit utes, thus all 
products (services) that consumers regard as close substitutes to the product or 
products of the firm whose behavior is examined should be part  of the same 
relevant market418.  
 The Guidelines (Market Definition) also consider “supply -side  
subst i tution” as a constraint, which occurs when suppliers are able to switch their 
production to other products quickly, without incurring significant costs 419.  Such 
effect is equivalent to demand substitution in terms of efficiency and rapid results. 
It  is l ikely that supply-side substitutabili ty will  be relevant in the situations where 
firms produce a wide range of different qualities, or different grades of a product 
that is not seen as substitutable by consumers, but which is produced on similar 
equipment420.  For instance, the production of paper includes various types. While 
consumers do not regard the different paper product s as substitutes, manufacturers 
can easily and at negligible cost adjust production at short notice421.  Then, such 
instance of supply-side substitution would suggest including all  qualities of paper 
in the relevant market definition 422.  
 Furthermore, there is a distinction between supply-side substitution and 
potential  competit ion. Potential  competit ion concerns the abili ty of fi rms outside 
the relevant product market to enter in the long term, while supply -side 
substitution relates the abili ty of firms to switch production in the short term and 
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419 Guidelines (Market Definition), n. 13. 
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without incurring significant sunk costs423.  Therefore, potential  competit ion is not 
generally considered in market definition, but is rather assessed under the analysis  
of dominant  position424.  
 2.2. Definition of Relevant Market  
 The relevant market is defined through a product dimension and a 
geographic dimension.  
 2.2.1. Relevant product market  
 The Guidelines (Market Definition) defines the relevant product market as 
comprising “the goods or  services … which are deemed identical in the eye of 
consumers in terms of their prices, intended use , and characteristics” 425 .  For 
product dimension, substitution  is considered if alternative products that compete 
with each other to satisfy consumer’s preferences do exist426.  The Board may have 
considered various criteria to determine substitution, such as findings that 
indicate the products substituted each other in  the recent past;  quantitative tests 
(which include demand elasticity and cross -price elasticity calculations for a 
certain product, analysis for similarity of price changes in t ime, causality between 
price series, and similarity of price levels) 427;  opinions of the customers and 
competitors;  consumer choices428,  costs and barriers related to switching the 
demand to potential  substitute products, different customer categories , and price 
discrimination429.  
                                                             
423 O’DONOGHUE/ PADILLA, n. 5947. 
424 See Guidelines (Market Definition), n. 16 (“Since it is not equally efficient as demand substitution in terms of fast 
results, potential competition is not generally taken into consideration for market definition”). See also Market 
Definition Notice, para. 24 (“potential competition, is not taken into account when defining markets, since the 
conditions under which potential competition will actually represent an effective competitive constraint depend on the 
analysis of specific factors and circumstances related to the conditions of entry.”). 
425 Guidelines (Market Definition), n. 3. 
426 Guidelines (Market Definition), n. 17, 18. 
427 The Board Decisions dated 09.06.2003 and numbered 03-40/436-187; dated 23.1.2004 and numbered 04-07/75-
18. 
428 The Board Decision dated 10.09.2007 and numbered 07-70/863-326. 
429 Guidelines (Market Definition), n. 23-30. 
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 2.2.2. Relevant geographical market  
 The Guidelines (Market Definition) state that “the geographical markets are 
areas in which undertakings operate in the supply and demand of their goods and 
services, in which the conditions of competition are sufficiently homogenous, and 
which can easily be distinguished from  neighboring areas, as the conditions of 
competit ion are appreciably different from these areas.” 430 The Board may 
consider several factors in the definition of relevant geographical market . These 
include findings that indicate orders were switched to differ ent regions in the 
past ,  quantitative tests431,  basic characteristics of demand (such as regional 
preferences or loyalty to local brands) ;  opinions of customers and competitors 432,  
existence of geographical trends of purchases , trade flow information433,  barriers 
related to shifting orders to undertakings at  other regions , and switching costs434.  
 In i ts decisions, depending on the degree of homogeneity of the conditions 
of competition between different areas, the Board reached different 
determinations for the relevant geographic market . These include global435,  
national436,  a province as relevant geographic market 437,  a few provinces together 
as relevant geographic market 438;  a district as relevant geographic market 439,  a 
neighborhood as relevant geographic mark et440,  or, in some cases, confined it to a 
                                                             
430 Guidelines (Market Definition), n. 3.  
431 The Board Decision dated 01.10.2012 and numbered 12-47/1413-474. 
432 The Board Decision dated 22.03.2007 and numbered 07-27/252-87. 
433 The Board Decision dated 20.12.2005 and numbered 05-86/1192-344. 
434 Guidelines (Market Definition), n. 31-38. 
435 The Board Decision dated 29.12.2011 and numbered 11-64/1656-586 (The Board recognized the suggestion of the 
parties that relevant geographic market is global, yet conclude that, specific to file, Turkey is the relevant geographic 
market). 
436 The Board Decisions dated 13.07.2011 and numbered 11-42/911-281; dated 17.11.2011 and numbered 11-57/1477-
533. 
437 The Board Decisions dated 04.08.1999 and numbered 99-37/376-241; dated 13.03.2001 and numbered 01-12/114-
29; dated 18.07.2002 and numbered 02-44/518-213. 
438 The Board Decision dated 17.10.2000 and numbered 00-39/436-242. 
439 The Board Decisions dated 22.01.2002 and numbered 02-04/39-20; dated 06.07.2011 and numbered 11-41/866-
271. 
440 The Board Decision dated 05.05.2005 and numbered 05-30/ 372-91. 
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facili ty in a single geographic location (e.g.,  gulf and ports 441,  customs 
territory442).  
 2.3. Effect of Price Discrimination on Market Definition  
 Price discrimination is a common practice, and when firms can price 
discriminate between customers, this may affect the relevant market definition. 
The Guidelines (Market Definition) remarks that where there are distinctly 
different customer groups, the borders of the product market may be reduced, i .e. , 
a different group of  customers for the relevant product may form a smaller and 
separate market in case there is price discrimination to i ts disadvantage 443.  For  
this to occur, the Guidelines (Market Definition) suggests that two conditions 
must be met: First ,  “if it  is not poss ible to determine which group a customer 
belongs to during the sale of the re levant product”, second “if trade between the 
customers or arbitrage by third parties is not economical or possible” 444.   
 The effect of price discrimination can occur either on dem and-side  
substitution or on supply-side substitution: 
 2.3.1. Effect of price discrimination on demand-side substitution  
 The language of the Guidelines (Market Definition) indicates the third-
degree price discrimination, where consumers are grouped based on observable 
characteristics, each group is charged a different price for the same item, and 
there is no arbitrage. In  this case , each group of consumers constitutes a separate 
product market. 
 Nevertheless, second-degree price discrimination, where consumers are 
sorted by self-selection, may also affect the market definition when they are 
offered a menu of price/quality combinations and each consumer selects his most 
                                                             
441 The Board Decisions dated22.08.2001 and numbered 01-40/402-104; dated 25.03.2004 and numbered 04-22/ 233-
49; dated 06.07.2001 and numbered 01-31/313-91; dated 01.10.2012 and numbered 12-47/1413-474. 
442 The Board Decision dated 26.04.2001 and numbered 01-21/ 191-49. 
443 Guidelines (Market Definition), n. 30. 
444 Guidelines (Market Definition), n. 30. 
145 
 
preferred combination. By offering different versions of the same product at 
different prices, firms induce consumers to reveal their preferences by selecting 
their most desired version 445.  In  this case, some consumers will  choose a low-
quality version due to i ts low price , whereas others will  be willing to pay extra to 
have a higher quality version. Herein, for each version, a separate group of 
consumers can be considered. However, unlike under third-degree price 
discrimination, those self -selected groups do need not estab lish separate relevant 
product markets, unless the price differential  between the various versions is  
sufficiently large, i .e. ,  consumers will  consider the products as substitutes and 
may be ready to switch between them in response to changes in their rela tive 
prices446.   
 For instance, a firm offers two product varieties 447: Food for pets labeled 
“economy” and “premium” , which are sold at  prices P E and PP ,  respectively. The 
firm may know that some consumers are willing to pay more for  quality than 
others are, but it  does not have the knowledge to identify them. The firm will  then 
set prices at  PE and PP ,  thus those consumers who are willing to pay more for  
quality will  opt for the high quality/high price combination while those with a 
lower reservation price for quality will  choose the low-quality/low-price 
combination. However, the choice of P P  will  be constrained by the choice of P E , 
and if the differential is too large, all consumers, regardless of their preference 
for quality, will  select  the low-quality/low-price combination. Thus, the menu 
                                                             
445 This strategy is called “versioning” (O’DONOGHUE/ PADILLA, n. 6552). 
446 O’DONOGHUE/ PADILLA, n. 6552. 
447 See the Commission decision, Case No COMP/ M. 2337, Nestlé / Ralston Purina (27.07.2001), paras. 11-13 
(Commission reached the conclusion that a subdivision of the cat and dog food markets into wet and dry formulations 
is justified, as wet and dry formulations do not appear to be substitutable on the demand side, therefore dry dog, wet 
dog, dry cat, wet cat products each constitute a separate product market. Since, wet and dry products normally satisfy 
different nutritional needs and the wet food for dogs and cats is also generally more expensive than the dry variants, 
due to the different average nutritional values and to the higher packaging costs for wet pet food, and the market 
structure for each category is also different in terms of the market position of each supplier. While, Commssion also 
remarked that to some extent makers of pet food segment their products into “economy,” “mainstream” or “premium” 
categories. However, the commssion concluded that these categories, which do not have a clearly defined scope 
generally connote quality differences and lower, medium and higher prices and pricing appears to be on a continuum 
with no clear break points, thus given the full substitutability of these products to serve the nutritional and dietary 
needs of dogs and cats the parties submit that a further segmentation of the relevant product markets is not justified). 
See also O’DONOGHUE/ PADILLA, n. 6552-6568. 
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pricing (viz. second-degree price discrimination) will  not be able to establish 
separate product markets on quality levels.  
 Furthermore, substitution may be asymmetri c or dissimilar448: For  example, 
firms offer high-speed internet access and low-speed internet access at  different 
prices that the prevailing price of high -speed access (the high-quality version) 
may create a considerable competit ive constraint on the pricing of low -speed 
access (the low-quality version). Herein, a price increase for the low -quality 
version would induce substitution towards the high -quality one, while i t  does not 
occur in the opposite way. Therefore, this asymmetry suggests that there is a 
separate market for  high-speed access.  
 2.3.2. Effect of price discrimination on supply -side substitution 
 Price discrimination can also be relevant on the supply-side substitution. 
While, under third-degree price discrimination, the products sold to different 
groups of consumers are functionally the same, that makes supply -side 
substitution a convincing constraint ,  which could cause a broader market 
definition. In the event of second -degree price discrimination, supply-side  
substitution might also lead  to an effective competit ion constraint449.  In doing so,  
                                                             
448 See the Commission Decision, Case No COMP/ 38.233, Wanadoo Interactive (16.07.2003), paras. 169-204 (The 
Commission defined the relevant  market as high-speed Internet access for residental customers, as considering 
offerings in the market, price ranges, different in use, technical features and performances. According to technical 
differences in performance, the Commission noted that it is not necessairly the sole basis of the market definition, but 
may be a factor in it. In this contect, the Commission remarked that the differences in performance between the two 
categories of products were clearly percieved by consumers, and the analysis of price differences between low-speed 
and high-speed offerrings showed that consumers were ready to pay a premium for extra performance and 
convenience. More importantly, the Commission considered the migrations process under its assessment of the degree 
of substitutability and  questioned whether high-speed users would switch back to low-speed access when the price of 
high-speed access increased, and found that the rate of switching from high speed to low speed was much less than 
from low speed to high speed. In this respect, it is concluded that that there was sufficient substitutability between 
low-speed and high-speed offerings for a significant price change to prompt subscribers to switch in large numbers 
from high-speed to low-speed. On the contrary, the results showed that high-speed subscribers have a distinct 
preference for the convenience and performance offered by high-speed access, thus there was no significant 
interchangeability between the two categories of service suggested that the existence of a separate market for high-
speed Internet access). 
449 See HAUSMAN, Jerry A. and LEONARD, Gregory K. and VELLTURO, Christopher A., “Market Definition 
Under Price Discrimination”., 64 ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL (1996), p. 368-386, available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1565843 (last visited 14.07.2017). 
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a producer of a high-quality version can often reduce the quality to a lower rank 
at no significant cost and almost instantaneously 450.   
 2.4. Market Definition in Tying and Bundling Cases  
 The effect of tying and bundling practices on market definition alters 
according to the type of bundling a t issue.  
 2.4.1. Effect on market definition: tying and pure bundling  
 Determination of relevant market in tying and bundling cases is closely 
associated with separate product test .  Tying only exists when two products are 
distinct , which means there are separate product markets for A and B.   
 However, whenever a distinct market for the t ied item exists, i t  does not 
imply the existences of the   widespread sales of the tying item in unbundled 
form451.  For example, firms sell cars with t ires, and tires can be bought separately,  
but i t  would be rare to see cars being sold without t ires. Thus, two components 
will  constitute one product, unless each c ould efficiently be sold without the 
other. Therefore, i t  can be determined whether the bundle (car + tires) is a single  
product or the combination of two separate products by considering the demand 
for t ied product (t ires). When it  is concluded that B is a separate product, the 
relevant question is whether there is demand for A as a stand -alone product 452. 
Provided that  consumers have the tendency to obtain product A without product 
B, then A and B are separate products. Otherwise, there are two products , which 
are AB and B453.   
                                                             
450 O’DONOGHUE/ PADILLA, n. 6568. 
451 O’DONOGHUE/ PADILLA, n. 6602. 
452 O’DONOGHUE/ PADILLA, n. 6602. 
453 Compare The Commission Microsoft decision, Case COMP/C-3/37, 792 (24.03.2004) which was upheld by the 
General Court, Case T-201/04, Microsoft v.  Commission [2007] ECR-II-3601 (In Microsoft decision, the Commission 
concluded that operating systems and media players were separate products, since there was separate demand and 
supply of media players. Yet, the Commission did not consider whether there was separate demand for operating 
systems without media players). If this question had been included, then it might be concluded that there are two 
markets, one for operating systems with media players and the other one for media players (O’DONOGHUE/ 
PADILLA, n. 6619). 
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 Relevant market issues and separate product test s will  be challenging for 
the competit ion authorit ies especially in the case of technological tying or 
bundling. In those cases, due to the novel character of AB products in a way that 
brought greater functionality, then consumers’ purchasing decision will  not be 
based on the individual prices of product.  
 For  instance, The Turkish Competition Board struggled to determine 
relevant geographical market in i ts Google decision. The Board stat ed that 
“GOOGLE's areas of business covers many areas interacting from different 
channels from mobile operating system, application development, operating an 
app store to marketing an internet advertising site” 454.  Thus, i t  is held that “the 
fact that changes in the definition of alternative markets will  not be achieved in 
assessing the competit ive effects of GOOGLE's action and according to the 20th 
paragraph of the [Guidelines (Market Definition)] 455 there is no definite market 
definition in terms of areas of activity that are in a complicated interaction with 
each other”456.  
 2.4.2. Effect on market definition: mixed bundling  
 Like price discrimination, bundling does not change the methodology of the 
assessment upon which market definition is based. However, i t  increases the 
number of products that need to be considered as potential  competitive constraints 
on each other, as substitutabili ty must be assessed between different bundles as 
well  as between bundles and individual components. When firms offer mixed 
bundles, the possibili t ies for relevant market definition are 1) the bundle and the 
                                                             
454 Google decision, n. 34. 
455 See Guidelines (Market Definition), n. 20 (However, in case the transaction under examination does not pose 
concerns for competition within the framework of potential alternative market definitions in terms of both product and 
geography, or in case there are competition distorting effects for all alternative definitions, a market definition may 
not be prepared). See also Board Decisions dated 15.06.2006 and numbered 06-44/551-149; dated 29.03.2007 and 
numbered 07-29/278-104. 
456 Google decision, n. 35. 
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single products may all  be part  of the same relevant market;  2) the bundle and 
separate products belong to differen t relevant market457.   
 First  possibili ty would be hold whereas at  current prices consumers are 
practically indifferent between buying the bundle and the two products separately.  
This will  occur if a small  increase in the price of the bundle induces consumer s 
to purchase the two products separately 458.  Second possibili ty arises when the 
price of bundle is significantly less than the price of buying the individual 
components, or consumers receive large benefits from buying the components 
jointly, such as conside rable quality advantages, thus at  current prices no 
substitution is l ikely in response to  a small  increase in the price of the bundle 459.  
Then a separate market for supplying the bundle would be appropriate.  
 2.5. Market Definition in Aftermarkets  
 A firm may tie a durable product (e.g. camera) with a consumable 
complementary product (e.g. spare parts or maintenance and repair services). The 
market for durable goods is called as the “primary market” or the “foremarket”, 
while the markets for the subsequently purchased products are expressed as 
“secondary markets” or “aftermarkets” 460.   
 The Guidelines (Market Definition) suggests the same method to define in 
these instances “assessing the responses of the consumers to the changes in 
relative prices”. However, th is t ime greater attention is required to “limitations 
on product substitution caused by the conditions in connected markets” 461,  in order 
                                                             
457 Europe Economics, “Market Definition In Media Sector-Economic Issues”, Report for the European Commission, 
DG Competition, November 2002, p. 23 [hereinafter Europe Economics (Media Sector)]. 
458 O’DONOGHUE/ PADILLA, n. 6619. 
459 Europe Economics (Media Sector), p. 24. 
460 See SHAPIRO, Carl, “Aftermarkets And Consumer Welfare: Making Sense Of Kodak”, 63 ANTITRUST LAW 
JOURNAL No. 2 (Winter 1995), pp. 483-511, available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/40843290 (last visited 
29.06.2017) [hereinafter SHAPIRO (Aftermarkets)]; TEMPLE LANG, John, “Practical Aspects Of Aftermarkets”, 7 
COMPETITION POLICY INTERNATIONAL 1, (Spring 2011) pp. 199-241, available at 
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/assets/Uploads/Temple-Lang-with-Cover.pdf (last visited 
02.09.2017). 
461 Guidelines (Market Definition), n. 44. 
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to determine whether competition in the foremarket prevents exploitation of 
consumers in the aftermarkets.  
 For  instance, there are domestic goods, and spare parts, maintenance and 
repair services for domestic goods. Different original equipment manufacturers 
(OEMs) substitute  and manufacture the domestic goods. Thus, they are considered 
in same relevant market. In princip le, there are three candidates for the relevant 
markets462:  
 1) A single system market: Where secondary products (spare parts and 
services for cameras) are included into the primary product (domestic goods)  
markets; 
 2) Dual markets: A relevant market for al l  primary products (all  branded 
domestic goods) and another relevant market for the spare parts and maintenance 
and repair services (for all  domestic goods brands);  
 3) Relatively Narrowly Defined Secondary Market (Brand -specific 
secondary market): a separate secondary market for each (domestic good) brand.  
 The facts of each case determine which definition is to be held. If  
consumers are able to consider the cost of spare parts and maintenance and repair 
services at  the t ime of purchase of primary product, where “the characteristics of 
the primary products make it  possible for the consumers to react promptly and 
directly to relative increases in the prices of the secondary products” 463,  then a 
price increase in the aftermarket (spare parts and mainten ance and repair services) 
would not be profitable due to a fall  in sales of the primary product  and the 
                                                             
462 O’DONOGHUE/ PADILLA, n. 6636; ASLAN (2017), p. 178. See Board decision dated 12.06.2010 and numbered 
10-44/771-253; TEMPLE LANG (Aftermarket), p. 201. 
463 Guidelines (Market Definition), n. 44. 
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aftermarket464.  In this instance, a broader market definition for secondary products 
may arise (a single system market).  
 If the spare parts and maintena nce and repair services for each brand are 
compatible with the spare parts and maintenance and repair services for other 
brands (and consumers are also aware of this), then it  is l ikely that dual market 
system would be held. In  this instance, the purchase of a particular domestic 
product brand does not “lock -in” consumers. They remain free to select the spare 
parts and the maintenance and repair services providers of rivals’ brands.  
 If the spare parts and the maintenance and repair services of one brand ar e 
incompatible with those of other brands (or consumer are not aware of this “lack 
of transparency”), then the determination will  be as either single market system 
or brand-specific system. If  consumers of a given domestic product brand are 
“forced” to make use of the spare parts for that domestic product , then they are  
“locked-in”.  
Which system determination will  be appropriate depends on whether i t  is 
possible for a user of primary products of one brand to switch to primary products 
of another brand, in order to avoid a price increase for secondary products of the 
first  brand. It  depends on the extent to which current and future consumers of 
domestic goods react to a price increase in spare parts and maintenance and repair 
services. In the meantime, it  depends on whether consumers consider the whole-
life cost of the domestic goods, including its maintenance and repair, when 
choosing the primary product. If  they consider the cost of spare parts and 
maintenance and repair services when purchasing domestic go ods,  then price 
increase in the aftermarket would not be profitable. Thus, under this circumstance 
the aftermarket does not constitutes a separate market, and therefore single system 
determination will  be appropriate.  
                                                             
464 See European Commission, “XXVth Report on Competition Policy” Brussels-Luxemburg (1996), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/annual_report/1995/en.pdf (last visited 03.08.2017), n. 86 [hereinafter 
XXVth Report on Competition Policy (1995)]. 
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 In the decision,    the Board determines relevant market for domestic goods 
and spare parts, as follow465:  
 1) First ,  the Board brought distinction between standard spare parts and 
non-standard spare parts in the secondary market. For  standard goods,  determined 
that spare parts of different bra nds were compatible with spare parts of primary 
products of a brand when it  is expensive for user.  
 2) For non-standard goods, the Board considered the “switching costs”. 
Regarding switching costs, the Board denoted that they occur mainly in two 
ways466: In the first instance, for users to sell  the used primary product at  an 
attractive price in order to buy a new primary product of another brand should not  
be economically viable. This becomes even more important if the price of the 
primary product is higher than the secondary product. The second type of  
switching costs relates to investments other than prices, such as training, routine 
replacement, downloads, software, and so on. By finding that switching costs were 
low between primary products (domestic good s), the conclusion is that, instead 
of brand-specific secondary market, i t  would be proper to determine the relevant 
market as “spare parts of the domestic goods provided by the domestic goods 
producers operating in the sector”.   
 3) In the end, the Board  reached the conclusion that there are two relevant 
markets, i .e.,  one for domestic goods, and the other for all  spare parts brands 
[including standard and non-standard (brand-specific)]. 
 In our opinion, the Board’s determination that standard spare parts  as a 
separate market was correct. Since there were undertakings that operate only in  
the production of standard spare parts 467  and in the event of a price increase of 
                                                             
465 Board decision (Preliminary Investigation) dated 14.07.2011 and numbered 11-43/942-306, n. 280 (hereinafter 
Domestic Goods decision). 
466 id., n. 260-270. 
467 id., n. 150, 160. 
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standard spare parts, consumers could switch to spare parts manufactured by 
another producer. 
 However, for non-standard (brand-specific) spare parts, it  should not be 
considered as a separate market. Since, non -standard parts were not compatible, 
i .e.,  switching to secondary products of other brands was not possible.  Therefore, 
they would not be part  of spare parts for all  domestic goods brands market (dual 
system). In this instance, there were two possibilit ies: either a single system 
market for domestic goods, including their non -standard spare parts, or a separate 
secondary non-standard spare parts market for each domestic product brand 
(brand-specific).  
Since the Board found that switching costs were low in the market for the 
primary product, then it was possible for a user of primary products of one brand 
to switch to primary products of another brand. Because price increase in the 
aftermarket would affect demand for products in the primary market, so that such 
price increase would be unprofitable for the sellers in the primary market. Then, 
the Board should reach  the conclusion that there is a “single system market”.  
 If,  instead, there were high switching costs  in the market for the primary 
product, then non-standard spare parts would constitute a  separate secondary 
market for each (domestic good) brand.  
 Furthermore, the Board should explain that the mere possibili ty for a 
consumer to choose from several brands on the primary market should not be 
considered as a sufficient  condition for the acceptance of the single market 
system. In addition, the Board did not demonstrate or mention whether a sufficient 
number of consumers would switch to other primary or secondary products in 
order to render price increases unprofitable 468.  Nonetheless, it  was interesting that 
the Board pointed out whether users could sell  their p rimary products in the 
                                                             
468 See the General Court decision, Case T-427/ 08, Confédération européenne des associations d’horlogers-
réparateurs (CEAHR) v Commission [2010] ECR II-05865 (15. 12.2010) paras. 79-121. 
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second-hand market in order to buy a new primary product of another brand. 
However, the Board did not clarify if i t  is plausible, or under which circumstance 
it  should be considered economically viable.  
 Proper market definition requires some specific attention for each case  and 
it  may seem complicated.  However,  simplified logic follows that greater 
importance to be on “consumers’  preferences”. In tying and bundling cases where 
firms offer AB and B. The question that  whether there is separate demand for B, 
is not sufficient. In addition, i t  should be asked whether there is consumer demand 
for A without B.  If the answer to both questions is yes, then relevant markets are 
market for A and market for B. If the answer to second question is no, then 
relevant markets are market for AB and market for B.  
 In aftermarket tying cases, key factors are “consumers’ reaction to price 
increase”, “existence of ‘available’ and ‘compatible’ secondary products ”, and 
switching costs. First  thing to determine whether there are compatible secondary 
products in the market. If there are, to include this factor into market definition, 
they should also be available to consumers. It  means that consumers should have 
the knowledge that they have compatible options and they should be free purchase 
a different brand’s secondary product. If compatible secondary products are not 
available for consumers (i t  can also be due to contractual /technological tying) 
then competition in the foremarket does not prevents exploitation of consumers 
in the aftermarket. In this case , the analysis should continue including the 
“switching costs” factor. If i t  is possible for a user of  a primary product to switch 
to another brand’s primary product  as a reaction to price increase in the secondary 
product, then consumers are consider ed not “locked-in”. In this case, there is a 
single system market. Rather, switching costs are high, and then consumers are 
locked-in and one brand of a product can constitute a separate  market. 
3. DETERMINATION OF DOMINANT POSITION  
Once the relevant market where alleged dominant undertaking operates is defined, 
then its potential  dominant position is assessed. Domin ant position itself is not 
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an infringement in the application of Article 6. However, establishing dominant 
position is an essential  pre -requisite under Article 6, as well  as antitrust analysis  
of tying practice469.  If dominance is not found, regardless of  the anticompetit ive 
effects of the conduct, no abuse can be carr ied out under Article 6. Two different 
concepts of dominant position are considered under Article 6. First  si tuation is 
when a single undertaking is a dominant seller. Second concept is joint 
(collective) dominant position, which occurs in oligopolistic markets when firms 
are interdependent and realize that competing with each other would ultimately 
be self-defeating and, thus, behave “as if” they had coordinated their behavior in 
the market  place470.  
 3.1. Single Dominant Position  
 3.1.1. The concept of dominant position 
 The legal concept of dominant position refers to a firm with a high degree 
of immunity from the normal disciplining forces of rivals’ competit ive reactions 
and consumer behavior471.  The concept of dominant position is defined in Article 
3 as “[t]he power of one or more undertakings in a particular market to determine 
economic parameters such as price, supply, the amount of production and 
distribution, by acting independently of the ir competitors and customers”. The 
economic concept of the dominant position is associated with the degree of an 
undertaking’s market power, behaving independently from competit ive pressure , 
and capable of profitably increas ing its prices above the competi t ive level and 
maintaining them at that level for a certain period 472.  In addition, such an 
undertaking would be able to control other factors, including the level of 
                                                             
469 Unlike Article 6 of TCA and Article 102 of TFEU, tying antitrust analysis under Section 1 of Sherman Act and 
Section 3 of Clayton Act do not require dominant position or monopoly power, but “sufficient market power” over 
the tying product. 
470 O’DONOGHUE/ PADILLA, n. 7236. 
471 O’DONOGHUE/ PADILLA, n. 7204. 
472 See Guidelines (Dominant Position), n.8,  fn.: 3 (“While for the purposes of determination of dominant position 
the relevant period of time can vary depending on the characteristics of the product and market under examination, it 
is generally accepted that a two-year period would be sufficient.”). See Court of Justice, judgement of 14 February 
1978, Case 27/ 76, United Brands Company and United Brands Continental BV v Commission [1978] ECR 207, at 
65, p. 277 (“relates to a position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to prevent effective 
competition being maintained on the relevant market by giving it the power to behave to an appreciable extent 
independently of its competitors, customers and ultimately of its consumers”). 
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production and distribution, the variety and/or quality of goods and services , and 
the level of innovation, below the competit ive level to i ts own advantage and to 
the detriment of consumers 473.  
 In principle, a dominant position derives from a combination of several 
factors. The assessment of an undertaking’s abili ty to behave independently of 
competit ive constraints on the relevant market will  depend on the circumstances 
of each case. Such assessment requires a comprehensive analysis, taking into 
account all  the factors that strengthen or weaken undertaking’s market position, 
i ts advantages and disadvantages, and constraints on its competit ive behavior in 
the relevant market.  
 In the first  stage of this assessment, the relative strength of the firms on 
the relevant market is based on their market shares, alongside with the 
consideration of the st ability of this market share in t ime and the number and 
market shares of competitors operating in the relevant market 474.  The second step 
of the assessment is to examine whether entry or expansion by rival firms is l ikely,  
t imely and sufficiently to exert  competit ive pressure on the behavior of the 
undertaking examined475.  Another factor to include in the assessment is the abili ty 
of buyers (“buyer power”) to restrict  the conduct of the undertaking examined 476.  
Finally, those elements will  verify the evidence of actual competition on the 
market whether undertaking examined can act independently of competit ive 
pressure.  
                                                             
473 Guidelines (Dominant Position), n.8. 
474 See Guidelines (Dominant Position), n. 11-14 (“There is no specific market share threshold that proves an 
undertaking is dominant. However, the established practice of the Board, in the absence of any indication to the 
contrary, is to accept that undertakings holding less than 40% of the market share are less likely to be dominant5, and 
more detailed examinations are conducted for undertakings with a higher market share.”). See also Guidelines (Market 
Definition), n. 41 (“Definition of relevant product market and relevant geographic market enables the determination 
of suppliers and buyers/consumers active in that market. From this point, based on the suppliers' sales of the relevant 
product in the relevant region, total market size and the market share of each supplier may be calculated. Total market 
size and market shares can mostly be calculated from the data of research companies or from the studies of the 
professional associations. When this is not possible or when available estimations are deemed unreliable, each supplier 
may be requested to provide its own sales numbers in order to calculate the total market size and market shares.”). 
475 See Guidelines (Dominant Position), n. 15-20.  
476 See Guidelines (Dominant Position), n. 21. 
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 3.1.1.1. Important factors for the assessment of market power of tying 
firms  
 In context to tying practice, the important point is not the existence of high 
market shares, but whether such shares are l ikely to confer lasting market power, 
which requires a proper assessment of barriers to entry and expansion. It  has been 
long recognized that the l ikelihood of new entry or expansion by existing rivals 
may constrain the conduct of the leading firm and, therefore, preclude dominance. 
Because, a firm with a high market share is much less likely to be able to behave 
independently of compet itors, customers, and consumers in a market where entry 
or expansion barriers are low. While the l ikelihood of new entry or expansion by 
existing firms in the market is high, incumbent firms will  be constrained by the 
threat that increased prices would lea d to actual or potential  rivals expanding 
output in response to price rises 477.   
 Barriers to entry refers the factors which prevent or hinder companies from 
entering a specific market, while barriers to expansion represent the barriers 
against the increasing market share for companies already in the market 478.  Entry 
barriers can be legal or economic. Most associated legal entry barriers with tying 
practice is intellectual property rights, while in many cases source of restriction 
on entry and expansion is inhe rent in the economic characteristic of the relevant 
market, such as sunk cost of entry, economies of scale or scope, the network 
effects, and switching costs for consumers.  
 3.1.1.1.1. Intellectual property rights   
 Intellectual property rights may create difficulties or prevent expansion and 
entry. Especially under US tying case law, existence patented, or copyrighted 
tying product had been implied sufficient market power for condemning tying 
practice for a long period479.  However, currently, i t  is understood that intellectual 
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479 See International Salt Co., Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 




property rights do not constitute automatic entry barriers and do not  necessarily 
render tying goods as a unique product that implies a dominant position 480.  If  the 
competitors are not able to provide close substitutes, then an intellectu al property 
right may confer a dominant position 481.  
 3.1.1.1.2. Sunk costs of entry 
 Start-up costs are the costs of establishing the infrastructure, such as 
building, machinery,  equipment, etc.,  required to start  an activity 482.  Especially 
when these costs are in the form of sunk costs 483,  entry into the market is 
considerably more difficult .  In aftermarkets, a high level of start -up costs exists 
for an independent manufacturer. An independent manufacturer should bear sunk 
costs such as investments in facilit i es and machines, and in information 
technology development needed to enter a specific market and that cannot be used 
for other purposes, since produced spare parts would be specific for each branded 
model. Furthermore, products become outdated very quickly due to their 
technological qualit ies and the use of high -tech production processes in 
production makes it  difficult  for general business principles to produce spare parts 
for use in each branded durable product for undertakings ra ther than the firms in 
the foremarkets484.  Moreover, i t  is l ikely that incumbents in the foremarket will 
also have intellectual property rights over their durable goods. Therefore, it  is 
common to find a dominant position in the relevant product market for each brand.  
                                                             
480 Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. (2006). See also See General Court decision, Case T-
321/ 05, AstraZeneca v Commission [2010] ECR II-2805, paras. 270-272 and   in Case C-475/ 10 P, AstraZeneca v.  
Commssion [2012] ECR-I, paras. 186, 187 (Also referring to Joined Cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P RTE and ITP 
v Commission (‘Magill’) [1995] ECR I-743 and in “IMS Health” (NDC Health/ IMS Health, OJ 2003 L 268/ 69, the 
Court confirmed that the mere possession of intellectual property rights is not sufficient to establish the existence of 
a dominant position. 
481 See Court of  Justice decision, Case 40/ 70, Sirena S.r.l. v. Eda S.r.l, [1971] ECR 69, para. 16; Case 78/ 70, Deutsche 
Grammophon v. Metro [1971] ECR 487, para. 16 (O’DONOGHUE/ PADILLA, n. 7534). 
482 Competition Terms Dictionary, p. 66. 
483 Sunk costs are costs that a firm must incur to enter a market but that are not recoverable upon exit of the market 
(Competition Terms Dictionary, p. 66, 67) 
484 See Board HP decision dated 08.05.2001 and numbered 01-22/192-50, p. 5, 6. 
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 3.1.1.1.3. Economies of scale/ scope  
 A firm enjoys economies of scale in the production or distribution of a  
product when its average costs fall as output increases 485.  The economy of scope 
occurs when a firm produces two or more products and it  may be cheaper to 
produce the two products than it  would be to make each of them separately 486.  
When a market present significant positive returns to scale, the largest firm will 
have a significant advantage over firms who have not yet reached the same level 
of production (or distr ibution)487.  Where the production of the t ied product 
benefits from economies of scale, i t may become likely for  competitors in the t ied 
product market to lose customers that  purchase the tying product and fail  to 
achieve sufficient sales to realize economie s of scale488.  In those circumstances, 
economies of scale or scope may give rise to barriers to expansion.  
 3.1.1.1.4. Network effects  
 Network effects is seen when the increase of the value of some product (or 
service) depends on the increase of number of users489.  An example is the 
Microsoft case, regarding the operating system (OS) and its applications, in which 
Commission established the network effects, evidencing high entry barriers in the 
personal computers and software markets. To the consumer, the uti l i ty of the 
operating system depends on the numbers of applications made to run in this  
system. Therefore, a popular OS will  have more applications written to i t . 
Consequently, the more applications are written to an OS, the more they will  be 
preferred by the users. The Commission concluded this behavior, based on 
network effects, “constituted a significant entry barrier to potential competitors”, 
considering Microsoft´s dominant position 490.  Thus, costs and other obstacles 
                                                             
485 Competition Terms Dictionary, p. 151. 
486 Competition Terms Dictionary, p. 127. 
487 O’DONOGHUE/ PADILLA, n. 7570. 
488 See Guidelines (Dominant Position), n. 91. 
489 Competition Terms Dictionary, p. 175. 
490 Microsoft, OJ 2007 L 32/ 23, at  515-525 which upheld on appeal in Case T-201/ 04, Microsoft v Commission 
[2007] ECR II-03601, paras. 558, 562. 
160 
 
resulting from network effects, faced by customers switching to a new supplier 
may also constitute a barrier to expansion or entry 491.  
 3.1.1.1.5. Switching costs for consumers  
 Switching costs are the costs other than the price that the customer will  pay 
for the goods or services that the  provider has encountered while moving to a new 
provider492.  A barrier to entry may also exist  if customers face high enough costs  
when switching suppliers493.  Switching costs can be in form of costs of 
information, learning, or transaction costs, or they can result  of the technological 
or commercial choices of the incumbents.  
 When switching costs are high, and most consumers are lock-in, switching 
costs deter entry. While switching costs are low, it  may sti l l  deter entry on the 
ground that incumbents are l ikely to fight entrants in order to retain their 
customers and avoid losing market power 494.  On the other hand, switching costs  
may facili tate entry into the market, even though on a l imited scale, if incumbents 
opt to focus on exploiting their locked -in customer base, and leaving to entrants 
those customers with low (or no) switching costs, whereas entrants may prefer to 
operate at  a low scale, leaving incumbents to exploit  their bases of captive 
consumers, rather than invest in the development of a large cust omer base495.  
 3.1.1.2. Nature of conduct as evidence of dominant position  
 For the finding of abuse, the Board should first  prove that an undertaking 
holds a dominant position on the relevant market and then prove abuse of that 
dominance. However, the Guide l ines (Dominant Position) states that “[i]n order 
                                                             
491 Guidelines (Dominant Position), n. 18. 
492 Competition Terms Dictionary, p. 105. 
493 Guidelines (Dominant Position), n. 17. See Microsoft, OJ 2007 L 32/ 23 which upheld on appeal in Case T-201/ 
04, Microsoft v Commission [2007] ECR II-03601, paras. 177, 484, 528. 
494 See National Economic Research Associates, “Switching Costs”, Office of Trade - Department of Industry, 
Economic Discussion Paper No. 5 (2003), available at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130301190828/http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/comp_policy/
oft655.pdf (last visited 09.09.2017) [hereinafter OFT (Switching Cost)]. 
495 KLEMPERER, Paul, “Entry Deterrence in Markets with Consumer Switching Costs”, 97 THE ECONOMIC 
JOURNAL (1987), pp. 99-117, available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/3038233 (last visited 09.09.2017). 
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for a particular conduct examined under Article 6 of the Act to constitute an 
infringement, the undertaking engaged in the conduct must hold dominant position 
in the market and the conduct itself must be of  an abusive nature. Where the 
absence of one of these fundamental factors may be demonstrated, the Board may 
choose not to perform analysis concerning the remaining factor” 496.  The Board 
consistently has opted for an approach that, instead of determining the  dominant 
position, directly assesses the abusive character of the alleged conduct under the 
“dominant position assumption” 497.  However, the Administrative Court stated as 
one of the grounds for dismissing the Board 's appeal, the Board opted to 
investigate directly abuse of the conduct without examining whether the relevant 
undertaking was in a dominant position, and held that this approach might prevent  
the achievement of correct conclusions 498.  
 It  is true that the conduct of a firm in the market relates to t he issue of 
abuse, and not to the assessment of dominance. We share the administrative 
court’s  stated concern because this methodology may lead  to an implementation 
that abusive practice as an indicator of market power. Similar to the  Hilti 
decision, the Commission determined the commercial behavior of the undertaking 
as being “witness to its abili ty to act independently of, and without due regard to, 
either competitors or customers” 499.   
 Likewise, US courts had long established the abili ty of a firm to price 
discriminate as an indicator of significant market power, which is held also where 
tying facili tates price discrimination 500.  Moreover, the mere fact that a tying 
                                                             
496 Guidelines (Dominant Position), n. 7. 
497 See Board decisions dated 08.12.2010 and numbered 10-76/1569-604, dated 4.11.2010 and numbered 10-69/1458-
557, dated 24.09.2014 and numbered 14-35/690-308; dated 28.12.2015 and numbered 15-46/766-281. 
498 Ankara 11. Administrative Court decision dated 11.07.2013 and numbered E.2012 / 1727, K.2013 / 1083. 
499 Eurofix-Banco v Hilti, OJ 1988 L 65/ 19, para. 71 which is upheld by the General Court, Case T-30/ 89, Hilti AG 
v Commission [1991] ECR II-1439 (O’Donoghue/ Padilla, n. 7747). 
500 See KLEIN/ WILEY, p. 623-629 (collecting  the example decision: Boise Cascade Corp. v. FTC, 837 F.2d 1127, 
1151-52 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (“The economists' definition of price discrimination requires, to be sure, that the seller have 
market power (i.e., a power to raise the price above competitive levels without loss of all sales): otherwise the 
discriminates would simply buy from alternative sources”); Will v. Comprehensive Accounting Corp., 776 F.2d 665, 
671 (7th Cir. 1985) (“Both the extension of power and the practice of price discrimination are impossible unless the 
seller has substantial market power”); Coal Exporters Ass'n of the U.S. v. United States, 745 F.2d 76, 91 (D.C. Cir. 
1984) ("it is well established that the ability of a firm to price discriminate is an indicator of significant monopoly 
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product is patented is also considered a proxy of market power. However, over  
the years, Supreme Court’s approach relying on assumptions is revised. In i ts  
more recent opinions, the Court has required a showing of market power in the 
tying product. This understanding explicit ly stated in Il l inois Tool Works v.  
Independent Ink decision and the Court held that neither patented tying product  
nor tying-induced price discrimination, or even their combination, should give  
rise to a presumption of market power 501.  
 Relying on the nature of the conduct as an indicator of market power is 
problematic. This  occurred in US tying case law due to patented tying product s 
or price discrimination, and tying practice  was i l l-treated. Thus, presumed market 
power coupled with long-time per se  treatment of tying practice hamper 
successful tying antitrust analysis . Est ablishing a dominant position due to an 
undertaking’s conduct alongside denoted “special responsibili ty” can lead to per 
se  treatment without actual anticompetitive effect s502.  Therefore, the Board should 
ensure that this approach does not turn into a substi tute for determination of 
dominant position, but can be considered as a verification of the analysis of  
market conditions in the assessment of dominance.  
 3.1.2. Abuse of dominant position 
 Article 6 seeks to detect anticompetit ive unilateral conduct, and it  prohibits 
“abuse”, but i t  does not prohibit  creating or having a dominant position that is 
result  of i ts internal efficiencies. The term “abuse” broadly covers three types of  
abuses under  Article 6, viz. 1)  exploitative, 2) exclusionary, 3)  discriminatory.  
                                                             
power."); USM Corp. v. SPS Technologies, Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 511 (7th Cir. 1982) (“But if a patentee has no market 
power -and, of course, not every patentee confers market power, ... he cannot use a tie-in to practice price 
discrimination, which presupposes market power”); Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 506 F.2d 934, 943 (5th 
Cir. 1975) (“Moreover, the increased revenues possible through price discrimination are really available only to 
manufacturers already enjoying an 'entrenched market position', and they tend to enhance monopoly power with no 
countervailing benefit to the consuming public”); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 349 
(D. Mass. 1953) (“price discrimination has been an evidence of United's monopoly power, a buttress to it, and a cause 
of its perpetuation..”). See also Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984), at 15 (fn.:23); Eastman 
Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc. 504 U.S. 451 (1992), p. 499. 
501 Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. (2006), p. 5, 15. 
502 See O’DONOGHUE/ PADILLA, n. 7747. 
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Article 6 does not define “abuse” itself,  rather suggests l ists of abusive conducts. 
Some abuses can be exploitative or exclusionary, or  both at  the same time, such 
as discrimination or tying.  The Board does not have tendency to determine the 
meaning of the term “abuse” for the categorization of abuses, unlike EU Courts 
that have articulated several different general formulations 503.  However, the Board 
has adopted some formulations provided  by EU institutions that were used for the 
determination of broad concept of “abuse”, such as “competit ion on merits” 504 and 
“special responsibili ty” 505 with respect to dominant undertaking’s duty not to 
abuse its position506.  
 Some commentators507 argue that the pure exploitation should not be found 
abusive under Article 102 of TFEU, since exploitation on its own does not 
demonstrate harm to competit ion and mostly constitutes rather a contract law 
problem than a competit ion law. While, pure exclusion on its own wi thout 
exploitation also should not be found abusive under Article 102 of TFEU to avoid 
protecting competitors rather than competition 508.  Exploitative abuse can and 
should be used as the test  of anticompetit ive effects on the market and conduct 
should only be found abusive if i t is exploitative. Thus, neither exploitative nor 
exclusionary abuse making sense on its own, this implies that there is ult imately 
one type of abusive unilateral action, which is exploitative 509.  
 In this context, in Turkish li terature, i t  is argued that to intervene with 
competit ion law it  requires injury to competition 510.  However, unlike Article 4 of 
the TCA that prohibits agreements, decisions , and concerted practices that have 
                                                             
503 See O’DONOGHUE/ PADILLA,, n. 9594-9646. 
504 See Commission ECS/AKZO decision, OJ 1895 L 374/1, para 81 (O’DONOGHUE/ PADILLA, n. 9594). 
505 See General Court decision, Case 322/81, NV Nederlandsche Banden Industrie Michelin v. Commission [1983] 
ECR 3461, para. 10. 
506 See Board decisions dated 15.05.2017 and numbered 17-16/223-93, dated 07.07.2015 and numbered 15-28/345-
115; dated 05.06.2007 and numbered 07-47/506-181; dated 01.12.2005 and numbered 05-80/1106-317. 
507 FOX, p. 393-397; AKMAN (2012), p. 301-315. 
508 See AKMAN (2012), p. 301-315. 
509 See FOX, p. 393-397. 
510 AŞÇIOĞLU ÖZ, p. 25,26; TOPALÖMER, p. 28,29; GÜRKAYNAK, p. 26-28. See also ÜNAL, p. 191, 192 
(Intervention for the exploitative abuse should be limited to the circumstances where barriers to entry and expansion 
exit, and in market that are unlikely to self-correcting). 
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as their object or effect the prevention, restriction , or distortion of competit ion, 
Article 6 of the TCA only states that “the abuse, by one or more undertakings, of 
their dominant position in a market for goods or services within the whole or a 
part  of the country on their own or through agreements with oth ers or through 
concerted practices, is i llegal and prohibited”.  
Article 6 of the TCA does not require a prevention, restriction or distortion 
of competit ion and does not lay down the certain objective(s) or standard of harm 
of the provision itself.  However, the dominant position itself is not prohibited, 
and Articles 1 and 2 of  the TCA states competit ion law aims at ensuring the  
protection of competit ion, which then requires there should be injury to  
competit ion. The competit ion itself is immeasurable , therefore injury to whom or 
what should be determined, i .e., injury to market structure, injury to competitors, 
injury to consumers or combination of these. Moreover, there is no consensus 
among commentators whether harm to consumer is the necessary condition  for 
condemn exclusionary conduct 511.   
 To us, i t  is not questionable whether Article 6 covers exploitative abuse. 
The question is how the prohibition of exploitative abuse under Article 6 should 
be interpreted for i t  to be used in a substantive way for the competition law and 
policy purposes. We agree that pure exclusion should not be found abusive under  
Article 6, because competit ion law does not protect competitors, and Guidelines 
(Dominant Position) explicitly states that exclusionary abuse to be find 
“detriment to consumer” is necessary 512.  Moreover, if the objective of Article 6 is 
                                                             
511 See ASLAN, Ece, “Türk Rekabet Hukukunda Hakim Durumun Kötÿe Kullanilmasi Doktrininde Ayrimcilik 
Eylemlerinin Siniflandirilmasi Sorunu [The Problem of Classification of Discriminatory Actions under Abuse of 
Dominant Position Doctrine in Turkish Competition Law]”, pp. 277-279, in Abuse of Dominant Position: Problems 
and Solution Suggestion Symposium, 22.06.2010), On Iki Levha Yayincilik, Istanbul 2011 [hereinafter ASLAN 
(2011)] and ODMAN BOZTOSUN, p. 122, 137 (advocate that direct harm to consumer is prohibited under Article 6 
without harm to market structure or competitors). See ODMAN BOZTOSUN, p. 127 (exclusion without exploitation 
also should not be found abusive under Article 6). See AŞÇIOĞLU ÖZ, p. 15; TOPALÖMER, p. 28; GÜRKAYNAK, 
p. 27 (Exploitative abuse -harm to consumer- should not be used as the test of anticompetitive effects on the market). 
512 See Guidelines (Dominant Position), n. 22 (“For a particular conduct examined under article 6 of the Act to be 
considered an infringement, not only the undertaking concerned must hold dominant position, but the conduct in 
question must have an abusive nature. Abuse may be defined as when a dominant undertaking takes advantages of its 
market power to engage in activities which are likely, directly or indirectly, to reduce consumer welfare. Abuse of 
dominant position by a dominant undertaking can lead to result that may harm consumer welfare including increases 
165 
 
enhancing consumer welfare, then harm to competit ion resulting in harm to 
consumer should be the test  of abuse.  
 However, suggestion that pure exploitation should be found abusi ve under 
Article 6 has been hesitated. It  can be supported that consumer protection law was 
designed for this, thus i t  has tools that are more efficient  in this instance. 
However, we are not convinced with this understanding. Consumer law can only 
condemn pure exploitative practice, but does not have proper  means to detect 
source of the exploitation. Moreover, the question whether Article 6 should cover 
pure exploitative abuse is distinct from how enforcement action against 
exploitative conduct should be. T o us, competit ion law commentators should deal 
with the latter more comprehensively, instead of automatically omitting pure 
exploitative abuse from scope of Article 6 of the TCA or Article 102 of TFEU.  
 Nonetheless, even if it  is important that the overal l concept of exploitative 
abuse should have a unified meaning, in each case, the legal and economic 
principles are somehow different. The above -mentioned discussion is overall 
valid, yet our aim is to find a meaningful interpretation of exploitative tying 
practice under Article 6 for the competit ion law and policy purposes.  
 The Board only in one decision stated that tying practice might have two 
anticompetit ive effects, namely exploitative and exclusionary. Therein, i t  is 
stated that “[e]xploitative abuse is pricing or other practices that cause a direct 
loss of consumer welfare. In such abusive conduct, the dominant undertaking 
takes advantage of i ts market power to extract rents from consumers that could 
have not been engage by non -dominant firm”513.  In the same decision, the Board 
did not require injury to competition. However, in the remaining decisions that 
                                                             
in prices, decreases in product quality and innovation level, and reduction in the variety of goods and services. This 
reduction in consumer welfare may emerge at the resale level or at the final consumer level.). See also Guidelines 
(Dominant Position), n. 8, 25, 36 (requires detriment to consumer for determining exclusionary abuse). 
513 Board Garanti Bank decision, dated 05.08.2009 and numbered 09-34/787-192 ((Forcing consumers who borrowed 
a loan from bank to take the insurance policy while there were lower premium alternatives is considered as an 
exploitative practice as leading loss of consumer welfare. Yet, the Board did not condemn alleged practice due to lack 
of dominant position). 
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addressed tying practice under Article 6, tying practice is considered only 
exclusionary. Furthermore, Turkish li terature only has  mentioned in passing the  
notion that tying can be exploitative and focuses instead on the exclusionary 
effect of i t .  
 First ,  we will  present an alternative interpretation of exploitative tying 
abuse, and then present our point of view.  
 3.1.2. Alternative interpretations for  exploitative tying abuse  
 3.1.2.1.1 “Competition on merits”  
 An alternative interpretation is to suggest that abuse is anything that is not 
legitimate competit ion or “competition on merits”, if i t  is accepted that a 
dominant firm is “entitled to compete on the merits”514.  The term “competition on 
the merits”, however, is vague 515.  MONTI attempted to define the competit ion 
regarding “price, quality and funct ionality” of  the product 516.  However, this does 
not provide sufficient l imiting principles. For example, t ying is competition by 
adding functionality, and reducing usually tying product price, but it  is not always 
permitted517.  
 If the main concern of the provision of abuse is directed against the further 
restriction by dominant firms of residual competition tha t preventing the 
strengthening of dominant positions by means other than competition on the 
merits, the relevant question is whether the initial  standard of “as if” competit ion 
was referred mainly to exclusionary practices. Since dominant positions are not  
i l legal when it  has emerged from competit ion on the merits ( because of their 
                                                             
514 See Commission ECS/AKZO decision, OJ 1895 L 374/1, para 81 (O’DONOGHUE/ PADILLA, n. 9594). 
515 See OECD -Policy Roundtables, “Competition on the Merits” (June 2005) available at 
http://www.oecd.org/competition/abuse/35911017.pdf (last visited 20.07.2016) [hereinafter OECD (Competition on 
the Merits)]. 
516 Comments by Mario Monti, European Commissioner for Competition, on the speech given by Hewitt Pate, 
Assistant Attorney General, US Department of Justice, at the Conference “Antitrust in a Transatlantic Context” 
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to the price or quality of their products, then we should consider intervening”). 
517 See O’DONOGHUE/ PADILLA, n.  9626. 
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internal efficiencies), MARTÍN -LABORDA suggests that the aim of any 
intervention was to support the competit ive process, not to change its outcome. 
Therefore, “as if’ standard fo r the control of dominant firms should be abandoned, 
and conduct should only be found abusive when it  is exclusionary 518.  
 It  is not clear whether the term “competit ion on merits” is used to determine 
whether the “dominant position is legitimate”, or if i t  is used to determine whether 
“conduct constitutes an abuse” 519.  Perhaps this distinction is not necessary,  or  
perhaps only the latter should be considered for exclusionary abuses in the sense 
that lack of “objective economic justification” is necessary for the exclusionary 
conduct to be found abusive520.  However, our understanding of the notion of 
“competition on merits” i s that conduct can be exploitative whenever a dominant 
firm exercises i ts legitimate market power not only based on its price or quality,  
but due to market imperfections.  
 In tying practice, lack of sufficient information at the t ime of purchase, 
may able  firms to force consumers to accept t ied product. In this instance, ability 
to force does not occur from dominant undertaking’s internal efficiency. Then, 
the related question is what the relevant parameters of exploitation are, i .e.,  price, 
quality or choice. In other words, if the consumers had sufficient information 
about price, quality and/or alternative choice, would they accept tying offer?  
 From the efficiency-minded point of view, such tying practice may have 
efficiency enhance effect, thus firms co mpete on merits. However, antitrust 
scrutiny on the source of the exploitation is a different issue from whether 
increased efficiency offsets adverse effects on consumer harm or competition.  
                                                             
518 MARTÍN-LABORDA, p. 10, 11.  
519 See O’Donoghue/ Padilla (criticizing that the terms, “normal competition”, “competition on the merits, and 
“genuine undistorted competition” are not merely vague, but also conclusory. Those terms are defined according to 
what the EU institutions or national authorities happen to conclude is an abuse in each case which is not satisfactory). 
520 See General Court decision, Case T-203/01, Manufacture française des pneumatiques Michelin v. Commission 
[2003] ECR II-4071, para. 107, 110.  
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 3.1.2.1.2 “Special responsibility” of dominant firms  
 Another a lternative to be considered for the definition of abuse  is the term 
“special responsibili ty”, which refers to “a dominant undertaking may be 
prohibited from conduct which is legitimate where i t  is carried out by non -
dominant undertakings” 521.  Further, i t  is stated that “special responsibili ty”  
indicates “not to allow [dominant undertaking’s] conduct to impair genuine 
undistorted competit ion on the …  market”522.  Our reading of those two statements 
suggests that dominant undertakings have “special responsibility”  not to cause 
further  distortion. To understand that “special responsibility” requires dominant 
firms to behave “as if” they lack market power does not make sense, since a 
dominant position is not prohibited.  
 Concerning exploitative prices, “special respo nsibili ty” does not prohibit 
profit  maximizing prices, which will  be monopoly prices only if they are inherent 
to the possession of a dominant position 523.  Since “monopoly price” is not 
prohibited, then “special responsibili ty” does not allow “supra -monopoly price”. 
ELHAUGE challenges that tying-induced price discrimination practice is 
exploitative as it  allows firms greater consumer surplus extraction than  the profit  
maximizing of a  single monopoly can do 524.  
 However, simple consumer surplus extraction is hazardous reason for 
intervention by a competition authority. First ,  consumer surplus requires 
interpersonal valuation, which is not obtainable. In addition, (further) consumer 
surplus extraction can only be made comparing “as if” monopoly pricing without 
tying, and “monopoly pricing” under tying. Then, the difference will  indicate “as 
                                                             
521 See General Court Atlantic Container Lines AB and Others v. Commission decision, Joined Cases T-191/98, T-
212/98 and t-214/98, [2003] ECR II-3275, para. 1460 (O’DONOGHUE/ PADILLA,, n. 9594). 
522 General Court decision, Case 322/81, NV Nederlandsche Banden Industrie Michelin v. Commission [1983] ECR 
3461, para. 10.  
523 See WAHL, Nils, “Exploitative high prices and European competition law – a personal reflection”, Fredenberg 
and Strand (eds) (2007), The Pros and Cons of High Prices, Swedish Competition Authority, p. 51 (noting that the 
monopoly pricing is inherent to the concept of dominance, thus prohibiting such pricing policy would be equal to 
prohibit dominance as well). 
524 ELHAUGE (Rehabilitating Jefferson Parish), p. 498-500. 
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if” consumer surplus loss, but will not include consumer utili ty or preferences. 
Second, intervention with firms ’  pricing strategy that leads to regulation of the 
prices of firms, even if they are monopolist ,  should be done ex ante .  Condemning 
exploitative abuse due to simple consumer surplus extraction will  create 
hesitation for determining an undertaking’s optimal prices for their products, and 
this may impair market efficiency, which can also benefit  consumers.  
 3.1.2.1.3 “Perfect competition” as a benchmark  
 “Perfect competit ion” can be considered as a benchmark to answer the 
question in which alternative state of competit ion the consumer welfare should be 
compared to decide whether they are being exploited by dominant undertaking. 
Which will  imply that pricing at marginal cost 525.  In competit ive markets, the price 
of goods or serviced tends to equal marginal cost of production. When production 
represents consumer preferences, f irms produces at  an allocatively efficient level. 
While, in markets where firm enjoys substantial  market power ( i .e.,  a  dominant 
position), the equilibrium price (monopoly price) tends to equal marginal revenue, 
exceeding the marginal cost and thus leading  to allocative inefficiency 
(deadweight loss) and producing a wealth transfer from buyers to the dominant 
firm (increasing of producer surplus) 526.  In addition, perfect competit ion does not 
occur in the real world, requiring pricing at marginal cost  is the same as stating 
that  dominant firms should not be free to charge prices at  the level they choose. 
However, i t  has been challenged that supra -competit ive prices will  attract new 
competitors, and this requirement (pricing at marginal cost) could distort 
incentives to invest and innovate 527.  
                                                             
525 LANDES/ POSNER, p. 937; AHLBORN, Christian and PADILLA, A. Jorge, “From Fairness to Welfare: 
Implications for the Assessment of Unilateral Conduct under EC Competition Law”, in C.D. EHLERMANN AND 
MEL MARQUIS (eds.), European Competition Law Annual 2007: A Reformed Approach to Article 82 EC, (Hart 
Publishing, 2008), p. 13, 18 available at 
https://www.eui.eu/Documents/RSCAS/Research/Competition/2007ws/200709-COMPed-Padilla-Ahlborn.pdf (last 
visited 12.08.2017). 
526 See LANDE (1982), p. 74-80. 
527 MOTTA/ De STREEL, p. 17,18, EVANS, David S. and HYLTON, Keith N., “The Lawful Acquisition and 
Exercise of Monopoly Power and its Implications for the Objectives of Antitrust”, 4 COMPETITION POLICY 
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 3.1.2.1.4. Direct harm to consumer is sufficient condition, exploitative 
abuse does not require injury to competition  
 ODMAN BOZTOSUN 528 and ASLAN 529 suggest that dominant undertaking’s 
conduct that cause a direct harm to consum er should be deemed anticompetit ive 
under Article 6, since objective of Turkish Competit ion policy is  to enhance 
consumer welfare.   
 Likewise, The Board ’s  interpretation suggests that direct harm to the 
consumer is the main characteristic of exploitative abuse. There is no requirement 
of injury to competit ion. However, the Board abandoned the assessment that tying 
can be pure exploitative abuse. Considering the date of the decision wherein 
exploitative abuse by tying practice was accepted, i t  runs into the acceptance of 
Guidance on the Commission's Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 102 of 
the TFEU to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings that 
brought emphasis on exclusionary practi ce and perceived by the Board in a way 
that competit ion law concern is l imited only to exclusionary abuses.  Since then, 
the Board evaluated exploitative abuses only in excessive pricing decisions.  
 However, excessive pricing is rarely condemned due to  the Board’s 
reluctance to regulate prices using general competit ion law powers. We had 
concluded above: intervention for excessive pricing only is accepted where there 
are significant barriers to entry where the self-correcting mechanism of market is 
not avai lable. In the absence of these conditions, competition is usually the 
preferred method to remedy excessive prices , due to the difficulties in identifying 
and monitoring a competit ive price. If one considers the Board’s  reluctance to 
intervene in exploitative abuse, then a simple case of direct harm would not be 
embraced by the Board. Nevertheless, applying underlying reasons to interfere 
with excessive pricing suggests that exploitative tying should raise antitrust 
                                                             
INTERNATIONAL 2 (2008), p. 46, 47, available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=1275431 (last visited 12.08.2017).; 
MARTÍN-LABORDA, p. 13. 
528 ODMAN BOZTOSUN, p. 127, 128. 
529 ASLAN (2011), p. 277-279. 
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concern, provided the self-correcting mechanism does not exist  for the source of 
the exploitation (market failures, for instance), namely information asymmetries 
in tying cases.  
 Considering above all  mentioned alternative formulations for the definition 
of exploitative abuse with the emphasis on the aim to protect competitive process,  
we suggest that 1) due to only consumer surplus extraction (even if i t causes 
further consumer surplus extraction than single monopoly pricing can), tying 
should not be regarded as exploitative abuse; 2) consumer cho ice will  be more 
relevant parameter to determine whether tying practice leads to exploitative 
abuse; 3) due to the goal of “protection of competitive process”, the requirement 
of “injury to competit ion or distortion of competit ion” should not be l imited to  
“exclusion”; rather ,  it  should be interpreted to mean that competit ion law requires 
examination of whether exploitative abuse occurs from distorted competit ion in 
addition to exclusion. The latter purpose draws a distinction from consumer law. 
In addition, the chosen remedies by competit ion authorit ies, who have ability to 
consider market structure as a whole rather than a single firm conduct, would be 
complementary to consumer law application.  
 Furthermore, excessive pricing analysis under competit ion la w suggests 
that lack of self -correcting mechanism in the market requires intervention th rough 
competit ion law. This approach guide s us to understand that competition policy,  
which aims at protecting competition,  is not l imited to “injury to competit ion” 
requirement, but also suggests detecting the “source of the exploitation”. 
Therefore, for the determination of competit ive harm or exploitative abuse we 
infuse the “source of the exploitation” criterion in tying c ases in a way that  
addresses the “market failures” .   
 Moreover, the approach to excessive pricing under antitrust analysis  also 
verifies that a pure supra-competitive price or monopoly pricing does not result  
in anticompetitive harm. Thus, proper determina tion of exploitative abuse should 
not be based on merely consumer surplus extraction or solely outcome of the 
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conduct. An overarching definition should cover possible related dimension s of 
consumer welfare. Since tying is imposed on consumers, we conclude that the 
focus should be on “consumer choice”. Therefore, we suggest that exploitative 
tying should be determined as (1) either  a tying practice distorts the consumer 
choice, or (2) it  could be imposed due to the distorted choice (in the instance of 
market failures). These two together we refer to as “restrain in  freedom of 
consumer choice”.   
 Developing a definition of exploitative abuse will also be consistent to 
follow an objec tive that promote efficiency and increase consumer welfare, 
because this approach does not include only consumer surplus but covers 
consumers’ util i ty, their satisfaction, so to say all  aspect of consumer preferences.  
Nevertheless, this chapter also provided an insight that “consumer preference” 
has decisive role in the separate product requirement and market definition in the 
tying antitrust analysis.  
 3.2. Joint Dominant Position  
 3.2.1. The concept of joint dominant position 
 Article 6 of the TCA prohibits the abuse by one or more undertakings  of 
their dominant position through agreements with others or through concerted 
practices .  Article 102 of TFEU also prohibits collective dominance, yet there is 
important difference between Ar ticle 6 of the TCA and Article 102 of TFEU. The 
latter does not require concerted practice or agreement for the joint dominant 
position, but “the undertakings concerned must, from an economic point of view , 
present themselves or act together on a particula r market as a collective entity” 530.  
 Article 102 of TFEU envisages the situations where abusive behavior 
originating from one or more undertaking which collectively hold a position of 
economic strength on the market, and there does not need to be an agreement 
between them, and behavior not ne cessarily caught by Article 101 TFEU. 
                                                             
530 See Discussion Paper, n. 20, 44 (emphasis added).  
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However, letter of Article 6 blurs the distinction between the application of 
Articles 4 and 6, and further l imits prohibition of abusive behaviors that  fall 
outside the scope of behaviors through agreement or concerted practice.  
 In Turkey, majority argues that joint abuse of dominant position should 
omit from scope Article 6, because it  should not treat as unilateral conduct, i t 
would be proper if they should treat either under Article 4 or concentration 
concept531.  Nonetheless, i t  is noted that effective supervision is necessary for joint 
dominant position, especially in Turkey where has high degree concentration and 
given the prolonged consequences of th e inflationist  effects of joint dominance 
practice532.  
 Article 6 does not foresee any criterion of how a joint dominant position 
should be considered. When we examine the implementation of the Board, a few 
decisions that addressed a joint dominant position , which can be termed tight 
oligopolies in all  cases533.  In these cases, there were only 3 -5 undertakings in the 
relevant market, and this situation was held to be sufficient for them to establish 
collective dominance. The Board did not clarify the characteri stic of the relations 
among the undertakings 534.  
 For the application of Article 102 of TFEU in the concept collective 
dominance, the criteria developed by the Court of Justice of the European Union, 
and the relevant case law is reiterated in Commission Disc ussion Paper535. 
Therein, “collective entity” concept and “incentives to tacit  collusion” and the 
                                                             
531 See ODMAN BOZTOSUN, p. 121, ÖZKAN (2014), p. 25; KEKEVİ, H. Göksin, Anlasma, Uyumlu Eylem ve 
Birlikte Hakim Durumun Kötüye Kullanilmasinda Kolaylastirici Eylemler [Facilitating Practice for Agreement, 
Concerted Action, and  Joint Dominant Position], Rekabet Kurumu, Ankara 2003, p.64, 65; TEKDEMİR, Yasar, “AT 
Rekabet Hukuku Işiğinda  ‘Birlikte Hakimiyet’ Kavrami:  Oligopol Sorununa Yeni Bir Yaklaşim [The Concept of 
'Joint Dominant’' in the EC Competition Law: A New Approach to the Oligopoly Problem], Persembe Konferanslari 
(Mart 2000), p.31-33. See O’DONOGHUE/ PADILLA, n. 7956 (noting that mergers and acquistions that create or 
strengthen situations of collective dominance are subject to merger control laws, yet merger control laws can onl tackle 
the problem of collective dominance as and when transaction happen to arise).  
532 SANLI, p. 256-259; ASLAN (2017), p. 692. 
533 See ASLAN (2017), p. 692-695. 
534 See Board decisions dated 14.12.1999 and numbered 99-57/ 614-391; dated 17.07.2000 and numbered 00-26/ 292-
162, dated 26.04.2001 and numbered 01-21/ 191-49. 
535 See Discussion Paper, n. 43-50. 
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conditions to sustain tacit  collusion (1 - market transparency; 2 - mechanism of 
retaliation; 3- lack of competit ive pressure from outsiders to the oligopoly) are  
emphasized. 
 However, neither Guidance (2009), not Guidelines (Dominant Position) 
explain abuses of joint dominant position, instead focus on single firm dominance.  
 3.2.2. Abuse of joint dominant position 
 Neither being single dominance nor being collect ively dominant is not 
i l legal in itself .  Nonetheless, if joint dominant position is proved, then behavior 
of each undertaking is in principle subject to under Article 6 and abuse of their 
joint dominant position will  be deemed il legal. However, noteworthy 
uncertainties arise in abuses of joint dominance under Article 6.  
First ,  Article 6 should not deal at  all  with agreement or concerted practice 
that falls under Article 4, but parallel  to suggested application Article 102 of 
TFEU, which deals with collusive conduct that cannot be caught by Article 4. 
Otherwise, i t  blurs the important distinction between unilateral conduct and 
collusion and the relevant provisions of the TCA envisaging with these two types 
of anticompetit ive conduct.  
 Second, the abusive character of the conduct should  not be inferred only 
from the joint dominant position of firms that  raise prices above a competit ive 
level. Monopoly pricing is not i l legal  in i tself for a single dominant firm, thus 
prices above the competitive level under an oligopoly should not be deemed 
abusive on their own;  additional proof of abuse is needed536.  
 Third, i t  is unclear whether one undertaking in an oligopoly market can 
commit an abuse even though other undertakings do not act in similar way. EU 
case law suggests in this situation that the factor to be considered is whether the 
                                                             
536 See O’DONOGHUE/ PADILLA, n. 8515 (stating that condemning mere participation in oligopolies is impractical 
and induce firms to behave irrationally). 
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conduct is the manifestation of the collective dominant position, i .e.,  the conduct 
should be part  of a tacitly agreed course of action and not merely unrelated 
conduct that an individual firm happens to carry out in an oligopolistic market 537.   
 Finally, in practice, i t  will  be unusual that an exploitative abuse could be 
committed by one of the joint dominant firms acting alone, but i t  is more common 
for abuses of collective dominance th at the firms concerned tacitly collude to 
exclude firms that do not form part  of the oligopoly, thereby maintaining or 
strengthening their overall  dominant position 538.  Herein, exclusionary abuse can 
be accomplished even by one firm. However, to be l inked to  an abuse of joint 
dominance, there must be proof that the conduct of one undertaking is part  of a 
tacitly agreed course of action 539.  
 Since tying practice is common, i t is likely that i t  also occurs in usually 
highly competit ive markets. Evidence that there are only 3 -5 firms in  the market 
and they offer similar t ie should not establish joint dominance in those instances. 
On the other hand, i t  is true that in the situations where similar t ie -ins are 
imposed, consumers will  not be able to assemble their preferred tying and tied 
product combinations. It  is more likely that the consumer will  consider the  overall 
price and util i ty of  two or more consumable goods tied or durable plus consumable 
package at the issue. In this case , antitrust concern should be focus on whether 
consumers are aware of their util i ty of purchasing tying product will exceed their 
loss that arise from not being able to purchase otherwise preferred tied product. 
Provided consumers have sufficient knowledge about this trade -off and switching 
cost, there is no need for intervention. Nonetheless, objective business 
justifications or efficiencies can exit ,  thus similar tying might be imposed not due 
to collusion, but based on each firm rational behavior.  
                                                             
537 See General Court decisions, Case T-228/97, Irish Sugar plc v. Commission [1999] ECR-II-2969, para. 66; Case 
C-393/92, Gemeente Almelo and others v.  NV Energiebedriff Ijsselmij [1994] ECR I-1477. See also 
O’DONOGHUE/ PADILLA,  n. 8147-8235; ASLAN (2017), p. 692. 
538 See General Court Compagnie Maritime Belge Transports AS and others v. Commission decision, Joined Cases T-
24/93, T-25/93, T-26/93, T-28/93 [1996] ECR II-1201, para. 98, 187. 
539 See O’DONOGHUE/ PADILLA,, n. 8515. 
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 Imposition of similar t ie -ins often also occur in aftermarket t ie-ins.  
However, therein, i t  is l ikely that foremarkets will  be highly competit ive, while 
aftermarkets will  be determined for each brand in the relevant market. Thus, i t  
will  be unlikely to establish joint dominant position. Neve rtheless, competit ion 
authorities should take necessary measures to ensure that consumers are aware of 
the cost of gathering their desired combination of tying and tied products at  the 



















INQUIRY OF UNILATERALLY IMPOSED EXPLOITATIVE TYING 
 After we determined exploitative abuse in tying cases as the conduct that 
results in restraining the freedom of consumer choice, in this chapter we elaborate 
the studies and denoted circumstances that suggest tying can be explo itative. This 
chapter questions whether the common understanding, including the Board ’s  
approach, that tying conduct is exploitative only when it  is exclusionary, has 
merits. We remark that the suggested exploitative effect of tying induced price 
discrimination is limited  to certain circumstances and merely focus on the 
outcome of the conduct and equates consumer welfare to consumer surplus.  
Therefore, to reach a conclusion , we will  analyze whether theoretical conditions 
to hold exploitative effect  of tying is applicable to concrete cases. There is no 
obstacle that the Board may find tying practice exploitative due to mere consumer 
surplus extraction, but we will  test  our suggestion that consumer choice as a 
relevant parameter is better  suited through our reading of concrete cases. While  
doing so,  we aim to answer whether a conduct found to be abusive should also be 
exclusionary to be exploitative in tying cases.  
1. ASSESSMENT OF COMPETITIVE EFFECTS  
1.1. Tying Induced Intra-Product Price Discrimination (Metering Pricing)  
1.1.1. Tying durable goods with consumable goods 
The given classic example is when a seller ties a durable product (printer) to a 
consumable product (ink). As we mention above under tying practice, the seller 
will  offer the tying product at  a discount, but will raise the t ied product price at 
supra-competit ive level. Current proposition of welfare effect studies of metering 
pricing, whether such tying practice should raise antitrust concern, is based on 
categorization of price discrimination that tying facili tates.  
 ELHAUGE and NALEBUFF challenges that third -degree price 
discrimination has a direct analogy for metering pricing practices, due to welfare 
effects of i t . Because metering pricing allows the seller to sort consumers  of tying 
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product into different groups (based on their number of t ied product purchases) 
and charging each group a different effective price for the same product (by 
inflating price of the t ied product) 540.  Thus, i t  leads to reallocation of some outputs 
from high-value consumers to low-value ones l ike third-degree price 
discrimination. Such studies541 on welfare effects of third -degree price 
discrimination suggest that price discrimination practice will  reduce consumer 
welfare, unless it  increases output. They conclude that output increase is a 
necessary condition for metering tie -ins to not to reduce consumer welfare 542.  
However, one should be aware that direct analogy from welfare effects of price 
discrimination studies in metering tie -ins has a difficulty, i .e .,  while studies on 
price discrimination content output of one product, in tying practice two products 
are involved. Their economic model proposes that welfare effects of metering tie -
in should be measured with tying product (durable good) output 543.  Under their 
model, even though the durable goods output is a necessary  condition to show 
that a metering tie increases consumer welfare or total  welfare, i t  is not sufficient 
condition unless i t  increases overall  output and the size of that output increases 
offsets the welfare harm from reallocating some output from higher -value buyers 
to lower-value buyers 544.  
Based on classic categorization of price discrimination schemes, the 
difference between second-degree and third-degree price discrimination lies on 
the price schedule to consumers. Within second -degree price discrimination, 
seller sells product or service under a single price schedule, but the price differs 
related to consumers’ consumption pattern 545.  However, under third-degree price 
                                                             
540 ELHAUGE (2009), p. 431; ELHAUGE, Einer and NALEBUFF, Barry J., “The Welfare Effects of Metering Ties 
(June 2016)”, HARVARD PUBLIC LAW WORKING PAPER No. 16-20, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2591577  (last visited 20.07.2016) [hereinafter ELHAUGE/NALEBUFF (2016)]. 
541 See SCHMALENSEE, Richard, “Output and Welfare Implications of Monopolistic Third-Degree Price 
Discrimination”, 71 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 1 (1981), pp. 242-247, available at 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1805058 (last visited 27.06.2017). 
542 ELHAUGE/ NALEBUFF (2016), p. 2. 
543 ELHAUGE/ NALEBUFF (2016), p. 2,6. 
544 ELHAUGE/NALEBUFF, p. 2,3 (emphasizes in original). 
545 HOVENKAMP/ HOVENKAMP (2010), p. 935; LAMBERT (2011), p. 26. See also KLEIN/ WILEY, p. 612. 
Another reasoning of the acceptance of metering ties as a form of second-degree price discrimination see 
HOVENKAMP/ HOVENKAMP (2010), p. 936 [“Customers may all purchase a single printer but use it by differing 
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discrimination, seller divides consumers into groups before the sell  and charges 
the different prices for each group 546.  Regarding this traditional categorization, 
HOVENKAMP/ HOVENKAMP and LAMBERT claim that the assumption, 
analogy of third-degree price discrimination welfare effect (always reduces 
consumer welfare and likely to reduces total welfare) for metering ties -ins is  
invalid547.  
 It  has been accepted that third -degree price discrimination is l ikely to 
reduce total  welfare, unless increase output by generating purchases by a category 
of consumers who would not buy the product or service at a uniform monopoly 
price, but will  buy at a discriminatory price to enjoy the discount on the product 
or service 548.  This condition (increasing output) is not necessary for the second -
degree price discrimination, because a reduction in the fixed costs (cheaper tying 
product) and an increase in variable costs (above the competit ive price t ied 
complements) are together, i t  will  cause different welfare effects for consumers 
who have different usage rates of tying product 549.  Basically, for low-intensity 
users, i t  generates greater consumer surplus as lowering price of tying product 550,  
                                                             
amounts, in which case the customer’s average cost of using the printer (i.e., the per-print price) decreases as the total 
amount of use increases…Thus, the tie operates as a quantity discount: the more you print, the less you pay per page. 
This is exactly the sort of situation that occurs under second-degree price discrimination.”]. 
HOVENKAMP/ HOVENKAMP (2010), p. 933,934,936; LAMBERT (2011), p. 26. 
546 See HOVENKAMP/ HOVENKAMP (2010), p. 934, 936, 937; LAMBERT (2011), p. 27. 
547 See HOVENKAMP/ HOVENKAMP (2010), p. 935-938; LAMBERT (2011), p. 28-31. 
548 LAMBERT (2011), p. 27, 28. See also HOVENKAMP/ HOVENKAMP (2010), p. 938 (“The fact that purchases 
are reallocated under tying does not prima facie imply that consumer welfare is harmed. In fact, because the price cut 
applied to the tying product is more significant to lower-use customers, they often benefit from tying even if they 
purchase fewer units of the tied product.”). 
549 LAMBERT (2011), p. 26, 30. See KLEIN/ WILEY, p. 613 (stating that “[t]he essential economic determinant of 
how closely using an aftermarket metering arrangement can approximate increases of perfect price discrimination is 
the accuracy measuring intensity of package demand above the non- price. If the meter is highly accurate in this regard, 
to high-intensity users will not result in the loss of intensity users. The meter will merely increase the package high-
intensity users in a way that collects varying levels surplus. On the other hand, sales to low-intensity users package 
price will expand.”). 
550 It is assumed that additional consumer surplus gained from cheaper tying product(CStying) is bigger that consumer 
surplus loss on increased tied product (CLStied) x unit of tied product (Utied). For instance, under single monopoly 
pricing tying product (a printer) is 100 liras, while tied product competitive price is 5 liras. With tying, printer price 
falls 70 lira, whereas ink price begins to sell 10 liras. Therefore, for one cartridge users: (CS tying) is 30, (CLStied) is 5 
liras. Furthermore, cheaper tying product brings into market new consumers (whose reservation prices were lower 
than uniform monopoly price of tying product but higher than tying price) that would not be into market absent tying, 
thus increase output too. Continuing the same example, who values the printer between 85-100 lira and uses up to 1-
3 cartridges will enter into market. Compare HOVENKAMP/ HOVENKAMP (2010), p. 943, 944, 948. 
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also medium-intensity users will  obtain consumer surplus 551,  while for high-
intensity users i t  probably generates a cons umer surplus loss 552.  Therefore, 
welfare effects of metering tie -ins as second-degree price discrimination depends 
on the concentration of low-, medium, and high-intensity users in the market 553,  
and how accurately meter is refined 554.  
 Furthermore, i t  is contended that, even though second-degree price 
discrimination produces distortions from perfect competit ion, i t  is different than 
third-degree price discrimination incidences, i .e.,  second-degree price 
discrimination allows the consumers to change “the level of  the ratios of the price 
to marginal cost they have been charged” 555 depending on their consumption 556.  
Moreover, in second-degree price discrimination, as the number of the 
classification increases, the scheme comes near to first -degree (perfect) price 
discrimination, thus output is l ikely to increase toward to the competition level 557.  
However, in practice it  is rare to reach perfect price discrimination kind of 
scheme, variable proportion (metering) t ies theoretically allows an infinitive 
number of degrees depending on the number of tied units that consumers buy 558.   
 Regarding to categorization of metering tie -ins, we agree with ELHAUGE 
and NALEBUFF approach that offers other categorization for metering pricing 
and rejection of general assumption of welfare enhancing effect of i t,  based on 
                                                             
551 As long as their (CStying) is bigger than (CLStied) x (Utied). Compare HOVENKAMP/ HOVENKAMP (2010), p. 
946, 952. 
552 Since (CLStied) x  (Utied) will exceed the (CStying). Compare HOVENKAMP/ HOVENKAMP (2010), p. 949, 952. 
553 See HOVENKAMP/ HOVENKAMP (2010), p. 945-949, 952; LAMBERT (2011), p.  30, 31. See also BURSTEIN 
(Full-line Forcing), p. 626,627 (noting that under uniform tying requirement only marginal consumer would be fully 
exploited, supramarginal consumers would retain consumer surplus from the use of the tying good). 
554 See KLEIN/ WILEY, p. 613. See also HOVENKAMP/ HOVENKAMP (2010), p. 941. 
555 See HOVENKAMP/ HOVENKAMP (2010), p.938 (“Both economists and others often use the term ‘price 
discrimination’ to mean charging different prices to two different groups, or for two different classes of sales. More 
technically, it is commonly defined as sales at differing ratios of price to marginal cost, or as prices that have different 
percentage markups in relation to cost.”). See also KLEIN/ WILEY, p. 603 (”…economic definition of price 
discrimination, whereby a firm takes advantage of differing elasticities of demand for similar goods by charging 
different profit-maximizing prices relative to cost.”). 
556 It is not possible for third-degree price discrimination, because consumers cannot change in which segmented group 
they are unless change their title such as becoming student or senior citizen etc. See HOVENKAMP/ HOVENKAMP 
(2010), p. 935. 
557 See also KLEIN/ WILEY, p. 612, 613; HOVENKAMP/ HOVENKAMP (2010), p. 935. 
558 HOVENKAMP/ HOVENKAMP (2010), p. 935. 
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the analogy from classic second-degree price discrimination. Determined 
categorization depends on the preferred characteristic. If one accepts for 
categorization that ex-ante division of the consumer population determine the 
price discrimination whether it  is second - or third-degree, then metering tie-ins 
fall  under the former, but one contends that distributive inefficiency is the 
criterion for this determination, then metering tie -ins should be classified as 
third-degree price discrimination. Because, i t  does  reallocate output from high-
value consumer to low-value consumer559.  
 The proposition that metering tie -ins has similar welfare effects to second -
degree price discrimination is based on the presumption that who has higher 
reservation price also has higher value for per printed page 560.  For  instance, 
consumer X values the printer 100 liras, and values the per printed page 1 l ira; 
while consumer Y values the printer 50 liras ad values each printed page 0,50 lira. 
This presumption follows that there is a perfect correlation between the u sage rate 
the consumer desire and the consumer’s average value per page. Thus, the 
suggested economic model does not include whether there is a consumer values 
the printer 100 liras, but value per usage 0,50 lira or a consumer that whose 
reservation price for printer 50 liras, but per usage 1 l ira.  
 Even though, an economic model can be developed that includes that 
number of the consumable units desired and the value per unit  vary separately.  
This model would be able to offer the conditions that can lead t o a net welfare 
effects of metering tying 561.  Which means a proposition that not to compensate  
                                                             
559 See HOVENKAMP/ HOVENKAMP, p. 951- 954 (observing that seller expects profit from high-intensity 
consumers’ purchase to offset his surplus loss from medium-intensity users, and expects to offset output reduction 
which occurs under tying as result of medium and high-intensity users purchase fewer units of tied product by 
purchases of the new entered low-intensity customers, but ignoring that this means also reallocation of output form 
high-value consumers to low-value consumers).  
560 See HOVENKAMP/ HOVENKAMP, p. 944-951; LAMBERT (2011), p. 37-41. 
561 See ELHAUGE/ NALEBUFF (2016), p. 28-33 (They suggest a more realistic model that the number of consumable 
units desired and the value per unit vary separately and they adopt a lognormal distribution of buyer usage rates. Under 
their assumption, the lognormal distribution offers a good fit for the distribution of income and firm size, and thus to 
extent that desired usage is proportional to income or firm size, it is appropriate.  Based on this assumption, they 
purpose that profitable metering ties always reduce consumer welfare, while the results for total welfare depend on 
the cost and the dispersion level: With zero capital good costs, metering ties will lower total welfare unless they 
increase output of the tying product by more than 37%; and when capital costs are positive , metering will reduce total 
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the alleged consumer surplus loss occurs from high -value users, but the necessary 
and sufficient conditions that leads not to decrease aggregated consumer surplus .  
Moreover, these conditions require a trade -off between consumer surplus loss 
from high-value consumers and consumer surplus gain from low -value users. This 
is the point we disagree that antitrust enforcement is a proper tool for intervention 
whereby wealth transfer between consumers.  
 It  has been observed that antitrust enforcement may have shortcoming to 
deal with distributional issues in this concept and consumer surplus standard 
provides only “a very poor approximation to a welfare measure that weights 
impacts using ordinary notions of distributional preferences” and one of the 
handicap of this standard is insisting that they count equally all  the consumers. 
However, “distributional concerns would suggest weighting the impact on the 
poor more heavily”, whereas the rich and poor consumers are affected differently 
by an antitrust decision562.  
 Furthermore, i t  has been challenged mostly by total  welfare (surplus) 
standard supporters that antitrust law is l imited in its abili ty to achieve 
distributive objectives, as i t  has most indirect means. Furthermore, even the 
consumer welfare standard cannot accomplish this task, because it  embraces all 
consumers (rich and poor) . However, the wealthy benefit  relatively more than the 
poor do from competit ive pricing, since they consume more and the benefit s of 
competit ive pricing tend be proportional to consumption, which rises less than 
proportionally with income, thus enhancing consumer welfare generates greater 
gains to those already economically more affluent563.  
                                                             
welfare unless they increase sales of the tying product by 30% which arises when the distribution in buyer usage rates 
exceeds 0.62.Moreover, with lognormal distribution of usage rates, reasonable costs, if 3% or more of metering profits 
are dissipated, metering ties will lower total welfare for all costs levels unless the dispersion of desired usage is above 
0.79, which is more than the dispersion of income in the United States). 
562 FARRELL/ KATZ, p. 11, 12. (They are also remarking when the market is not a final-goods market, consumer 
surplus standard favors buying firms over selling firms). 
563 KAPLOW (The Choice of Welfare Standard), p. 5, available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/ 
See also BAKER/ SALOP, p. 1-3 (showing data that in last two decades the economic growth has been effectively 
arrogated to those already well off). 
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 Nevertheless, there is consensus that metering tie -ins reduces consumer 
surplus (at  least harm high-intensive users) either it  is considered second - or  
third-degree, and its effect on output is ambiguous. Even if the output effects  
were precise, we do not see why this presumed welfare effects should be the basis 
for antitrust enforcement. Indeed, almost in all  jurisdictions, “increasing price as 
decreasing output” is assumed harm to consumer or anticompetitive. However, the 
handicap of the studies on welfare effects of price discrimination or tying induced 
price discrimination practices is that they use “perfect competition” or “perfect 
price discrimination” as a benchmark. Creating an economic model and purposing 
metering tie should be deemed anticompetit ive if i t  reduces X% consumer surplus 
unless increase Y% tying or t ied product output, is only useful if the competit ion 
policy is “maximizing consumer surplus” or aiming “perfect competit ion”.  
 Our understanding does not suggest tha t the goal of competition is 
maximizing consumer surplus or allocative efficiency. Nor do we suggest that 
merely  consumer surplus extraction or supra -competit ive prices should be deemed 
exploitative abuse. Price -based exploitative abuses should raise antit rust concerns 
on the grounds that the source of the exploitation is not the market power obtained 
through efficiency, but is facili tated by market failures.  
 In addition, we did not detect any court decision that stated tying induced 
price discrimination, in this instance, second- or third-degree price discrimination 
increases of output or surplus of low-value user should be X amount to offset the 
Y amount  of consumer surplus extraction from high -value users. We do not expect 
to see this either. If we recall  mostly cited court decisions that addressed metering 
tying564,  we can explain better.  
 For  instance, in International Salt Co., Inc. v.  United States 565,  the Court 
determined a tying arrangement because the International Salt  Company (the Int.  
Salt .  Co.) leased its patented machines “ Fixator” and “Saltomat” (the tying 
                                                             
564 See ELHAUGE (Rehabilitating Jefferson Parish), p. 473; BORK (The Antitrust Paradox), p. 376-377. 
565 International Salt Co., Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947). 
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products) on the condition that the buyer purchases the unpatented salt  products 
(the tied products) to use with its machines from the Int. Salt . Co. 566.  It  is worth 
to note that  provisions in the Lixator tying contract foresee that if any competitor 
offered salt  of equal grade at a lower price, the lessee should be free to buy in the 
open market;  if the appellant did not receive the salt  at  an equal price , as in the 
Saltomat tying contract, the lessee was entitled to the benefit  of any general price 
reduction in lessor's salt  tablets567.   
 The Court determined that the Int. Salt  Co. closed the salt  ma rket to the 
competit ion when it  t ied its patented machines to unpatented salt568.  The tying 
arrangement was condemned as i t was a per se  violation of Section 1 of the  
Sherman Act569 and Section 3 of the Clayton Act 570.  There was no indication that 
the Int. Salt  Co. had monopoly power on the tying product or the Court did make 
requirement for i t571.  The Court determined that the volume of business affected 
was not insignificant or insubstantial ,  by virtue of the sales of salt  products for 
use in the machines 572.   
 The Court did not accept that the price -protection clause in the “Lixator” 
contract can save the tying arrangement from unreasonableness, because it does 
not stop the anticompetit ive effect of the agreement on competit ion 573.  The Court 
did not agree with the In t. Salt  Co. argument that the tying was necessary to 
                                                             
566 See id., at 395, 396. 
567 See id., at 396, 397. 
568 See id., at 395, 396. 
569 “…it is unreasonable per se to foreclose competitors from any substantial market…The volume of business affected 
by these contracts cannot be said to be insignificant or insubstantial…” (id., at 396). 
570 “…the tendency of the arrangement to accomplish of monopoly seems obvious…[A]greements which "tend to 
create a monopoly" being forbidden, it is immaterial that the tendency is a creeping one, rather than one that proceeds 
at full gallop; nor does the law await arrival at the goal before condemning the direction of the movement” (id., at 
396). 
571 Neither actual market for salt machines (whether there were competing machines that available as substitutes for 
its patented machines) or its market share were considered by the Court. This position of the Court received criticism 
by the literature, because, thereof there could be no market power in the tying product. TURNER, Donald F., “The 
Validity of Tying Arrangements under the Antitrust Laws”, 72 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 1 (November 1958), pp. 
52, 53, available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/1338363.pdf (last visited 05.04.2017); BORK (The Antitrust 
Paradox), p. 368. 
572 332 U.S. 392, at 395, 396. 
573 See id., at 396, 397. 
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minimize maintenance burden and to guarantee the satisfactory operation of the 
machines, since the obligation to repair and maintain the machines belonged to 
the lessor, for the reason that this could be  overcome by setting reasonable 
standards which other suppliers can meet 574.  
 How can this case guide the Turkish Competition Board enforcement? In 
several aspects. First ,  tying (selling or leasing) a durable product to a consumable 
product –  a staple i tem such as salt  –  that is largely used in the industry, cannot 
cause foreclosure share in the t ied markets or i t  is impossible for the seller to 
attempt to become dominant position in these markets. While the Guidelines 
(Dominant Position) requires evidence of anticompetit ive foreclosure as one of 
the necessary conditions, it  offers l imited guidance on specifically what is 
involved in the case of tying and bundling. It  refers to the general factors that 
apply for  other exclusionary abuses: (1) the extent of dominance; (2) barriers to 
entry (including network effects);  (3) the position of the dominant firm’s 
competitors;  (4) the position of the customers or suppliers, including , in 
particular , the pervasiveness of  the practice in the market;  (5) the scope and 
duration of the conduct examined: (6) possible evidence of actual foreclosure; 
and (7) direct evidence of any exclusionary strategy. Furthermore, the Board 
implementation for tying antitrust inquiry focuses on factors 1) and 2). Therefore, 
the Board should include in i ts assessment whether the volume of business 
affected in the t ied market was not insignificant or insubstantial  whereas the t ied 
product has a staple character. However, in the factor (5) i t  is noted that “the 
higher the percentage of sales affected by the conduct within the total  sales in the 
relevant market, the longer i ts duration, and the more regularly i t  has been 
applied, the greater is the l ikelihood of market foreclosure”. Therein, The Board 
                                                             
574 332 U.S. 392, at 397, 398 (referring to International Business Machines Corporation v. United States, 298 U.S. 
131). However, the Court does not count the oversight cost that tying firm should burden, if it is the alternative to 
tying. See POSNER (Antitrust Law), p. 172. 
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may consider a comparison betwe en the tying firm and its rivals’ percentage of 
the sales of the t ied product 575.   
 Second, i t has been remarked that price -protection clause has potential  to 
convert consumers into cartel  police who would report to the dominant tying 
seller, if any suppliers were selling the t ied product for below the market price, 
which was fixed by cartel 576.  The Court did not recognize this issue, yet tying was 
deemed anticompetit ive due to distortion in the t ied market even though customer 
was able to buy tied product at  c ompetit ive price. 
 Third,  The Board has tendency focusing on abuse and anticompetit ive effect 
rather than market power over the tying product due to procedural economy. Even 
if the Board becomes aware that in this instance substantial  amount of t ied sales 
can be the indicator for abuse instead of foreclosure, the Board should be cautious 
that market power should not be inferred from this outcome. However, in this 
instance, lack of market power may sti l l  not be sufficient evidence for competit ive 
effect of tying practice. The Board should also count whether the competitors may 
have using similar tie -ins to detect parallel  behavior in the market 577.  
 In International Business Machines Corporation v. United States 578,  leased 
its patented tabulating machines provid ed that the lessee’s exclusive use of IBM 
manufactured tabulating cards. IBM challenged that tying was necessary due to 
quality control, but could not prove that other manufacturers were not able to 
offer adequate supply of tabulating cards at  same or lowe r prices579.  What we want 
                                                             
575 See International Business Machines Corp. (IBM) v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936), at 136, 139 [The Court 
looked at the average of the gross receipt of the machines and the average sales of the cards per year, and compared  
sales by IBM (which makes and sells 3,000,000,000 cards -tied product- annually, 81 percent of the total) with the 
sales by the Remington Rand Company, its only competitor (representing the remaining 19 percent, are approximately 
600,000,000) and convinced that IBM’s leases “may be to substantially lessen competition”]. 
576 LESLIE (1999), p. 1785. 
577 See GRIMES, Warren S., “Antitrust Tie-In Analysis After "Kodak": Understanding the Role of Market 
imperfections”, 62 ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL 2 (Winter 1994), pp. 263-325, available at 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40844119 (last visited 17.06.2017) [hereinafter GRIMES (The Role of Market 
Imperfections)] 
578 298 U.S. 131 (1936). 
579 Id., at 134,139, 140. 
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to draw attention with this case, the government brought the suit  against IBM and 
three other corporations, all  manufacturers of machines performing substantially 
the same functions as IBM’s,  using similar ties 580.  In fact , the Board has not been 
able to carry out a  successful examination in the case that  involved similar 
complaint. 
 In a preliminary investigation, the Board evaluated the claim about Hewlett 
Packard (HP), Lexmark, Canon and Xerox (printer suppliers) t ied their own 
licensed cartridges, toner or ribbon product sales to their printer sales, as refusing 
the exercise of warranty rights if the customers/consumers have not been used 
original consumables with their printers 581.  The Board determined that in addition 
to the l icensed (tied) products on the relevant market, there were equivalent and 
refil l products, which have a certain quality that could be substituted by these  
products582.  The Board assessed the complaint that distributors, head dealers or 
technical services of HP, Lexmark, Canon or other printer manufacturers 
companies make verbal notices to customers during the sale of their products that 
the printer will be out of warranty if the original cartridge is not used following 
the depletion of the cartridges within the pri nter that have a l ife of about 2 
years583.  Then, the Board looked at the provisions contained in the manufacturer 's  
(cited to HP’s) guarantee documents and the booklet which denote that 
malfunctions and damage caused by non -genuine HP supplies will  be repair ed by 
HP services for normal hours and material  charges, while damage caused by 
original consumables is directly covered by the warranty 584.   
 However, the complainant acknowledged that despite the existence of these 
provisions in the guarantee document and the booklet, there was opposite de facto  
application in the market. If the technical services of the printer manufacturer 
companies saw refurbished/ refil led cartridges/ toner/ ribbon in the printer, they 
                                                             
580 Id., at 132. 
581 The Board decision dated 17.6.2004 and numbered 04-42/ 490-118 (hereinafter Printer Suppliers decision). 
582 Printer Suppliers decision, p. 6. 
583 Printer Suppliers decision, p. 6. 
584 Printer Suppliers decision, p. 6,7. 
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do not repair those damages even in the event of a failure not caused by the non -
original consumable usages and they keep the printer out of warranty 585.  
 In the investigation, the Board concluded that since non -original cartridge 
is used by the complainant, there is no document showing that the malfunctions  
that occur in the printer and damage not caused by the cartridge are excluded from 
the warranty586.  However, in the investigation, i t  was clear that a customer/ 
consumer who was subject to such an application, the notification was made 
verbal.  
 Once again, the Board did not explain whether alleged tying practice is 
addressed under Article 4 or Article 6 of the TCA. Since there was no showing in 
the decision that the Board assert  collusive or parallel behavior between the 
printer suppliers, i t is assumed that  the case was handled according to Article 6 587.  
It  can even be said that Board merely focused on HP’s practices (which has a 
higher market share) . The Board was convinced that HP did not have intention to 
force consumers to use original consumable goods, du e to HP statement that HP 
has sent a letter to the responsible persons in charge of sending a warning to the 
technical service to prevent any application from happ ening individually in the  
direction claimed by complainant 588.  
 Therefore, the Board failed to assess tying practice comprehensibly and 
overlooked whether there was parallel  behavior. Even if,  rigid competit ion exists 
between the competitors, the Board may find necessary a market inquiry to  
understand better whether this practice occurs due to natur al character of the 
market or due to asymmetric information problem in the demand -side. 
                                                             
585 Printer Suppliers decision, p. 7. 
586 Printer Suppliers decision, p. 7, 8. 
587 See ARDIYOK, Sahin, “Motorlu Taşıtlar Tebliği’nin Rekabet Hukuku ve Satış Sonrası Pazar Teoriler Analizi 
[Competition Law and Aftermarkets Sale Theory Analysis of the Communiqué on Motor Vehicles], Rekabet 
Hukukunda Güncel Gelismeler Sempozyumu – V, Rekabet Kurumu Yayınları, Ankara 2007, p.19. 
588 Printer Suppliers decision, p. 8. 
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 More importantly, the Board only considered market shares of the printer 
suppliers in the tying product (printer) market and in the t ied products (printer 
toner, cartr idge and ribbon) market589.  However, i t  was not the market power over  
the tying product that may force consumers to use original cartridges or toner in 
their printer, but the market power over in the aftermarket services. Consumer 
received the printer with o riginal cartridges, sufficient for 2 years average 
consumption. According to the booklet, if they use non -original inks, their printer 
would not be out of warranty automatically.  They faced with this implementation 
when they needed aftermarket service. The  Board investigation did not include 
the determination of neither the warranty services market nor the market power 
in there. 
 Northern Pacific R. Co. v. United States 590 was the case in which the Court 
determined a tying arrangement (“preferential  routing c lauses”) in land sales 
contracts and leases, regarding the Northern Pacific required buyers and lessees 
to use also transcontinental railroad lines to ship over all  commodities produced 
or manufactured on the land and condemn the tying arrangement as findi ng per se  
violation of the Section 1 of the Sherman Act 591.  The contracts provided a price -
protection clause that the rates charged would be equal or better than those of 
competing carriers and the land was sold at  the market rate (and also, in some 
instances, the vendee or lessee is permitted to ship by competing carrier, if i ts 
service is better)592.  Evidence of market power was not required by the Court 593,  
which held that “sufficient economic power” over the tying product is able to 
restrain free competit ion in the market for the t ied product 594.  
                                                             
589 Printer Suppliers decision, p. 3-5. 
590 356 U.S. 1 (1958). 
591 356 U.S. 1, at 3-4. The tract of the land was the tying product and the use of the railroad was the tied product. 
592 id., at 7 (fn.: 6), 11. 
593 But it is assumed by the virtue of Northern Pacific’s extensive landholdings (id., at 7). 
594 “They [tie-ins] are unreasonable in and of themselves whenever a party has sufficient economic power with respect 
to the tying product to appreciably restrain free competition in the market for the tied product and a "not insubstantial" 
amount of interstate commerce is affected.” (id., at 6 and also see id., at 11). Cf. see dissenting Justice Harlan and two 
other justices join (id., at 14-19) (disagreeing the making inferences from merely based on appellant’s (Northern 
Pacific) landholding without showing the proportion of Northern Pacific lands of various types to the total of the lands 
of the same types sold and leased in the area of the defendants’ operation or no findings of the uniqueness of any of 
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 The Court did not consider metering pricing effects of tying, yet in the 
l i terature i t  is suggested that Northern Pacific case involved metering pricing 595.  
It  is also noted that cartel  facili tation features of a meeting -competit ion clause 
(such as in the Int. Salt  case) was presented 596.  Furthermore, i t  is also suggested 
that tying in the Northern Pacific case had a role for evasion of price regulation 597.   
 The last  proposition was made by BORK, who indicated that  Northern 
Pacific might have used the t ie for undercutting the fixed -rail  charges that were 
set by Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) 598.  This is an important finding 
that may support why competit ion authorities should not reject an inquiry merely 
because the alleged exploitative practice occurred in  a price-regulated market. In 
previous decisions, the Board chose such an approach that any inquiry was 
rejected because alleged excessive pricing took place in the price-regulated 
sector599.  Hence, i t  shows that for tying practice that occurs in sector regulated 
market, it  requires special concern from competit ion authorities600.  The sector 
specific regulator may not be aware of this effect of tying practices, and solely 
be concerned with the price of the tying product. Therefore, a generalist 
competit ion authority can screen such behavior. We do not suggest that when the 
competit ion authority determines such a behavior , they should a lso impose 
                                                             
the appellants’ lands either because of the location or the qualities of the production (superior mineral, timber, or 
agricultural products) in there. Also, criticizing (id., at 20) not following the request that monopoly power (or 
dominance position) in the tying product for violation of the Sherman Act as stated in Times-Picayune, but not saying 
so “a monopoly power in the sense of § 2 of the Sherman Act must be shown over a tying product”, but “sufficient 
economic power in cases of this kind could be based upon a variety of factors, such as significant percentage control 
of the relevant market, desirability of the product to the purchaser, use of tying clauses which would be likely to result 
in economic detriment to vendees or lessees, and such uniqueness of the tying product as to suggest comparison with 
a monopoly by patent”). 
595 See GRIMES (The Role of Market Imperfections), p. 300, 301. 
596 Id., p. 301. 
597 BORK (The Antitrust Paradox), p. 376. 
598 BORK (The Antitrust Paradox), p. 376 
599 See Board decisions dated 8.3.2002 and number 02-13/ 127-54; dated 29.06.2006 and numbered 06-46/ 601-172; 
dated 30.10.2008 and numbered 08-61/ 996-388. 
600 This effect has been recognized by the Guidelines (2009), n. 92. Yet, since the Guidelines addresses merely 
exclusionary tying practice, here we draw attention of the Board for considering this effect for the exploitative tying 
practice as well. 
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sanctions. It  will  be more efficient and appropriate if the competition authority 
co-operates with the sector specific regulator 601.   
 GRIMES offers an approach to antitrust analysis of  t ies that include the 
roles of market imperfections and market share in the tying product, and 
comparing possible results from the interaction of the two key variables602.  He 
concludes that market imperfection coupled with high market share poses an 
anticompetit ive risk against static  and dynamic efficiencies, and even though the 
tying firm lacks high market share, whether the collective market share of all 
sellers use a t ie can be indicator for l ikely harm from cartel  facili tation or market 
foreclosure603.  His proposition for integrating market imperfections into t ie -in 
analysis 604 was based on the presumption that t ies can undermine consumer 
demand quality605 when buyer is not a frequent purchaser of the tying product;  or 
purchase of the t ied product is deferred (and the seller controls the  price of the 
t ied product);  or the tying product (not the tied product) is the major object of the 
buyer 's purchase 606.  
 We share the concern with respect to questioning whether competitors may 
have seen using similar t ies, but we do not agree with Grimes’s  theory that “tying 
complicates/confuses buyers while making it  more difficult  for them to compare 
                                                             
601 See BORK (The Antitrust Paradox), p. 381. 
602 See GRIMES (The Role of Market Imperfections), p. 273. 
603 Id., p. 273 (It is called dual Market imperfections/ Market power test that is premised on a tie causing substantial 
injury to static or dynamic efficiency should be prohibited and it  assumes ties are harmful when either of two 
preconditions are met: 1- as the result market imperfections, the tie causes competitive injury that would be caused in 
the absence of a tie; or 2- as the result of the share that the tying seller possesses in the market the tie causes competitive 
injury in any of a number of ways. And it accepts only one exception that the efficient bundling of products sought by 
informed consumers, ties are likely to have few significant procompetitive benefits that cannot be attained in less 
anticompetitive ways. Id., p. 292-297). 
604 GRIMES (The Role of Market Imperfections), p. 273 (“Any departure from perfect competitive conditions may be 
called a market imperfection. In the context of a tie, market imperfections should be a concern to antitrust only to the 
extent that the tie worsens the injurious effect of a market imperfection beyond that which would occur in the absence 
of a tie.”). 
605 “Consumer demand quality” refers the level of consumer knowledge, understanding, and motivation that be 
effective on purchase decision [GRIMES (The Role of Market Imperfections), p. 267, fn.: 10)]. 
606 Grimes also observes further market imperfections affecting buyer motivation that may bear on the use of tie-in in 
the absence of information problems, i.e. The seller may be able to extract a premium price, if the buyer can pass on 
the increased costs to the next level or the seller may also enjoy leverage over an intermediate buyer if the buyer 
receives that tie-in is an industry wide practice (See id., p. 275-279). 
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prices due to deferred purchase in metering ties”. LARSON suggests 
reconsidering the applicabili ty of this standard in producer goods market and limit 
i t  in consumers goods markets 607.  However, there is no consensus about i ts 
applicabili ty for  end-user consumers regarding whether market imperfections 
should be included in antitrust analysis or alleged additional harm can be 
addressed under consumer protection la ws608.  
 At a glance ,  i t  seems more plausible limiting Grimes’ suggested 
presumption for the consumers’  goods market. However, we are not  convinced 
that metering tying merely due to deferred purchasing should indicate information 
asymmetry in the market or consumers will  unlikely consider the price of their 
consumable goods at  the time purchase. Information asymmetries or other market 
imperfections should be included in antitrust analysis, but competition authorities 
should ask the right questions to interested persons, instead of leading an 
investigation based on presumption.  
 Likewise, The Board in another preliminary investigation about Hewlett 
Packard (HP), implicitly included information asymmetry concerns and stated that 
“conscious users who see the product price and the price of consumables together 
as a data, have a tendency to choose the most appropriate product among the 
producers on the market when purchasing the product” 609.  However, the Board 
draw this conclusion from a decision by the Office  of Fair Trading of the UK 
                                                             
607 LARSON, Alexander C., “Antitrust Tie-In Analysis After Kodak: A Comment”, 63 ANTITRUST LAW 
JOURNAL 1 (Fall 1994), p. 263, available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/40843279 (last visited 16.06.2017).  
608 See Kodak case, p. 494, 495 (the Dissent challenged that market imperfections should not be included in antitrust 
analysis and it should be addressed exclusively under consumer protection laws). See also CRASWELL, Richard, 
“Tying Requirements in Competitive Markets: The Consumer Protection Issues”, 62 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW 
REVIEW (1982), p. 679-681, available at https://law.stanford.edu/publications/tying-requirements-in-competitive-
markets-the-consumer-protection-issues/ (last visited 16.06.2017)(suggests alleged injury was worked by ties 
associated with market imperfections should be addressed through consumer protection laws); Larson, p. 265, 266 
(suggests dealing with information-based problems that leads consumer harms under consumer protection law or 
contract law rather than under antitrust law). Compare GRIMES, Warren S., “Antitrust Tie-In Analysis After Kodak: 
A Reply to Larson's Comment”, 63 ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL 1 (Fall 1994), p. 271, available at 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40843280 (last visited 16.06.2017) [hereinafter GRIMES (Reply to Comment)] (agrees 
with them, but since market imperfections effects recognized, ignoring them will be inconsistent with legislative 
intent). 




(OFT), about an investigation in HP practice. OFT had directed the question to 
HP, “do you really think that consumers consider after -sale maintenance and 
repair costs when they make a decision to buy a printer?”. HP answered tha t 
“based upon surveys conducted by the company, i t  is found that consumer take 
into consideration all  costs when they buy a printer. This is the reason for the  
efforts to give sufficient information at sales points about consumables 
(cartridges, paper, etc .) ,  additional warranty and support packs”.  
 Thus, the Board did not overlook market imperfections, but obviously failed 
to assess i t  successfully. First ,  considered only UK consumers as a parameter, 
second and more importantly, presumed parameter was not  based on an impartial 
survey.  
 Additionally, IBM and Northern Pacific cases have a common feature that 
tying did not impose against larger volume buyers. Hence, ELHAUGE and 
NALEBUFF theory does not fi t  in this instance, and the allocative efficiency of  
t ie-ins is not held. GRIMES argues that the seller’s selective imposition of a t ie 
is consistent with the thesis that information problems allow the seller to exact a 
supra-competit ive return from less informed, but is inconsistent with the perfect 
conditions required to increase allocative efficiency 610.   
 We agree partly with Grimes proposition. In tying cases where one or more 
large buyers are relieved of the requirement to purchase the t ied product, it  may 
show that the seller used the opportunity to explo it  the inexperienced buyers (who 
are not frequent purchaser)611.  However, we do not agree that in the indicated 
instances i t is reasonable to call the buyers (who was imposed tie) inexperienced, 
since they were purchasing for their business, and it  can be ex plained with 
negotiation power of the parties, which is different than calling a merchant 
                                                             
610 GRIMES (The Role of Market Imperfections), p. 287, 288. (“In all probability, the lowest per unit price for the 
bundled items is now paid by the intensive user; the highest price is paid by the medium intensity user unable to get 
out from under the tie; and a mid-level price is paid by the low-intensity user.” id., p. 287). 
611 Referring to Kodak case that tie not imposed against buyers who service their own machines); IBM case that tie 
was not imposed against the government) and in Northern Pacific, the railroad tie did not impose against 390 of its 
larger customers (id., p. 275, fn.: 43). 
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behaved inexperienced while doing a purchase for his own business. Second, in 
the stated cases, there is no showing that t ied products were sold at  supra -
competit ive price. Contrary,  in the Northern Pacific case tying contract had 
included a price-protection clause612,  while in the IBM case, the government was 
exempt from tying imposition, but therefore, the government had lost the discount 
for leased machine613,  while the  buyers had received such a discount in the tying 
product. Thus, consumer surplus extraction depends on whether the seller offered 
overall  competit ive price for tying plus t ied product. Nevertheless, exemption of 
large volume buyers indicates that tying wa s discriminatory between the 
customers, but not necessarily exploitative (as inflating tied product price).  
 In the Tetra Pak II case, the EC Commission evaluated the misuse of the 
dominant position of Tetra Pak due to the sale of cartons and fil ling equip ment 
used in packaging milk and dairy products. Commission concluded that Tetra Pak 
had abused its dominant position in the aseptic sector in order to establish a 
dominant position in the non-aseptic sector through predatory pricing and tying 614.   
 The Commission found in i ts investigation that Tetra Pak’s sale or lease of  
the machine was tied to the purchase of cartons from Tetra Pak, i .e.,  tying practice 
was fulfil led by Tetra Pak requiring its customer to use only Tetra Pak cartons in 
Tetra Pak machines and by only allowing the customer to obtain supplies from 
Tetra Pak itself615.  Tetra Pak also tied its machine sale/lease to an exclusive right  
to provide maintenance and repair services, and to supply spare par ts was also 
reserved for Tetra Pak616.  The Commission held that these obligations had no 
connection to the purpose of the contract i tself,  i .e.,  selling or leasing machines 
practice, thus created an “artificial  and unjustified” link between Tetra Pak and 
                                                             
612 356 U.S. 1 (1958), at 7. 
613 298 U.S. 131 (1936), at 131. 
614 EC Commission decision, 92/163/EEC of 24 July 1991, (Tetra Pak II), (OJ 1992 L 72). Tetra Pak applied this 
decision to the CFI (the General Court) and, the case send to the ECJ for final judgement. Tetra Pak’s appeals were 
dismissed by the both Courts. See CFI decision, Tetra Pak International SA v Commission of the European 
Communities, Case T-83/91 (06.10.1994), ECJ decision, Case C-333/94 P, Tetra Pak International SA v Commission 
[1996] ECR I-5951 (Tetra Pak II). 
615 Commission Decision, Tetra Pak II, at 115-116. 
616 Commission Decision, Tetra Pak II, at 107-109. 
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i ts customers as a violation of Article [102] 617.  Regarding the pricing of machines 
through sales of carton, The Commission emphasized that the machines and 
cartons are separable, thus, Tetra Pak’s price differentials and trading conditions 
discriminated between customers and submitted that the primary consid eration 
was the customer should be free to decide to pay more for the machine on purchase 
and less for the cartons afterwards 618.  
 In sum, current suggestions for welfare effects of tying induced intra -
product price discrimination (metering pricing) that dir ect analogy from second-
degree or third-degree price discrimination instance does not fi t in the concrete 
cases.  
 In the concrete cases, tying product was a durable good, usually sold or 
leased with the requirement of purchase of t ied products (consumable  goods) from 
the seller as well  as guarantying either to meet competitive price for t ied goods 
or maintenance or repair of the tying product. Thus, concrete cases are not 
consistent with the concern about supra -competitive prices, but, indeed, in these 
cases price-protection clause or warranty conditions indirectly forces 
customers/consumers to go with the t ied products. Therefore, “consumer choice” 
is a better indicator for the evaluation of exploitative effects of metering pricing 
rather than “consumer surplus extraction”. However, the Board should identify as 
a relevant consideration in the assessment of foreclosure “the extent of the 
allegedly abusive conduct” including “the percentage of total  sales in the relevant 
market affected by the conduct” when t ied product has staple character. It  is 
belonged to the Board establish a “safe harbor” or “threshold” that below which 
the tying conduct would not be considered exclusionary 619.  
                                                             
617 Commission Decision, Tetra Pak II, at 117. 
618 Commission Decision, Tetra Pak II, at 158,159, 169. See also the CFI decision, Tetra Pak II, at 206. 
619 See UK Office of Fair Trading decision, CE/9322/10, IDEXX Laboratories (2011), n. 6.35, 6.66-6.71 (it is denoted 
that the foreclosure of actual or potential competitors did not occur due to a small portion of the tied market was 
affected -less than 5% in one market and 15% in another) [O’DONOGHUE/ PADILLA, n. 22564]. 
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 1.1.2. Tying in aftermarkets sale  
 Availabili ty of complete information for bu yers and sellers is an assumption 
that perfect competit ion relies upon. However, i t  is understood that information 
cannot be obtained without cost, and when information is vital  for the functioning 
of the market, it  places responsibili ty on the government to gather or process the 
necessary information620.  Government may adopt measures not merely through 
economic regulations or consumer law, but also competit ion law 621.  The US 
Supreme Court’s decision in the Kodak Case put the information asymmetry on 
the agenda and drew attention to the need for a more detailed review of the market  
that is theoretically supposed to operate properly 622.  
 Indeed, Kodak case brought a new perspective as including the possibili ty 
that lack of information may facili tate antitrust viola tion especially due to the 
after‐sale costs of durable goods. The discussion is focused on whether consumer 
considers the upcoming costs of the product during its economic lifetime while 
buying it ,  as well  as the possibili ty for the consumer to switch to s ubstitute 
products if unexpected costs arise. Thus, information asymmetries and switching 
cost were considered as basic market failures. Theories on the aftermarket analyze 
the possibili ty of firms violate competition rules throu gh the interaction between 
foremarket and aftermarket. In addition,  suggest that, whereas a firm has a strong 
market position in the aftermarket, the tying of spare parts sale under i ts control 
with repair and maintenance services may create an abuse of market power.  
                                                             
620 See BEALES, Howard and CRASWELL, Richard and Salop, Steven, “Information Remedies For Consumer 
Protection”, FTC Bureau of Economics Working Papers No. 36 (1980), available at 
https://www.ftc.gov/reports/information-remedies-consumer-protection (last visited 12.06.2017). 
621 LANDE, Robert H., “Market Power Without A Large Market Share: The Role of Imperfect Information and other 
“Consumer Protection” Market Failures” (2007), available at  
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2007/03/27/222102.pdf (last visited 12.06.2017). 
622 See SHAPIRO, Carl, “Aftermarkets and Consumer Welfare: Making Sense Of Kodak”, 63 ANTITRUST LAW 
JOURNAL No. 2 (Winter 1995), pp. 483-511, available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/40843290 (last visited 
29.06.2017) [hereinafter SHAPIRO (Aftermarkets)]. 
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 Since the l iterature offers detailed analyses of aftermarket sales theories 623,  
our questioning will  focus on the role of metering pricing in aftermarket sales, 
and whether the underlying reasoning for tying is the exclusion of rivals or 
exploitation of consumers, or if the exploitative effect can be achieved merely 
due to information asymmetry or switching cost. In this context, we will  review 
the Kodak case and a similar decision in the EU, the Hugin case, in order to 
conclude whether emerged concepts from these cases affected the Turkish 
Competit ion Board’s analysis in the aftermarket tying.  
 1.1.2.1. Kodak case  
 The case developed like this624,  prior to 1982, Eastman Kodak Co. 
(hereinafter Kodak)  offered to service almost all of i ts micrographic and copier 
equipment, and also Kodak sold replacement parts ( at profit) to any part  that used 
them to repair Kodak equipment. Image Technical Services and other independent 
service organizations (hereinafter ISOs) do not manufacture the replacement 
parts, they use in the providing service. Due to Kodak’s policy that freely selling 
replacement parts, ISOs began to compete significantly with Kodak (in 1984 -
1985), and offered service price for as l i t t le as hal f of Kodak’s price. Respond to 
this result ,  Kodak went to price cut for service in some cases. Meanwhile, it  had 
been observed that some customers found ISOs service superior to service of 
Kodak.  
                                                             
623 BORENSTEIN, Severin and MACKIE-MASON, Jeffrey K. and NETZ, Janet S., “Antitrust Policy In 
Aftermarkets”, 63 ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL (1995), pp. 455-482, available at 
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/borenste/download/ALJ95Aftermarkets.pdf (last visited 05.06.2017) [hereinafter 
BORENSTEIN et. al. (1995)]; BORENSTEIN, Severin and MACKIE-MASON, Jeffrey K. and NETZ, Janet S., 
“Exercising Market Power in Proprietary Aftermarkets”, JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT 
STRATEGY (2000), pp. 157-188, available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1430-
9134.2000.00157.x/epdf (last visited 05.06.2017) [hereinafter BORENSTEIN et. al. (2000)]; ELZİNGA, Kenneth G. 
and MİLLS, David E.,“Independent Service Organizations and Economic Efficiency”, 39 Economic Inquiry 4 (2001), 
pp. 549–560, available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1093/ei/39.4.549/full (last visited 20.06.2017); 
FARRELL, Joseph and KLEMPERER, Paul, “Coordination and Lock‐In: Competition with Switching Costs and 
Network Effects”, 2001, available at http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/users/klemperer/lockinwebversion.pdf (last visited 
20.06.2017). 
624 See Image Technical Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co, 903 F2d 612 (9th Cir 1990), at 614. 
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 At the beginning of 1985, Kodak stopped selling parts to I SOs and made 
agreements with its contracted original -equipment manufacturers not to sell parts 
to ISOs, and also pressured independent parts distributors not to sell  Kodak parts  
to ISOs. In addition, Kodak attempted to restrict  the availabili ty of used mac hines. 
To foster this policy, Kodak also adopt the practice that i t would not sell 
replacement parts for its equipment owners unless they agree not to use service 
of ISOs. In 1987, ISOs filed an antitrust law suit .  The District Court granted 
summary judgment for Kodak, and determined that Kodak’s conduct did not 
constitute tying, because Kodak did not condition the sale of one product 
(equipment) on the buyer’s purchase of another product (replacement part) 625 and 
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit  re versed the summary judgment, on the 
ground that the District  Court misconstrued alleged tying as determining Kodak 
tied equipment to parts, or parts to equipment, instead, Kodak tied parts to 
service, therefore correcting included components of tying  woul d require 
determination of market power over the tying product, which would be power in 
the parts market instead of equipment market 626.  Then the Supreme Court, where 
granted Kodak’s petit ion for certiorari ,  affirmed the Court of Appeals ' reversal of 
the summary judgment, and remanded the case for trial 627.  In the re‐trial ,  the 
Federal District  Court found Kodak guilty and imposed fine as well as obliged 
Kodak to sell ,  for a period of 10 years, spare parts to ISOs,  at  prices that were 
not discriminatory against  them628.  Kodak appealed this decision again, yet The 
Ninth Circuit  Court of Appeals kept the Federal District  Court’s verdict 629 .  
 The Court affirmed that Kodak tied the sale of service for i ts machines 
(photocopiers and micrographic equipment) to the sale o f replacement parts for 
i ts equipment, and this practice brought violation of section 1 of the Sherman 
Act 630,  and Kodak’s refusal to sell  parts to ISOs had unlawfully monopolized, and 
                                                             
625 Image Technical Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., No. C-87-1686-WWS, at 5, 1988 WL 156332 (N.D. Cal. 
Apr. 18, 1988). 
626 Image Technical Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co, 903 F2d 612 (9th Cir 1990), at 616, 617. 
627 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc. 504 U.S. 451 (1992) [hereinafter Kodak case]. 
628 Image Technical Service, Inc, et al. v. Eastman Kodak Co., C 87-1686 (January 18, 1996). 
629 Image Technical Service, Inc, et al. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, cert. denied (1998). 
630 Kodak case, p. 479. 
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was an attempt to monopolize, thus violated section 2 of the Sherman Act 631.  
Kodak’s conduct had two -stage, because Kodak adopted policies to l imit the 
availabili ty of parts to ISO in order to obstruct competition of ISOs in the service 
market for Kodak equipment 632.  That created unilateral refusal to deal (with ISOs) .  
To prevent ISOs’ competit ion further, Kodak deployed conditional refusals in the 
form of tying which was imposed on customers, i .e.,  Kodak would not sell  
replacement parts for i ts equipment to Kodak equipment owners unless they agree  
not to use ISOs.  
 The Court determined that: 1- Service and parts are distinct products, since 
there is sufficient consumer demand for proving them separately 633,  2- 
Appreciable economic power in the tying product market is necessary for  
condemning tying 634,   3- Kodak’s claim that prevent ISO’ s from free-riding on 
Kodak’s investment in the copier and micrographic industry was not valid 
business justification635,  4- In some instance such as in Kodak position, one brand 
of a product can constitute a separate market 636,  5- The Court concluded that high 
information and switching costs (market imperfections) enabled Kodak to price 
discriminate. 
 Kodak, first ,  tried to defeat the claim as contending that competitiveness 
of the equipment market precludes the market power in the aftermarkets, further 
Kodak contended that “cross -elasticity of demand” of the customers would not 
allow exercising this power exploitatively in the parts or service market, because 
                                                             
631 id., p. 480-486. 
632 id., p. 455, 458 
633 id., p. 462, 463. 
634 id., p. 464. The Court inferred the existence of such power from Kodak’s possession of a predominant share of the 
market as referring to Respondents’ evidence that Kodak controls nearly 100% of the parts market and 80% to 95% 
of the service market, with no readily available substitutes (id., p. 457, 464, 481) Kodak contended that lack of market 
power in the primary equipment market precludes the possibility of market power in derivative aftermarkets and a 
single brand of a product or service can never be relevant market (p. 456, 461, 467). See the dissent in the Court of 
Appeal accepted Kodak argument that with respect to lack of market power [903 F2d 612 (9th Cir 1990), at 622]. 
635 Kodak case, p. 461, 485. 
636 id., p. 481, 482 (“The relevant market for antitrust purposes is determined by the choices available to Kodak 
equipment owners”). Compare SALOP, Steven C., “The First Principles Approach to Antitrust, Kodak and Antitrust 
at the Millennium”, 68 ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL (2000), p. 192, available at 
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/208 (last visited 12.06.2017). 
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if Kodak raised its parts or service price above competit ive level, potential  
customers would regard this as an increase in the price of equipment, thus stop 
buying Kodak equipment 637.  However,  the Court did not find Kodak’s argument 
was plausible, and concluded that “equipment market imposes a restraint on prices 
in the aftermarkets by no means disproves th e existence of power in those 
markets”638.  Furthermore, the Court remarked that Kodak increased service prices 
without decreased in equipment sales, therefore found Kodak claim lacks 
coherence639.  In sum, the Court did not accept Kodak defense for lack of mark et 
power to exploit  the t ied market.  
 When Kodak failed with this argument, by changing tactics, they  brought  
the defense that i t  was a “marketing strategy of spreading over the t ime the total 
cost to the buyer of Kodak equipment” 640.  The Court denoted that this pricing 
strategy argument would make sense if Kodak offered sub -competitive prices for 
equipment or parts as hoping to recoup its profits through service, and since 
Kodak set prices of equipment at  competit ive level, the Court concluded that this 
pric ing strategy cannot be the explanation for Kodak’s policy 641.   
 However, this “hypothetical” (so called by the Court) pricing strategy could 
be sufficient explanation and even though it  was not uttered, i t  was able to serve 
for metering tie-in. The Court missed the point that Kodak did not need to reduce 
the price of equipment or parts, because if Kodak could not charge supra -
competit ive prices for service, i t  had to reflect its investment costs on equipment 
or parts,  which would make Kodak less competit ive i n those market. In other 
words, Kodak already was offering a lower price for those than it  could not offer 
without tying (along with attempt to exclude ISOs from service market) 642.  
                                                             
637 504 U.S. 451, p. 469, 470. 
638 id., p. 471. 
639 id., p. 472. 
640 id., p. 472. 
641 id., p. 472. 
642 See KLEIN/ WILEY, p. 607 (affirming that pricing equipment similarly to their competitors and expected to earn 
profits on both equipment and service sales does not contradict the use of metering tie price discrimination strategy, 
it can be explained by that all firms in the industry found it profitable to adopt this same strategy). 
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Instead, the Court found that this strategy would be inconsistent with Kodak ’s  
policy toward its self -service customers, because Kodak could not sell  them parts 
without service643.  
 Moreover, the Court did miss out the detail that Kodak induced tying was 
not strictly requiring the purchase of service t ied to parts, but requiring not  buying 
the service from ISOs. Therefore, Kodak was aware that self -service customers 
would not purchase the service, and if Kodak wanted to attract self-service  
customers into its own service market, Kodak would require explicit ly purchase 
of service t ied to parts, without mentioning ISOs. However, the Court did not 
accept that Kodak offered overall  a competitive price for package of equipment, 
parts and service, but at  the same time affirmed that Kodak was not able to sell 
service to high-intensity users of service.  
 Furthermore, to strengthen its argument the Court assumed that exploitative 
tying market power occurred from market imperfections. The Court affirmed ISOs 
counter argument for the service market price to affect equipment demand that 
suggests consumers must have the information of the total  cost of the equipment, 
parts and service altogether at  the time of the purchase, viz. “life -cycle price”644,  
and determined that to acquire this information is difficult ,  is l ikely to be 
customer specific and since it  is expensive, consumers who are more concerned 
about equipment capabili ties than service costs, they may not found it  is worth to 
gather the information645.  
 With respect to lack of information of l ife -cycle price, the Court stated that 
Kodak exercise price discrimination between sophisticated (knowledgeable) 
customers and unsophisticated (uniformed) customers 646.  The Court was concern 
with alleged price discrimination practice, together with high switching costs,  
                                                             
643 Kodak case, p. 472, 473. 
644 id., p. 473. 
645 id., p. 474, 475 (The Court also did not accept Kodak claims that market power arising from inadequate information 
would be negated by competitors who supply consumers accurate information). 
646 id., p. 475. 
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because, as a result  of that, consumer s who already have purchased the equipment 
become “locked in”, so they will  tolerate some level of price increase for service 
before changing the equipment brands. As the Court stated “[u]nder this scenario, 
a seller profitably could maintain supra -competi t ive prices in the aftermarket, if 
the switching costs were high relative to the increase in service prices, and the 
number of locked-in customers were high relative to the number of new 
purchasers”647.  Therefore, the court concern about consumer surplus ext raction 
arouse from absent information that blurs the total  cost of the product for 
consumers, and due to the high switching cost where locked -in consumers, there 
is the possibili ty to worsen this. In sum, the Court found that market imperfections 
(lack of information about life -cycle price of the tying product at  the t ime of the 
purchase) enabled Kodak to price discriminate (not via metering tie, but ex ante  
categorization of consumer groups as informed and unformed, and charging supra -
competit ive prices f rom the latter group) via tying (sale of the parts to service) 
had anticompetitive effects.  
 The dissent challenge with the Court’s conclusion (the t ie between parts 
and service somehow does enable Kodak to increase overall  monopoly profits) 
mainly offering two counter arguments: 1) The distinguishing Kodak’s consumers 
as sophisticated and unsophisticated is unreasonable, they are all  rational 
consumers648 2) Since without inter-brand power, Kodak cannot engage price 
discrimination649.  We only agree wi th dissen t’s argument with respect to the 
Court’s approach is inconsistent due to distinguish whether t ie equipment to parts 
or part  to service, and assumed in the former it  does not raise antitrust concern650.  
This understanding does not explain why consumers are ab le to inform life-cycle 
price when tie parts to equipment, and why not t ie parts to service.  
                                                             
647 Furthermore, the Court remarked that this strategy is even more likely to be profitable when the seller can price 
discriminate between its locked-in customers and potential new customers, Kodak case, p. 476. 
648 Kodak case, p. 495, 499. 
649 id., p. 499. 
650 id., p. 478, 479. 
203 
 
 It  is also questionable whether the market imperfections enable d Kodak to 
price discriminate or if i t  was the policy that aimed to exclude ISOs from the tied 
service market. Nor Kodak Court neither market imperfections based market 
power supporters considered the role of refusal to deal policy of Kodak 651,  but 
they merely assumed that market imperfections led to separate sophisticated and 
unsophisticated customers groups,  and Kodak was able to price discriminate 
between them. Further t ie s between parts and service enable Kodak to charge 
supra-competit ive prices for tied service product s from the latter customer group.  
 The Court did not denote that Kodak implement m etering tie, but the dissent 
stated alleged price discrimination was through metering tie 652.  To be profitable 
of a t ie between foremarket and aftermarket, firm’s strategy as follow,  customers 
could receive equipment and service from same prices, however fir m lowers 
equipment prices and raises service prices as aiming metering -tie induced price 
discrimination that permits to charge higher total  package prices from high -
intensity users (who demand more service) relative to cost than low -intensity 
users (who demand less service)653.  Therefore, we suggested that i t was necessary 
to assess distribution of intensity of use of unsophisticated customers in the post -
1985 market to conclude Kodak’s practice could harm economic efficiency and 
consumer welfare. Since the Court conceded that high-volume users were 
knowledge and self -service users;  i f uninformed customers were not heavy users,  
Kodak overall  pricing might be seemed competit ive or at  least not excessive.  
 However, the court insist  that Kodak could charge supra  competit ive prices 
since customers were locked-in due to high switching costs. However, high 
switching costs was not created or increased after Kodak new policy, i t  always 
existed. Customers would become locked -in with Kodak service market, as losing 
                                                             
651 See also FOX, Eleanor M., “Eastman Kodak Company v. Image Technical Services, Inc. - Information Failure as 
Soul or Hook?”, 62 ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL (1994), p. 760, 761, available at 
http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/antil62&collection=journals&id=801&startid=&endid=810, 
last visited (02.09.2017) [hereinafter FOX (Information Failure)]. 
652 Kodak case, p. 499. 
653 See KLEIN/ WILEY, p. 601, 603, 604. 
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their alternative for service. Nonetheless, this explanation does not fit  the facts, 
since Kodak sought to make its parts policy change prospective and apply it  only 
purchases of its new model while continued to make replacement parts available 
to ISOs servicing for old models, and this restrictive part  policy was generally 
known654.   
 Thus, we are looking for a coherence explanation for Kodak marketing 
strategy. As we seen before in the printer -ink tie, pricing based on the intensity 
of t ied product (here is the  aftermarket) usage has potential  to increase seller’s 
overall  profit as permitting collection of consumer surplus across different users 
and uses. If  intensity of equipment use is related to customer value, the price 
discrimination could be a way to charge higher package price to relatively high -
value buyers while charging lower overall  prices to relatively low -value buyers 655.  
  Another l ikely explanation for the practice where a manufacturer cut the 
price of equipment and increased the aftermarket service price suggests that i t  is 
a way to assure consumers about quality of the equipment, because lower -quality 
products will  be used less intensively, thus generate lower profits under tying 656. 
Therefore, a warranty would solve the problem of pre -purchase consumer quality 
uncertainty.  
 When Kodak claimed that tying was necessary to defeat ISOs free riding by 
taking advantage of the low equipment prices without paying the price of higher 
service prices, the Court did not accept this argument, and in the decision, i t was 
not argued whether refusal to deal with ISOs enabled Kodak to price discriminate. 
However, i t  can be questioned whether manufacturer could meter value by 
including an upcharge on replacement parts. Even though customers used ISOs’s 
                                                             
654 See Kodak case, dissent opinion, p. 492. See also KLEIN/ WILEY, p. 608. 
655 KLEIN/ WILEY, p. 604, 605. 
656 See SCHWARTZ, Marius and WERDEN, Gregory J., “A Quality-Signaling Rationale For Aftermarket Tying”, 64 
ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL No. 2 (Winter 1996), pp. 387-404, available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/40843333 
(last visited 29.06.2017). 
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service, Kodak could sti l l  sell  replacement parts to ISOs at high and profitable 
prices657.   
 KLEIN/ WILEY suggests that this strategy (replacement parts as an 
effective metering device) may not serve, because an increased price of parts 
would lead customers to economize on high parts price by increasing the servicing 
of the equipment, and this incentive to substitute service for parts could be large, 
and further the result  would be large increase in parts prices as compared to 
service prices that would lead a reduction in ma nufacturer profit658.  
 In addition, refusal to deal also explains why equipment manufacturers also 
may aim to discriminate in favor of relatively more knowledgeable high -intensity 
customers that prefer self -service, because placing a metering upcharge on 
replacement parts would have resulted in substantially high package prices that 
drive away high-intensity users659.   
 Now we have alternative explanation for Kodak induced price 
discrimination that why Kodak preferred metering service demand instead of 
direct sells of replacement parts at  higher price or what was the reason not 
imposing tie on high-volume users, but sti l l  we have to conclude that when 
information asymmetry and customer lock‐in stemming from high switching costs 
“could create a weaker connection between service and parts prices and equipment 
sales”660.  
 In fact, we are not challenging that the Supreme Court has failed, regarding 
the interaction between the foremarket and the aftermarket, as denying the 
applicabili ty of economic theory that solely ta kes into account conditions in 
foremarket. Supreme Court correctly considered the burden of the costs 
throughout the economic life of a product. However, we suggest that inclusion of 
                                                             
657 See Image Technical Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co, 903 F2d 612 (9th Cir 1990). 
658 KLEIN/ WILEY, p. 606.  
659 KLEIN/ WILEY, p. 607. 
660 Kodak case, p. 473. 
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“unexpected pricing experienced by current customer base” criteria, also requires 
considering whether the practice is proactive or retroactive 661.  Primarily, locked-
in should be assumed if aftermarket tying has effects retrospectively. If  
aftermarket tying effects are prospective, then competit ion authorities should not 
impose sanction, but should introduce remedies to ensure that customers/ 
consumers are aware of this practice and the future costs.  
 1.1.2.2. Hugin v. Liptons case  
 While Kodak case provided the  first  t ime the US Supreme Court used the 
term “aftermarket”662,  a decade before Kodak case, in the EU, the Court of Justice 
easily found an inter -brand aftermarket in the Hugin case 663,  wherein a similar 
prevention of supply to an independent servicer and repairer were addressed 664.  
Hugin was a Swedish firm that manufact ured cash registers. It  had a 12 percent 
market share in the EU and 13 percent share in the UK cash register market, which 
were considerably competit ive 665.  At the t ime of purchase, Hugin inform ed 
customers about after -sale services, and offered a free one-year warranty. In  
addition, contracts were offered for periodical maintenance, including spare parts 
at  a fixed price and servicing at significantly low prices for the following years.  
 Due to the high demand for cash registers in the UK at the time, Hugin 
appointed a firm –  Liptons  –  as  i ts distributor for  the London area. Liptons also 
offered the sale, rental ,  maintenance, and repair of various brands of cash 
registers in addition to that of Hugin cash registers, providing maintenance and 
repair services and necessary spare parts supplied by Hugin. Hugin first  offered 
Liptons the opportunity to be the authorized dealer in the London area. However,  
Liptons refused it  due to low profit  margin s. Following that, Hugin confined its 
                                                             
661See KLEIN/ WILEY, p. 639 (concluding that “Kodak's conduct did not meet this test of an unanticipated change in 
aftermarket arrangements. Instead, Kodak’s refusals to supply replacement parts to ISOs were largely prospective”). 
662 SHAPIRO, C. and  TEECE, D. J. “System Competition and Aftermarkets: An Economic Analysis of Kodak”, 
Antitrust Bulletin (Spring 1994), p. 2. 
663 Hugin Kassaregister AB v. Commission, Case 22/78, [1979] ECR 1869. (hereinafter Hugin case). 
664 FOX (Information Failure), p. 762. 
665 The Leading firms in these markets have 34 percent share in UK market and 18 percent in EU market. 
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sales to i ts own distribution system and stopped supplying cash registers and spare  
parts to Liptons.  
 Liptons fi led a complaint to the EU Commission alleging that Hugin abused 
its dominant position and breached articl e 102 TFEU. After examining the case, 
the EU Commission held that Hugin abused its dominant position in the after -sale 
services for Hugin branded cash registers, by refusing to supply Liptons the spare  
parts required to provide maintenance and repair servi ces666.  Hugin appealed this 
decision to the Court of Justice, and challenged with similar grounds to Kodak’s 
arguments667.  
 The Court of Justice held the Commission finding that spare parts 
constituted a separate market and Hugin was dominant therein. The Cour t stated 
that independent firms might specialize in maintenance and repair of cash 
registers, hence Hugin needed to provide spare parts to repair Hugin machines, 
unless Hugin showed an objective reason and therefore i ts practice could not be 
abusive668.  However, the Court did not assesse the abuse and dismissed the 
Commission’s Decision due to Hugin’s conduct did not restrict  the trade between 
member states. 
 In the Hugin and Kodak decisions, courts held that, despite the competit ive 
foremarket, if a firm has a dominant position in the aftermarket, exclusion of ISOs 
must be justified. However, in the Hugin decision, Court primarily considered 
whether there was an exclusionary behavior, i t  did not include information failure 
or consumer exploitation. Although, in response to Hugin 's submission to the 
Court of Justice, the Commission stated that a dominant firm “cannot deny its 
customers freedom of choice . . .” 669.  In Kodak case, information asymmetry and 
switching costs (exploitation of consumers) were the leading reasons of the 
                                                             
666 Commission decision, OJ L 22/23,  25 January 1978, p. 23. 
667 See FOX (Information Failure), p. 763-767 (comparing Kodak and Hugin’s arguments). 
668 Hugin case, at 1896, 1897. 
669 Hugin case, at 1884. 
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finding of an intra -brand aftermarket power670.  In other words, market 
imperfections emphasis and its connection to price discrimination overshadowed 
the role of refusal to deal policy of  Kodak in the case.  
 1.1.2.3. The Turkish Competition Board decisions  
 The Board assessed the claims that Hewlett  Packard Computer and 
Measurement Systems Inc. violated the TCA provision as determining high prices 
for printer consumables and spare parts, and the maintenance and repair costs for 
after-sales services, as well as obligating their use the STREP program in after -
sales services and not to sell  spare parts to third parties who are outside the 
authorized services671.  
 The Board, similarly to the Kodak and the Hugin decisions, determined the 
aftermarket as separate market, regardless o f the competit ion level at  foremarket 
(the printer market). However, the Board approach was different from Kodak 
decision, but more similar to Hugin in the sense that not granting information 
asymmetries a decisive role for the determination of abuse of dominant position.  
 The Board approach was also interesting and different from stated cases, 
on the ground that i t  opted a bifurcated analysis for market power in the spare 
parts and consumable goods as considering dynamic str ucture of the market.  
 The Board even placed a subtit le “economic analysis” under the heading of  
determination and legal evaluation issue. Therein, the Board pointed that “Unlike 
traditional industries, the short life span of the information technology ind ustry,  
not 10 years but just  6 months, makes the production of spare parts for HP 
products, which are in great demand in the market, economically impossible for 
secondary producers” 672 and concluded that “[t]he fact that products become 
outdated quickly due to their technologic characteristics, a newer product, 
                                                             
670 See FOX (Information Failure), p. 766. 
671 The Board decision (Preliminary Investigation) dated 08.05.2001 and numbered 01-22/192-50 (hereinafter HP 
decision). 
672 HP decision, p. 4. 
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replacing such a product, is offered by a lower price though with higher 
performance, thus the use of high technology, and a high start -up capital  cost is 
required. Therefore, the firms other than HP w ould face difficulties in the sense 
of general principles of business management in manufacturing spare parts to be 
used with HP products leads that HP is dominant in the market of spare parts for 
HP products” 673.  
 For  the dominant position in the consumable goods for HP printers, The 
Board again denoted the dynamic structure and requirement of investment in the 
high R&D processes to achieve necessary know -how, and pointed that “the cost 
efficiency in the production of consumables limits the production of secondary 
consumables to large chemical companies in scale. When they start  to make 
monopolistic profits on prices, they will  be faced with the threat of these 
secondary producers. This situation is seen as an import ant valve head preventing 
the contrary practice in the sector. On the other hand, there is a tendency for  
conscious (aware) users, who receive the product price and the price of the 
consumables together, to select the most appropriate combination among the  
producers in the market when they buy the product, where the secondary 
consumables producers cannot intervene for various reasons” 674.   
 However, the Board continued that “[t]herefore, if printer manufacturers 
sell  their products to consumers and make the c onsumers depend on them for their 
consumables, secondary manufacturers may be able to enter the market of major 
ink producers if they use these advantages to increase their consumable s prices 
so as to obtain monopolistic profit .  For this entry, i t  will  be necessary to provide 
a scale to present products for all  models of all  available printer brands on the 
market.  Therefore, printer manufacturers are dominant in the consumable markets  
that they used as their foremarket”675.  
                                                             
673 id., p. 5. 
674 id., p. 4. 
675 id., p. 6. 
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 Since the Board found that HP had dominant position in spare parts and 
consumable goods, i t  went on analysis whether alleged abuse of dominant position 
exists676.  Regarding the allegations of excessive pricing in spare parts and 
consumable goods, the Board followed again bifurcated approach for spare parts 
and consumable goods. However, ,  this time, included information asymmetry 
concern like in Kodak case, yet reached different conclusions:  
Users who demand products in this market need to consider not only their 
price but also after-sales services and the cost of consumables when 
buying a printer.  The cost of consumables is the main decision variable, 
while spare parts prices are not effective in making this decision because 
the product starts to become outdated before the warranty expires.  
Enterprises operating in this market, including HP, compete on this 
variable by taking the single variable ‘product price + consumable price 
to be used during economic life’ when determining product prices 677.  
 The Board did not explicit ly exclude informati on cost of high spare parts 
prices, but rather showed the tendency to convince that i t  cannot be relevant for 
the purchase decision. Further, the Board explained “the fact that spare parts 
prices appear to be high in the eyes of the user does not exactly r eflect the reality 
of the industry specifications because the sales prices of the models sold in the 
past years are so high that the annual price erosion in the information technology 
sector is 20%, resulting in high maintenance and repair costs of the old  models 
but i t has been found that the reason for this is due to the high inventory costs 
incurred in the past years 678”679.  
                                                             
676 It is another decision that the Board did not explicitly stated its analysis was subject to Art. 6, yet we are sure that 
the Board evaluated the case under Art. 6, since merely focus on determination of dominant position. 
677 id., p. 7, 8 (emphasis added). 
678 In accordance with the legislation in force, spare parts must be stocked for a period of 10 years for a product 
presented to the market. Due to this legal necessity, even spare parts that have not received any demand will have to 
be loaded in quantity. The necessity of having this stock is adversely affected by spare parts prices. 
679 id., p. 8 
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 The Board concluded that “the spare parts and especially consumables were 
priced too high when compared to the product price, not beca use of a competit ion 
infringement but as a requirement of the industry’s structure, where users must  
be aware  of the amount of possible costs to be incurred during economic life of a 
product rather than considering its price only” 680.  
 Regarding the claim for refusal by HP to sell  spare parts to third parties 
other than authorized service providers, The Board has found that spare parts were 
available for persons and entit ies other than authorized service providers 681. 
However, the Board did not evaluate the cla im that whether consumers are forced 
to use HP’s own consumable goods due to technological reasons or lack of 
compatible substitutes for them.  
 Likewise, three years later , in Printer suppliers’ decision, the Board faced 
similar claim, and determined that compatible (same quality and function) 
consumable goods were available for the HP printers 682.  Therefore, even though 
high prices could be justified due to high investment costs, and could be assumed 
consumers should bear information cost of consumable goods  as conscious users, 
these grounds could not be justified reduction in consumer choice through alleged 
tying practice. 
 We agree partly with the Board approach as leading different paths for 
inclusion of information asymmetries for spare parts and consumab le goods. It  is 
more likely that consumers see printer plus ink price as a package, and take into 
account cost of l ife cycle 683.  While, need for spare parts and after -sale service 
arise more delayed time of period relatively need to consumable goods. Even if  
the Board approach to high spare part  prices is acceptable, this justification does 
not allow that information cost of spare parts should be bear by consumers.  
                                                             
680 id., p. 8, 9. 
681 id., p. 7. 
682 Printer Suppliers decision, p. 6. 
683 See XXVth Report on Competition Policy (1995), n. 86-87. 
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 Later on, the Board launched a preliminary investigation its own initiative 
for examination of whether the companies operating in the medical imaging and 
diagnostic devices market violated the Law No. 4054 by applying passwords and 
spare parts in the technical service market of these devices 684.  Therein, the Board, 
expressing clearly the fact that i t considered Kodak and Hugin in i ts examination, 
has defined the relevant product market as technical service and spare parts 
market separately for each brand of medical imaging and diagnostic devices 685.  
The Board had determined the dominant position, this t ime parallel  to Kodak case, 
as including high switching and information costs. In addition, 
medical imaging and diagnostic devices manufacturers are the only 
manufacturer of the spare parts of  such devices and most of the customer 
services are provided by  the manufacturer or distributors, considering the 
factors such as the high prices of medical imaging devices, non -publication 
of spare parts price l ists (non-transparency), and [that] the price of spare 
parts is lower than the price of these devices, the customer who bought the 
device once does not change the device despite the high spare parts prices ,  
[which]  indicates that the price of the secondary product may be increased 
independently of the primary product market 686.  Therefore, i t  has reached 
[the point where] the technical service and spare parts market for medical 
imaging and diagnostic devices belonging to each brand has the dominant 
position of the authorized undertakings of these brands 687.  
 Furthermore, the Board designated possible competi t ive effects, as 
follows688:  
 1) The main product, service and spare parts are complementary products, 
and because of the effect of each other on price and demand, companies can expect 
                                                             
684 The Board decision dated 18.02.2009 and numbered 09-07/ 128-39 (hereinafter Medical Imaging and Diagnostic 
Devices decision). 
685 id., n. 240-300. 
686 id., n. 320. 
687 id., n. 240-320. 
688 id., n. 570- 680. 
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to be in applications such as reducing spare parts prices or providing wi despread 
service in order to increase their competit iveness in the main product;  
 2)  However, these companies may only aim at providing the service to the 
product in order to maintain the service quality and product safety, and therefore 
may not want to provide spare parts with the service provider other than its own 
service network, or special tools or software required for malfunction detection 
may require such a situation;  
 3) However, considering the Kodak and Hugin decisions, firms may tie 
spare parts and consumable goods or prevent supplying spare parts or consumables 
to independent service providers, may lead independent service providers to be 
excluded from market, thus causes restriction in the competit ion.  
 Therefore, the Board concluded that some of the undertakings in the market 
may use their dominant position in the spare parts market to impose tying on 
customers and obstruct independent service providers’ activities. Even though,  
the Board determined that “there are currently no such problems in  the service 
market, i t  has potentially serious drawbacks”. Thus, the Board ordered to relevant 
undertakings to take these measurements, as follows 689:  
 1) after the expiration of the guarantee period of the medical devices, in 
the event that the customers, who purchase the devices, applied a written request 
or the technical services received from the customers are in writing, passwords 
for devices, or any similar function internal system information, should be given 
to interested person, except the force maj eure, on the working days, in 24 (twenty-
four) hours free of charge; 2) In the case  that apparatus/devices which allow 
technical service for external devices to be installed, these apparatus/devices 
should deliver to customers within 3(three) days from the  date of the written 
request from the customers or the technical services; 3) Determination of rental 
fees for these apparatuses in a manner that is not discriminatory and proportional 
                                                             
689 id., n. 690-710. 
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to the cost of the apparatus;  4) Informing the customers in writing abo ut the 
above points during the first  sale of the devices; 5) Based on the last  3 (three) 
years sales figures of medical devices, the current price lists of the 100 most 
frequently used spare parts are announced on the Internet; 6)  Answering of the 
spare part  price requests coming from the customers and competitor service 
providers within 3 (three) working days at  the latest;7) To avoid discriminatory 
practices against competing service providers and their customers that are not 
based on objective criteria i n the sale of spare parts.  
 We believe that the Board delivered sound decisions, as considering for  
exploitative practice not merely market structure for dominant position, but also 
bringing connection to information asymmetry and customer lock -in stemming 
from high switching costs, and whether these concepts could weaken the 
connection between service and parts prices and equipment sales.  
 We conclude that in metering pricing for durable and consumable goods,  
merely charging a  supra-competit ive price for the latter cannot establish 
exploitative abuse, if consumers consider the  overall  price (price of tying product  
plus t ied product ), since tying firms will  continue to compete on overall  price.  In 
this case, a price-protection clause or threat for not covering warranty will  be a 
better indicator for forcing consumers and reducing consumer choice than 
artificially expanding consumer demand in the t ied product sales. Likewise, when 
a consumable product is a staple i tem,  foreclosure share effect ,  preservation, or 
extension of dominant position are unlikely. The relevant question here is whether 
tying conduct expands consumer demand artificially. In other words, if  consumers 
would not have otherwise bought even from anothe r seller in the t ied product 
market, then tying did not induce artificial  demand 690.   
                                                             
690 See Jefferson Parish, at 16 (“Similarly, when a purchaser is ‘forced’ to buy a product he would not have otherwise 
bought even from another seller in the tied-product market, there can be no adverse impact on competition because no 
portion of the market which would otherwise have been available to other sellers has been foreclosed.”). 
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However, merely asking whether they were forced to purchase unwanted -
product is not sufficient 691.  It  should also be asked whether they were forced to 
relinquish their preferred tied product elsewhere.  Therefore, the Board will  
examine the “percentage of total  sales in the relevant market affected by the  
conduct”692,  and then compare the percentage of total  sales of the tying firm before 
and after tying conduct in order to determine whether there is significant increase 
after the t ie-in. Furthermore, the Board also verifies whether the percentage of 
total  sales of rivals decreased significantly. Only the latter verification can 
indicate that consumers are forced to give up their preferred tied product. In 
addition, the competition authority should be aware that even though both tying 
and tied products are placed in a competit ive market, if tying producers impose 
similar t ies, it  reduces freedom of consumer choice, and also can create an entry 
barrier for firms who are willing to enter only tying product market.  
 With regard to aftermarket tying, the HP decision shows the possibility of 
other explanations rather than price discrimination or mere consumer surplus 
extraction for why tied products (spare parts and aftermarket service) prices can 
be supra-competit ive, or even excessive. However, concrete cases also show that 
competit iveness of the tying product does not automatically weaken the dominant 
position of the firms in the aftermarket. In this case , information failure demands 
greater concern compared to tying of consumable goods because, in the former, 
deterred purchasing plays a more decisive role. Therefore, competit ion authorities 
should be cautious to ensure that customers/consumers are aware of the expected 
life-cycle costs.  
                                                             
691 Compare ELHAUGE (Rehabilitating Jefferson Parish), p. 503, 504 (“[T]he unwanted-product exception 
affirmatively fits strongly with the price discrimination and extraction theories as an economic matter. Intra-product 
price discrimination requires that the consumer wants the tied product to use with the tying product, and thus it cannot 
occur if the consumer does not want the tied product at all. To put it another way, this theory of consumer harm 
requires a correlation in product demand that is impossible when there is no demand for one of the products”). 
692 The difference between Guidelines (Dominant position) and Sherman Act requirement is that, the latter suffices 
that the tying agreement to restrains competition if it affects substantial dollar amount of sales in the tied market, but 
does not require a substantial share or percentage of the tied market. 
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 In addition, when a tying firm refuses to sell  spare parts for independent 
service organization, creating obstacles for competit ion in the service market, i t 
reduced the choice of consumers. However,  this practice, in fact, does not exclude 
the ISOs from the market, but prevent them to compete with the tying firm. Thus, 
narrow definition of the aftermarke t- establishing relevant product market for 
each brand, should be hold for the assessment of exploitative effect, not for the 
exclusionary effect. In other words, tying firm practice that refuses to sell spare 
part  to ISOs is exploitative  on the ground tha t it  forces consumers to give up what 
they want, namely ISOs aftermarket service.  
 Competit ion authorit ies should not intervene with undertaking’s marketing 
or pricing strategy. Firms should be free to reflect overall  cost ,  either on the 
foremarket products, on spare parts ,  or on aftermarket service. In practice, there 
may be firms who reflect high fixed cost on durable product + consumable product 
package and offer competit ive price for aftermarket service, and also there may 
be firms who reflect high fixed cost on aftermarket service, thus offer competit ive 
price for durable product + consumable product package. It  is l ikely that 
manufacturers will  opt to similar t ies to compete efficiently. If consumers’ 
purchasing decision is based on durable product + consumable product package, 
then they will  opt to reflect high fixed cost on aftermarket service. To be able to 
do this, they have to prevent ISOs competit ion for their own aftermarket service. 
When tying manufacturers or producers impose similar t ies, thi s cumulative effect 
excludes ISOs from the market, and also reduces consumer choice.  
 Even if this imposition occurs due to market structure, the relevant question 
is whether competition authority should look if less strictive alternatives are 
available. However, this will be associated with whether competition authorities 
should impose its preferred pricing strategy.  Because less strictive alternative 
will  result  in higher prices for durable + consumable goods package. Which means 
interference in consumer preferences. Then the question is whether consumer have 
preference to opt lower durable + consumable goods, but higher spare parts + 
aftermarket service package, or vice versa ,  or another combination. The answer 
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can change in sector bases. The ideal is,  fo r competition policy, to  ensure that 
consumers are able to gather their best combination. However, due to high fixed 
cost in durable goods and spare parts, the market structure may lead that tying is  
indispensable for the supply-side. On the other hand, competit ion authorit ies have 
also responsibility to ensure demand -side function in the competition. To provide 
this, for metering pricing practices, i t requires that consumers’ purchasing 
decision is made by sufficient information.  
 1.2. Tying Induced Inter -Product Price Discrimination  
 1.2.1. Bundling 
 Bundling is a common feature of pricing 693,  may be used to reduce cost and 
improve quality694 and can be device to facili tate price discrimination 695.   
 Early studies suggest that a monopolist  cannot increase the monopolistic 
profit  through bundling its monopoly goods with a competit ive product 696.  This 
has become known as “the single monopoly profit  theory” that claims the leverage 
of monopolistic power is not possible due to this theory.  
 When it  is concluded that leverage is not possible, then price discrimination 
is suggested for explanation of bundling 697.  Different than metering pricing where 
only demand for t ied product is elastic or heterogenous, bundli ng allows price 
discrimination even when products are t ied using a fixed ratio 698.  The underlying 
reason is that buyers have a different reservation price for different products in 
                                                             
693 ADAMS/YELLEN, p. 475, 476. 
694 EVANS, David E. and SALİNGER, Michael, “Why Do Firms Bundle and Tie? Evidence from Competitive 
Markets and Implications for Tying Law”, 22 YALE JOURNAL ON REGULATION 37 (2005), p. 52-65, available 
at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=550884 (last visited 15.10. 2015). 
695 STIGLER (Block-Booking), p. 152-157. 
696 DIRECTOR, Aaron and LEVI, Edward H., “Law and the Future: Trade Regulation”, 51 NORTHWESTERN 
UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW (1956), pp. 281-296, available at 
http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5416&context=journal_articles (last visited 
20.07.2016); BORK, p. 372–375; POSNER, p.  197-199; Bowman (Leverage Problem), p. 19-24. 
697 DIRECTOR/ LEVI, p. 281-283; Stigler, p.  152-155. 
698 NALEBUFF, Barry, “Bundling and Tying”, The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Second Edition, Eds. 
Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, p. 2,3, available at 
<http://www.dictionaryofeconomics.com/article?id=pde2008_B000304> (last visited 23.07.2016) [hereinafter 
NALEBUFF (2008)]; ELHAUGE (2009), p. 409; ELHAUGE (Rehabilitating Jefferson Parish), p. 474. 
218 
 
not positive way, unlike metering pricing. Thus, monopolist  offers the goods only 
in a package and the buyers are sorted into only two groups in between those 
whose reservation price for the bundle is at  least equal to the bundle’s market 
price and those whose reservation price is lower than it 699.  Reducing the diversity 
of the population of consumers facili tates sellers to extract more consumer 
surplus700.  This is the advantage of the package selling compared to direct price 
discrimination, because former requires less information, i .e.,commodity 
bundling can be practiced even though m onopolist knows only the joint 
distribution of reservation prices of consumers 701.  Therefore, bundling helps the 
seller set  a profit -maximizing price without losing sell  due to negatively 
correlated demand for the products in the bundle.  
 Later examination of bundling shows that bundling can leverage market 
power and drive out rival from the tied market due to dynamic reasons 702.  When 
the bundling firm has market power over both products, i t  can use the bundle to 
deter potential  entrants. If a monopolist  observes the threat that a rival can 
produce one of the components at  a lower price, i t  will  opt to sell  the first  product 
only in combination with the second product with the incentive of subsidizing 
second product in order to sell  first product 703.  Thus, even though rival goods may 
be efficient to compete with second good s, bundling will  reduce the availabili ty 
of potential  market to the entrant. Furthermore, entering only one of the 
                                                             
699 ADAMS/ YELLEN, p. 479. 
700 SCHMALENSEE (Commodity Bundling), p. S211, S218; ADAMS/YELLEN, p. 496. 
701 See SCHMALENSEE (Commodity Bundling), p. S211, S227; SALINGER, Michael A., “A Graphical Analysis of 
Bundling”, 68 THE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS 1 (January 1995), p. 97, available at 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2353084 (last visited 07.08.2016) [hereinafter Salinger (1995)]; ADAMS/ YELLEN, p. 
490; BAKOS, Yannis and BRYNFOLSSON, Erik, “Bundling Information Goods: Pricing, Profits and Efficiency”, 
45 MANAGEMENT SCIENCE 12 (1999), p. 1625, available at http://people.stern.nyu.edu/bakos/big.pdf (last visited 
07.08.2016) [hereinafter BAKOS/ BRYNFOLSSON (1999)]. 
702 See WHINSTON, Michael D., “Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion”, NBER Working Paper No. w2995 (1989), 
available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=227224 (last visited 15.10.2016); CARLTON, Dennis W. and WALDMAN, 
Michael, “The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving Industries” NBER Working 
Paper No. w6831 (December 1998), pp. 1-64, available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=141885 (last visited 15.10.2016) 
[hereinafter CARLTON/ WALDMAN (Strategic Use)]; NALEBUFF, Barry J., “Bundling as an entry barrier”, 
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS (2004), pp. 159-187, available at 
http://faculty.som.yale.edu/barrynalebuff/BundlingAsEntryBarrier_QJE2004.pdf (last visited 15.10.2016). 
703 NALEBUFF (2008), p. 3. 
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components’ market may not be attractive when this market is not large enough 
to cover costs of entry or achieve minimum efficient scale 704.  
 It  is always possible that a rival can enter the market with competing bundle 
products. However, i t  will be more difficult  to develop two better products705.  
Furthermore, even if a rival responds to the bundle with a bundle, this offer can 
reduce the prices  and consumers will  benefit  from lower prices, but consumers 
will  not have the option buy components separately 706.  
 These theories suggest that pure bundling can be a device to protect and 
leverage market power, or enable sellers to extract more consumer surplus through 
price discrimination. However, even if the most vigorous advocator who 
emphasizes price discrimination effect of bundling, recognize s that the firms 
cannot extract significant amounts of consumer surplus unless bundling forecloses 
a substantial  amount of sales707.  
 1.2.1.1. Google case 
 There is no decision that the Board assesses the claim of price 
discrimination through bundling practic e. However, i t  is worth to review the 
Board’s Google decision where addressed the tying arrangement under the scope 
Article 6 of the TCA and reached the conclusion that anticompetitive effects of 
tying would not occur, due to alleged practice was not l imit ing the consumers’ 
preference708.  
 Limited Liabili ty Company YANDEX (hereinafter YANDEX) claimed that 
GOOGLE, which is allegedly found dominant in a significant portion of the world, 
                                                             
704 WHINSTON, Michael D., “Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion”, NBER Working Paper No. w2995 (1989), p. 41,42 
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http://www.jstor.org/stable/2950626 (last visited 13.09.2016). 
707 See ELHAUGE (Rehabilitating Jefferson Parish), p. 474 (suggesting cumulative conditions for tying induced inter-
product price discrimination to be deemed anticompetitive). 




had violated of Article 6 of the TCA, by introducing some anti -competit ive 
conditions to the original equipment manufacturers (OEM) who want to use the 
Android operating system (OS) on their mobile devices. Accordingly, GOOGLE 
signed agreements with original equipment manufacturers under the name of (a) 
a mobile application distr ibution agreement, (b) a revenue sharing agreement, (c) 
an Android compatibility program, and a non -piece-breaking agreement. Due to 
these agreements, OEM who wanted to opt for the Android OS, should pre -install 
Google Play Store, Google Play Services and Google Mobile Services Package 
(including Google Search, and Chrome) for their device; Google Phone -top Search 
icon must be placed at least on the panel immediately adjacent to the Default 
Home Screen; and Google Phone -top Search must be set as the default  search 
provider for all  Web search access points on the devices, and OEM should not  
pre-install  apps that compete with Google Mobile Service (GSM) apps (such as 
third-party “store” and third party “search”) on any other of i ts devices running 
other versions of Android. Thus, equipment makers would be able to get a share 
of revenue gained from the GOOGLE's search through engine adds or apps.  
 Regarding the market power assessment of GOOGLE, The Board 
determined these findings 709: 1) With a market share of 82.8% in the second 
quarter of 2015, Android had a significant market power in the mobile operating 
system market710;  2) It  was seen that market share of Android rose from 69.3% to 
84.8% in 2012-2014, while iOS 'market share fell  by 5%; 3) The Google Play 
Store was well  ahead of rival app stores in terms of the number of apps it  had 711 
which indicated that Google Play Store had a significant market power in terms 
of mobile apps; 4) Obtained from YANDEX and the results of a consumer survey 
conducted by an independent research company to examine consumers’ use habits 
of Android smartphone application also indicated that GOOGLE had a high market 
power (According to the survey results, the Board compared the ratio of 
                                                             
709 id., n. 38, 39. 
710 Android is followed by iOS mobile operating system owned by Apple with a market share of 13.9%. 
711 By 2015, Google Play Store has applications more than 10 times comparing to Yandex Store and Samsung App 
Store, and Amazon App Store more than 4 times comparing to Amazon App Store. In addition, a similar result is 
achieved when the number of applications downloaded from the Google Play Store and Yandex Store are compared. 
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application stores pre-installed on smartphones using Android operating system 
and actually used  application stores) 712.  
 First ,  the Board evaluated agreements that GOOGLE signed with OEM 
under the scope of Article 4 of the TCA. The Board denoted that the agreements 
between Google and OEM who are placed at di fferent levels of mobile operating 
systems, mobile applications and services market was vertical agreement, thus the 
exclusive pre-installation provisions in the contracts were vertical restrictions 713.  
The Board continued that “this can create a competit ive  disadvantage for  
competitors in the presentation of their search services/application/application 
stores to consumers. Indeed, exclusive pre -loading can provide to GOOGLE a  
distribution advantage which other mobile apps and service providers do not have 
a t  the point of reaching the consumer”  714.    
 However, the Board remarked that “[a]t  this point, however, i t  should be 
noted that the exclusive pre -installation in devices does not prevent consumers 
from downloading other applications afterwards. Although, t he search service 
/application /app store that consumers meet in first their smart devices belong to 
GOOGLE, consumers will  be able to create shortcuts to download alternative 
apps”715.  Furtmermore, the Board denoted that:  
Some of the mobile device users do not confine themselves to using default 
/  pre-installed apps and services, and search for new and alternative 
applications and use i t  by loading it  on the device, while the remaining 
users can be satisfied with the defaul t  applications and services. 
Therefore, exclusively pre -loading does not impose a restriction on the 
testing/choosing competing applications for Google applications, for 
consumers who are not satisfied with the default/  preloaded application 
                                                             
712 The Board also compared the Google internet browser’s pre-installed and the actual usage rate on Android devices. 
Yet the rates did not share due to confidential business information.  
713 Google decision, n. 70. 
714 id., n. 71 
715 id., n. 72. 
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and services. …according to [above mentioned survey] pre -loading and 
usage rate are different from each other. In this respect, the exclusive pre -
installation provides a key distribution advantage to GOOGLE, not for all 
Android-based mobile device consumers, but only co nsumer who are 
satisfied with default  applications and services… At this point, it  is 
noteworthy that the actual usage rate of the Google internet browser and 
app store is higher than the pre -installation, thus it  can be deduced that 
the consumer has a prior preference in terms of Google internet browser 
and application stores 716.  
 In the end, the Board concluded that “ the absence of an obstacle for 
consumers to download other mobile services and applications to their mobile 
devices, as they desire, may limit  the adverse effects of the exclusively pre -
installation agreements”717.  Thus, i t  was found that there was no need to open an 
investigation, but i t  was appropriate to send an opinion to GOOGLE pursuant to 
the third paragraph of Article 9 of Law No.  4054 that  i t  was beneficial  to remove 
the provisions relating to exclusively pre -install ing from contracts signed with 
original equipment manufacturers.  
 The Board assessed the complaint that Google Play is  contractually t ied to 
other apps in GMS including Google Search and Chrome, as well as forcing  
consumers to use Google 's Network Location Provider service as their location 
provider under the scope of Article 6. However, they merely repeated 
determinations and recommendation related to tying in the Guidelines (D ominant 
Position)718,  and recognized only the exclusionary effect of tying, stating only 
indirect harm to consumers (“a dominant undertaking can harm consumers by 
causing foreclosure in the t ied market”) 719.  After stating that dominant position is 
a pre-condit ion for the violation of Article 6, the Board noted that “since no 
precise dominant position determination for GOOGLE has been made at this stage,  
                                                             
716 Google decision, n. 73. 
717 id., n. 75. 
718 Guidelines (2009), n. 26, n. 82-88, n. 94 were repeated. 
719 Google decision, n. 78. 
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i t  is important to assess whether there is an abuse under the assumption that i t  is 
dominant”720.  The Board repeated the above finding that pre -install ing does not 
prevent consumers from subsequently downloading other apps on devices they 
purchase ,  and added that “for consumers who prefer GOOGLE apps and services, 
GOOGLE also reduces the cost of pre -loading these applications and services in 
bundles”721.  Therefore, i t  has been concluded that the relevant actions of GOOGLE 
did not drive competitors from the mobile operating systems, mobile applications , 
and services markets , and did not violate Article 6 of the TCA. 
 The Board conclusion and reasonings can be questionable in varies aspects:  
 1.2.1.1.1. The Board addressed only bundling, did not grab tying  
 GOOGLE’s Android is the dominant mobile operating system available for 
installation on third-party hardware, while  Apple iOS and RIM Blackberry are 
only available on those companies’ own devices 722.  Google had begun to use i ts 
control over Android to require that device manufacturers carry and favor other 
Google services in the way that Google specified, if a manufactur er wanted to 
distribute a commercially-viable Android device (branded with the Android name 
and logo associated with other Android devices, and able to connect to the Google  
app store to download other apps), the manufacturer had no choice but to make 
Google location services and Google Search the only and default  providers for  
their respective functions723.  Further, due to the Android compatibility agreement 
(even if stated that the Android OS is  open source) 724 a manufacturer needs 
Google’s certification and approval to ship a new device 725.  In other words, 
                                                             
720 id., n. 83. 
721 Google decision, n. 85. 
722 id., n. 20, 30. 
723 See EDELMAN, Benjamin, “Leveraging Market Power Through Tying And Bundling: Does Google Behave Anti-
Competitively?”, May 12 2014, p. 55, 56, available at http://www.benedelman.org/publications/google-tying-2014-
10-26.pdf (last visited 02.09.2017).  
724 Google decision, n. 25, 26 
725 Google decision, n. 36. 
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GOOGLE tied Android OS (tying product) with GMS (tied products) as using its  
dominant position in Android platform to favor i ts other services.  
 The Board did not evaluate this tying arrangement under Articl e 6, but 
merely assessed bundling (GMS package). With respect to assessment under 
Article 4, the Board mentioned this issue, but our reading suggests that the Board 
implicit ly  concluded that the adverse effect to competition created by Google’s 
conduct (tying) is outweighed by dynamic efficiencies. Since there is a general 
emphasis in the language of the decision that Android is “open” and “open 
source”, and within the entrance of GOOGLE (even it  was late) into the 
smartphone market, Android OS was able  to compete with iOS by making it  open 
source, and the financing for this is obtained from advertising revenues 726.  The 
Board considered that tying (Google Play) was the only way to generate income, 
and the compatibili ty requirement was necessary to be part  of t his ecosystem 727.  
 Regarding Android as open source, indeed the main Android code is 
available and manufacturers can substitute improvements that provides i tself or 
l icenses from others728,  does not change the availability of  Android OS without 
GMS. The OEM have strong preference to include Google’s applications, which 
provide features that users expect 729.  However, the restrictions in the agreement 
are contractual, not enforced through software (OS). Thus, i t  implies no technical 
obstacle to a manufacturer insta ll ing non-GMS, despite lack of permission from 
GOOGLE, but in practice, the threat of contractual enforcement prevents these 
tactics730.  In  other words, even it  is accepted that pre -installation benefit s 
consumers, consumers do not  benefit  from the prevention of installing rivals’  
apps. They may prefer a combination of Google Play Store with rival’s internet 
browser.  
                                                             
726 Google decision, n. 19-30. See n. 22 (“[Innovation in the relevant market] has been slower until 2007 as a result of 
the insufficient number of applications supported by each mobile operating system). 
727 id., n. 27, 30, 32,36 
728 id., n. 25, 28. 
729 id., n. 20, 21. 
730 EDELMAN, p. 58. 
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 With respect to compatibili ty requirement, GOOGLE’s certification is 
required for a device to access Google Play to  obtain apps, and GOOGLE reserves 
the right to withhold the Android compatibili ty certification, if “devices aren’t 
compatible”, without explaining the factors that determine compatibili ty 731.  The 
Board neither elaborated on the criteria for compatibili ty, n or questioned whether 
there was less strictive alternatives to obtain same benefits without hampering 
competit ion. 
 In dissenting opinion, tying issue has been correctly addressed, and it  has 
been suggested that through tying Google has been leveraged its market power 
(l ikely dominant position) in the Android operating system into the mobile 
applications and services market, while through bundling it  has been leveraged 
its market power of certain mobile applications and services into other mobile 
applications and services, and used the powers in these markets to maintain i ts 
Internet advertising market place 732.  
 In sum, the Board took into consider dynamic efficiencies crated by 
GOOGLE’s Android Open Source Project (AOSP) until  the time, but failed to 
balance those benefits against potential  harms that reduced choice, slower 
innovation, lower quality, and higher prices due to exclusion of rivals from 
relevant market733.  
 1.2.1.1.2. Sophisticated users v. unsophisticated users’ preference (lock-
in effects) 
 The tendency toward to lock-in effect for successful technologies is 
determined one of the characteristic of dynamic markets 734.  A lock-in effect 
                                                             
731 EDELMAN, p. 55, 56. 
732 Google Decision, n. 17, 18. 
733 It was recorded that market share of Android rose from 69.3% to 84.8% in 2012-2014, while iOS 'market share fell 
by 5%, but the Board did not question whether Android success is achieved through superior product or tying and 
bundling practices. Blindly assumed that GOOGLE has eventually good intention for developing Android as an open 
source. 
734 See KATZ, Michael L. and SHAPIRO, Carl, “Product Compatibility Choice in a Market with Technological 
Progress”, 38 OXFORD ECONOMIC PAPERS, New Series, Strategic Behaviour and Industrial Competition 
(November 1986), pp. 146-148, available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/2663007 (last visited 12.09.2017); 
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indicates that once consumers get familiar with a product and are practiced using 
it ,  they become reluctant to switch  to a different product735.  Thus, this create 
tendencies toward monopoly or maintain market power in dynamic markets.  
 The Board considered the lock -in effect, but not in the sense above 
mentioned. The Board understanding was GOOGLE may have distribution 
advantage through only consumer who are satisfied with default  applications and 
services. In addition to strength its argument propounded that actual usage rate 
of GMS is higher than rate of pre -installed GMS 736.  The Board read this finding 
as higher preference for GMS, but failed to elaborate whether once users get used 
to Google Chrome or Google Play Store, they find difficult or t ime consuming to 
look for other applications even when they switch to non -pre-installed 
applications in Android mobiles. Further, almost all  the information kept 
confidential ,  we are not able to compare actual usage rate and rate of pre -installed 
applications. More importantly, i t  is a shortcoming that the Board did not compare 
the change in actual usage rate s after GOOGLE’s conduct (tying and bundling) 
and before its conduct.  
 The Board found that defaults do not have a lasting effect, consumers can 
easily download a browser or desi red application later on. However, the Board 
                                                             
RUBINFELD, Daniel L., “Antitrust Enforcement in Dynamic Network Industries”, 43 ANTITRUST 
BULLETIN(1998), pp. 960-868, available at http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/facpubs/985 (last visited 
12.07.2017); LITAN, Robert E., “Antitrust and the New Economy, 62 The University of Pittsburgh Law Review 
(2001), p. 429, 430; PITOFSKY, Robert, “Antitrust and Intellectual Property: Unresolved Issues at the Heart of the 
New Economy”, 16 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL (2001), p. 538-540, available at 
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1312&context=facpub (last visited 12.07.2017). 
The other determined characteristics are strong economies of scale; the presence of network effects; and the tendency 
toward rapid technological change: Economies of scale exist on the supply side in dynamic markets indicates that the 
necessary knowledge to develop software or other types of high-tech products, is generally expensive to produce. But, 
once these products are developed, they are usually cheap to reproduce, i.e. these industries tend to be characterized 
by high fixed costs and low marginal costs, thus, average costs are reduced as output increases (See LITAN, p. 429). 
Network effects occur when the value to a consumer of using a good or service increases with reference to the number 
of other consumers who also use it. For instance, in computer operating systems market, the larger the network of 
users (system has more users), the more likely that higher initiatives to develop applications for use on that system 
(KATZ/SHAPIRO, p. 146-148; RUBINFELD, p. 861; PITOFSKY, p.  539). While first two characteristics 
(economies of scale and network effects) create tendencies to become monopoly in dynamic markets, characteristic 
of rapid technological change, can have the opposite effect as making it difficult for a monopolist to dominate a market 
over the long term since competitors are likely to produce superior or competitive products meanwhile. 
735 LITAN, p. 430. 
736 Google decision, n. 73. 
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did not ask whether these required top placements or defau lt  status are removable, 
or if removing them is practical for users. Indeed, receiving mobile phone with 
Google Play will  ease for user to install  other desired Google apps, but when user 
has preference for rival’s application instead of pre -install  one, whether out would 
like to keep  and let  the apps get clutter. The Board settled that there are some 
sophisticated consumers (who will not be satisfied with pre -loaded applications 
and service) may pose some constraint on Google’s conduct 737.  However, this 
ability, on a user-by-user basis, does not grant competing search providers and 
application developers to attract users all  together 738.  
 In summary, the Board concluded that coercion or reduction in consumer 
choice did not occur, as asking the question whether  consumers are forced to 
purchase unwanted product or at  higher price. Answer this question negatively 
due to higher actual user rate (as indicating even without tying user  would opt 
GMS) and cost savings from pre -installation. However, ,  the Board did not ask the 
question whether consumers were forced to give up the product or service they 
wanted. Since, due to lock-in and network effects rival’s service and product 
might become less available for the users.  
 1.2.1.1.3. Intention v. effect 
 Yandex made a request for the re-assessment of the Google decision of the 
Competit ion Board, yet the Board found that there was no room for the removal, 
withdrawal, amendment or a new transaction of the Board decision 739.  Thus, 
Yandex resorted to the Administrative Court.  
 The Court held that to decide not to open investigation, the conclusion 
should be based on undoubtful evidence and documents that showed the relevant 
behavior would not be considered a violation of competition, otherwise, i t  was 
                                                             
737 See Ankara 5. Administrative Court decision dated 8.3.2017 and numbered 2017/741, p. 6,7. 
738 See EDELMAN, p. 64. 




necessary to open an inquiry in order to comprehend it in any way 740.  The Court 
adjudged that since Google’s tying and bundling tactics were suspect under 
antitrust law (as considering dissenting opinion), the Board decision with respect 
to no need to open the investigation, was not j ustifiable741.  
 YANDEX challenged in its application that the relevant concerns in the 
complaint were not handled and underestimated because the relevant market was 
not determined in the decision and all markets in which GOOGLE operates are 
generally ambiguous742.  Further, systematic regarding to evaluation of tying and 
bundling practice was wrong due to lack of dominant position determination 743.  
The Board conclusion was incorrect because GOOGLE violated Article 6 as 
reducing consumer choice and creating entry b arriers and obstacles for potential 
developments of applications, and ability to install  alternative application could 
not outweigh these adverse effects744.   
 YANDEX did not challenge before the Board and the Court, and the 
Administrative Court did not consider whether GOOGLE behaviors were 
infringements of Article 6 subparagraphs (a) 745 and (d)746.  We are not surprised 
that this possibility was not considered by the Board. Since, the Board ’s approach 
is clear for evaluation of “objective” factor in i ts previous  decisions as indicating 
that if the conduct does not have a restrictive effect or that effect is l imited, 
                                                             
740 Ankara 5. Administrative Court decision dated 8.3.2017 and numbered 2017/741, p. 4. 
741 id., p. 6-8. 
742 YANDEX re-assessment requirement, n. 3. 
743 YANDEX re-assessment requirement, n. 3. 
744 YANDEX also claimed that assessment under Article 4 was incorrect, the Board should evaluate vertical restraints 
under Article 5 whether it was possible to grant exemption, yet since GOOGLE has more than 40% market share, it 
should not be ensured block exemptions for the alleged restraints, and it should be held that violation of Article 4 
existed. See YANDEX re-assessment requirement, n. 2-4; Ankara 5. Administrative Court decision, p. 1, 2. 
745 “Preventing, directly or indirectly, another undertaking from entering into the area of commercial activity, or 
actions aimed at complicating the activities of competitors in the market” (emphasis added). 
746 “Actions which aim at distorting competitive conditions in another market for goods or services by means of 




merely existence of stated “objective” in the relevant subparagraphs cannot be 
established automatically an abuse under Article 6 747.  
 Now, the Board i s given a third chance to correct i ts decision about 
GOOGLE. Following a comprehensive analysis, GOOGLE’s practice should be 
found anticompetit ive. Nevertheless, we suggest that YANDEX can also challenge 
against GOOGLE practices under Article 6 (a) and (d) , since the Board stated 
that: 
 both the increase in  internet usage and the shift  of this usage from personal 
computers to  mobile devices,  GOOGLE has come to experience the AOSP, which  
aims to  develop a mobile operating system for fault -free,  integrated,  portable 
devices with original equipment manufacturers,  mobile network operators  and 
other technology companies to  actively take part in  the mobile services market  
with the aim of protecting its position in  the internet advertising space market 748.  
 Even if,  the Board fails to determine anticompetit ive effect that cannot be 
outweighed by created efficiencies by GOOGLE’s conduct, YANDEX may have 
chance before the Council  of State as requesting consideration of Article 6 (a) 
and (d). Because, the Council  of Stat e has taken a formal approach for applying 
mentioned subparagraphs in the judicial  review of Board decisions, and has hold 
that the relevant behavior is a violation of Article 6, if there is a restrictive 
purpose for competit ion, even if there is not a res trictive effect in competit ion749.   
 1.2.1.2. Avea/TTNet case  
 The Board evaluated the claim that the Türk Telekomünokasyon abused its 
dominant position via tying/package sales in a campaign which was offered a 
global system for mobile (GSM) operator (Avea)  subscription with a dominant 
                                                             
747 See the Board decisions dated 05.06.2007 and numbered 07-47/506-181; dated 27.5.2008 and numbered 08-
35/466-166. 
748 Google decision, n. 65 (emphasis added). 
749 The Council of State 13.D, dated 07.02.2011 and numbered E.2007/13574, K.2011/ 486; The Council of State 
13.D, dated 12.04.2011 and numbered E.2008/ 8249, K.2011/ 1525. 
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Internet provider’s (TTNet) subscription 750.  The alleged campaign was providing 
for users, who connect to the internet via TTNet, would be given total  960 minutes 
free-talk as a gift  for three months (which was valued 109 Turkis h Lira per 
month), if they obtained Avea postpaid l ine.  
 After indicated that those four conditions should be looked (cumulatively) : 
1) Determination of the dominant position, 2) the products subject to the tying/ 
package sale are different/ independent p roducts, 3) the practice can have an anti -
competit ive effect (exclusion/ foreclosure) 751,  4) the absence of an objective 
justification and/or lack of efficiency defense; the Board determined that alleged 
campaign was a mixed bundling practice, therefore it  w as sufficient to determine 
the dominant position in any of the subject products 752.  
 For the conclusion, the Board elaborated those findings, as follows:  
 1) Considering the demand/ the number of persons participating in the 
campaign and the demand shift  in terms of the determination of a possible 
foreclosure effect, it  has been noticed that the Avea GSM subscription (which is 
the tying product) was already the least preferred GSM service by consumers, 
even from Avea users, only few of the them showed interes t in this campaign 
during the offer, the contribution of the campaign to TTNet was at  a minimum 
level and that there was no question of consumers passed to the TTNet from the 
competitors due to the alleged campaign, therefore, i t  was not possible to preven t 
competit ion in the retail  broadband internet access services market 753;   
 2) “User preferences” has been examined in virtue of the fact that when the 
users’ value attributed to products is positively correlated, even if the products 
                                                             
750 The Board decision (Preliminary Investigation) dated 9.10.2008 and numbered 08-57/ 912-363 (hereinafter 
Avea/TTNet decision). 
751 Regarding foreclosure effect in the tied product market, the Board denoted that “In principle, the evaluation of the 
foreclosure effect on the market is determined by, (1) the type (s) of the users/ clients that the competitors of the 
dominant undertaking are unable to compete with, (2) the percentage of the user/ customer (who accepted tying) in 
the tied market” (Id., n. 240). 
752 id., n. 220-230. 
753 id., n. 280-420. 
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are not complementary, the foreclosure effect will  increase; and found that that 
there was no complementarity/substitution feature between the internet 
subscription and the GSM subscription 754,  and the cost of the product in question 
was related to the use and therefore the free m inutes to be given were valid for 
only 3 months, indicating that the campaign could only be considered as a 
promotion755 and it  was not possible to prevent competit ion in the retail  broadband 
internet access services market 756.  
 3) Considering that mixed packa ge sales could lead competitors to drive out 
of the market through a predatory pricing, thus the Board evaluated those factors, 
i .e., the size of the discount offered at the campaign, i ts Impact on  price of TTNet, 
those who participated in the campaign had  the right  to have a  free speech for 109 
TL, the price of the internet will not be deducted from the cost of the internet, 
internet subscription to make use of the campaign, Avea postpaid l ine 
subscription, existence of negative margins in exceptional case s when the total 
amount of expenditures such as related taxes and fixed costs is taken into account, 
and held that the practice is far from limit to competition in the market 757 
 It  was an interesting decision, due to the alleged market for anti -
competit ive effects would be seen as a result  of tying/package sales, at  the same 
time it  was the retail broadband internet access services market which is claimed 
to be dominant. In addition alleged campaign was a mixed bundling practice that 
the products (Avea GSM and TTNet internet subscriptions) were available 
separately,  thus prima facie  consumers were free to buy preferred item from 
competitors, especially the tying product. However, the Board correctly 
considered that whether offered package was priced in such a way that i t  would 
not be rational for consumers to buy individual products from the bundle to match 
                                                             
754 Avea/TTNet decision, n. 790, 800 (“…the presence of 63 million GSM subscribers and only 5 million internet 
subscribers mentioned above clearly demonstrates that such complementarity is not acceptable…Apart from this, in 
the request of the complaint, 960 min. of free speech duration, covers only Avea and the fixed line, thus this constitutes 
another limiting direction of the campaign”).  
755 Avea/TTNet decision, n. 810. 
756 Avea/TTNet decision, n. 680-770. 
757 Avea/TTNet decision, n, 850-1300. 
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them with complementary products produced by a competitor. The Board 
evaluated carefully and concluded that the discount (the offer of free -talk minutes 
in value of 109 TL) was not large enough that efficient competitors could not 
offer758.   
 Above concrete cases show that the primary focus in the competit ion law 
on tying has been the foreclosure of competit ion in the t ied product. In contrary 
to this focus, concrete cases (clearly in Google decision) demonstrate that tying 
was used to preserve and extend the dominant position in the tying product. The 
fact that products are available or consumed separately does not prevent 
undertaking to engage tying practice. Since economists are almost sure that tying 
creates efficiency, competit ion authorit ies may grant important weight to any 
plausible efficiency gains from tie, even it  is dif ficult  to qualified or quantify.  
However ,  what economists do not include their analysis is “the motivation” of the 
undertaking. There is no reason to rule out underlying aim of undertaking for 
tying practice for jurists. Further, economists suggest efficie ncies achieved 
through physical integrations should receive greater weight than efficiencies 
achieved through contracts759.  
 Regarding dynamic efficiency concern, indeed, i t is more difficult  to 
evaluate the welfare consequences of encouraging more innovatio n. Because, 
init ially tying can increase the rate of return, thus promote more innovation, yet 
the consequence of strategic conduct may attenuate the incentives for subsequent 
innovations760.  Nonetheless, if social rate of return from innovation exceeds the 
private rate of return, then such a tying maybe desirable 761.  However, i t  is difficult 
                                                             
758 Avea/TTNet decision, n. 430-670. 
759 See CARLTON/ WALDMAN, p. 38. 
760 See POSNER, Richard A., “The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation”, 83 The Journal of Political Economy 
4 (August 1975), pp. 807-828, available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/1830401 (last visited 11.04.2017) [hereinafter 
POSNER (Social Cost of Monopoly)]; FISHER, Franklin M., “The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation: Posner 
Reconsidered”, 93 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 2 (April 1985), pp. 410-416, available at 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1832184 (last visited 11.04.2017) [hereinafter FISHER (1985)]. See also ELHAUGE 
(2009), p. 440-442; CARLTON/ WALDMAN, p. 39. 
761 See CARLTON/ HEYER (Extraction vs. Extension), p. 292, 294, 305; KLEIN/ WILEY, p. 618. 
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to say that competit ion authorities will  grant decisive role to innovation in order 
to allow monopolization762-unlike the Board Google decision.  
 We do not find concrete evidence that tying used for  price discrimination 
or merely for consumer surplus extraction raises antitrust concern. However, we 
have supportive findings that competition law grants a decisive role to freedom 
of consumer choice in the determination of exclusionary and exploitative abuse. 
However, in the Google decision, the Board failed to establish that cost savings 
for sophisticated users through pre -installed apps and service could not offset the 
loss in unsophisticated consumers’ freedom of choice. Moreo ver, the Google 
practice signaled a  potential  reduction in consumer choice due to preserving its 
dominant position in the tying product and dampening rivals’ incentives for 
developing competitive t ied products.  
 Furthermore, “forcing” is not a precise requ irement in all cases. Instead, i t 
is more of a means to comprehend whether an anticompetit ive t ie and effects arise. 
Tying induces inter-product discrimination will  l ikely ease for the firm to set the 
profit  maximizing prices. However, in challenge practices, especially in the case 
of technological t ie -ins, such as in Google case or Microsoft (Windows Media  
Player or Internet Explorer) decisions, the fact that there was not separate charge 
for t ied items or consumers were not strictly prevented from using a  rival’s t ied 
product. Therefore, in this instance, percentage of the sales of the t ied product 
cannot be the only relevant factor to pose the risk of harm to competit ive 
structure. Likewise, percentage of the sales of the t ied product may not sufficient 
to understand of reduction in consumer choice. In this case , barriers to entry,  
extent of dominant position and all  other factors should be included for the 
assessment. In addition, in bundling cases, rather than price discrimination 
                                                             
762 See Guidance (2009), n. 30 (“Rivalry between undertakings is an essential driver of economic efficiency, including 
dynamic efficiencies in the form of innovation. In its absence, the dominant undertaking will lack adequate incentives 
to continue to create and pass on efficiency gains. Where there is no residual competition and no foreseeable threat of 
entry, the protection of rivalry and the competitive process outweighs possible efficiency gains. In the Commission's 
view, exclusionary conduct which maintains, creates or strengthens a market position approaching that of a monopoly 
can normally not be justified on the grounds that it also creates efficiency gains.”). 
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(therefore consumer surplus extraction), discriminatory conduct (between 
sophisticated and unsophisticated users) leads to exploitation. The higher the 
number of unsophisticated users (who are satisfied with pre -installed tied items), 
the higher the degree of reduction in consum er choice. In addition it  leads not 
only exploitative effect, at  the same time stands for injury to market structure as 
creating higher entry barriers.  
 Virtual freedom of consumer choice does not prevent antitrust scrutiny for  
mixed bundling either. An antitrust concern arises in mixed bundling, where 
undertakings can achieve similar result s (of pure bundling or tying)  by keeping 
the component prices artificially high 763,  and the “economic coercion” is more 
likely to occur through predatory pricing, which is exclusionary.   
 1.3. Tying Induced Intra-Consumer Surplus Extraction  
 Tying induced intra -consumer surplus extraction occurs, when the 
undertaking ties the sale of product (tying product) to an obligation to buy another 
product (t ied product) from it  at  an elevated price (required tie-in). This effect is 
well  recognized by the l i terature 764 and by the legislation, especially for tying 
where results in a single branding type of obligation imposed through vertical 
agreement765.  
 The seller can successfully impose tying by taking advantage of the fact 
that buyers’ valuation for the tying product is significantly higher than for the 
t ied product. However, the main concern in this case is that such tie-ins restrain 
competit ion for tied product sales 766.  Nonetheless, tying can raise prices of t ied 
product for customers of tying firm as well  as customers of rivals of tying firm. 
                                                             
763 NALEBUFF (2008), p. 4.  
764 See BURSTEIN (Tie-in Sales), p. 69-73; BURSTEIN (Full-line Forcing), p. 613, 614; ELHAUGE (2009), p.412, 
413; ELHAUGE (Rehabilitating Jefferson Parish), p. 469-472; Justin Ho, Katherine, Ho and Holland Mortime, Julie, 
“Analyzing the Welfare Impacts of Full-line Forcing Contracts” (2011), available at 
http://www.columbia.edu/~kh2214/papers/hhm_revised_121211.pdf (last visited 20.06.2017). 
765 See EC Guidelines on Vertical Restraints (2010), n. 214; Guidelines on Vertical Agreements, n. 202. 
766 See ELHAUGE (2009), p.412, 413; ELHAUGE (Rehabilitating Jefferson Parish), p. 469-472 [showing a model 
and suggests that such ties restrain competition for tied product sales (in a substantial dollar amount) in a way that 
always lower consumer surplus, but does not leads necessarily a substantial foreclosure share]. 
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These condition is well  recognized in the EC Guidelines on Vertical Restraints 
(2010), as follows767:  
 T ying may lead to  ant icompet it ive fo rec losure effect s in t he t ied market ,  t he 
t ying market ,  o r  both at  t he same t ime.  The fo rec losure e ffect  depends on the t ied  
percentage o f t ot al sa les on the market  o f t he t ied product .  On the quest ion o f what  
can be cons idered apprec iable fo rec losur e un der  Ar t ic le 101(1) ,  t he ana lys is fo r  s ing le 
brand ing can be app l ied.  Tying means that  t here is  at  least  a  fo rm o f quant it y - fo rc ing  
on the buyer  in respect  o f t he t ied product .  Where in add it io n a non -co mpete obliga t ion 
is agreed in  respect  o f t he t ied prod uct ,  t his increases t he poss ible fo rec losure e f fect  
on the market  o f t he t ied product .  The tying may lead to  less co mpet it ion fo r  customers  
int erest ed in buying the t ied product ,  but  no t  t he t ying product .  I f t here is  no t  a 
su ff ic ient  number  o f customer s w ho  wil l buy the t ied product  alone to  sust ain 
compet it o rs o f t he supp lier  in t he t ied market ,  t he t ying can lead to  t hose customers  
fac ing higher  pr ices.  I f t he t ied product  is  an impor t ant  complementary product  fo r 
customers o f t he tying product ,  a  reduct ion o f a lt ernat ive supp l iers o f t he t ied product  
and hence a reduced ava ilabi l it y o f t hat  product  can make ent r y to  t he tying market 
a lone more d iff icu lt .  
 Studies and legislations indicate concern for  the tying effect on tied sales, 
and requires quantity-forcing on the buyer or lack of fixed ratio between the tying 
and tied products to occur the foreclosure effects 768.  Here, we contend that 
quantity forcing or lack of fixed ratio criteria do not need to be hold for 
exploitative effect of tying in this instan ce. However, the question is whether the 
exploitative effect of t ie -ins should be deemed anticompetitive.  We propose that 
surplus extraction and supra -competit ive prices cannot be deemed exploitative for 
metering pricing and bundling, and competition authorit ies should focus on 
reduced consumer choice or the source of the exploitation.  
                                                             
767 Guidelines on Vertical Agreements, n. 216. Turkish Authority adopted the same provision under Guidelines on 
Vertical Agreements, n. 205. 
768 See ELHAUGE (Rehabilitating Jefferson Parish), p. 471 (contending that such effect only possible when buyers 
purchase multiple units of the tying product and do not purchase the two products in fixed ratio. Because if buyers 
instead bought only one-unit tying product or bought in fixed ratio, then obligation to buy the tied product at an 
elevated price is equivalent to price increase on each unit bought of the tying product and it will cause buyer to 
purchase fewer units of tying product). 
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 Indeed, dominant firms may use their market power over one product to 
force consumers to buy another product which they do not want. In Jefferson 
Parish, i t  is stated that “forcing” someone to buy a product she/he  “did not want 
at  all” or “might have preferred to purchase elsewhere on different terms” means 
tying “foreclosed a choice” 769.   
 The question is that should we apply this holding for requirement t ies to be 
deem anticompetitive? What can be the right question to ask: Can seller force 
consumer to pay something they do not want;  or can seller force consumers to pay 
more than they should for the things they do want;  or can seller force consumers 
to buy things they would p refer to buy from another seller?  
 Let us answer these questions through a concrete case.  In “Inter Milan -
Spiel” decision770,   the German Competit ion Authority addressed the FC Köln 
practice that sold the t icket for national game (the FC Köln v. Braunschweig) as 
announcing that who purchase of this t icket would also be given a t icket for an 
UEFA Cup game (the FC Köln v. Inter Milan). This behavior was considered as 
tying and found exploitative on the ground that consumers who have high interest 
to see Inter Milan game, were forced to purchase the t icket for Braunschweig 
game. 
 The German Competit ion Authority supposed it  detecte d exactly what a 
tying firm may try to achieve through a requirement t ie, i .e.,creating artificial 
demand for tied product through high reservation price for tying product. 
However, did supporters of the FC Köln  not want to see at  all  Braunschweig game, 
or were they forced to pay more than they would?  
 CRANE challenges that no matter how great i ts market power, the seller 
cannot force the consumers to pay for something that they do not value. In other 
words, the sel ler cannot exceed the buyer reservation price, i t  can only extract the 
                                                             
769 Jefferson Parish, at 12, 28. 
770 OLG Düsseldorf, 22.01.1985, WuW/E OLG, s. 3335 (KARAKILINÇ, p. 136-138). 
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amount for thing they value, buyer will  see that the additional things are given 
free771.  We agree with this observation, for the example second ticket was given 
or charged would not change the existence of tying 772,  and also could not change 
supporters’ reservation price. It  does not matter whether they wanted to see only 
one game or both. 
 The relevant question to be asked, is whether they are forced to give up 
something they want. For  thi s, the buyer does not need to pay more for t ied 
product than she/he would pay for the rival’s product . Buyer may prefer  the  
rival’s product, and thus may suffer a loss in util i ty when forced to buy through 
tying.  Even if the buyer  values a rival’s product  more than the tying seller’s t ied 
product , she/he will  select  the t ied product provided her/his util i ty for  the rival’s 
product exceeds her/his util ity for  the tied product by less than the price of the 
rival’s produc. In  this case, the buyer will  decide to consume the tied product 
rather than make an additional purchase of the rival’s product .773.  Thus, here, tying 
forecloses a choice, without even decreasing consumer surplus.  
 For instance, the buyer’s need for the t ied product of a rival is 10 liras 
(assuming util i ty is measured in monetary term), and the tied product of tying 
firm is 8 l iras. While the t ied product of the rival is sold at  3 l iras, the tied product 
of the tying firm is sold at  5 l iras. The buyer will  select tying. If  the buyer’s  need 
for the t ied product of a rival were equal  to or exceeded 14 liras, the buyer would 
also purchase the tied product from the rival. This i l lustration suggests for  
calculation of aggerated consumer surplus loss or util i ty, to know buyers’ 
reservation price or utili ty which measured in monetary term and each lira has the 
same value for to all  buyers. That is not administrable for the competit ion 
authorities. Thus, comparison the tied sales before and after tying practice would 
                                                             
771 CRANE, Daniel A., "Tying and Consumer Harm", 8 COMPETITION POLICY INTERNATIONAL 2 (2012), p. 
29, 30, available at http://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2373&context=articles (last visited 
05.04.2017). [hereinafter CRANE (Tying)]. 
772 Compare Case T-201/04 Microsoft v Commission [2007] ECR II-3601, at 970 (“It does not follow from either 
Article [102 (d)] or the case-law that consumers must necessarily pay a certain price for the tied product in order for 
it to be concluded that they are subject to supplementary obligations within the meaning of that provision”). 
773 See CRANE (Tying), p. 31. 
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be better indicator whether tying artificially increased the demand for the t ied 
product of the tying firm, and force buyers to forego without rival’s t ied product.  
 If we return to our example, from Inter Milan supporters point of view, they 
might force to buy FC Köln v. Braunschweig game due to high demand for seeing 
Braunschweig game that they were  worry that they could not find ticket for Inter 
Milan game. Or, vice versa  from Braunschweig supporters point of view, they 
might force to buy FC Köln v. Inter Milan game due to high demand for seeing 
Inter Milan game that they were  worry that they could not find ticket for 
Braunschweig game. For FC Köln supporters tying likely provided the most 
benefit .  In the end, no one had been forced to giving up they did want.  
 When tying forces the buyers to forego a rival’s product , i t increases the 
demand for its own tied product artificially. However, i t  is difficult to say that 
this effect occurs merely due to reservation price for tying product significantly 
more then tied product. The effected tied amount of sale will  be a better indicator 
of whether tying foreclosed a choice , unless consumers lack price consciousness 
or cannot evaluate the quality of the t ied product 774,  which means that we do not 
suggest condemning tying induced intra -consumer surplus extraction, unless the 
percentage of total sales on the market of the t ied product is significant. To 
determine this effect, the Board first  will examine the percentage of total sales in 
the relevant market affected by the  conduct, then compare the percentage of total 
sales of the tying firm before and after the tying conduct in order to determine 
whether there is significant increase aft er t ie-in. Thereafter, they will  verify 
whether the percentage of total sales of rivals decrease d significantly. In other 
words, tying cannot be exploitative unless i t  is exclusionary in this instance.  
                                                             
774 See Jefferson Parish, at 27, 28. 
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2. PRO-COMPETITIVE JUSTIFICATIONS AND DEFENSES  
2.1. Objective Necessity Justification  
Article 6 does not contain an exemption provision similar to Article 5, yet i t  has 
long been established that “objective justification” can immunize conduct that 
would otherwise be an abuse under Article 6 from liability by  the Board. The 
Board implied this approach either (disputably) infusing it  in commercial usage 
test  under the assessment of whether tying involved separate products or referring 
to Discussion Paper, which suggests assessment of objective justification for  the 
evaluation of exclusionary dominant undertaking’s conduct 775.  Guidelines 
(Dominant Position) explicit ly suggests that a dominant firm’s conduct may be  
justified by objective necessity 776.   
 When assessing an objective necessity justification, the Board wi ll  consider 
whether 1) the conduct protects a legitimate benefit ;  2) the conduct is 
indispensable for achieving the relevant benefit;  3) this conduct of the dominant 
undertaking must be caused by external factors (such as health and safety 
requirements set  out by relevant public authorit ies);  4) the undertaking must not 
restrict  competit ion more than necessary when protecting the benefit  in question. 
The burden of proof for demonstrating that the conduct under examination is 
indispensable for protecting a l egitimate benefit  l ies with the dominant 
undertaking777.  
 It  has been crit icized that the defense of objective justification is in some 
ways a tautology. As Advocate General Jacobs stated in Syfait , “the very fact that 
conduct is characterized as an abuse su ggests that a negative conclusion has 
already been reached”, thus objective justification means that “certain types of 
conduct on the part of a dominant undertaking do not fall  within the category of 
abuse at  all”778.  Similar argument has been suggested for the assessment of 
                                                             
775 See The Board Digitürk decision (2008); Avea/TTNet decision (2008). 
776 Guidelines (Dominant Position), n. 31. 
777 Id., n. 31. 
778 See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Case C-53/ 03 Synetairismos Farmakopoion Aitolias & Akarnanias 
(Syfait) and Others v GlaxoSmithKline plc and GlaxoSmithKline AEVE [2005] ECR I-4609, para. 50-53. 
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“objective justification” defense, since if the practice is objectively justified, then 
i t  should not be abusive in the first  place 779.  Two-stage analysis is artificial  for 
the exemption of the conduct due to objective justification 780.  Therefore, i t  is 
argued that the competit ion authority should prove the absence of an objective 
justification as an integral part  of determination of the infringement 781 
 We agree with the arguments partly. Whether i t  is found that conduct could 
be justified on objective necessity bases, then it  was not abusive. Therefore, the 
two-stage analysis that the Board first  used to establish abusive behavior then 
accepts that the defense of “objective necessity” become s artificial .  However, we 
claim that there should be distinction between defenses of “objective necessity” 
and “efficiency”. Then, the conceptual problem is whether “objective necessity” 
justification is a “defense”, since there was no abuse in the first  place, thus 
removing the need for an undertaking to pr ovide a defense782.  
 Our reading of the Guidelines (Dominant Position) suggests that, for 
“objective necessity” justification, the dominant undertaking does not need to 
prove prima facie  objective justification, but i t  will  merely claim this 783.  In  other 
words, the two-stage analysis implies that the burden of proof is borne by the 
competit ion authority to show an infringement under Article 6 and cannot shift  to 
the defendant784.  However, the legal burden must be distinguished from the 
                                                             
779 See NAZZINI, Renato, “The Wood began to Move: An Essay on Consumer Welfare, Evidence and Burden of 
Proof in Article 82 Cases”, 31 European Law Review 4 (2006), p. 533, available at 
https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=2101311 (last visited 02.09.2017); O’DONOGHUE/ PADILLA, n. 
11108. 
780 See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, para. 53; Akman (2012), p. 118. 
781 LOEWENTHAL, Paul-John, “The Defence of ‘Objective Justification’ in the Application of Article 82 EC”, 28 
World Competition 4  (2005), pp. 459-461, available at 
https://www.kluwerlawonline.com/abstract.php?area=Journals&id=WOCO2005028 (last visited 02.09.2017); 
AKMAN (2012), p. 118-120. 
782 See van der VIJVER, Tjarda, “Article 102 TFEU: How to Claim the Application of Objective Justifications in the 
Case of prima facie Dominance Abuses?”, 4 Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 2 (2013), p. 124, 
available at doi:10.1093/jeclap/lps062 (last visited 02.09.2017). 
783 Guidelines (Dominant Position), n. 30 (“In the application of article 6 of the Act, the Board will also take into 
consideration any claims put forward by a dominant undertaking that its conduct is justified. Claims of justification 
examined by the Board may be classified under the categories of objective necessity and efficiency.”). 
784 See the speech of 16 September 2006 at the Fordham Conference by Emil Paulis, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2006_014_en.pdf. (last visited 12.08.2017). 
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evidentiary burden, which demands that the person who makes an assertion must 
provide proof thereof785.  However, a dominant firm that merely claims “objective 
necessity” cannot fulfi l l  the requirement of evidentiary burden. The dominant 
undertaking can be expected to demonstrate “with  a sufficient degree of 
probability,  and on the basis of ver ifiable evidence” 786.  Furthermore, evidentiary 
burden requires proof from the li tigating party that is best positioned to provide 
it ,  and this makes it  unattractive for a party to make assertions th at i t cannot 
substantiate787.  Therefore, i t  should be the dominant undertaking that bears the 
(initial) evidentiary burden to provide proof, since success of the objective 
necessity will  be based on the evidence that is usually only  available to the 
dominant  firm. 
 After the possibili ty of conduct protects a legitimate benefit  is shown, then 
the Board assess whether the conduct is indispensable for achieving the relevant 
benefit”788.  However ,  the Guidelines (Dominant Position) foresees that “the 
burden of proof  for demonstrating that the conduct under examination is 
indispensable for protecting a legitimate benefit  l ies with the dominant 
undertaking”789.  Here, burden to proof “indispensabili ty” is problematic. Since, 
to show indispensabili ty, the dominant undertak ing should prove that there is no 
less strictive alternatives to the conduct that are capable to fulfill  objective 
necessity.  
 In the context of “objective necessity” the dominant firm should show that 
i t  had no alternative way to conduct. Van der VIJVER claims that this will  not be 
easy to prove, as alternatives courses of action will  often be imaginable 790.The 
                                                             
785 van der VIJVER, p. 123 (“The evidentiary burden may thus be borne by any of the litigating parties depending on 
what they have asserted”). 
786 See Guidance (2009), n. 30. 
787 van der VIJVER, p. 123. 
788 Guidelines (Dominant Position), n. 31. Compare Guidance (2009), n. 31 (“It is incumbent upon the dominant 
undertaking to provide all the evidence necessary to demonstrate that the conduct concerned is objectively justified. 
It then falls to the Commission to make the ultimate assessment of whether the conduct concerned is not objectively 
necessary and, based on a weighing-up of any apparent anti-competitive effects against any advanced and 
substantiated efficiencies”). 
789 Guidelines (Dominant Position), n. 31. 
790 van der VIJVER, p. 128. 
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standard will  be easily satisfied, if the lack of alternatives can be shown from the 
available evidence, for instance that the dominant firm’s condu ct was prescribed 
by law791.  The Board embraces this example and even in a previous decision went 
further and ex officio considered that the undertaking’s conduct was legitimate to 
compulsion by the relevant law792.  
 UZUNALLI argues that in the field of quasi -judicial  actions, the principle 
of in dubio pro reo  is valid, and the Board is obliged to prove that the substantive 
fact has occurred by providing a full proof 793.  Therefore, any information, 
documents and evidence that may have influence on the decision may be submitted 
to the Competit ion Board by the dominant undertaking, as well ,  ex officio , the 
Board may do any necessary research, or will  be able to evaluate al l  the 
information, documents and evidence submitted by the third parties 794.  Then, 
nonetheless, the dominant undertaking can prove that i ts behavior is economically 
the only possibili ty based on its right to defense 795.  
 In the context of requirement of “indispensability”, we also argue that i t  is 
contrary to the terms of administrative and civil  proceedings in Turkey 796.  The 
evidentiary burden should be borne by the Board or the other party to provide for 
less anticompetit ive alternatives, since they have the be nefit  from the legal 
consequences. Then, the burden shifts to the dominant undertaking to refute or 
rebut the evidence to show that less anticompetitive measures would not be 
sufficient797.  
                                                             
791 Id., p. 128. 
792 See the Board HP decision. 
793 UZUNALLI, Sevilay, “Avrupa Birligi Rekabet Hukuku Isiğinda Yikici Fiyat Uygulamalari ile Hakim Durumun 
Kötüye Kullanilmasi [The Abuse of Dominant Position Through Predatory Price Practices Under The Light Of 
European Union Competition Law]”, 11 Rekabet Dergisi 4 (2010), p. 95. 
794 UZUNALLI, p. 95, 96. 
795 Id., p. 96 
796 Code of Civil Procedure No: 6100,  dated 12.01.2011,  Article 190 (“The burden of proof shall be borne by the 
party making the claim for its benefit from the legal consequence attached to the alleged case unless a special 
arrangement is made in the Code.”). 
797 For the allocation of burden of proof in the application of less restrictive alternatives in US Competition Authorities 
See FELDMAN, Gabriel A., “The Misuse of the Less Restrictive Alternative Inquiry in Rule of Reason Analysis”, 58 
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 3 (February 2009), p. 583, available at 
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 The most recognized objective necessity argument under tying practi ce is 
tying as a means to improve product quality, quality control, product safety , and 
the protection of reputation. It  is a shortcoming of the Guidelines (Dominant 
Position) that does not suggest any objective necessity examples under tying 
practices but  merely proposes to assess cost savings as an efficiency defense. 
 Quality control or quality assurance is matter since increasing 
sophistication (and sometimes coupled with fragili ty) of products in modern 
economies is important for producers to be able t o provide quality assurance 798.  
When the consumer gathers the products, i t  may not be clear whether any 
malfunctions are the fault  of the consumer or of the component suppliers, which 
may also lead a reputation for poor quality. Thus, protection of reputatio n 
necessity will  usually intertwine with quality control or product safety. Here,  
tying proper complementary products or components may provide more certainty 
for the consumer and the producer  more certainty about the product quality.  
 However, claims that tying as a means to maintain product quality or  
product safety have been dealt  very cautiously in the decisional practice and case 
law, on the grounds that there are less restrictive alternatives to achieve the 
relevant objective necessity  799.  The usual counter-argument will be that 
publishing a specification for necessary quality standards or providing training to 
a health and safety authority is  a less restrictive option 800.  However, these 
arguments should not be asserted without consideration of whether i t may not be 
                                                             
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr (last visited 10.06.2017) (as reviewing courts’ decision, has found that 
inconsistency exists, i.e. “With respect to the burden of persuasion, the majority of the circuits place the burden on the 
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798 O’DONOGHUE/ PADILLA, n. 22631; KARAKILINÇ, p. 544, 545. 
799 See Case T-30/ 89, Hilti AG v Commission [1990] ECR II-163; Tetra Pak International SA v Commission [1994] 
ECR II-755, para. 138; and C-333/ 94 P, Tetra Pak International SA v Commission [1996] ECR I-5951; Int’l Business 
Machine Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936); Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947). United 
States v. Jerrold Elecs. Corp., 187 F. Supp 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff’d percuriam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961). 
800 See O’DONOGHUE/ PADILLA, n. 22631. 
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easy, useful, or less costly to publish specifications , due to lack of assurance that 
consumers or customers will  follow them 801.  
 Through tying,  especially technological one s, i t  may be aimed at improving 
the tying product or creat ing a new or upgraded one 802.  For instance, new 
additional functions such as adding a camera or internet browsers into cellphones 
became a device that consumers prefer.  
 The Board approach has a clear tendency to include objective necessity 
justification issue in i ts assessment of tying under Article 6, but i t provides no 
clear framework as to the applicable standard of proof. We detect only two Board 
decisions that tackled with objective necessity. In  one of them, Board considered 
objective necessity as a part  of separa te product test803.  In the other, concluded 
that tying was economically indispensable due to statutory obligation 804.  In both 
decisions, the Board carried out an ex officio  analysis. However, i t  is difficult  to 
say that the Board embraces the understanding tha t objective necessity as a part 
of definition of abuse under tying assessment. Since, in the former, the Board 
include objective necessity as expanding the scope of commercial usage test , 
while in the latter a clearly available evidence exits. Nevertheless , we do not find 
obstacles for the Board to take into account objective necessity ex officio  provided 
it  reaches relevant documents or evidence, either by itself or supplied by the  
parties, even if it  is not claimed by the dominant undertakings.  
 2.2. Efficiency Defenses under Article 6 of the TCA 
 2.2.1. Discussions on the legal basis of efficiency defenses 
 We determined the objective of Turkish Competit ion Policy and Law as 
“promote consumer welfare through efficiency”, by examining constitutional 
basis alongside the Competit ion Authority’s policy declaration in chapter one. 
                                                             
801 See POSNER (Antitrust Law), p. 175; HOVENKAMP (Tying and the Rule of Reason), p. 22,23; O’DONOGHUE/ 
PADILLA, n. 22631, SAGI, p. 8. 
802 SAGI,, p. 6, 7. 
803 The Board Digitürk decision. 
804 The Board HP decision. 
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Here, we will  examine whether wording of the Article 6 of the TCA allows to 
achieve this objective and if the application of the provision by the Competit ion 
Board is consistent with the stated objective. Unfortunately, there is no traceable 
legislative history that demonstrates explicit l y preference for improvement of 
efficiency and consumer welfare were the objectives of Article 6. It  is a repetition 
of Article 102 of TFEU 805.  
 While Article 4 can be interpreted as having con sumer welfare objective 
due to Article 5, that making exemption f rom prohibition of Article 4 as 
conditioning “benefitt ing consumers”, Article 6 does not include similar clause 
or provision. Thus, i t  is questionable whether Article 4 and 6 can have the same 
objective, or application of Article 5 is extendible to Article  6. 
 However, first  i t  should be questioned whether even Article 5 provides a 
consumer welfare objective for the application of Article 4. Then, we can examine 
the role of efficiencies under Article 6 and whether Article 6 has also (if so) 
consumer welfare  objective. This context is relevant, due to determine whether 
efficiency resulting from otherwise competit ive conduct must be pass on to  
consumers is a necessary condition.  
 Article 5 is applicable where a conduct is found to be restrictive under 
Article 4. For the application of Article 5, the procompetit ive effects of the 
practice should be determined in order to assess whether these procompetit ive 
benefits outweigh the anticompetit ive effects 806 .  If  the foreseen conditions 
meet807,  then practice would not be considered infringement of Article 4.  
                                                             
805 For the review of historical roots of Article 102, see AKMAN (2012) (observing that efficiency was the utmost 
importance for the creators of the Article 102); CSERES (2009), p. 4. During the modernization process of Article 
102, the Commission had expressed the necessity of consideration efficiency gains under Article 102, as it was done 
under Article 101(3). See Discussion Paper, n. 84-92; KROES, p. 598, 599. 
806 Guidelines (Exemption), n. 15. 
807Id., n. 16 (“a) Ensuring new developments and improvements, or economic or technical development in the 
production or distribution of goods and in the provision of services, b) Benefitting the consumer from the above-
mentioned, c) Not eliminating competition in a significant part of the relevant market, d) Not limiting competition 
more than what is compulsory for achieving the goals set out in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b)”). 
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 There is a significantly crit ical difference between Article 5 of the TCA 
and the referenced provision in 101(3) of TFEU. Article 5 merely states 
“benefit t ing consumer”, while 101(3) requires consumers to be allow ed a “fair 
share of the resulting benefits” from the restrictive practice for the exemption. 
This precise requirement ( fair share) in Article 101(3) indicates “consumer 
welfare” consideration, and excludes the “total welfare” perspective 808.  The 
implementation of this, under the consumer welfare standard, dictates that 
benefits only can be considered if they pass on to the consumer. This also means 
that  assessment of efficiency gains is the core test in the understanding of the 
preferred welfare standard being applied by the competit ion authority 809.  
 Therefore, the relevant questions are whether Article 5 can be a proxy for  
consumer welfare objective. If so,  whether the same objective can/should be valid 
for Article 6. Furthermore, i t  should b e answered why there is no clause or 
provision similar to Article 5 for Article 6. What are the possible reasons for the 
non-existence? 
 2.2.1.1. The welfare objective under Article 5 of  the TCA 
 Determining whether Article 5 has consumer welfare objective  is relevant 
in order to question if one accepts that Article 5 can transpose to Article 6 (if i t 
was the intention of Turkish legislators), and if one concludes that efficiency 
defenses is part  of determination of abuse without necessarily meeting conditi ons 
established under Article 5. Thus, whether i t  is supportable that competition rules 
can follow different objectives under Articles 4 and 5, and whether this will  be 
consistent with stated competition policy.  
                                                             
808 See LYONS, Bruce R., “Could Politicians be More Right than Economists? A Theory of Merger Standards”, 
Revised Centre for Competition and Regulation Working Paper CCR 02-1 (2002), p.2 (fn.;2), available at 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/53f7/a90f066190beeffdc24a371509274de8d0f9.pdf (last visited 02.09.2017) 
[hereinafter LYONS (2002)]; GiFFORD, Daniel J. and KUDRLE, Robert T., “European Union Competition Law and 
Policy: How much Latitude for Convergence with the United States?”, 48 THE ANTITRUST BULLETIN 3 (2003), 
p. 773, available at 
http://www.heinonline.org/HOL/Page?collection=journals&handle=hein.journals/antibull48&id=735 (last visited 
02.09.2017). 
809 See LYONS (2002), p. 1. 
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 There are several reasons for questioning whether Article 5 indicates a 
consumer welfare objective. First ,  i t  can be argued why Turkish legislators avoid 
including term “ fair share”, and this is not only in Article 5810,  but also Article 6 
excludes “unfair trading conditions” 811.  Turkish legislators have clear tendency to 
avoid the “fairness” objective in competit ion rules 812.  The question turns to 
whether omission of “fair share” indicates that the aim was exclusion of 
distribution of income concern, or “benefitt ing consumer” request means resulting 
benefits should be higher  than detriment to consumer, not merely neutral .  If i t  is 
the latter, then distributional concern is excluded.  
 The Board will  decide on a case-by-case basis the meaning of “benefit t ing 
consumer” under Article 5. However, the suggestions brought by the Guidelines 
for the application of Article 5 creates serious obstacles to follow a consumer 
welfare objective: First ,  the Guidelines (Exemption) l imits the first requirement 
of Article 5 (a) to efficiency gains, and dispense non -efficiency related benefits813.  
Second, the Guidelines (Exemption) suggests that the resulting efficiency gains 
must compensate  consumers for the actual or potential  negative impact of the 
agreement on competition or consumers 814.  However, in this instance, the 
compensation does not require an offset atoningly or higher benefit than detriment 
to consumer, but suggests that “the net effect of the agreement on consumers must 
at  least be neutral”815.  Furthermore, compensation is not used in the sense of 
Pareto Principle, which proposes that everyone would be better off or at least no 
one would be worse off .  Since, the Guidelines (Exemption) propose that “in terms 
of consumer benefit ,  the overall  impact on consumers , not the impact on a group 
of consumers, should be taken into account”816.  The overall  language of the 
Guidelines (Exemption) reflects Kaldor -Hicks’  criterion, that claims if in society 
some persons are better off and some worse off, the gainers could compensate the 
                                                             
810 Compare referenced Article 101(3) of TFEU. 
811 Compare referenced Article 102 (a) of TFEU. 
812 The only exception is Guidelines (Technology Transfer Agreements) in no. 128. 
813 Guidelines (Exemption), n. 22. 
814 id., 44 
815 id., 44. 
816 id., 45. 
248 
 
losers in such way that ,  on every person was better off, then welfare would be 
increased817.   
 In addition, according to the Guidelines (Exemption), the concept of 
“consumer” covers not only end users, but also those who purchase the products 
for resale purposes818,  which indicates that i t  aims to ensure  the welfare gains 
through increased efficiency. Thus,  the consequences of the practice will  also lead 
to an increase in social welfare, not necessarily consumer welfare. Alternatively,  
the Guidelines (Exemption) should require proof that likely benefits from 
customer pass on to end-users. While the customers may desire a product that may 
maximize their profits, the interests of the consumers may not be related to merely 
surplus, but  to the broad notion of satisfaction 819.  
 Secondly, i t  is disputable whether recognition of “pass on to consumers” is 
an independent requirement to be shown or whether i t  will  be assumed merely 
from established efficiencies or residual competit ion.  
 It  has been suggested that the cumulative conditions for the exception in 
Article 101(3) (equivalent to Article 5 of the TCA) assumes that some resulting 
benefit for consumers due to an improvement in production or distribution or 
technical or economic progress is inevitable, Hence, the “benefit t ing consumer” 
requirement becomes a formality, once the existence of the possible efficiencies 
were established820.  This interpretation can be hold the ground that the Guidelines 
(Exemption) does not require that “to demonstrate that all  of the efficiency gains 
                                                             
817 See id., n. 45 (“Consumers as a whole may benefit from lower production costs, production of new and advanced 
products or services and more efficient allocation of resources thanks to efficiency gains”); n. 46 (“It is not required 
to demonstrate that all of the efficiency gains expected from the agreement are passed on to consumers. It is important 
that sufficient benefits be passed on to compensate for the negative effects of the agreement”).  
818 İd., 43. 
819 See AKMAN, Pinar, “Consumer Versus Customer: The Devil in the Detail “, ESRC Centre for Competition Policy 
Working Paper No. 08-34 (2008), available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1313802 (last visited 20.06.2017) 
[hereinafter Akman (Consumer versus Customer)]. 
820 See EVANS, Andrew, “European competition law and consumers: The Article 85 (3) exemption”, 2 European 
Competition Law Review (1981), p. 429-431(concluding that assessment of the existence of resulting benefit for 
consumers plays no decisive role in the application of Article 101(3).  The Commission treats the promotion of 
“consumer welfare” as an outcome of the application of Article 101(3) rather than as a consideration affecting the 
content of this provision).  
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expected from the agreement are passed on to consumers” 821,  and listing the 
circumstances where passing on the benefits are l ikely 822.  
 It  has been also argued that the requirement of a fair share for consumers 
can be inferred from the fourth requirement imposed by Article 101(3);  that is, 
sufficient remaining competit ive pressure will  ensure that the benefits resulting 
from an agreement are passed on 823.  There are also some viewpoints placed in the 
Guidelines (Exemption) that supports this understanding. The Guidelines 
(Exemption) put forwards  that “if the restriction of competit ion generated by the 
agreement is substantial and the efficiency gains are insignificant, i t  is unlikely 
that the agreement will  be exempted from the prohibition in Article 4” 824.  Reverse  
version of this suggestion is tha t  “if the restriction of competit ion is not 
substantial  and the efficiency gains are not insignificant, i t  is l ikely that 
requirement of pass on to consumer is fulfi l led” 825.  
 In addition ,  the Guidelines (Exemption) states that “the basic principle of 
the assessment is the maintenance of the competitive process in the market” 826,  
which is a repetition of Article 1 of the TCA. Thus, elimination of competit ion is 
not accepted under Article 5. Therefore, this raises the question whether Article 
5 can be transposed to Article 6, since elimination of competit ion is inherited 
where dominant position exits. Whether due to the practical impossibili ty of  
fulfi l ling the last  condition of Article 5, efficiencies are deemed irrelevant to 
Article 6. Moreover, this indicates that Articles 4 and 6 pursue different 
objectives.  
 Therefore, although the recognition of consumer interests exits, i t  is not 
clear whether the requirement of pass on to consumers indicates consumer welfare 
                                                             
821 Guidelines (Exemption), n. 46 
822 See Guidelines (Exemption), n. 48-53. 
823 See VEDDER, H. H. B., “Competition Law and Consumer Protection: How Competition Law can be used to 
Protect Consumers Even Better –Or Not?”, 17 European Business Law Review (2005), p. 87 [ AKMAN (2012), p. 
145]. 
824 Guidelines (Exemption), n. 45. See also n. 49, 52. 
825 Because this suggestion is given under the title of “Consumer Benefit”. 
826 Guidelines (Exemption), n. 54. 
250 
 
objective under Article 5, since not only create s ambiguous “consumer” concepts, 
i ts practical relevance is also questionable.  
 2.2.1.2. The issue of lack of a provision similar to Article 5 for Article 
6 and the implication of this  
 In this context, one can possibly think that efficiencies are irrele vant due 
to lack of exemption clause for Article 6. To support this view, it  can be argued 
that while under Article 4 “commercial usages” is placed as a prerequisite for 
tying practice, i t  is excluded under Article 6 intentionally.  
 For the absence of an exemption clause, the other and more plausible 
possibili t ies are that 1) it  is a silent acceptance, considering the clause already 
exists in Article 5, 2) it  is an omission of drafters (of TFEU) and also  legislators 
of the TCA, 3) i t  is a silent refusal.  
 First  possibili ty can be supported on the ground that unlike Article 101(3), 
which is placed in the Article 101 that equivalent to Article 4 of the TCA, Article 
5 is placed separate from Article 4. This is the reason that, while drafters of 
Article 101 (3) have limited the applicabili ty and effect of that paragraph to 
Article 101827,  Turkish legislators have anticipated Article 5 as a common 
provision for Article 4 and 6. However, Article 5 explicit ly states that i t  is for 
the application of Article 4, and extension of i ts implementation for Article 6 will 
be inconsistent with legal certainty.  
 Second explanation is also difficult to hold, because to consider the absence 
of Article 5 as an omission, Article 4 and Article 6 should have the same contexts. 
In fact , they have difference context, since Article 4 addresses multilateral 
conduct, Article 6 deals with, in principle, unilateral conduct and pre -requires a 
                                                             
827 See AKMAN (2012), p. 115 (concluding that although Articles 101 and 102 are in the same Chapter of TFEU, the 
drafters have not envisaged paragraph (3) of Article as a common clause to Article 101, therefore it cannot be 
transposed to Article 102). 
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dominant position. Thus, i t  is more likely that lack of similar provision to Article 
5 is not an omission, but a silent refusal 828.  
 However, i t  demonstrates that drafters and legislators were aware of 
efficiency concept, but did not envisage it  for Article 6. Then, question turns to 
how should we interpret this silent refusal: Are efficiencies not relevant to Article 
6? Alternatively,  are they inherited alread y in Article 6? Article 6 does not allow 
for an exemption, yet i t  does not answer whether efficiencies are relevant and, if 
so, how they should be treated under Article 6.  
 The Guidelines on The Assessment of Exclusionary Abusive Conduct by 
Dominant Undertakings brought similar conditions of Article 5 and has been  
“efficiency justification” under Article 6.  
 Thence, the dominant undertaking must be able to show that the efficiencies 
created by the alleged conduct outweigh the likely negative effects on co mpetit ion 
resulting from the conduct and the l ikely harm to consumers that the conduct 
might otherwise have 829.  In order to establish this justification, the dominant 
undertaking must demonstrate that 1) the efficiencies should be realized or likely 
to be realized as a result of the conduct;  2) the conduct should be indispensable 
to the realization those efficiencies; 3) the l ikely efficiencies brought by the  
conduct should outweigh any possible negative effects on competition and 
consumer welfare in the affected markets; 4) the conduct should not eliminate 
effective competition by removing all  or most existing sources of actual or 
potential  competit ion830.   
 Indeed, i t  was necessary to include the assessment of efficiencies under 
Article 6. However, inclusion via  Guidelines of this issue is  not without i ts 
problems. This is because  of the following: First ,  as ODMAN BOZTOSUN 
                                                             
828 See AKMAN (2012), p. 115.  
829 Guidelines (Dominant Position), n. 30-32. See also Discussion Paper, n. 79; Guidance (2009), n. 30. 
830 Guidleines(Dominant Position), n. 32. Compare Guidelines (Exemption), n. 16. See also Discussion Paper, n. 84; 
Guidance (2009), n. 30. 
252 
 
correctly argues that introducing an “exemption” or an “exception” rule under 
Article 6 through Guidelines, which is a secondary -legislation, is against the 
wording of  the provision. Since an exemption rule does not exist  in Article 6, i t  
cannot be introduced without an amendment to the TCA831.   
 Second, the last condition asserted for the justification, viz. “conduct does 
not eliminate effective competit ion”, makes the proof of efficiencies under Article 
6 almost impossible , because there is already an elimination of competit ion in the 
market due to the existence of a dominant position 832.  However, in the application 
of Article 6 of the TCA, it  is not in i tself an infringement for an undertaking to 
hold a dominant position833.  Therefore, there are two possible ways to follow : 
either with the elimination of competit ion will  not be a consideration when 
assessing the efficiencies of the conduct 834;  or the requirement of “substantially 
eliminated” will  be interpreted in a narrow sense, i .e.,whereas alleged conduct 
has been found to have an actual or l ikely exclusionary effect 835.  
 The Guideline  (Dominant Position) foresees that efficiencies should be 
treated as “justification” and it  should be invoked by the dominant undertaking 836.  
This approach indicates a two-stage evaluation, l ike in Article 5. In the first  step, 
practice should be found to prima facie  breach of Article 6 (abusive). Then , as a 
second step, the undertaking could prove that efficiencies outweigh the l ikely 
negative effects. Thus, if the undertaking cannot prove the efficiencies, the 
conduct will  be deemed abusive.  
 The third problem that arises is related to two-phase analysis that suggests 
distinguishing between abuse and its justification. ASLAN proposes that objective 
justifications and efficiency defenses should be included in the definition and 
                                                             
831 See ODMAN BOZTOSUN, p. 108, 109; AKMAN (2012), p. 116. 
832 AKMAN (2012), p. 117. 
833 See Guidelines (Dominant Position), n. 2.  
834 AKMAN (2012), p. 117.  
835 O’DONOGHUE/ PADILLA, n. 11234, 11236. 
836 Guidelines (Dominant Position), n. 30, 32.  
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finding of abuse under the assessment of Article 6 837.  Unlike Articles 4 and 5 –  
that in the case of the determination of a negative effect under Article 4, then the 
rule of reason approach under Article 5 –  Article 6 requires a rule of reason 
approach that considers the negative and positive effects of the conduct 
concurrently to be determined as abusive 838.   
 AKMAN suggests that the lack of exemption rule in Article 102 does not  
indicate that the drafters of the Treaty intended to prohibit  efficiency enhancing 
conduct of dominant undertakings. On the contrary, her examination of the 
travaux préparatoires  demonstrates that efficiency –  and especially eliminating 
the productive inefficiency of dominant undertakings –  was the primary concern 
of the drafters839.  Hence, under Article 102, efficiency has a decisive role for the 
determination of “abuse”, rather than as a defense or justification 840.  
 The implication of the acceptance of the understanding that efficiency 
defense is involved in the determination of abuse is that: 1) inefficiency of  
conduct should be seen as a necessary condition for finding th e practice abusive 841,  
and 2) efficiencies should be considered ex officio  by the competit ion authority 
before finding that conduct is abusive 842.  
 Indeed, increasing the performance and efficiency of undertakings is one 
of the reason for the adoption of compe tit ion rules. However, inclusion of 
efficiencies in the definition of abuse is difficult  to support. First ,  the Board is 
                                                             
837 ASLAN, I. Yilmaz, Rekabet Hukuku [Competition Law], Ekin Yayin Evi, Bursa (2005), p. 365 [hereinafter Aslan 
(2005)]. 
838 ASLAN (2005), p. 366. See also Speech of  Philip Lowe, “Consumer Welfare and Efficiency- New Guiding 
Principles of Competition Policy?” Munich 2007, p. 6, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2007_02_en.pdf  (according to the previous Director General of DG 
Competition, efficiencies will be assessed in an integrated approach as part of an overall weighing of positive and 
negative effects of the conduct, like in mergers). 
839 AKMAN (2012), Part I, 2, section V (for the review of travaux préparatoires; for the implications of the review, 
p. 95-102). 
840 AKMAN (2012), p. 118. 
841 AKMAN (2012), p. 119. 
842 AKMAN (2012), p. 119. See also ROUSSEVA, Ekaterina, “The Concept of ‘Objective Justification’ of an Abuse 
of a Dominant Position: Can it Help to Modernise the Analysis under Article 82 EC?”, 2 The Competition Law Review 
(March 2006), p. 68, 69, available at http://new.clasf.org/CompLRev/Issues/Vol2Issue2Art2Rousseva.pdf (last visited 
02.09.2017)(suggesting that efficiencies should be involved in the concept of competition on the merits). 
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not in the position that can have the knowledge whether dominant undertaking’s 
intention was to increase efficiency. In addition cannot  have the knowledge 
unless, at  least,  the dominant undertaking claims this. Even if,  i t  is accepted that 
efficiency gains will  be considered ex officio  by the competit ion authorities, 
whether competit ion authority is able to obtain possible and plausible e fficiency 
gains created by the alleged conduct sufficiently. The dominant undertaking has 
the necessary information for this, and obtaining the necessary information from 
dominant undertaking will  l ikely be less costly and more sufficient than ex officio  
analysis.  
 Thus, we do not agree that burden of proof should be bear by the 
competit ion authority or the other party. To grant importance for the efficiency 
defenses, an understanding can be adopted such as claiming that dominant 
undertaking initially bears at  least evidential  burden of asserting the relevant 
efficiency and providing some initial  evidence of i t .  Then the burden shifts to the 
competit ion authority (or  the other party if i t  concerns li t igation) to prima facie  
evidence on efficiency adduced by the dominant firm843.  
 Nonetheless, two-stage analysis  is inevitable for the assessment of 
efficiency defenses. Unlike legitimate objective business justification that 
eliminates abuse in the first  place, efficiency gains cannot automatically eliminate 
restriction in competit ion and consumer harm. Efficiency gains are accepted 
provided they deliver sufficient benefits to offset adverse effects in competit ion 
and consumer welfare. To evaluate if this offset occurs, i t  is necessary to conclude 
whether the conduct was abusive in the first  place. In the first  step, determination 
of abuse does not mean that the conduct is per se  i llegal. It  is necessary to  
calculate the actual or possible adverse effects of the conduct in order to evaluate 
the extent of the outweighing test .  Thus, application of two-stage analysis does 
not prevent overall  rule of reason approach, or indicates that the dominant 
undertaking cannot challenge against findings related to alleged adverse effect.  
                                                             
843 See O’DONOGHUE/ PADILLA, n. 4924, 22610. 
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 Hence, there is no plausible reason to re ject two-stage analysis for the 
assessment of efficiency defenses under Article 6. In addition, the argument that 
competit ion authority should bear the burden of proof is not administrable.  
 2.2.1.3. Pass on requirement  
 The Guidelines (Dominant Position) for the acceptance of efficiency 
defense requires that the l ikely efficiencies should outweigh any possible negative 
effects on competit ion and consumer welfare 844.  For the exclusionary tying 
practice, it  also suggests that  
[ t ]he Board may cons ider  and inc lude  in it s  ana lys is  argument s o f t he dominant  
under t ak ing engag ing in t he tying conduct ,  which c la im that  t he pract ice ensures 
product ion and d ist r ibut ion savings to  t he benef it  o f customers,  t hat  it  reduces 
t ransact ion cost s fo r  customers who  otherwise wo u ld have to  buy the bund led product s 
separat e ly,  and that  it  a llows the supp lie r  to  pass on to  t he customers any e ff ic ienc ies 
st emming fro m the product ion o r purchase o f t he t ied product s in large numbers
845.   
 Then, the genera l requirement of the Guidelines  (Dominant Position) 
suggests that the net effect of the agreement on consumers must at  least be neutral. 
It  does not explicit ly require that the benefit  to consumers should be higher than 
the negative effects to consumers, but at least equal , which also means efficiency 
gains should be at  least equal to consumer loss. Further, for tying conduct, the 
Guidelines (Dominant Position) merely suggest consideration of productive 
efficiencies. Thus, this understanding suggests that under Turkish competi t ion 
law, one lira of consumer surplus is equivalent to one lira of producer surplus , 
which means the income distribution effects of economic activity are excluded. 
However, ,  i t  is not surprising, since the concept of “consumer” includes all  direct 
and indirect users of the product or services covered by the practice, such as input, 
                                                             
844 Guidelines (Dominant Position), n. 32.  
845 Id., n. 94. 
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wholesalers, retailers , and dealers who purchase the products for resale purposes, 
and not only end users 846.   
Guidelines (Dominant Position) suggests for  efficiency gains created  by 
tying practice merely taking into account the benefit  of “customers” or pass ing 
such benefit  on to “customers” ,  even if distributional effects can be ignored in 
the pass-on requirement at  consumer level. Moreover, the Guidelines (Dominant 
Position) does not stipulate whether the benefits to customers will  also be passed 
on to end users. Accordingly,  Article 6 cannot be about more than “Borkean 
consumer welfare”, which has only the ti t le of the “consumer”, but i t  is all  about 
“total  welfare” that is disguised by “allocative and productive efficiency”.  
 Furthermore, the general requirement of the assessment of the efficiency 
does not explain indicate which type of efficiencies should be taken into account , 
or whether qualitative efficiencies (that take the form of the production of a new 
or advanced product, greater product variety and higher quality) may be  
considered. Guidelines (Dominant Position) propose considering the contribution 
to innovation for specific type of conducts 847 and suggests the Board consider the 
short- and long-term effects of the conduct, but does not provide any elaboration 
model for the necessary trade -off between static and dynamic efficiencies.  
 In addition, the Guidelines (Dominant Position) embodies the intention to 
include efficiency defenses for exclusionary conducts. There is no secondary 
legislation for the exploitative conduct that addresses similar issue s. 
 Finally, neither embracing the understanding that Article 5 can be 
transposed to Article 6, nor clarification of the inclusion of efficiency 
justification by the Guidelines  (Dominant Position) suggests that the consumer 
welfare objective can be achieved by the way in which Turkish Competition Law 
is applied. To clarify, inclusion of efficiency defenses as an exemption or 
                                                             
846 See Guidelines (Dominant Position), n. 22; Guidelines (Exemption), n. 43. 
847 See Guidelines (Dominant Position), n. 35, 37 (refusal to supply) and n. 68 (exclusivity agreement). 
257 
 
exception proxy is not i l legal in i tself,  but the suggested balancing test  (net 
effects) is contrary to the letter of the provision and stated Turkish competit ion 
law and policy itself.  Without the proper pass-on (of efficiency gains to end users)  
requirement, competition rules can only serve for a total  welfare objective.  
 After all ,  the fact is that Article 5 cannot be transposed to Article 6. It  is 
desirable that efficiencies become a part of Article 6. To establish the consistency 
with Article 5, the requirement of pass on to consumers is  necessary that 
efficiencies to be  legitimate. However, the Guidelines (Exemption) creates 
contradiction to stated competit ion policy, furthermore it is against the letter of 
the Article 4 which states “consumer”. We do not find legitimate that extension 
of the legal and economic understan ding of the term “consumer” to “customer”, 
and not requiring the benefit t ing of end-users to countervail  this extension via 
secondary legislation. Thus, the Guidelines (Dominant Position) has a similar 
problem with the Guidelines (Exemption) in respect to pursuing consumer welfare 
objective.  
 We do not challenge that consumer welfare should be the objective of 
Turkish Competit ion Law. We point out that implementation and application of 
the secondary legislation is contrary to the wording of the TCA, as wel l  as 
declared competit ion policy.  One may argue that i t  does not contradict the 
wording of the TCA or the legislative intent, since it  is stated that to “protect the 
competit ive process” is the goal, and the promotion of consumer welfare and 
efficiency is considered a possible outcome of the competition law enforcement.  
 Nevertheless, even if one accepts that Article 5 demonstrates “consumer 
welfare” objective, application of the relevant guidelines completes the lack of 




 2.2.2. The Board’s approach to efficiency defense 
 Even though it  is debatable whether the wording of Article 6 allows 
efficiency defenses, we concluded that efficiencies are welcome and do not 
contradict Turkish competit ion policy. In fact , tying practices were never 
examined under the per se  rule by the Board. We determined that the Board 
explicit ly includes efficiencies in its examination at the end of 2008848.  However,  
even before the Board did not follow an approach that nature of the conduct i tself 
anticompetit ive  ( per se  treatment) , but tying conduct is examine through its 
adverse effect on competition849.  
 Both Guidelines (Dominant Position) and the Board explicit ly states in most 
cases tying is a common practice and benign 850.  Regarding the debate of whether 
inefficiency of conduct is a necessary condition for determining this practice, 
efficiencies should therefore be considered ex officio by the competit ion 
authority; or if they are accepted as a defense, the Board decisions have the 
tendency to embrace the former understanding 851.  However, i t  should be noted 
that, to date, number of the tying cases examined under Article 6 do not provide  
sufficient conclusion for this. In addition,  our position is clearly the latter one, 
even though we do not challenge that the Board should not evaluate efficiencies 
ex officio  if  it  can determine. In the first  instance, the burden of the proof, on the 
dominant firm to raise the relevant efficiency a sserted, and the prima facie  
evidence or arguments to support i t 852.Then, the burden shifts to the Board to 
address the prima facie  evidence on efficiency put forward by the dominant firm.  
                                                             
848 Board Avea/ TTNet decision dated 09.10.2008 and numbered 08-57/912-363. 
849 See Board Tekhnelogos decision dated 11.09.2008 and numbered 08-52/791-320; Digitürk decision dated 
07.02.2008 and numbered 08-12/126-43; HP decision dated 08.05.2001 and numbered 01-22/192-50. 
850 Guidelines (Dominant Position), n. 83, Board Google decision dated 28.12.2015 and numbered 15-46/766-281, n. 
78. 
851 See Board Google decisions [that efficiencies (costs saving benefits) are explicitly considered]. See also Digitürk 
decision [our reading suggests that the Board application of separate product test inclusively examine efficiencies 
considering whether combining two independent products bring into a new product to the market]. See also HP 
decision (where the Board considered ex officio not merely efficiency but generally objective justifications). 
852 See Guidelines (Dominant Position), n. 32. 
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 However, considering the cumulative conditions determined in the 
Guidelines (Dominant Position)853,  i t  is l ikely that i t  will  be difficult  for a 
dominant firm to present a successful efficiency defense, unless those conditions 
are applied strictly.  
 First  condition that efficiencies are realized, or l ikely to be realized, as  a 
result  of the conduct do not bring limitation in types of  efficiency to be  
considered. The Guidelines (Dominant Position) indicates possible efficiency 
arguments that the Board may consider 854.  These include the claims that savings 
in production or distribution that would benefit  customers, reduction of 
transaction costs for customers who would otherwise be forced to buy the 
components separately, and the supplier to pass on efficiencies arising from its 
production or purchase of large quantit ies of the t i ed product. Efficiency defenses 
and motivations are non-exhaustive,855 through the change in market and depend 
on market’s creativity and necessity they will  diversify. The key point to be 
considered that tying practice satisfies  this condition is that “any efficiency 
enhancing tying must be driven by customer preferences for joint consumption” 856.  
 Second condition that the conduct should be indispensable to the realization 
of those efficiencies, will  be difficult  to satisfy.  To do this,  the defendant must 
show that “there must be no less anti -competit ive alternatives to the conduct that 
are capable of producing the same efficiencies” 857.  The indispensabili ty 
requirement assumes that firms would often evaluates whether there might be 
                                                             
853 Guidelines (Dominant Position), n. 32 (“The Board will expect the undertaking to prove that all four conditions 
listed below are fulfilled: 1) the efficiencies should be realized or likely to be realized as a result of the conduct, 2)the 
conduct should be indispensable to the realization of those efficiencies, 3) the likely efficiencies brought about by the 
conduct should outweigh any possible negative effects on competition and consumer welfare in the affected markets, 
4) the conduct should not eliminate effective competition by removing all or most existing sources of actual or 
potential competition). 
854 Guidelines (Dominant Position), n. 94. 
855 Such as reducing cost of searching for most appropriate combination of products; give rise to new or better 
products/ services, avoid double marginalization, create economies of scale and scope in production and distribution 
are among other efficiencies can be created by tying practices. See KARAKILINÇ, p. 562-567; O’DONOGHUE/ 
PADILLA, n. 21913-21985. 
856 See Case COMP/39230, Rio Tinto Alcan, Commission Decision of 20 December 2012, para.89 (O’DONOGHUE/ 
PADILLA, n. 22614).  
857 Guidance (2009), n. 30. 
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alternative conducts that would have less impact on rivals and on consumer 
welfare while decide to tie or bundle two products in order to achieve certain 
efficiencies858.  However, in practice, i t  may not be possible for a dominant firm 
to make such a detailed assessment at the time it d ecides on its commercial 
strategy ex ante.  Similar to our suggestion for requirement of indispensability 
under objective necessity justification is valid for efficiency justification as well . 
Burden of proof should be borne by the Board. The Board may able  to identify 
post hoc  an alternative, but key question to ask whether the relevant information 
was available to the firm at the time it  decided tying practice. If the Board can 
prove that at  the t ime of the decision less restrictive alternatives existed, then the 
dominant undertaking can refute the evidence as showing its behavior was the 
economically the only possible way 859.  
 Third condition that the conduct should not eliminate “effective 
competit ion” by removing all  or most existing sources of actual or potential 
competit ion, may cause problem through strict  interpretation, but Turkish 
competit ion law is clear that dominant position does not necessarily mean that 
effective competit ion is eliminated 860.  The Board application implies that a 
finding of dominant position and foreclosure effect under Article 6 will  indicate 
whether competit ion is substantially eliminated 861.  
 Final condition requires the trade -offs to be made between likely benefits 
brought by the t ie and any possible negative effects on competitio n and consumer 
welfare in the affected market. The Board considers whether efficiency gains pass 
on to consumers, but does not explain on which ground or which amount of 
efficiency to be satisfied this requirement 862.  It  is a difficult  task, and there will 
often not be a single right evaluation, due to i t  is inherently based on value 
judgments. However,  the main problem with the suggested trade -off model, in 
                                                             
858 See O’DONOGHUE/ PADILLA, n. 22664. 
859 See UZUNALLI, p. 95, 96. 
860 See Grounds of Article 6; Guidelines (Dominant Position), n. 22-26. 
861 Board TTNET/Avea decision; Google decision.  
862 See Board Google decision. 
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principle, i t  requires as a net effect of the conduct on consumers. In other words, 
if the tying worsens the conditions prior to the conduct for consumers, this 
condit ion is not fulfil led. Therefore, if one unit  of Turkish lira has the same value 
to both producer and consumer, then the application of this trade -off model can 
be consistent with Turkish competition policy, which claims to “to maintain 
competit ion in order to create efficiency market and  increase consumer welfare”. 
Hence, in the implementation of this, whenever efficiency and consumer welfare 
are not aligned, efficiency will  be favored, and th en the objective is not to 
















SUGGESTED LEGAL CONDITIONS AND REMEDIES  
 This chapter suggest minimum legal conditions to determine the 
anticompetit ive effects of tying.  The last  chapter also suggests possible remedies 
for violation of Article 6 of the TCA, and proposes possible difficulties and 
shortcomings for successful implementation of these remedies.  
1. SUGGESTED LEGAL CONDITIONS FOR ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECTS  
1.1. General Remarks  
Few tying cases are addressed by the Board, but they are in sufficient numbers so 
that we can determine the antitrust treatment of tying practice under Turkish 
competit ion law and the Board approach against tying.  
 The Board approach is consistent regarding treatment of tying practice 
under rule of reason approach . However, there are also several shortcomings in 
respect to i ts procedures and its determination of competitive harm.  
 We detected at least three cases that the Board did not sta te alleged tying 
practice was examine under Article 4 or Article 6 of the TCA 863,  which is 
inconsistent with Article 52 of the TCA, which envisages required points in its 
decision which included the grounds for and the legal basis of the decision.  
 Regarding the legal conditions to determine abusive tying or bundling 
practice are lack of systematic. While the market definition and the dominant 
position analysis are consistent with decisions, they are divergent in terms of 
evaluation of anticompetitive effect s and the necessary conditions for the 
violation of Article 6: In one decision, i t  is stated that it  would be sufficient to 
exclude competitors from the violation864.  In another decision (which was 
                                                             
863 See Board Digitürk decision dated 07.02.2008 and numbered 08-12/126-43; HP decision dated 08.05.2001 and 
numbered 01-22/192-50; Printer Suppliers decision dated 17.6.2004 and numbered 04-42/ 490-118. 
864 Board decision dated 05.08.2009 and numbered 09-34/786-191, n. 220 (it is stated that in order to a tying practice 




delivered on the same date of the previous one), i t  was remarked that tying may 
be harmful due to exclusionary practice as well  as the exploitation of the 
consumer865 (which is also the only decision to examine the exploitative effect of 
tying). In another decision , the cumulative factors are presented: (1)  
determination of dominant position, (2) the tying product and the tied product 
should be distinct, (3) i t  should be likely for the tying practice to lead to anti -
competit ive foreclosure, and (4) there are no objective necessities  or efficiency866.  
In i ts latest  decision, parallel to Guidelines (Dominant Position), the Board 
denoted those two factors for the violation: 1) the tying product and the t ied 
product should be distinct, and 2) it  should be likely for the tying practice to lead 
to anticompetitive foreclosure867.  
 We suggest that  there is no satisfactory answer why the Board abandoned 
its previous approach (even if not an established one) that inclusion of 
exploitative effect of tying as anticompetit ive. The only explanation we can 
purpose that the process of modernization of Art. 102 TFEU had affected Board’s 
approach, and the paradox arose from there that exclusionary practices should be 
the primary concern of competit ion law, since they ultimately exploit  consumers. 
It  is not the modernization process of TFEU to blame; i t  is the Board’s failure to 
internalize this understanding along with Turkish competit ion law policy. Even 
the Guidelines (Dominant Position) also state that abuse can be exploitative or 
discriminatory (n. 5). Lastly, the  Board appr oach is lack of a comprehensive 
theory of  anticompetit ive harm in tying cases , which is the reason that leads 
insufficient antitrust analysis.  
 Therefore, we suggested a determination of “competitive harm” following 
Turkish competition policy that i ts obje ctive “to maintain competit ive process in 
order to increase consumer welfare through efficiency”, which can help to 
                                                             
865 Board Garanti Bank decision dated 05.08.2009 and numbered 09-34/ 787-192. 
866 Board Avea/ TTNet decision dated 9.10.2008 and numbered 08-57/912-363. See also Board Tekhnelogos decision 
dated 11.09.2008 and numbered 08-52/791-320 (stated cumulative conditions are: 1- presence of separate product, 
2- tying of product, 3- determination of dominant position). 
867 Board Google decision dated 28.12.2015 and numbered 15-46/766-281. 
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establish necessary legal conditions for tying antitrust analysis. We purposed that 
objective of competit ion policy which is placed at the c enter of free market 
economy has two dimensions: Maintain competit ive process requires protect and 
establish undistorted competit ion, which can be achieved through ensuring all  
market actors (both producers and consumers) have “freedom of choice”. Since, 
restraining a choice is inherent in tying practice, it  should be the main concern of 
tying antitrust analysis. Detection of restrain in freedom of consumer choice can 
also indicate restrain in rivals’ freedom of choice. Because, provided resource 
allocation is directed by the consumer,  the tying firm will  not able to force the 
purchase of an unwanted product or give up a wanted product from another seller. 
Thus, where consumers’ purchases are based on undistorted decision, tying can 
be neither exploitative nor exclusionary. The second dimension, “increase 
consumer welfare through efficiency” ,  is associated with consequences of the 
conduct , which cannot serve to detect the source of the abuse, but can decide 
whether tying abuse can be acceptable due to its neu tral effect. It  will  also be 
more useful for evaluating indirect harm to consumers.  
 Moreover, we do not confine consumer welfare with consumer surplus, but 
suggest that consumer choice should be at  the center of i t ,  which covers as such 
quality, uti l i ty,  price, satisfaction aspects of consumer preference. Finally, since 
our theory of harm is embodied around “freedom of consumer choice”, i t  answers 
the question whether tying practice should be exclusionary in order to be 
exploitative. 
 1.2. Legal Conditions for Anticompetitive Effects 
 Metering pricing or tying induced intra -product price discrimination effects 
has been long established. However,  the truth is, suggested welfare effects are 
unlikely to occur in practice. Moreover, we argue  that neither the consumer 
surplus standard nor the total  surplus standard should be applied as an overarching 
goal in this context. We purpose three reasons for this: First ,  welfares 
(consequentialist) approach does not cover two -dimensional objective of 
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protection of competition from the point of consumer. “Protection of competit ion” 
requires ensuring allocative resources are directed by consumers, while at  the 
same time, detecting anticompetit ive behavior that is detrimental to consumers. 
Application of consumer surplus standard in metering pricing case overlooks that 
competit ion rules are not only about outcome of the conduct but also competit ive 
process. Likewise, the total  surplus standard suggests  metering pricing is l ikely 
to increase output , therefore it  should not raise antitrust concern. However, they 
miss the point that the consumer should lead the allocative resources for 
establishing competit ive environment. Second, denoted welfare effects to be hold 
tying should be imposed on high volume purchasers, and/or t ied product should 
be sold at  supra-competitive price. In  concrete cases, either of these conditions 
does not fi t . Third, tying induced price discrimination , which should be seen as 
pricing strategy,  and firms should be allowed to set their p rofit  maximizing prices. 
This understanding includes that dominant firms’ tying induced price 
discrimination to set their profit -maximizing price should be allowed. Otherwise, 
forbidding monopolistic price will  be equal to prohibiting dominant position 
itself,  which can cause consumer harm in the long-term as hindering dynamic 
efficiencies. 
 In the case where firms tie durable good s to consumable goods, first  thing 
to look character of consumable good. If  i t  is staple good, the Board approach 
that “a dominant undertaking can harm consumers by causing foreclosure in the 
t ied market through driving existing competitors from the market by reducing the 
number of potential  customers and create new barriers to entry for i ts competitors 
in the t ied market” is  not sufficient for detecting anticompetit ive effect. Our 
suggested criterion is “whether tying conduct expands consumer demand 
artificially”. To determine this requires two -fold question: First ,  whether 
consumers are forced to purchase unwanted product;  s econd, whether they force 
to give up their preferred tied product elsewhere. However, supra -competit ive 
price of tied product is not accurate indicator to answer these questions 
affirmatively, because, consumers consider the price charged for consumables i n 
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their decision to purchase a durable product . Therefore, intense competition on 
the “primary” (durable good) market restrains firms to enjoy their dominant 
position in a “secondary” market for consumables. Thus, some firms can opt for 
lower tying product  price plus supra-competitive t ied product price, or vice versa ,  
and in the end consumers consider overall  price of t ied items, which means also 
that tying firms are competing through the overall  price of tying products in the 
market. Furthermore, the competitive price of tied product is not an accurate 
indicator to answer the relevant question in a negative way automatically ,  
especially where the primary market is not competitive. Herein, a dominant firm 
may envisage a price protection clause in order to d etect whether any seller 
offered below the market price for t ied product. In addition, the dominant firm 
can use i ts market power in the primary market to meet the prices offered for t ied 
product by other sellers. Thereby,  the “percentage of total  sales in  the t ied market 
affected by tying” will  be the better indicator to answer whether tying conduct  
expands consumer demand artificially. Comparison of the percentage of total  sales 
of the t ied product before and after tying conduct will  answer the first part  of the 
question. Moreover, a significant decrease in the percentage of total  sales of 
rivals’ t ied product will  verify the validity of the first  answer.  
 In this instance, where consumable good does not have staple character, 
follows the same above mention approach. However, in addition to this, there are 
further points to cross check. Because, when consumable good is non -staple item, 
there are circumstances where a producer may enjoy its dominant position in a 
secondary market for consumables or service for i ts own primary products. Again, 
supra-competit ive or competitive price of the tied product will  not be proper 
indicator. Because, constraints on substitution of tied product may be imposed 
through warranty right of consumers (i .e.,  not covering warranty for durable 
goods that are used with non-original consumables). The practice without 
objective necessity basis that complicates consumer to purchase compatible tied 
product for primary product may force to consumer to give up wanted tied product, 
and go with tying firm’s t ied product. Furthermore, imposition of similar t ie -ins 
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by firms in the primary market will  also adverse effect on sales in compatible t ied 
market. At this point, practical difficulties to monitoring consumers’ consumption 
of rival’s t ied product will  be overcome due to guaranteed durable goods.  
 Tying aftermarket product (spare parts and service) as metering pricing, 
and practicing price discrimination does not establish a priori  that such a practice 
is anticompetit ive. Metering pricing may allow more user s to reach primary 
product or to monitor an investment made by the dominant firms. Nevertheless, 
the condition (reallocation of some outputs from high -volume purchasers to low-
volume purchasers) that welfare effects to be occur in this instance does not fi t 
in the practice. It  is more likely that high -volume purchasers are more price 
sensitive and they are conscious about total l ife cost of the durable good, so firms 
will  not be able to impose tying against them. Then, exploitation does not arise 
due to price discrimination, but discrimination between sophisticated consumers 
and unsophisticated consumers. This outcome supports our suggestion that tying 
should be exploitative not due to consumer surplus extraction, but distorting 
consumer purchase decision, o r where tying firms able to engage tying practice 
due to distorted consumer purchase decision. This determination also will 
suggests an opposite condition for offsetting adverse effect of tying on 
competit ion: While to outweigh adverse effect on consumer w elfare of tying 
induced intra-price discrimination, concentration of low- and medium-volume 
purchaser should be higher than high -volume purchaser;  where tying induced 
discrimination between sophisticated (likely high -volume purchasers) and 
unsophisticated consumers, same outcome (higher concentration of  low - and 
medium-volume purchaser) will indicate that tying harms consumer welfare. 
However, we are not embracing a welfarist approach here ; our main consideration 
remains on whether resource allocation is d irected by consumers.  
 To determine this, it  requires market definition is correctly done. Which 
will  focus on consumer preferences, consumer reaction on price increase in 
secondary products, and switching costs factor in particular to extent which 
competit ion in the primary market prevents exploitation of consumers in the 
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aftermarket. At least but not last ,  those key factors for proper market definition 
to be hold, consumer should have sufficient information about whole -life costs of 
primary good at the t ime of purchasing.  
 Therefore, key points to cross check for successful antitrust examination of 
tying in aftermarket, as follows: (1) Awareness of whole -life cost of primary 
good, i .e.,consumers’ freedom to choose from several brands on the primary 
market is not sufficient to assume the primary and aftermarket as single market 
unless choice is made based on competit ive conditions on the secondary market 
(2) Whether secondary products of different brands are available and compatible 
(3) It  must be showed that sufficient number of consumers would switch to other 
primary or  secondary products in order to render price increases unprofitable (4) 
Whether there are “active” undertakings which operates only  in the aftermarket.  
 Technological tying cases (particula rly the Board examination of Google  
practice), show that the Board primary focus on the foreclosure of competition in 
the t ied product does not provide sufficient antitrust analysis. Welfarist  point also 
is not sufficient to detect anticompetitive effect, since either t ied products are 
given free or i t  is l ikely that consumers receive costs saving benefits from tying.  
Furthermore, in this instance, consumers are not strictly prevented from using a 
rival’s t ied product. Anticompetitive effects arise from int ention of the dominant 
firms to preserve and extend their dominant position in the tying product (e.g. 
Google’s dominant position in the internet advertising market) and due to lock -in 
and networks effects in dynamic markets. In associate with the latter e ffects, 
number of sophisticated users (who can download/obtain rivals t ied product) 
should not be assumed to adverse  non -lasting effect of tying prima facie .  Such 
practice result in that tying firms a head starts than rivals to compete. Therefore, 
whether tying firm remains ahead of the game should be detect with 
comprehensive foreclosure analysis  that includes all  relevant factors, 
i .e.,sufficient number of sophisticated users, barriers to entry,  percentage of the 
sales of t ied product, extent and intent o f dominant position. Those are the factors 
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that will  determine whether tying practice reduces consumer choice in the long-
term. 
 In requirement tie -in, for a tying practice to be exploitative , i t  should also 
have anticompetit ive foreclosure effects in the t ied market. The foreclosure effect 
may occur in two ways: First ,  the higher the percentage of t ied sales affected by 
the conduct within the total  sales in the relevant market, the greater is the 
l ikelihood of market foreclosure. Second, if there is an insufficient number of 
consumers who will buy the t ied product alone , the rivals’ t ied market will  be 
affected, and then the rivals’ consumer will face higher prices due to output 
reduction. Furthermore, if the t ied product is a complementary product of a tying 
product, i t  may increase the barrier to entry to the tying market alone. Therefore, 
the two-fold question for determining is “whether tying conduct expands 
consumer demand artificially”, which forecloses the choice, is also held in this 
instance. 
 Clearly, the Board confines i ts enforcement policy to cases where tying is  
exclusionary. However, the Board fails to examine anticompetit ive foreclosure 
effects in a t ied market . The Board also underestimates the undertaking’s 
intention to strengthen or main tain i ts dominant position in the tying market. 
Furthermore, implicit ly tying practices are allowed where they result  in a  net 
effect on consumers (i t  does not need to be efficiencies are greater than the 
anticompetit ive effects of the t ie, but must at  least be neutral).  The Board 
proposes efficiency gains that are passed on to consumers, but does not render an 
insight on which ground s the condition is satisfied. This creates a dichotomy 
between the Competit ion Authority policy and application of the compet it ion 
rules by the Board. Because, the Board implementation does not provide a sound 
indicator of whether the objective of the competition policy that increase s 
consumer welfare through efficiencies is achieved.  
 It  can be said that main handicap of the Board approach is that, i t  is lack of 
an overarching theory of harm, but i t  is focused on entry deterrence. Thus, we 
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first  attempted to determine an inclusive theory of harm that tying can cause to 
consumer. Then, given consumer harm coupled with fact -specific indications in 
concrete cases lead us to submit that legal conditions described above, which are 
not sufficient, but minimum necessary conditions.  
2. REMEDIES   
2.1. Fines 
2.1.1. Legal basis for fines  
Articles 16 and 27868 of the TCA and Regulation on Fines869 compose the legal 
power of the Competition Board to impose fines. According to relevant 
regulations, infringements to impose fines can be categori zed as procedural acts 
[foreseen under Article 16(1)] and substantive acts [foreseen under Article 16(3 )]. 
In principle, the fining decisions are based on annual gross revenues (turnover) 870 
in the preceding business year. Therein, The Board may impose administrative 
fine where a dominant undertaking’s conduct that violates Article 6, falls into 
scope of Article 16 (1) the subparagraphs (c) and (d),  i .e.,“c) In implementation 
of articles 14 and 15 of the Act, incomplete, false or misleading information or 
document is provided, or information or document is not provided within the 
determined duration or at all ,  d) On-the-spot inspection is hindered or 
complicated”.  
 According to Article 16 (1), the Board shall  impose on natural and legal 
persons having the nature of an undertaking and on associations of undertakings 
or members of such associations an administra tive fine by one in thousands of 
annual gross revenues of undertakings and associations of undertakings or 
members of such associations which generate by the end of the financial year 
preceding the decision, or which generate by the end of the financial ye ar closest 
                                                             
868 Article 27 (f) (The duties and powers of the Board are as follows: “To issue communiqués and make the necessary 
regulations as to the implementation of [the TCA]”). 
869 Regulation on Fines to Apply In Cases Of Agreements, Concerted Practices And Decisions Limiting Competition, 
And Abuse Of Dominant Position (Official Gazette dated 15.02.2009 and numbered 27142) (hereinafter Regulation 
on Fines). 
870 See Regulation on Fines Article 3(g) (“Annual gross revenue: net sales in the uniform chart of accounts, or if this 
cannot be calculated, the revenue closest to the net sales, which is to be determined by the Board.”). 
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to the date of the decision if i t  would not be possible to calculate it  and which 
would be determined by the Board for those mentioned in sub -paragraph (c), and 
by five in thousands of their gross revenues to be calculated in the same manner 
for those mentioned in sub-paragraph (d).  
 However, the penalty to be determined pursuant to this principle cannot be 
less than ten thousand Turkish Liras 871.  It  should be noted that this fixed lower 
l imit on fine may cause unfair consequences for some undertakings. It  is 
suggested that the fixed lower threshold should be removed, especially in the case 
of small  enterprises, and the fixed lower threshold should be made gradually 872.  
 Pursuant to Article 16(3), the Board shall  impose administrative fine whe re 
abusive conduct by dominant firm is find: “ An administrative fine shall  be 
imposed up to ten percent of annual gross revenues of undertakings and 
associations of undertakings or members of such associations to be imposed a 
penalty, which generate by the  end of the f inancial year preceding the decision, 
or which generate by the end of the financial year closest to the date of the 
decision if  it  would not be possible to calculate i t  and which would be determined 
by the Board.” .  Further, up to five percent of the administrative fines that are 
imposed according with Article 16(3) on undertakings or associations of  
undertakings, shall  be imposed on managers or employees of the undertaking or 
association of undertakings if those are determined to have a decisiv e influence 
in the infringement873.   
 The administrative fines may be determined by showing the upper and lower 
l imits874,   nevertheless, the amount of the penalty is  at  the discretion of the Board.  
                                                             
871 Article 16(1) of TCA. 
872 ASLAN (2017), p. 1044. Cf. ARI, M. Haluk and AYGÜN, Esin, “Rekabet Kurulu’nun Ceza Yönetmeliği: Yeni Bir 
Dönemin Ayak Sesleri [Regulation on Fines adopted by Turkish Competition Authority: Footsteps of New Era], 10 
Rekabet Dergisi, 4, p. 26. 
873 Article 16(4) of TCA. 
874 Article 16(5) referred to Article 17 paragraph two of the Faults Act dated 30/3/2005 and numbered 5326 which 
prescribes that “Administrative fines can also be determined by showing the upper and lower limits in the act. In 
this case, while the amount of administrative fine is determined, the unfairness content of the offense committed 
together with the defect and economic situation of the perpetrator are considered together.”. 
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When deciding on an administrative fine pursuant to 16(3), th e Board shall  
consider the repetit ion of infringement, i ts duration, market power of  
undertakings or associations of undertakings, their decisive influence in the 
realization of infringement, whether they comply with the commitments given, 
whether they assist  with the examination, and the severity of damage that takes 
place or is l ikely to take place 875.  
 Regulation on Fines sets out the methodology for  calculation of fines that 
may be imposed pursuant to Article 16 (3) and (4). The stated Regulation, suggest s  
basic steps to apply: First ,  the base fine shall  be calculated 876,  then following the  
calculation of the base fine, aggravating 877 and mitigating878 factors shall  be 
considered within the framework of relevant provisions in the Regulation, and an 
increase and/or a reduction shall  be made. However, the cumulative application 
of those calculation is subject to ten percent of the annual gross revenue (of the 
undertakings and associations of undertakings or the members of such 
associations) upper l imit 879.  
 Furthermore, Article 17 foresees proportional administrative fine to 
strength the enforcement of penalties mentioned in Article 16:  
 [T]he Board sha ll,  fo r  each day,  impose on under t akings and assoc iat ions o f 
under t ak ings an admin ist rat ive fine by f ive in t en thous and o f annua l gross revenues o f 
t he relevant  under t akings and assoc iat ions o f under t akings and/o r  members o f such 
assoc iat ions which generat e by the end o f t he f inanc ia l year  preced ing the dec is ion,  o r 
which generat e by the end o f t he financ ia l year  c loses t  to  t he dat e o f t he dec is io n,  if it  
                                                             
875 Article 16(5) of TCA. 
876 According to Article 5 of the Regulation on Fines, the base fine will be calculated, a rate between five per thousand 
and three percent for the violations of Article 6 of TCA, and in the determination of the rates issues such as the 
market power of the undertakings or associations of undertakings concerned, and the gravity of the damage which 
occurred or is likely to occur as a result of the violation, and the duration of the infringement shall be considered. 
877 According to Article 6 of the Regulation on Fines, the base fine might be increased due to aggravating factors in 
the cases such as repetition of the or coercing other undertakings into the violation.  
878 According to Article 7 of the Regulation on Fines, the base fine might be reduced due to mitigating factors in the 
cases such as terminating infringement as soon as the Board intervenes, existence of encouragement by public 
authorities or coercion by other undertakings in the violation. 
879 Regulation on Fines Article 4 (2). 
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would no t  be poss ible t o  calcu lat e it  and which wou ld be det ermined by the Board in  
t he event  t hat   
a)  Obligat ions int roduced o r commit ment s made by a fina l dec is io n o r  int er im measure  
dec is io n are no t  complied wit h,  
b)  On- the-spo t  inspect ion is hindered o r  complicat ed,   
c)  In implementat ion o f ar t ic les 14 and 15 o f t he Act ,  info r mat ion o r document  
request ed is no t  provided within the durat ion det ermined.   
Pursuant  to  paragraph one sub-paragraphs (a)  and (c) ,  administ rat ive fines can be  
imposed from the co mplet ion o f t he durat ion det ermined fo r  complying with the 
obligat ions in t he dec is io ns ment ioned in  t hese sub -paragraphs.  The admin ist rat ive fine  
re lat ed to  t he act  in sub-paragraph (a) can be imposed from the day fo llo wing the no t ice  
o f t his dec is io n if any durat ion has no t  been det er mined in t he dec is io n where an 
obligat ion is int roduced and the admin ist rat ive fine re lat ed to  t he act s in sub -paragraph 
(b)  can be imposed fro m the day fo llowing the day when the act  has b een rea l ized.  
 The associated problem with the application of Article 17 is that, there is 
no upper l imit.  For instance, if the undertakings did not provide the requested 
document, because they lost or destroyed the relevant document, then will 
imposition continue for perpetuity? For instance, if the fine (%0,05) is to be 
applied for 20 days, i t  will  be equal to one percent of the turnover. This will  be 
an average penalty for the abuse of  dominant position. In this case, the total  fine 
that can be given should not exceed the fine that would have been paid if a 
violation was found as a result  of the investigation 880.  Nevertheless, in this 
instance, the envisaged fine pursuant to Article 16 (1) (d) can be imposed 
additionally.  
 2.1.2. The nature of the fines and the ne bis in idem  principle  
 According to Article 2 of the Faults Act, every act that is foreseen by law 
to result  in administrative sanction is “fault”. Administrative penalties imposed 
by the Competition Board are also administrative sanction. Thus, i t  is a fault  on  
                                                             
880 ASLAN (2017), p. 1059. 
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the basis of every action that has been defined in contradiction to the Turkish 
Competit ion Act 881.   
 The ne bis in idem  principle (double jeopardy) sets prohibits being tried or 
punished twice for the same offence, and is applicable, in principle, in crimi nal 
law882.  It  has a precise role in the system of human rights protection, which is 
founded in Europe on the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (hereafter ECHR/Convention) 883 and is envisaged in the 
Article 4 of the Protocol no. 7 to the ECHR 884.  
 The ECHR is an international supremacy norm and Turkey is party to the 
Convention. In accordance with Article 90 (5) of the Turkish Constitution, 
International agreements duly put into effect have the force of law. Moreover, in 
the case of a conflict  between international agreements, duly put into effect, 
concerning fundamental rights and freedoms and the laws due to differences in 
provisions on the same matter, the provisions of international agreements shall 
prevail .    
 Therefore, the guarantees mentioned in the ECHR are binding for Turkish 
law and courts. Likewise, i t  is understood that the European Court of Human 
                                                             
881 See ÇAĞLAYAN, Ramazan, “Kabahatler Kanunu ve Uygulamasi [The Faults Act and its Application]”, Persembe 
Konferanslari (April 2010), p. 148, available at 
http://www.rekabet.gov.tr/File/?path=ROOT%2f1%2fDocuments%2fPer%25c5%259fembe%2bKonferans%25c4%2
5b1%2bYay%25c4%25b1n%2fperskonfyyn131.pdf (last visited 20.09.2017), Aslan (2017), p. 1043. 
882 ROSİAK, Przemysław Kamil, “The Ne Bis in Idem Principle in Proceedings Related to Anti-Competitive Agreements 
in EU Competition Law” 5 Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory 6 (August 16, 2012), p. 113, available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2130859 (last visited 20.09.2017); ÖZEN, Mustafa, “Non Bis In Idem (Aynı Fiilden Dolayı 
İki Kez Yargılama Olmaz) İlkesi [The Ne bis in idem Principle (Prohibition on Repeated Trial)]”, 14 Gazi University Law 
Faculty Journal 1 (2010), p. 390, 391, available at http://www.webftp.gazi.edu.tr/hukuk/dergi/14_1_14.pdf (last 
visited 20.09.2017); WİLS, Wouter P. J., “The Principle of ‘Ne Bis in Idem’ in EC Antitrust Enforcement: A Legal and 
Economic Analysis” 26 WORLD Competition: Law and Economics Review 2 (2003), p. 3, available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1319252 (last visited 20.09.2017); KOSTOVA, Lubomira, “The Non-Interaction between 
Actions for Damages and Ne Bis in Idem” Utrecht University, Department of Law, Economics and Governance, 
Utrecht 2013, available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2295588 (last visited 19.09.2017), p. 31-35. 
883 The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (formally the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms) is an international treaty to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms singed in 
Rome and d in 1950 entered into force on 3 September 1953.  
884 Protocol No. 7 to the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
entered into force November 1, 1988. 
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Rights (hereafter, the ECtHR) judgments are important in determining the scope 
of the guarantees, given the interpretive  nature of the ECHR provisions 885.  It  
should be noted that Turkey has not yet ratified Protocol no. 7 to the Convention. 
However, this does not prevent the consideration of ECtHR’s jurisprudence 
regarding the scope of  “criminal charge and proceedings” that s uggests a wider  
application of the procedural guarantees enshrined in the ECHR. As in the cases 
examined under Article 6 of the ECHR 886,  the accusation may be deemed to be a 
criminal charge even if they are not characterized as an “offence” under 
applicable national law, but correspondingly based on a general norm of a 
preventive and repressive nature and of universal application 887.  Within this 
scope, i ts jurisprudence provides that severe financial penalties imposed by the 
administrative authorit ies might be equivalent to a criminal nature of the 
proceedings888.  
 In fact, even though the Turkish Constitution does not i tself include a 
provision explicit ly stat ing the ne bis in idem principle, i ts binding force can be 
originate from the “state governed by rule of law” ,  which is enshrined as a general 
principle under Article 2 of the Turkish Constitution 889.  Furthermore, the ne bis 
in idem  principle is placed in legislative provisions such as in Articles 44 of 
                                                             
885 ASLAN (2017), p. 1045; GÜNDÜZ, Harun, Avrupa İnsan Hakları Sözleşmesi’nin Rekabet Hukuku Uygulamasına Etkisi 
[Effect of the European Convention on Human Rights on Competition Law Enforcement],  Rekabet Kurumu Uzmanlık 
Tezleri Serisi No: 122, Ankara 2009, p.13. 
886 Article 6 of the ECHR envisaged “right to a fair trial”. 
887 See ECtHR judgment, Öztürk v Germany (application no. 8544/79 dated 21,02,1984). See also ROSİAK, p. 115; 
WILS, p.5; KOSTOVA, p. 19-23. 
888 See ECtHR judgments, Engel and Others v. The Nederlands (Application No: 5100/71; 5101/71; 5102/71; 5354/72; 
5370/72 and dated 08.06.1976); Jussila v. France (Application No:73053/01 and dated 23.11.2006); Hüseyin Turan 
v. Turkey (Application No: 11529/02 and dated 04.03.2008). 
889 Cf. In practice, the Constitutional Court accepted the ne bis in idem principle, but denoted that this principle was 
not envisaged by the Constitution, thus left to the discretion of the legislator to act in accordance with this principle. 




Turkish Criminal Code890,  223(7) of Turkish Criminal Procedure Code,891 and 
Article 15 of the Faults Act.  
 Therewithal, the Turkish Constitutional Court in i ts decision regarding 
issued “Principles relating to offences and penalties” (the Article 38 of the 
Constitution)892,  determined that the relevant article does not  bring distinction 
between judicial  penalty and administrative penalty, thus the security provided 
by Article 38 of the Constitution shall  also be implemented in administrative 
penalties893.  
 These explanations indicate some basic safeguards related to fault s, some 
of which are general principles related to criminal law. With respect to application 
of ne bis in idem  principle, the relevant question to ask  is  under which 
                                                             
890 Turkish Criminal Code Law No. 5237 (Official Gazette No. 25611 dated 12.10.2004). Article 44- Conceptual 
Aggregation: “A person, who is considered to have committed more than one offense through performance of an 
act, is punished from the offense which requires imposition of heavier punishment “. 
891 Criminal Procedure Code Law No. 5271 (Official Gazette dated 12.10.2004 and numbered 25673). Article 223(7): 
“The cases, where there is a previously rendered judgment, or a pending case against the same accused because of 
the same conduct, the case will be declared inadmissible”. 
892 Article 38 of Turkish Constitution: “No one shall be punished for any act which does not constitute a criminal 
offence under the law in force at the time committed; no one shall be given a heavier penalty for an offence other 
than the penalty applicable at the time when the offence was committed. 
 The provisions of the above paragraph shall also apply to the statute of limitations on offences and penalties 
and on the results of conviction. 
 Penalties, and security measures in lieu of penalties, shall be prescribed only by law. 
 No one shall be considered guilty until proven guilty in a court of law. 
 No one shall be compelled to make a statement that would incriminate himself/herself or his/her legal next 
of kin, or to present such incriminating evidence. 
 (Paragraph added on October 3, 2001; Act No. 4709) Findings obtained through illegal methods shall not 
be considered evidence. 
 Criminal responsibility shall be personal. 
 (Paragraph added on October 3, 2001; Act No. 4709) No one shall be deprived of his/her liberty merely on 
the ground of inability to fulfil a contractual obligation. 
 (Paragraph added on October 3, 2001; Act No. 4709, and repealed on May 7, 2004; Act No. 5170) 
 (As amended on May 7, 2004; Act No. 5170) Neither death penalty nor general confiscation shall be 
imposed as punishment. 
 The administration shall not impose any sanction resulting in restriction of personal liberty. Exceptions to 
this provision may be introduced by law regarding the internal order of the armed forces. 
 (As amended on May 7, 2004; Act No. 5170) No citizen shall be extradited to a foreign country because of 
an offence, except under obligations resulting from being a party to the International Criminal Court.” 
893 See the Constitutional Court decisions, dated 11.09.2014 and numbered E. 2014/52, K. 2014/139; dated 
10.01.2013, E. 2012/93, K. 2013/8 (Official Gazette dated 28.03.2013 and numbered 28601; dated 29.11.2012 and 
numbered E. 2012/106 K. 2012/190 (Official Gazette dated 06.03.2013 and numbered 28579). 
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circumstance it  can be determined whether an administrative penalty is criminal 
in nature . In this context, the jurisprudence of ECtHR can provide guidance, 
which provides the criteria of (1) the legal qualification of the offence under the 
domestic law of a given state;  (2) the nature of the offence, as well  as the 
“repressive” and “deterring” character of the penalty; and (3) the type and the 
degree of severity of the penalty 894.    
 In the application of the criteria, the ECtHR emphasis ed the second and 
third criterion. Essential  for the “criminal nature” determi nation according to the 
ECtHR is (1) the scope of the violations and the deterrence effect of the penalties, 
i .e.,  whether the penalty is imposed via a norm addressed to the whole  population 
or to a specific group with a specific status (as in disciplinar y provisions), and 
whether i t is intended to deter the repetit ion of a given conduct 895;  (2) the type 
and the degree of severity of the penalty, such as imprisonment , or, in cases where 
failure to pay the penalty may result  in imprisonment or the compulsory 
liquidation or bankruptcy of the sanctioned undertaking, are considered to be 
belonged to “criminal sphere” 896.  
 Within this framework, the ECtHR conclu ded that administrative penalties, 
which include penalties imposed by national competit ion authorities due  to the 
aim of competition law (protection of the economic public order), the nature of 
penalty (preventive and repressive effect) ,  and the severity of sanction (high 
                                                             
894 The criteria for the qualification as “criminal” are so-called “Engel criteria’ which named after the judgment in 
which they were proposed for the first time. See ECtHR judgement, Engel and Others v. The Nederlands (Application 
No: 5100/71; 5101/71; 5102/71; 5354/72; 5370/72 and dated 08.06.1976). 
895 The ECtHR judgments, Jussila v. France (Application No:73053/01 and dated 23.11.2006); Bendenoun v. France, 
(Application No: 12547/85  and dated 24.02.1994); , Öztürk v Germany (Application no. 8544/79 dated 21,02,1984). 
See also ROSIAK, p.116;  
896 See the ECtHR judgement, Özturk v. Germany (Application No: 8544/79 and dated 21.02.1984); Engel and Others 
v. The Nederlands (Application No: 5100/71; 5101/71; 5102/71; 5354/72; 5370/72 and dated 08.06.1976). See also 
KOSTOVA, p. 20; ROSIAK, p. 116; WILS, p. 5, 6. 
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financial penalties) have a criminal nature, thus competit ion proceedings should 
be covered by guarantees envisaged in Article 6 of the Convention 897.  
 2 .1.3. Determination of “criminal nature” of the penalties applied to 
competition infringements by Turkish Competition Board  
 The Turkish Competition Board operating within the framework of Act No. 
4054 imposes fines in accordance with Articles 16 and 17 , which are stipulated 
in the third chapter t it led “Administrative Fines” of the mentioned Law against 
competit ion infringements. Therefore, the penalties imposed by the Board are 
considered administrative penalties in national law. Thus, in the assessment of 
whether administrative sanctions are criminal in nature, i t is seen that the formal 
qualification of the act under national law is not criminal law. Nonetheless,  the 
legal qualification of the sanction in national law does not play a decisive role in 
determining whether the sanction is criminal.  
 In assessing whether the penalties imposed on competition violations are 
criminal in nature, the scope of the infringed  rules and the deterrent effect of 
punishments are emphasized. In addition to the applicabili ty of Act No. 4054 to 
all  goods and services markets898,  according to the given definition of the 
undertaking in the TCA, partnerships and individuals without legal personality 
can be subject to competition law899,  and it can be said that the Turkish 
competit ion rules can be applied to all  citizens 900.  In addition, administrative 
penalties imposed on competit ion infringements may be considered deterrent in 
terms of the violation, given the existence of the provision of recurrence 901.  
                                                             
897 In this context, see the following ECtHR judgments, Hüseyin Turan v. Turkey (Application No: 11529/02 and 
04.03.2008); A. Menarini Diagnostics S.R.L. v. Italy (Application No: 43509/08 and dated 27.06.2011). See also 
ROSIAK, p. 116, 117; KOSTOVA, p. 28-30. 
898 Article 2 of TCA. 
899 Article 3 of TCA (“Undertaking: Natural and legal persons who produce, market and sell goods or services in the 
market, and units which can decide independently and do constitute an economic whole. Association of 
Undertakings: Any kind of associations with or without a legal personality, which are formed by undertakings to 
accomplish particular goals.). 
900 KARABEL, Gözde, Rekabet Hukukunda Ne Bis In Idem Ilkesi [The Ne Bis In Idem Principle in Competition Law], 
Rekabet Kurumu Uzmanlik Tezleri Serisi, No: 141, Ankara 2015, p. 37. 
901 See Article 16(5) (“When deciding on an administrative fine pursuant to paragraph three, the Board shall take 
into consideration issues such as the repetition of infringement…”). 
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Likewise, on the grounds of Article 16 902 and in the general preamble of the 
Regulation on Fines903,  the “deterrence effect” is explicit ly mentioned.  
 Moreover ,  within the scope of “severity of the penalty” criterion, pursuant 
to Article 16 of the TCA, the Board has the authority to apply fines of up to 10% 
of the annual gross revenues of undertakings. Thus, i t  is understood that this 
criterion is met in terms of administrative fines imposed by the B oard904.  
 In summary,  acts that violate competition rules can be defined as “faults” 
and the fines imposed by the Board can be defined as “administrative penalties”. 
However, absence of the legal qualification of “offence” or “crime” does not 
prevent competit ion proceedings to  be covered by guarantees laid down in Article 
38 of the Constitution , such as the principle of legality, the presumption of 
innocence, and the right to remain silent905.  This understanding is found in the 
Constitution Court’s interpretation of the scope of Article 38 906.  Even though the  
Turkish Constitution does not include the ne bis in idem  principle, considering 
the supremacy norm character of Article 6 of the Convention, and the ECtHR’s 
jurisprudence that considers i ts close relation to Article 4 of Protocol no. 7 to the 
Convention907,  we conclude that the ne bis in idem  principle should be applied to 
                                                             
902 “Furthermore, a paragraph has also been added stating that natural persons serving in managerial bodies of the 
legal personality shall be fined personally, for purposes of being deterrent”. 
903 Therein, it is stated that the goals to be accomplished by the Regulation on Fines are as follows: “Ensuring that 
fines are specifically and generally deterrent. Specific deterrence is preventing those undertakings, which are the 
addressee of fines, from violating the Act. General deterrence is dissuading those undertakings which are likely to 
violate the Act or which continue a violation that has not been detected yet. In this context, fines should be 
determined in such a way that they ensure both types of deterrence.”. 
904 KARABEL, p. 38. 
905 See ASLAN (2017), p. 1046; KARABEL, p. 39. 
906 It is also accepted in the doctrine that mainly the basic criminal law principles should be applied on administrative 
fines. See GÖLCÜKLÜ, Feyyaz, “İdari Ceza Hukuku ve Anlamı; İdarenin Cezai Müeyyide Tatbiki [Administrative 
Criminal Law and Its Meaning: Imposition of Criminal Sanctions]”, 18 SIYASAL BILGILER FAKÜLTESI DERGISI 2 (1963), 
p. 118, available at http://dergiler.ankara.edu.tr/dergiler/42/398/4310 (last visited 19.09.2017); DONAY, Süheyl, 
“İdarenin Ceza Verme Yetkisi Konusunda Anayasa Mahkemesinin Bir Kararı Üzerine Düşünceler [Thoughts on a 
Decision of the Constitutional Court on the Right of Punishment]”, 37 İSTANBUL ÜNIVERSITESI HUKUK FAKÜLTESI 
MECMUASI 1-4 (1971), p. 418, available at  http://www.journals.istanbul.edu.tr/iuhfm/article/view/1023005182 
(last visited 19.09.2017); ÖZKAN, Faruk, “Kabahatler Hukukunun Rekabet Hukuku Açısından Uygulanması 
[Application of the Faults Act in Competition Law]”, Istanbul University Social Sciences Institute, İstanbul (2011) 
[hereinafter ÖZKAN (2011)], p. 40; ASLAN (2017), p. 1045, 1046. 
907 Article 4 of Protocol no. 7 to the Convention: 
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competit ion proceedings , as competition rules are applied to all  citizens (with 
their deterrence effect),  and imposed fines can reach the weight of criminal 
sanction.  
 2.1.4. The circumstance to be taken into consideration the ne bis in idem  
principle in the application of Turkish Competition Law  
 First ,  the application of the ne bis in idem  principle prohibits not only 
“repeated punishment” but also “repeated trial”. In other words, ne bis in idem  
grants an undertaking procedural and substantive protection of i ts rights in the 
initiated legal procedure following the  infringement of Articles 4, 6 , or 7.  
However, in Turkish law, no legal regime prevent s duplicate investigations for 
administrative violations. Therefore, in the case of the same act resulting in 
multiple faults, each offence/fault  is examined by different authorit ies under 
different rules and will  follow different processes.  
 One of the  legal basis for the application of ne bis in idem  in terms of 
administrative financial penalties is Article 15 (3) of the Faults Act, which 
regulates the method of punishment in the case of a crime and a  fault  at  the same 
time due to the same act. On the other hand, Article 15 (1) of the Faults Act, 
which regulates the possibili ty of imposing more than one administrative financial 
penalty for the same act, can be regarded as another aspect of the principl e908.  In 
this context, repeated punishment may occur when 1)  an act constitutes both 
offence and infringement of competition 2)  if the same act is treated both as an 
individual punishment and as an aggravating factor in the determination of the 
amount of the  final administrative fine 3) the same act results in multiple faults. 
                                                             
 “1. No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again in criminal proceedings under the jurisdiction of the 
same State for an offence for which he has already been finally acquitted or convicted in accordance with the law 
and penal procedure of the State. 
 2.The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not prevent the re-opening of the case in accordance with 
the law and penal procedure of the State concerned, if there is evidence of new or newly discovered facts, or if there 
has been a fundamental defect in the previous proceedings, which could affect the outcome of the case. 
 3.No derogation from this Article shall be made under Article 15 of the Convention.”. 
908 ÖZEN, p. 395. 
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 2.1.4.1. The situation that an act constitutes both offence and 
infringement of competition  
 Pursuant to Article 15 (3) of the Faults Act, if an act constitutes both a fault 
and an offence, the act may be punished for the fault ,  unless the act is not punished 
due to an offence. In this respect, if the violation of the competit ion constitutes a 
crime at the same time, the act should not be punished by the Board, if the act has 
been sanctioned bt criminal courts909.  Within this framework, the application 
principles of the Article 15(3) of the Faults Act are as follows: 
 1) During the preliminary investigation or investigation, if the Board finds 
that the investigated act may const itute a criminal offence, the Board should fi le 
a complaint in accordance with Article 158 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Thus, 
the Board should suspend the examination of whether Act No. 4054 has been 
violated by considering the decision of the pu blic prosecutor or criminal court 910.  
If the public prosecutor decides that he/she is unable to obtain evidence to 
constitute sufficient suspicion as to the occurrence of a crime , or if there is no 
room for criminal prosecution, the Board will  be able to con tinue the 
investigation.  
 2) If  a criminal prosecution is insti tuted, at  the end of the prosecution, 
pursuant to Article 223 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the criminal court can 
rule acquittal , conviction (imprisonment or punitive fine), and/or security 
measures. If the court decides on a conviction and/or security measure, and this 
decision is finalized, the Board, in accordance with 15(3) of the Faults Act, will  
no longer be able to impose administrative fines 911.  In that case, the criminal court 
decides on acquittal  because the alleged act was not fulfi l led by the person who 
is the subject of the case, the Board should not apply administrative fines again 
for that person912.  
                                                             
909 KARABEL, p. 41. 
910 İd., p. 42. 
911 ÖZKAN (2011), p. 40; ÖZEN, p. 412, 413; KARABEL, p. 42. 
912 KARABEL, p. 42. 
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 3) As for the rule in Article 15 (3) of the Faults Act, the same action must 
be taken by the same  person. In the evaluation of the same person ’s  condition, 
legal persons and natural persons are not considered as one and the same913. 
Therefore, the ongoing criminal prosecution or conviction and/or security 
measures for the legal personalit y of the undertaking is not an obstacle to the 
Board launching an investigation or imposing administrative fines on managers 
or employees of the undertaking or association of undertakings who are 
determined to have a decisive influence in the infringement, according to Article 
16(3). On the other hand,  vice versa ,  the continuing criminal prosecution or 
conviction and/or security measures for the natural person (managers or 
employees) does not prevent the imposition of a fine on the undertaking 914.  
 2.1.4.2. Possible repeated punishment to occur while determining final 
administrative fine  
 The method to be applied in de termining the penalties to be imposed by the 
Board is specified in the Regulation on Fines. Accordingly, when the Board 
determines the penalty, i t  firstly determines the base fine pursuant to Article 5 of 
the Regulation on Fines, then in the framework of Articles 6 and 7 of the 
Regulation on Fines,  aggravating and mitigating factors are taken into 
consideration (by increasing or decreasing)  and the final amount of the fine is 
calculated. In Article 6 (2) subparagraph (b) of the Regulation of Fines, “no 
assistance with the examination” is count ed as an aggravating factor. 
Furthermore, Article 16 (1) subparagraph (d) foresees that administrative fines 
(by five thousand of the gross revenues) on the undertaking that prevents or  
complicates the investigation as an independent punishment from the 
investigation conducted.  
                                                             
913 See Board decision dated 26.07.2007 and numbered 07-62/740-268. Council of State decisions dated 01.02.2013 
and numbered E. 2009/3363, K. 2013/217; dated 25.01.2011 and numbered E. 2007/16188, K. 2011/240.  
914 See Council of State decisions dated 01.02.2013 and numbered E. 2009/3216, K. 2013/219; dated 30.05. 2013 
and numbered E. 2009/3218, K. 2013/1632. 
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 Therefore, following the application of the fine stipulated in Article 16(1) 
(d) of the TCA in the phase of preliminary investigation/ investigation, if the base 
determined as the result  of the i nvestigation is increased on the basis of the same 
hindering or complicating action, repeated punishment will  arise and  the ne bis 
in idem  principle will  be violated915.  
 Thus, precaution is needed in the implementation of the aggravating factor 
so that the same act is not punished individually. If the act (no assistance to 
examination) is punished under Article 16 (1) of the TCA, due to the ne bis in 
idem  principle, the same act should not be taken as an aggravating factor.  
 2.1.4.3. Same act that leads multiple faults  
 According to Article 15(1) of the Faults Act, in the event of the act 
constituting more than one fault , the act shall be punished by the heaviest 
administrative fine envisaged. In  the case of enforcing sanctions other than 
administrative penalties, each of these sanctions shall  apply. Therein, the scope 
of the ne bis in idem  principle is limited to administrative fines 916.  However, i t  is 
unclear whether Article 15 (1) of the Faults Act contains the situation in which 
faults fall ing within the jurisdiction of different administrative authorities, or that 
fall  under the jurisdiction of the same administrative authority. With respect to 
this question, the application of Article 44 of the Turkish Criminal Code , which 
is indicated as a reference fo r the application of Article 15 (1) of the Faults Act 
in i ts grounds for Article 15 (1), can provide insights.  
 Article 44 of the Turkish Criminal Code stipulates the “conceptual 
aggregation” provision for  a situation in which more than one crime is commit ted 
by a single act. In the enforcement of the verdict, the competent authority, the  
criminal courts, conducts the legal characterization of the act and identifies the 
                                                             
915 ARI/ AYGÜN, p. 40-42; ASLAN (2017), p. 1090. See also Council of State decision dated 14.05.2008 and numbered 
E. 2006/1113, K. 2008/4207 [cancelling the Board decision (dated 14.10.2005 and numbered 05-68/958-259) due to 
repeated punishment]. See also KARABEL, p. 44. 
916 KARABEL, p. 45. 
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most severe of the different offences. Thus, Article 44 of the TCK is applied in 
the situation where offences fall  under the jurisdiction of the same authorities, 
namely the criminal courts917.  Therefore, i t is considered that the stated regulation 
cannot be applied to the problem of repetitive punishment that may ar ise because 
of the same act being punished by multiple administrative authorit ies 918.  
 Moreover, the same act constitutes more than one fault  within the 
competence of the Competit ion Authority, i .e.,  the same act that violates different 
subparagraphs of the same article of the TCA, or violates Article 4 and Article 6, 
can elicit the repeated punishment. However, in addition to Article 15 (1) of the 
Faults Act, the envisaged method of determining the base fine within Reg ulation 
on Fines provides a solution to the problem. According to Art icle 4 (1) 
subparagraph (a), only behaviors that can be regarded as independent in terms of 
market, nature , and chronological process will  be punished separately 919.   
 Lastly, a violation of competit ion within the scope of the TCA may bring 
also violation of different kinds in another law or regulation, and the issue of 
repeated punishment may occur. Especially,  if the same act is described as fault  
in the regulated sectors ’ legislation  and is also prohibited under the TCA. This 
situations might arise  repeated punishment by different competent administrative 
authorities. Turkish law does not seem to have an arrangement to deal with this 
problem. Nonetheless, application of the ne bis in idem  principle in EU 
competit ion law can provide guidance in this subject.  
 Similar to the jurisprudence of ECtHR, the General Court has specified that 
the ne bis in idem  principle prohibits punishing the same subject twice for the 
same il legal act and for the same protected legal interest, while emphasizing that 
in order for the principle to be applied , three conditions should be met: (1)  
                                                             
917 ÖZEN, p. 408; KARABEL, p. 46. 
918 KARABEL, p. 46. 
919 See ARI/ AYGÜN, p. 19-21 (reviewing both the Board decisions and Council of State decision, and concluding that 
no approach has been followed in the Board decisions related to the issue, which would cause repeated 
punishment). See also KARABEL, p. 47-50. 
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identity of the facts920,  (2) unity of offender921,  and (3) unity of the legal interest 
protected922.  
 The Competit ion Authority is competent and responsible for ensuring and 
protecting competit ion in all  sectors 923.  In this regard, i t  appears to be unable  
prevent that competence of the Board from overlapping with the sector specific 
regulator authorit ies’ competence. This issue is recognized and the cooperation 
protocols between the authorit ies have been signed924.  However, cooperation or 
collaboration protocols are not sufficient in themselves to avoid infringement of 
the ne bis in idem  principle. On the other hand,  it  does not mean that the 
Competit ion Board abdicates i ts competence over the regulated sector.  
 On this subject, in its decisions the Board explicit ly states the ne bis in 
idem  principle, but does not interpret this principle as an obstacle for launching 
its own investigation under the TCA even if the same conduct is being investigated 
concurrently, or is punished by another administrative authority 925.  The course of 
the Board depends on “competit ive harm”. The Board has opted to start  i ts own 
investigation if i t  determines that ongoing investigation by another administrative 
authority will  not address competit ive harm or is not able to offset competit ive 
harm926.  
 However, i t  cannot be said that the Board consistently followed this 
approach. In some decisions, the Board decides not to intervene in the presence 
                                                             
920 Connect to this subject, Article 4 of Regulation of Fines that defines independent behavior can be considered for 
the identity of the facts whether the acts constitute same event and followed by same aim. 
921 See the General Court FNCBV v Commission decision, Cases T-217/03 and T-245/03, ECR [2006] II-4987 
(concluding the lack of identity of the offenders as considering separate legal personality, separate budget, and 
separate statutory aims, and that each of offenders’ own collective actions to protect their own specific interests). 
922 ROSIAK, p. 120 and stated case law therein. 
923 Article 2 of the TCA.  
924 Protocol on Cooperation between Information Technology and Communication Authority and Competition 
Authority (02.11.2011), Protocol on Cooperation between Public Procurement Authority and Competition Authority 
(14.10.2009), Protocol on Collaboration and Information Sharing between Banking Regulation and Supervision 
Agency and Competition Authority (15.11.2012). 
925 See the Board decision dated 09.06.2003 and numbered 03-40/432-186 (KARABEL, p. 51). 
926 See the Board decisions dated 10.02.2005 and numbered 05-10/81-30; dated 08.01.2009 and numbered 09-01/2-
2  (KARABEL, p. 52, 53). 
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of the sectoral regulator and the regulations without further evaluation 927.   In this  
aspect, The Board’s approach is unapproved by the Council of State, and the court 
has canceled the Board ’s  decision as recognizing that sectoral regulations do not 
change the scope of the Competition Authority’s authority over all  goods and 
services928.  The Council  of State emphasizes that the Board has  the discretion not 
to open an investigation if the interference of another authority has resulted in 
the termination of the effects of the existing competition infringement and the 
competit ive harm has been completely eliminated.  
 The Council  of State does not explicit ly state “protected legal interest”, but 
i ts emphasis on “competit ive harm” is in line with this criterion. In the 
determination of legal interest,  i t  would be appropriate to take into consideration 
the facts of the authorities that called for the sanctions. In that case, the 
administrative authority imposes sanctions by considering competition law, and a 
second intervention by the Board will  mean a breach of the ne bis in idem  
principle. In this respect, the information and documents, analysis and 
calculations that form the basis of the evaluations and determinations made by 
the relevant administrative authority on the issue of  penalty matters should be 
obtained and examined by the Board929.   
 The importance of cooperation and transparency between administrative 
authorities is the key to determining whether rules on competition law are taken 
into consideration by another authority. If the penalty imposed by the relevant 
authority is directed towards the establishment and protection of the competit ive 
environment, i t  can be considered that both institutions pursue the same interest. 
However, the Board should be aware throughout the investigation , and if an 
infringement is determined, there should be concern about foreseen penalties or 
                                                             
927 See the Board decisions dated 22.12.2005 and numbered 05-87/1199-348; dated 11.09.2008 and numbered 08-
52/792-321; dated 21.10.2009 and numbered 09-48/1206-306; dated 8.3.2002 and number 02-13/ 127-54; dated 
29.06.2006 and numbered 06-46/ 601-172; dated 30.10.2008 and numbered 08-61/ 996-388. 
928 See the Council of State (13th Chamber) decisions dated 20.11.2007 and numbered E. 2006/2052, K. 2007/7582; 
dated 08.05.2012 and numbered E. 2008/14245, K. 2012/960; dated 13.02.2012 and numbered E. 2008/13184, K. 
2012/359. See also KARABEL, p. 50-55. 
929 KARABEL, p. 55, 59. 
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remedies for the infringement by sector regulators. The imposed remedies by the 
sector regulator may not be equal to the weight of the remedies that would be 
imposed by the Board if the conduct were examined before the Board. This can 
be true even if competitive harm is address ed by sector regulator.  
 We propose that  if another administrative authority addresse s the 
“competitive harm” and also considers competit ion law, but fails to introduce 
effective remedies for the identified abuse, it  does not grant the Board the right 
to init iate i ts own investigation to introduce a complementary measure for the 
same abuse. It  is clear in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR that the ne bis in idem  
principle does not accept an offsetting of the amount of the first  penalty imposed 
because of the earlier proceeding from the amount of the second penalty 930.  The 
principle forbids repeated punishment as well  as repeated trial  for the same 
offence. 
 Therefore, the suggestion of the Council  of State that “ and  the competit ive 
harm has completely eliminated” for not breaching the ne bis in idem  principle is 
not sufficient to avoid  a repeated trial .  Provided that the  sector regulator takes 
into account the competitive sphere of the conduct, undertakings should be 
guaranteed that a repeated trial  will  not be conducted . 
  In summary, the ne bis in idem principle  should be viewed as a fundamental 
human right consequent to the principle of the rule of law and the right to a fair 
trial . Absence of explicit  reference to the principle does not change this outcome 
for Turkish Law. Administrative fines imposed by the Board meet the conditions 
(applicable to all  cit izens, their deterrence effect ,  and severity character) str essed 
by the ECtHR for the wider application of the ne bis in idem  principle.  
                                                             
930 ECtHR judgement Franz Fischer v. Austria (Application No:37950/97 and dated 29.05.2001) (ROSIAK, p. 117). 
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 2.2. Consequences of the Restriction of Competition in Private Law  
 2.2.1. Contractual validity in abuse of dominant position  
 Abuse of dominant position may occur due to a contract or a contractual 
clause. In this context ,  the question to be asked is what the effect is of a finding 
of abuse under Article 6 of  the TCA on the validity of the legal transaction (a 
contract or a contractual clause)? This issue has not been clarif ied by the Board 
or the TCA. For  Article 4, the answer is clear pursuant to Article 56 of the TCA , 
which stipulates that “any agreements and decisions of associations of 
undertakings, contrary to Article 4 of this Act , are invalid”. However,  Article 56 
does not cover the Article 6.  
 Since there is no statement in the TCA, we should invoke the general 
provisions of  the Turkish Code of Obligation 931.  According to Article 27 (1) , 
“Contracts that are contrary to the provisions of the law, morals, public order, 
personal rights or impossible are absolutely null  and void”. Therefore, in the case 
where a contract or contractual clause is itself considered abusive , i t  should 
automatically be deemed void, since it  will  be contrary to the imperative 
provisions of the TCA. However, this approach will be inconsistent with the legal 
structure of the TCA, due to clear distinctions introduced by Article 56 between 
Article 4 and Article 6.  
 Moreover, acceptance of invalidity may cause further damage to the party 
injured by abusive conduct932.  In this context, ASLAN and O’DONOGHUE/ 
PADILLA suggest applying the doctrine of severance 933 to determine whether  the 
offending terms can be severed from the contract ,  leaving the remaining terms to 
continue operating as an enforceable contract 934.  
                                                             
931 Turkish Code of Obligations Law No. 6098 (Official Gazette dated 04.02.2011 and numbered 27836) 
932 ASLAN (2017), p. 1135. 
933 Doctrine of severance is placed under Article 27(2) of Turkish Code of Obligation:” The invalidity of some 
provisions of the contract does not affect the validity of others. However, if it is clear that the contract will not be 
made without these provisions, all of the contract will be null and void.”. 
934 ASLAN (2017), p. 1135, 1136; O’DONOGHUE/ PADILLA, n. 32329. 
289 
 
 There is no Board decision on this issue, and in many cases, the Board 
specifies a remedy (usually imposition of “termination of infringement” 935 
proactively) instead of determin ing the effect of Article 6 on contractual validi ty.  
In our opinion, if the conditions for severance are satisfied, the doctrine of 
severance can be applied. However, the principle to be applied for these cases 
must be in favor of the injured party. The undertakings should not be entit led to 
derive advantage from unlawful agreement 936.   
 2.2.2. Right to compensation  
 Compensatory provisions that may be claimed in the event of a competit ion 
violation are regulated as follows:  
Right  to compensat ion  
Art ic le 57-  Anyo ne who  prevent s,  d is to rt s or  rest r ict s compe t it ion via prac t ices,  
dec is io ns,  cont ract s o r agreement s cont rar y to  t his Act ,  o r  abuses his do minant  posit io n 
in  a par t icu lar  market  fo r  goods o r services,  is  obl iged to  compensat e fo r  any damages  
o f t he injured.  I f t he damage has resu lt ed fro m the behavi o r  o f more than one people,  
t hey are respons ib le fo r  t he damage jo int ly 937.  
Compensat ion for the Damage  
Art ic le 58-  [1]  Those who  suffer  as a  resu lt  o f t he prevent ion,  d isto rt ion o r  rest rict ion 
o f compet it ion,  may c la im as a damage the d ifference between the cost  t hey pa id and  
the cost  t hey would have pa id if co mpet it ion had no t  been limit ed.  [2]  Compet ing  
under t ak ings  a ffect ed by the limit at ion o f compet it ion may request  t hat  al l of  t he ir  
damages are compensat ed by the under t ak ing o r under t akings which limit ed  
compet it ion.  [3]  In det ermin ing the damage,  a ll pro fit s  expected to  be ga ined by the  
                                                             
935 Article 9 (1) of the TCA: “If the Board, upon informing, complaint or the request of the Ministry or on its own 
initiative, establishes that articles 4, 6 and 7 of this Act are infringed, it notifies the undertaking or associations of 
undertakings concerned of the decision encompassing those behavior to be fulfilled or avoided so as to establish 
competition and maintain the situation before infringement, in accordance with the provisions mentioned in section 
Four of this Act.”. 
936 ASLAN (2017), p. 1136; O’DONOGHUE/ PADILLA, n. 32329. 
937 Emphasis added.  
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in jured under t ak ings are ca lcu lat ed by tak ing into account  t he ba lance sheet s of t he  
previous years as we l l.   
I f t he resu lt ing damage ar ises from an agreement  o r decis io n o f t he part ie s,  o r from 
cases invo lv ing gross neg l igence o f t hem,  the judge may,  upon the request  o f t he  
in jured,  award compensat ion by three - fo ld o f t he material  damage incurred or  o f t he 
pro fit s  ga ined o r  like ly to  be ga ined by those who  caused the damage. 938 
Burden of Proof  
Art ic le 59-  Should the in jured submit  to  t he jur isd ict iona l bod ies proofs such as,  
par t icu lar ly,  t he actual par t it ioning o f market s,  st abilit y observed in t he marke t  pr ice  
fo r  qu it e  a  long t ime,  t he pr ice increase within c lose int erva ls  by the under t ak ings  
operat ing in t he market ,  which g ive the impress io n o f t he exist ence o f an agreement ,  or  
t he d isto rt ion o f compet it ion in t he market ,  t hen the burden o f proof is  fo r t he 
de fendant s t hat  t he under t akings are no t  engaged in concer t ed pract ice.   
The exist ence o f agreement s,  dec is ions  and pract ices l imit ing co mpet it ion may be  
proved by any k ind o f evidence.  
 Claims for compensation will  be invoked before the general courts by those 
who are injured as a result  of a competit ion law infringement. Although it  is 
expected that the TCA, which is a special law according to the Turkish Code of 
Obligation Law No. 6098 939,  will  allow the issues to be settled by general law, the 
TCA has introduced some specific regulations. However, these arrangements can 
lead to divergent interpretations and problems due to poorly written regulations . 
If the right to compensation were to be regulated clearly, i t  would have been more 
accurate to state who could be sued for what, and the method for the quantification 
of damage.  
 When the mentioned TCA provisions are evaluated collectively, plaintiffs ,  
defendants, and the compensation that may be awarded for damages under a 
violation of Article 6, can be expressed as follow s: 
                                                             
938 Emphasis and numbered references added. 
939 Turkish Code of Obligation Law No. 6098 (Official Gazette dated 04.02.2011 and numbered 27836). 
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 1) Any person injured by a violation of Article 6 of the TCA may fi le an 
action against the undertaking(s) that abuse their dominant position. Anyone who 
may be harmed by this violation may claim compensation on this basis. 
 2) There is no uniformity in terms of “plaintiff” in the related provisions.  
Expressions of “those who are injured/suffer” (57, 58/1 [1] -2, 59), “competing 
undertakings” (58/1 [2]), and “injured undertakings” (58/1[3])  are used. 
Therefore, i t  is not necessary for those who can sue to be an “undertaking”. In  
this case, consumers seem to be able to bring a compensation claim due to 
infringement of competit ion.  However, although it  is possible for consumer 
organizations to fi le lawsuits related to consumers in general,  they are not able to 
open lawsuits for damages in the name of consumers940.  Pursuant to Articles 73 
and 74 of the Law on Protection of Consumers Law No . 6052 (hereinafter 
Consumer Law), in cases where there is no individual consumer problem and 
consumers are generally concerned, consumer organizations may file lawsuits in 
consumer courts in order to prevention of the violation of the Consumer Law. 
Thus, these regulations are l imited to violation of the Consumer Law, and they 
cannot be implemented in cases that will be opened due to competit ion 
infringement941.   
 3) It  can be said that provision 58(1) [1] refers implicitly to customers and 
consumers. However , i t  is difficult to find an objective explanation why the law 
stipulates different provisions in respect of customer/consumer compensation for 
damages. By considering the provision 58(1)[1] on its own,  i t  should not be 
concluded that consumers and custome rs can only claim the difference in price 
(“overcharge”). That is not to say that prices will  always increase when 
competit ion is restricted. In this respect, in Article 58(1) [1] , “may claim” ,  and 
in Article 57, “any damages of the injured” should be inte rpreted jointly, and 
consumers and customers should be considered to be able to claim all  types of  
                                                             
940 As a matter of fact, cases that can be filed by consumer organizations within the scope of Article 56 (Unfair 
Competition provision) of the Turkish Commercial Code do not include compensation cases. 
941 ASLAN (2017), p. 1140. 
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damage942.  In  this regard, consumers and customers should be able to claim 
compensation for both material  and immaterial  damages.  
 Within the scope of these provisions, whether immaterial  damages can be 
claimed is disputed. According to ATILA 943 and SANLI 944,  relevant provisions do 
not cover immaterial  damages. While this view accepts that immaterial  damages 
may be occur, i t also suggests that the  case must be fi led in accordance with the 
general provisions945.  On the other hand, ASLAN claim s that “any damages” (in 
Article 57 of the TCA) also covers immaterial  damages 946.  
 In our opinion, “any damages” includes implicit  immaterial  damages. If the 
legislator had only predicted material  damages, i t  would be explicitly stated as 
under Article 58 (2). Although it  is unclear where consumers and customers may 
suffer immaterial  damage due to competit ion infringement , at  least from the point 
of competing undertakings, violation  of inner peace, freedom of enterprise , and 
causing discouragement may also cause immaterial  damages 947.  
 As stated, the amount of the material  damage that customers/consumers can 
claim should not be l imited to “overcharge”. Loss of  profits (including loss o f  
future profits) can be demanded948.  However, due to lack of similar provisions in 
                                                             
942 See ASLAN (2017), p. 1140. Cf. SANLI, K. Cem, “Türk Rekabet Hukukunda Haksiz Fiil Sorumlulugu[Tort Liability in 
Turkish Competition Law]”, Rekabet Hukukunda Güncel Gelismeler Sempozyumu I, Kayseri (2003), p. 244, available 
at http://www.rekabet.gov.tr/File/?path=ROOT/1/Documents/Etkinlik+Kitab%c4%b1/etkinlikkitap12.pdf  (last 
visited 30.09.2017) [hereinafter SANLI (2003)]. 
943 ATİLA, Metin, “Rekabet Hukuku Açisindan Zarar [Damages in Competition Law]”, REKABET HABER BÜLTENI 15 
(2005), p.7, available at 
https://view.officeapps.live.com/op/view.aspx?src=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.rekabetdernegi.org%2Frk_bulten%2Fsa
yi15.doc (last visited 30.09.2017). 
944 SANLI (2003), p. 236. 
945 It should be noted that neither the White Paper nor the Green Paper, as well Directive on Antitrust Damages 
Actions which are the instruments that suggest specific policy measures to establish effective redress mechanism in 
order to be fully compensated for the harm of victims of infringements of the EU antitrust rules, do not include 
immaterial damages. The relevant documents are available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/documents.html (last visited 20.09.2017). 
946 ASLAN (2017), p. 1141, 1142. 
947 See ASLAN (2017), p. 1141. 
948 See also Directive of The European Parliament And of The Council on certain rules governing actions for damages 
under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European 
Union (“Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions”), Brussel 24 October 2014, available at 
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Article 58 (2) and Article 56 (1) (e) of Turkish Commercial Code Law No. 6102,  
“the profits gained or l ikely to be gained by those who caused the damage” cannot 
be awarded as compensation within the framework of 58(1) for 
customers/consumers.  
 4) Article 58 (1) [2] emphasizes that “competing undertakings’ will  be able 
to claim compensation for  any  damages. In  respect of Article 58(1)[3], i t  is 
debatable whether this provision is a tautology as foreseeing “ loss of profits 
(including loss of future profits)” can be claimed as damages, or whether the 
legislator had intended to refer to the profits gained “by those who caused the 
damage”, instead of “by the injured”. The latter view makes more sense, since 
Article 56 (1) (e) of Turkish Commercial Code provides similar provision that 
allow those who are injured to claim as material  damage “the expected benefits 
of the defendant to be obtained as a result of unfair competition”. Accordingly, i t  
is generally accepted  that Article 58 (1) [3] is badly worded, and it  should be 
understood as “by those who caused the damage” in accordance with  Article 56 
(1) (e) of Turkish Commercial Code949.  
 According to us, i t  should be placed as “by those who caused the damage”, 
in order to explain why Article 58(1) [3] is written while Article 58(1) [2] exists. 
This interpretation is also necessary to bring consistency between provisions 
58(1) [3] and 58(2). However, this clear distinction exists, thus the best solution 
is to change this expression. Thus ,  the difficulty in the quantification of “loss of  
profits” can be simplified. Nonetheless, since Article 59 (2) is present, the 
expression of “as wel l” in Article 58 (1) [3] will  serve rather than an unnecessary 
repetit ion. 
 5) Article 58(2) has resulted in “treble damages” ,  and it  is the first t ime 
that the Turkish legal system foresees punitive damages. By virtue of the 
                                                             
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/damages_directive_final_en.pdf (last visited 
20.09.2017).  
949 See ASLAN (2017), p. 1144, 1145; AŞÇIOĞLU ÖZ, p. 182,183; ATİLA, p. 7. 
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provision, consumers/ customers and competing undertakings that suffer injury 
may demand such compensation. Accordingly, compensation may be award ed at 
the rate of three  times the “material  damage” or “the profits gained or l ikely to  
be gained by those who caused the damage”.  
 In this context, those issues can be discussed: when the conditions of 58 
(2) are fulfilled, shall  the judge award punitive damages; can the judge award 
compensation only at  the rate three t imes; or this rate may be up to three -fold but 
not exceed three-fold? 
 The questions mentioned above are answered differently in the l i terature. 
GÜL purports that even if the conditions are met, the indictment is at  the 
discretion of the judge, but i t  cannot be awarded in one - or two-fold form instead 
of three-times950.  According to this view, if the judge rules for compensation, this 
should only be three -fold.  
 AŞÇIOĞLU ÖZ  argues that the judge does not have the discretionary power 
when the conditions are met ;  however, the compensation rate need not be three-
fold951.  It  should be understood that i t  can be at most  three-fold. ASLAN also 
accepts that the judge must award compensation if circumstances arise, but, i t  is 
not possible for the judge to award compensation “up to three -fold” ; i t  must be 
three-fold952.  
 We suggest that  the expression “judge may” cannot be interpreted as 
awarding compensation up to judge’s discretion. Our reading suggests that ‘judge 
may” refers here to “upon the request of the injured”. In other words, the judge 
cannot rule “treble damages” ex officio .  It  should be required by the injured 
plaintiff,  and if the resulting damage arises from an agreement  between or 
decision of the parties, or from cases involving gross negligence, then the judge 
                                                             
950 GÜL, Ibrahim, Tesebbüsün Alicilarina Ayrimcilik Yaparak Hakim Durumunu Kötüye Kullanmasi [Abuse of Dominant 
Position through Discrimination between Customers], Rekabet Kurumu Yayini, Ankara 2000, p. 27. 
951 AŞÇIOĞLU ÖZ, p. 197. 
952 ASLAN (2017), p. 1148. 
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must award compensation. In respect of the rate to be determined, the wording of  
the provision is clear ;  i t  cannot be up to three -fold –  i t  should be three-fold. 
Otherwise, the legislator would grant discretionary power to the judge for  
decreasing the compensation amount to be awarded, as in Article 52 of the Turkish 
Code of Obligation. 
 Aside from the grammatical interpretation, we should examine the ratio 
legis  of the TCA. Even though private l i t igation is not aimed at protecting the 
public interest but at protecting individuals’ subjective right s, such as right to 
compensation, the TCA legislator would not stipulate right to compensation 
separate from general provisions, unless the additional benefit  to be derived was 
apparent . Indeed, private l it igation indirect ly benefits competit ion law 
enforcement by increasing the detection rate of the competit ion infringements and 
fostering private parties to identify violations. While Articles 57 and 58(1) 
provide this indirect benefit ,  Article 58(2) aims to exert  an additional  deterrence 
effect due to i ts punitive character. It  is similar to the US regulation that  aims to 
grant private enforcement a prominent role in the enforcement of competition law.  
 Article 58 (2) has  the potential  to render the private l i tigation as a first -
resort  remedy. However, lack of necessary regulati ons that allow representative 
and collective actions in compensation cases hinder this effect. Damages suffered 
individually by final consumers or low-volume purchasers will  often not attract 
l i t igation, especially considering the regulation that  the unsuccessful party pays 
the other party’s costs. Therefore, i t  also hinders private damage claims. For the  
effectiveness of the compensatory provisions in Turkey, legal reform is necessary 
that introduces a collective redress mechanism for injunctive relief and  
compensation caused by competition law violations , and which enables consumer 
associations to represent consumers in these l it igations 953.  
                                                             
953 See Communication from the Commission on quantifying harm in actions for damages based on breaches of 
Article 101 or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, C(2013) 3440, 11.6.2013, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/documents.html (last visited 20.09.2017). 
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 6) The further issue to deal  with is burden of proof under compensation 
li t igations. In these cases, general provisio ns are valid, i .e.,  in principle, all 
persons are  obliged to prove their claim. Article 59(1) eases the burden of proof, 
in accordance with paragraph three of the Article 4, as foreseeing the concerted 
practice presumption that transfers the burden of proof to the defendant party in 
cases where certain evidence exists.  Furthermore, Article 59 (2) denotes that  the 
claim may be proved by any kind of evidence.  
 However, even though any kind of evidence may be provided by private 
parties, identification of the  documents by the courts can raise problems. 
Furthermore, certain evidence may not be held by the parties but be in the file of 
the Board. The general court  does not have the authority to order the defendant 
or a third party to disclose evidence, and the claimant does not have access to 
documents held by the Board.  
 Moreover, the Board’s decision is not binding on the general courts. There 
is no legal basis that envisages given a final decision finding an infringement of 
the TCA is binding for  the general court,  or a pending proceeding before the Board 
arises prejudicial  issue for the general courts. Notwithstanding, the Court of 
Appeal has held that in cases where the Competition Board did not  find 
infringement, i t  does not require the court to suspend its proceedings while  
awaiting the Board’s final decision954.  
 This problem can be overcome with a legal regulation that define s the 
relationship between the Competition Board and the general courts. The  White 
Paper recommends that national competit ion authorit ies’ final decision s when 
finding an infringement should be binding in subsequent civil  antitrust damages 
cases in order to ease the burden of proof of claimants955.  We propose that  this 
                                                             
954 Court of Appeal (19th Chamber) decision dated 29.10.2002 and E.2002/2827, K. 2002/7580 [Aslan (2017), p. 1153, 
1154]. 
955 White Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, COM (2008) 165, Brussels 02.04.2008, p. 




approach be adopted by Turkish practice, since it  will  increase legal certainty and 
procedural efficiency. Within this framework, under Turkish law,  the plaintiff 
will  need to prove “fault” ,  “damage” ,  and “causal l ink (alleged infringement  that 
caused the damage)”. Under current legislation, i t  is discretionary on the courts 
to consider  a non-final decision as a prejudicial  issue. We foresee that i t  will  be 
beneficial  for practical reasons: the introduction of a legal regulation that 
envisages the Board’s finding of an infringement as binding, and a non-finalized 
decision as a prejudicial  issue for the general courts.  
 The compensatory provisions are not without problems. Nonetheless, they 
offer indirect and direct benefit  to competit ion law enforcement. Currently, i t  
cannot be said that their application is able to foster private action to become 
dominant in the enforcement of competit ion law. The underlying reasons include 
a lack of representative and collective actions, costs of action, claimant’s inability 
to obtain certain evidence within the competit ion authority’s confidential  files, 
or the fi les that are held by the defendant. These shortcomings should be  
eliminated with legal regulations that enable consumer associations to represent 
consumers by bringing collective actions for injunctive relief and compensation 
resulting from competit ion law violations, introduce cost allocation rules and 
rules for necessary disclosure inter partes ,  and have a binding effect in terms of 
the final infringement decision of the Board 956.  Furthermore, in the 
implementation of Article 58(1)  it  should be clarified that anyone (including 
consumers and customers) can require full  compensation, not merely  the 
“overcharge”  portion. In respect to Article 58(2), i t  should be clarified that judges 
do not have the discretion, upon the request of the injured  and when conditions 
are met  to award “treble damages” should be awarded. It  should also be explained 
that the rate is fixed,  and i t  cannot be interpreted as “up to three -fold”. This issue 
is important, considering the general atti tude of the courts that consider 
“compensation is not a tool for enrichment” when d etermining the amount of the 
compensation. Article 58(2) is a novel provision for Turkish law, which not only 
                                                             
956 See White Paper, p. 4, 5; Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions, paras. 15-25. 
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aims to protect the  individual’s subjective right, but also to strengthen antitrust 
enforcement via private l i tigants.  
 2.3. Remedies in Tying Cases 
 In contractual tying cases where the dominant undertaking sells its product 
on the condition that a second product is purchased , or offers i ts product via pure 
bundling, the Board has chosen termination of the infringement (tying) and , 
depending on the restrictive effect of tying on the competition, also imposed fines.  
 Tekhnelogos, which offers software program to the natural gas installation 
companies, required the issue a digital  insurance policy for the application of 
ZetaCad digital  sending/ onl ine approval system (DIPOS), which is used for 
project delivery. The application is made by its own company, the Üç Elma 
Sigorta Aracılık Hizmetleri  Limited Company 957.  As a result  of the preliminary 
proceeding the Board determined that the  obligatory clause  of Tekhnelogos (to 
issue insurance policy on this system, as well  as the online project submission 
service in DIPOS) was tying practice958.  Therefore, the Board held that 
Teknelogos abused its dominant position in the “online submission market of 
natural gas installation projects”, because it  was seen that the applications 
adversely affected the competition in the insurance sector (especially local 
insurance agencies) and the installation companies were restricted in terms of 
options such as the price and the service of the insurance company 959.  After taking 
into account that the practice covered a significantly small  portion of the 
insurance sector,and alternative options for competitors were found, the Board 
did not impose fines but ordered the removal of the compulsory digital  insurance 
policy from DIPOS 960.  
                                                             
957 Board Tekhnegolos decision dated 11.09.2008 and numbered 08-52/791-320. 
958 id., n. 580-600. 
959 id., n.610-680. 
960 id., n.700-710. 
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 The rights of the football  clubs related to the league matches were 
transferred to the Turkish Football  Federation (TFF), and the TFF sells these 
rights exclusively through tender to a broadcasting orga nization “Digitürk” 961. 
Digitürk, which won the tender and became a monopoly in this area, offered to 
sell  these images in a package and allegedly discriminate d on behalf of another 
television channel affiliated to the same broadcasting group 962.  Therefore, the 
Board concluded that  Digitürk’s packaging (pure bundling) practices constituted 
one of two actions to abuse its dominant position: Pursuant to the tender contract, 
upon request, Digitürk should provide to other publishers “these images for not 
more than 4000 US dollars per minute and limited to three minutes”963.  Thereupon, 
Digitürk demanded 108,000 US dollars for 27 minutes of video band per week 
from other publishers by means of “not to sell ing images for less than three 
minutes” and “selling packaged ima ges of nine matches played during the 
week”964.  In this context, the Board first  evaluated whether each of the images of  
the nine games played each week can be described as a separate product . The 
Boardconsidered that  publishers request match-based images and publishers who 
have the right of publishing in the previous period also sell  the images on a match 
basis, therefore i t  determined that there were nine different products at  the 
issue965.  However, i t  is noteworthy that the reason behind Digitürk’s practice is 
not an attempt to earn more profit  by selling products in packages but , because of 
the packaging practice, it  intended to complicate these images to be supplied by 
competing publishers of Show TV, which is Digitürk’s sister company 966.  
Therefore , Digiturk is held to have abused its dominant position  and is obliged to  
deliver “images” in standard lengths (which can be determined from market 
research by the broadcaster) within “1 -3 minutes” of the broadcast standard, and 
                                                             
961 Board Digitürk/TFF decision 28.08.2002 and numbered 02-50/636-258. 
962 id., n. 130-150. 
963 id., n. 600-610. 
964 id., n. 630. 
965 id., n. 1310-1370. 
966 id., n. 1430-1460. 
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within “45 minutes after the end of the match” to the claimants  and a fine is 
imposed967.  
 Regarding the “1-3 minutes images” obligation, there is no explanation why 
the Board delivered such an demand to Digitürk, since it  has the right not to sell 
less than three minutes pursuant to tender contract 968.  With respect to the 
obligation to deliver images within 45 minutes , i t can be crit icized whether it  was 
economically or technically rational for Digitürk to create bands containing 
images of different lengths re lative to the same game within 45 minutes. 
Eventually, the Board imposed fines and ordered that the tying and discriminatory 
practice end. However, the Board did not require ongoing monitoring for  non -
discrimination obligation to be effective in practice, but only repeated that if 
Digitürk continues such a practice, an investigation will  be opened and the 
transactions will  be carried out in accordance with Articles 16 and 17 of the 
TCA969.  
 In this case, t ie-in is not imposed by contract, but by the technical 
integration of two separate products ;  removing the t ied product  may seem suitable 
remedy. At this point, i t  can be useful to recall  the remedies imposed in the 
Microsoft l i t igations970.  In  the Microsoft decision, the Commission held that 
Microsoft had abused its dominant position by tying its Windows Media Player  
(WMP) to the Windows PC operating system 971.  As a remedy, Microsoft is  required 
to offer Windows without WMP in Europe. However, this reme dy could not be 
effective due to the pricing of the bundled (Windows/ WMP) and unbundled 
versions (Windows), since Microsoft charged the same price for the unbundled 
and bundle versions. Herein, another issue to be questioned is whether the remedy 
was effective to off-set distortion of competit ion. The complainants argued that 
                                                             
967 id., n. 1540 
968 However, see id., n. 1370-1380 (Board mentioned that the previous organizations with the right of publishing had 
given images in bands 1-3 minutes to publishers). 
969 id., n. 1540-1550,  
970 For detailed critics of remedies in Microsoft litigations see O’DONOGHUE/ PADILLA, n. 32078-32094. 
971 The Commission decision, OJ 2009 C 166/20, para. 948-941. 
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Microsoft’s past conduct would continue to hinder consumer decisions even 
though it  was halted for the future, due to the “network effects” in the media 
player market 972.  In  another dec ision in which Microsoft’s tying practice 
(installing Internet Explorer) was addressed, Microsoft is required to us e a neutral 
and unbiased screen design that guides users to have the choice of installing 
Microsoft’s Internet Explorer or other browsers 973.  
 The above-mentioned decisions show that  for the opted remedy to be 
effective often requires more specific commitments to ensure removal of the tied 
product. In this instance, further to the cancelling decision of the Administrative 
Court, the Board should open an investigation into Google’s practice (obligation 
of OEMs to pre -install  Google’s apps in mobile phones). In the preliminary 
investigation, the Board held that the alleged practice does not restrict 
competit ion, because users remain free to download  rivals’ apps. Nonetheless, the 
Board also recommended that Google terminate this practice. However, the Board 
had also found that pre -installation has cost -saving benefits for users who prefer 
Google’s app. Thus, if the Board require s the removal of Google’s apps, i t  will 
harm consumers who are benefit t ing from pre-installation, witout affecting future 
consumer decisions (lock-in and network effects) due to past practice. It  is 
obvious that the obligat ion to offer bundled and unbundled version s will  not be 
effective. Even if i t  can also be required to offer an unbundled version at lower 
price, again it  will  not only harm the consumer but also increase costs for OEMs,  
as an unbundled version will  probably have low demand. We suggest that,  
following the Microsoft ( Internet Explorer) decision, a guidance design  (perhaps 
an information package)  can be required that explains to users that they have the  
option of install ing competing apps, and the option of removing  the default  status 
of pre-installed apps.  
 Another issue that should be noted regarding the remedy for technological 
tying is the geographic scope of  such tying. The competency of  competit ion 
                                                             
972 id. 
973 The Commission decision, OJ 2010 C 36/7, para. 899-901. 
302 
 
authorities is l imited within the field of application of competit ion rules. 
However, the relevant markets of Microsoft and Google are worldwide. Continued 
tying practice outside Turkey would also impact competition in Turkey. Each 
competit ion authority will  impose its own remedies974.  Therefore, while the Board 
choosing/designing and imposing re medies should consider its effectiveness in 
this regard.  
 In the cases where tying practice is used as metering pricing (even though 
in practice will  often not result  in a supra-competit ive price in the tied product, 
but can be sti l l  discriminatory in favo r of sophisticated consumers), the focus  
should be on establishing “transparency” of firms ’  pricing strategy instead of 
imposing remedial action that will affect firms’ pricing decisions. When a firm 
offers a durable product (printer) with its own consumable product (ink), 
competit ion authorities determine that consumers of printers are well  informed 
about the price charged for consumables and consider this in their decision to 
purchase a printer975.  It  is l ikely that the printer market will  be highly competi t ive, 
and consumers that  consider the useful l ife of a printer (including the total  cost 
of consumables for that printer) will  have a strong incentive to switch printer 
brand if the price of consumables for that brand are raised. Therefore, even if 
printer suppliers impose similar tie-ins, due to low switching cost and awareness, 
i t  can be assumed that consumer preferences are not distorted. Further, compatible 
consumables may exist  in the market. Therein, the imposition of similar t ie -ins 
will  cause negatively affect the  consumer and competing tied producers. However,  
the adverse effect of imposition of similar t ie -ins can only occur if tying firms 
are able  to monitor their consumers. Monitoring can be managed through a  
                                                             
974 Various complaints made against Google’s several practices in the EU and US. See Statement of the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) regarding Google’s Search Practices “In the Matter of Google Inc.”, FTC File No. 111-0163 (January 
3, 2013), available at https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/102-3136/google-inc-matter [FTC 
reached the conclusion that Google’s product design decisions (vertical integration strategy) was not 
anticompetitive, since plausible procompetitive justifications have been offered, and those justifications are 
supported by ample evidence]. Compare Commitments in Case COMP/C-3/39.740 – Foundem and Others (January 
31, 2014), available at http://docs.dpaq.de/6448-google_commitments_full.pdf (Google has proposed to provide 
the “Rival Link” mechanism in Europe). 
975 See Board Printer Suppliers decision and HP decision; XXVth Report on Competition Policy (1995), p. 140-141. 
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provision in the guarantee documents that stipulates negation of printer warranty 
due to usage of non-original consumables. In fact , consumers may have 
preferences on price over the quality, and elect to purchase non-original or 
compatible , but lower-quality consumables. In this instance , by taking into 
account the printer suppliers’ right of quality control, a moderate remedy can be 
followed: Cancellation of the warranty will  be l imited to the damages being 
caused by non-original and non-compatible consumables, and objective criteria 
will  be placed in the guarantee documents and booklets to define  when a 
consumable product is to be accepted as compatible.  
 In aftermarket tying cases, in Medical Imaging and Diagnostic Devices 
decision, the Board emphasized the transparency of price of the devic es and their 
spare parts and directed several measurements to establish this. As we noted 
above, the Board decision was sound, but can be crit icized on some grounds . The 
Board imposed several duties to deal, within them, considered upon the third 
parties (ISOs)  request device’s passwords should be given free of  charge in 
certain t ime, but the Board did not mention or l imit this implementation 
where/whether software protected by intellectual property rights.  
 The Board denoted that “ensuring passwords and t he dongle or similar 
apparatuses for access to the technical services of the devices are provided for a 
reasonable period of t ime is necessary for establishing competit ion” in the service 
market for medical imaging and diagnostic devices 976.  However, while explaining 
why the number of independent service providers in the service market is very 
small ,  the Board offered two reasons977.  First ,  the devices in question are complex 
high-tech products, and they are subject to tight regulations worldwide because 
they have a direct impact on human health, and the engineers who will  care for 
them must have special training. This training can only be provided by the device 
manufacturers.  Companies in Turkey are only providing this training to their own 
engineers. Independent service providers, which will  be competing with the 
                                                             
976 Board Medical Imaging and Diagnostic Devices decision, n. 480-490. 
977 id., n. 480. 
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manufacturer, are therefore only possible through the establishment of their own 
companies or the employment of companies established for this purpose. The 
second reason is that access to the technical  service department of the devices can 
be provided by means of a password or dongle device. Given the high cost of 
these, or other potential  obstacles to their acquisition , lead to entrepreneurs being 
reluctant to enter the market. The Board’s  intention to stimulate new entrants  is 
welcome and much needed . However, i t  is also clear that the service provided by 
the manufacturers carries a cost . It would be contrary to the aims of Article 6 if 
a compulsory dealing results in terms that promoted inefficient entry.  
Furthermore, such a duty is also l ikely to affect  investment decisions. Ex ante  
decisions on investments are directed through assessme nt of expected costs, 
returns, and risk. In this respect, the risk that a firm might be subject to a duty to  
deal in future, might affect  expected future returns978.  
 To generalize the problem in the aftermarkets, imposition of similar t ie -ins 
and market structure (brand-specific dominant position in secondary market) 
creates risk that may render anticompetit ive behavior exclusionary or 
exploitative, or usually both in the market. At the same time, any compulsory 
remedial actions that result  in the protection of inefficient independent service 
providers will  result  in higher prices for consumers. To increase consumer choice 
and ensure that purchasing decision s are not distorted, competition authorit ies 
should introduce remedies that establish transparency in t he market, and a tying 
practice or conditional tying (refusal to supply to ISOs) that lack s objective 
necessity should be terminated.  
 The above-mentioned cases lead us to conclude that remedies should have 
at least these two characteristics: Effectivenes s and proportionality979.  More 
precisely, i t  may be educed that remedies for tying practice under Article 6 should 
                                                             
978 See O’DONOGHUE/ PADILLA n. 31864. 
979 See Article 7 (1) of Regulation 1/2003 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 
and 82 of the Treaty, OJ 2003 L 1/1 (16 December 2002), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-




be imposed to fulfil l the following objectives: 1) Termination of the infringement 
(either prohibiting or ordering certain behavior), 2) Elimination of the 
consequences of the abuse (not merely prospective) , 3) Prevention of the 









  Under Turkish competit ion law, tying practices can be forbidden if 
they are conducted by dominant firm(s) and are found to be abusive according to 
Article 6 of the TCA. However, Article 6 does not provide necessary legal  
conditions that would deem tying practice abusive. We analyzed the Turkish 
Competit ion Board’s approach through its decisions regarding tying practices in 
order to determine whether a consistent framework is provided by the Board. The 
Board stated that tying can be anticompetitive due to its exploitative or 
exclusionary effect, but consistently followed the approach that tying can be  
anticompetit ive if i t  is exclusionary, i .e.,  if  tying practice results in 
anticompetit ive foreclosure . However ,  the Board’s attempt to identify an abuse 
through anticompetit ive foreclosure indicates a lack of systematic  procedure and 
does not clarify what anticompetitive harm is addressed and which objective is 
followed to separate the pro-competit ive tying from anticompetit ive tying.  
Additionally, i ts approach does not justify why tying practice should not be 
considered exploitative if i t  is not exclusionary. Therefore, our thesis aimed to 
specify an overarching theory of anticompetit ive harm in tying cas es to determine 
minimum necessary legal conditions, and to answer whether a tying conduct found  
to be abusive should also  be exclusionary to be exploitative.  
 To establish a comprehensive theory of anticompetit ive harm in tying cases, 
our starting point was “competit ion” itself.  Competit ion refers to the market 
structure which foresees an economic system that operates with its own dynamics, 
i .e.,  without interfering with the market conditions of supply and demand. It  
requires a free market economy that prot ects the independence of decisions of the 
market actors in order to distribute the scarce resources of the society in the most 
efficient way. Since competit ion is central to a  free market economy, i t  was 
necessary to evaluate whether the economic structure envisaged by the Turkish 
Constitution offers guidance or l imitation for selecting a free market system in 
Turkey. By assessing general principles of the Turkish Constitution along with 
financial and economic constitutional provisions, we recognized that t he social 
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state principle embraced by the Turkish Constitution is one of the fundamental 
elements that guide the economic order and policy. Furthermore, the Turkish 
Constitution also requires that the  state provide an orderly functioning market and 
take measures to improve it .  In this context, the constitution settles the legal 
substructure of a sound market economy, but does not necessarily impose any 
economic policy model that polit ical power is required to implement. Therefore, 
there is no obstacle to choosing a free market economy, and it  is currently the  
economic system in Turkey.  
  Under these determinations, we conclude that the state is obligated to 
ensure a competit ive environment where all  market actors have “freedom of 
choice” that enhances economic growth by reallocating resources in the most 
efficient way. Nevertheless, the enhancement of economic growth is not an end 
in i tself;  the state should also ensure that each member of society obtain a fair 
share of the benefits resulting from this economic growth. In other words, 
enhancement of economic growth should be done in tandem with fair distribution 
of national income. 
 Constitutional provisions also provide the legal basis for Turkish 
competit ion policy and law. According to Artic le 167 of the Turkish Constitution, 
“the state shall  take measures to ensure and promote the sound, orderly 
functioning of the money, credit ,  capital ,  goods , and services markets;  and shall 
prevent the formation, in practice or by agreement, of monopolies and cartels in 
the markets”. Thus, in order to create a competitive environment, the Act on the 
Protection of Competition No. 4054 (TCA),  which stipulates competit ion rules , 
has been prepared and come into force.  
 The adoption of the TCA was compulsory by a constitutional directive, but 
there is no obligation for the State that duty of  fair distribution of national income 
should be fulfil led through the same policy, namely competit ion policy.  
Distributional concerns can be addressed by other policies such as tax policy, or  
competit ion authorit ies can select  a policy that addresses this issue . Likewise, the 
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Turkish Competit ion Authority (the Authority) sets i ts policy as to maintain the 
competit ion process in order to create efficient market (promote efficie ncy) and 
increase consumer welfare. In this context, determination of understanding of 
“consumer welfare” of Turkish competition authority guided us to realize whether 
distributional concerns are part  of Turkish competition policy, and also to specify 
relevant factors to determine anticompetit ive harm.  
 First ,  we determined that “consumer welfare” does not refer merely to the 
economic interests of the consumer, but also to prosperity and standard of l iving 
or quality of l ife of the consumer  according to the understanding of the Authority. 
While “promoting efficiency” refers to a practice that restrains competition, i t 
also creates efficiency,  which can be allowed under competit ion rules, provided 
the efficiency gains are greater than adverse effect on competit ion. The 
competit ion authority accepts more than one type of efficiency,  as all  kinds of 
efficiencies that can contribute to society are welcome d by the Authority.  
However, we remarked that there  are different types of efficiency (viz. allocative, 
productive and dynamic), and they might not emerge concurrently. Furthermore, 
circumstances that increase efficiency do not necessarily increase consumer 
welfare. An efficiency gains may benefit  producer s while harming consumers.  
 At this  point, the att i tude of competit ion authorit ies indicates whether 
distributional concerns are addressed by their competition policy. Our reading 
suggests that the Turkish Competit ion Authority’s competit ion policy accepts that 
consumer welfare should have preference over producer’s welfare in this instance. 
This objective can be achieved by requiring that consumers receive a fair share 
of created efficiencies that resulted from the practice. However, pursuant to 
secondary legislation, the Board ’s  approach is not consistent with Turkish 
competit ion policy. In the secondary legislation [Guidelines (Dominant Position], 
the suggested trade-off in this issue grants equal importance to efficiency and 
consumer welfare. Application of this approach stipulates that the result  of the 
trade-off must at least be neutral on consumer welfare. Thus, this trade -off can 
include distributional concern only if one unit  of Turkish lira has the same value 
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to the producer and the consumer. The Board can overcome this problem by adding 
its value judgements to the trade-off assessment, and by allowing the practice 
only if consumers receive benefits from created efficiencies. However, we did not 
observe any clear tendency of the Board that indicates distributional concerns had 
directed its trade-off assessment in tying cases.  
 In addition, approach to trade-off between efficiency and consumer welfare 
issue help us to understand that whenever efficiency and consumer welfare are 
not aligned, efficiency will  be favored. Therefore, we concluded that application 
of the objective is not to increase consumer welfare, but at  least not to allow 
decrease. Concordantly, we used this understanding as a threshold to set one of 
the premises for our determination of harm and abuse.  
 Our main and second premise stem from the Turkish competit ion policy 
emphasis on “consumer sovereignty” and its objective of maintain ing 
competit ion. This can be achieved by ensuring all  market actors (producers and 
consumers) have “freedom of choice”. Restrain ing a choice is inherent in tying 
practice. Tying is imposed on consumers; thus , the focus should be on whether 
tying results in restraint of freedom of consumer choice. Restrain t of consumer 
choice also indicates restraint in rivals’ freedom of choice. Since resource 
allocation is directed by consumer, the tying firm will  not able to force the 
purchase of an unwanted product or surrender a wanted product from another 
seller. Thus, where consumers’ purchases are based on undistorted decision, tying 
can be neither exploitative nor exclusionary. To a ssume that consumers direct 
resource allocation freely, i t  requires that consumers have sufficient knowledge 
about their options at  the t ime of purchasing.  
 Furthermore, the Board ’s  approach to unilateral exploitative practice 
provides us with the insight that promoting efficiency and increas ing consumer 
welfare (or not allowing its reduction) are not the only expected outcomes from 
protection of competit ion but , in some circumstances, it  requires the competit ion 
authority’s intervention. We remarked that l egitimate intervention does not occur 
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due to supra-competitive or monopolistic prices, but due to the absence of a self-
correcting mechanism in the market.  
 Moreover, we noted that competit ion authorities are not equipped to 
function as price regulators ;  the Board also has a clear tendency to avoid trying 
to establish a “competitive price”. Based on this understanding, we argued that 
tying practice that facili tates price discrimination to set i ts profit -maximizing 
price should not be found abusive, unless these prices are set due to the lack of a 
well-functioning market.  
 Likewise, our  reading of concrete cases showed that the conditions to price 
discrimination effects of tying conduct unlikely occur in real markets.  Concrete 
cases also show that supra -competit ive or competit ive prices of tying or t ied 
products cannot indicate  whether tying restrains a choice. In addition, fact -
specific conditions indicate that tying practice cannot restrain a choice if the 
consumer purchase is based on undistorted decision . In this regard, i t  is not the 
tying practice i tself that enable s firms to force buyers to purchase their t ied 
products, and relinquish their wanted product elsewhere, but consumers’ lack of 
knowledge about their options in the market.  
 In contrast  to  the Board’s  approach wherein tying practice should be 
exclusionary to be exploitative , which results in gap cases, our proposition that 
“freedom of consumer choice” should be used for determining anticompetit ive 
harm and abuse in tying cases is over inclu sive but does not result in 
overdeterrence. It  is also appropriate in all  concrete cases. That is to say, i t 
establishes a “safe harbor” for tying practices in aftermarkets, by allowing firms’  
pricing strategy through tying, provided their strategy is  transparent in the eyes 
of consumers. It  also establishes a threshold for other tying practices by 
suggesting identifying “restrain t  in consumer choice” , including “the percentage 




 In addition, “consumer choice” as a benchmark promotes efficiency and 
increases consumer welfare. It  does not limit consumer welfare within consumer 
surplus or allocative efficiency,  but i t  covers quality, uti l i ty, and price – 
satisfaction aspects of consumer preference. By doing so, not only it  does not 
hinder dynamic efficiency that can bring more sustainable and greater benefits 
for consumers in the long-term, but i t  also allows productive efficiency that 
reflects consumer preferences.  
 Ultimately, the distinction of exploitative abuse from exclusionary abuse, 
and merely focusing on the latter, is artificial  and hazardous. It  results in a 
consequentialist approach and overlooks the competitive process i tself.  The 
correct approach to successful anti trust analysis is  to determine an inclusive 
anticompetit ive harm that focuses on establishing exploitation to identify the 
factors that render tying practices abusive. In  this way, i t  will  clarify the objective 
of Article 6 of the TCA, and establish legal certainty for business. Nevertheless, 
exclusion is relevant for determining which exploitative practice can violate 
Article 6 of the TCA, but contrary to current antitrust analysis , the assessment 
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